THE FRAGMENTS

OF

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THE FRAGMENTS

OF

ZENO AND CLEANTHES

WITH INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATORY NOTES.

AN ESSAY WHICH OBTAINED THE HARE PRIZE IN THE YEAR 1889.

BY

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PREFACE.

This dissertation is published in accordance with the conditions attached to the Hare Prize, and appears nearly in its original form. For many reasons, however, I should have desired to subject the work to a more searching revision than has been practicable under the circumstances. Indeed, error is especially difficult to avoid in dealing with a large body of scattered authorities, the majority of which can only be consulted in a public library.

The obligations, which require to be acknowledged for the present collection of the fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, are both special and general. The former are soon disposed of. In the Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie for 1873, p. 435 foll., Wellmann published an article on Zeno of Citium, which was the first serious attempt to discriminate the teaching of Zeno from that of the Stoa in general. The omissions of Wellmann were supplied and the first complete collection of the fragments of Cleanthes was made by Wachsmuth in two Gottingen programs published in 1874—1875 (Commentationes I et II de Zenone Citiensi et Cleante Assio). Mullach’s collection of the fragments of Cleanthes in vol. I of the Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum is so inadequate as hardly to deserve mention.
Among the general aids the first place is claimed by Zeller’s *Philosophie der Griechen*, which has been constantly consulted. The edition referred to is the Second edition of the English Translation of the part dealing with the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, which appeared in 1880. In a few cases the fourth German edition has also been quoted. Reference is also made to the English Translations of the other parts of Zeller’s book, wherever available. Except incidentally, Zeller gives up the attempt to trace the development of the Stoa in the hands of its successive leaders, and this deficiency is to some extent supplied by the ingenious work of Hirzel, *die Entwicklung der Stoischen Philosophie*, forming the second volume of his *Untersuchungen zu Cicero’s Philosophischen Schriften*. To Hirzel belongs the credit of having vindicated the originality of Cleanthes against ancient and modern detractors, although in working out his views he often argues on somewhat shadowy foundations, and has unduly depreciated the importance of the contributions made by Zeno. Lastly, Stein’s two books *die Psychologie der Stoa* (1886), and *die Erkenntnistheorie der Stoa* (1888), have been of great service, and his views, where he disagrees with Hirzel, have been generally adopted. Many other books have of course been consulted and will be found cited from time to time, among which Krische’s *die theologischen Lehren der Griechischen Denker*, and Diels’ *Doxographi Graeci*, deserve special mention. Although the results arrived at have been checked by the aid of modern writers, the ancient authorities and especially Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Stobaeus (*Eclogae*), and Cicero have been throughout treated as the primary source of information. The references to Stobaeus are accommodated to Wachsmuth’s edition (Berlin, 1884). Susemihl’s article on the birth-
year of Zeno in the *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie* for 1889 appeared too late to be utilised for the introduction.

A word must be said with reference to the plan of the present collection. No attempt has been made to disentangle in every case the words of the writer from the body of the citation in which they appear. Although this is practicable in some cases, in others it is mere guess-work, and a uniform system has therefore been adopted. For similar reasons the fragments have been arranged as far as possible in natural sequence, without regard to the comparatively few cases in which we know the names of the books from which they were derived. However, the arrangement has been a matter of much perplexity, especially in those cases where the authorities overlap each other, and several modifications in the order would have been introduced as the result of a larger experience, were it not that each alteration throws all the references into confusion. The collection was made and put together practically in its present form before an opportunity offered of consulting Wachsmuth's pamphlets, and it was satisfactory to find that only a few of his passages had been missed. On the other hand, the additional matter which will be found here for the first time is not large. It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that we now possess the greater portion of the material, which is available for reconstructing the history of the earlier Stoa. For the sake of completeness I have included even those notices, whose authenticity is open to suspicion, as well as a collection of the so-called *Apopthegmata*, though it is often impossible to draw a strict line between written and oral tradition.

I desire to thank Mr R. D. Hicks, Fellow of Trinity College, for many valuable suggestions and criticisms.
CORRIGENDA.

p. 37, l. 13, for “he was only able” read “he alone was able”.
p. 53, l. 23, add “see however on Cleanth. frag. 114.”
INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. Life of Zeno.

The chronology of Zeno's life, formerly a subject of much dispute, has been almost entirely cleared up by an important passage discovered in one of the papyrus rolls found at Herculaneum, which contains a history of the Stoic philosophers and was first edited by Comparetti in 1875. From this we learn that Cleanthes was born in 331 B.C., and, as we know from other sources that he lived to the age of 99, he must have died in B.C. 232 in the archonship of Jason. But, according to the papyrus (col. 29), at the time of his death he had presided over the School for 32 years, which fixes the death of Zeno as having taken place in B.C. 264, thus confirming the authority of Jerome, who says under the year Ol. 129, 1 = B.C. 264, "Zeno Stoicus moritur post quem Cleanthes philosophus agnoscitur." Now, in Diog. Laert. vii. 28 we have two distinct

2 Col. 28, 29. Comparetti believes this book to be the work of Philodemus.
3 Lucian Maerob. 19. Val. Max. viii. 7, Ext. 11.
4 So too the papyrus col. 28 (ἀ)πηλλάγ(η ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος 1)ἀσονος.
5 Such at least is the restoration of Gomperz: Comparetti reads τριάκοντα καὶ ὅκτω, but admits that δύο is possible. The word after καὶ is illegible.
6 So Rohde states, but in Migne's ed. of Eusebius i. p. 498 the statement appears to belong to Ol. 128.
accounts of his age at the time of his death, the one, that of Persaeus, in his ἡθικαὶ σχόλαι, who makes him 72, and the other apparently derived from Apollonius Tyrius¹, declaring that he lived to be 98 years old. Apart from internal considerations, the authority of Persaeus is unquestionably the higher, and reckoning backwards we are thus enabled to place the birth of Zeno in the year 336 B.C.² Rohde suggests that the other computation may have been deduced by Apollonius Tyrius from the letter to Antigonus, now on other grounds shown to be spurious, but which Diogenes unquestionably extracted from Apollonius’ book on Zeno³. In this Zeno is represented as speaking of himself as an octogenarian, so that on the assumption that the letter was written in B.C. 282, shortly after Antigonus first became king of Macedonia, and, calculating to the true date of Zeno’s death (B.C. 264), he would have been 98 years of age in the latter year⁴.

Zeno, the son of Mnaseas⁵, was born at Citium, a Greek city in the south-east of Cyprus, whose population had been increased by Phoenician immigrants⁶. Whether he was of pure Greek blood or not we cannot tell⁷, but we can readily believe that his birthplace, while it in no degree influenced his philosophical genius, which was truly Hellenic, yet gave an

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¹ A Stoic philosopher (floruit in the earlier half of the 1st century B.C.). For his work on Zeno’s life see Diog. L. vii. 1. 2. 24. 28. Strabo xvi. 2. 24.

² Gomperz l.c. undertook to prove that Zeno died in the month Scirophion (Ol. 128, 4) = June 264 B.C., offering to produce the proofs in a later article, but this promise does not seem to have been fulfilled.

³ Diog. L. vii. 7. 8.

⁴ The weakness of this hypothesis lies in the fact that Antigonus Gonatas did not become King of Macedon until 278—277 B.C., although no doubt he was struggling for the crown from the time of the death of his father Demetrius in B.C. 283. This is met to some extent by Rohde 1. c. p. 624 n. 1.

⁵ Diog. L. vii. 1 mentions Demeas as another name given to his father but elsewhere he is always Ζήνων Μνασέου.

⁶ Cimon died while besieging this place (Thuc. i. 112).

⁷ Stein, Psychologie der Stoa n. 3 sums up, without deciding, in favour of a Phoenician origin. So also Ogereau p. 4 whereas Heinze thinks that everything points the other way (Bursian’s Jahresbericht vol. 50, p. 53).
Oriental complexion to his tone of mind, and affected the character of his literary style, so that the epithet "Phoenician," afterwards scornfully cast in his teeth by his opponents, is in any case not altogether unwarranted.

Again following the authority of Persaeus (Diog. L. l.c.)², we may conclude that he arrived at Athens at the age of 22, but as to the cause which brought him thither we are differently informed, and it is uncertain whether he came for the express purpose of studying philosophy, or in furtherance of some mercantile enterprise⁴. There is however a consensus of testimony to the effect that he suffered shipwreck on his voyage to Athens, a misfortune which he afterwards learnt to bless as it had driven him to philosophy³. The story of his first meeting with Crates is characteristic: Zeno, who had recently arrived at Athens, one day sat down by a bookseller's stall and became engrossed in listening to the perusal of the second book of Xenophon's Memorabilia. Suddenly he enquired of the bookseller where such men as Socrates were to be found. At that moment Crates happened to pass down the street, and Zeno, acting on a hint from the bookseller, from that time attached himself to the Cynic teacher.

It is impossible to reconcile the dates, which we have taken as correct, with the remaining indications of time, which are scattered through the pages of Diogenes. Thus we are told that Zeno was a pupil of Stilpo and Xenocrates for ten years, that the whole time spent under the tuition of Crates, Stilpo, Xenocrates and Polemo was twenty years, and that Zeno presided over the School, which he himself founded, for fifty-eight years⁷. This last is the statement of Apollonius,

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² Another account gives his age as thirty (Diog. L. vii. 2).
³ Diog. L. vii. 32.
⁴ Diog. L. vii. 3.
⁵ See Zeno apoph. 3, and the notes.
⁶ Diog. L. vii. 3.
⁷ Diog. L. vii. 2. 4. 28. The other tradition is traced by Rohde to Apollodorus known as ὁ τοῦς χρόνους ἀναγράφας. Evidence of his having dealt with Zeno's chronology will be found in Philod. περὶ φιλοσόφων
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and must be taken in connection with his opinion that Zeno lived till he was 98 years of age. Probably, Apollonius adopted the tradition that Zeno came to Athens at the age of thirty, and allowed ten years for the period of tuition. He must have assigned B.C. 322 as the date of the foundation of the Stoa, which is obviously far too early. According to the chronology adopted above, Zeno came to Athens about B.C. 314, and, if so, he cannot have been a pupil of Xenocrates, who died in that year. All that can be said with any approach to certainty is that after a somewhat extended period of study under Crates, Stilpo, and Polemo, Zeno at length, probably soon after 300 B.C., began to take pupils on his own account, without attaching himself to any of the then existing philosophical schools. These pupils were at first called Zenonians, but when their master held his lectures in the Stoa Poikile, they adopted the name of Stoics which they afterwards retained.

Though not yet rivalling the Peripatetic school in respect of the number of its followers, the Stoic philosophy steadily won its way into general esteem no less by the personal influence of its founder than through the fervour of its adherents. So great, indeed, was the respect which the character of Zeno inspired at Athens, that shortly before his death a decree


1 According to Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 321, Zeno was a πρεσβύτερος when he προσεμαρτύρησεν ἐαυτῷ τῷ εὐρέσιν τῆς ἄλθεος. This refers to the publication of his writings, but this must have shortly followed the opening of the school. Jerome on Euseb. Chron. (i. p. 498 Migne) says opposite Ol. 126 "Zeno Stoicus philosophus agnoscitur."

2 Diog. L. vii. 5.

3 Zeno apoph. 6.

4 The decree was carried in the archonship of Arrhenides, i.e. Nov. 265 B.C., if Arrhenides was archon 265—264 as seems to be Gomperz's opinion, vid. supr. p. 2, n. 2.
was passed by the assembly awarding him a golden crown and entitling him to a public funeral in the Ceramicus on his decease. The grounds mentioned in the body of the decree, which is preserved by Diog. L. vii. 10, for conferring this special honour on Zeno were the high moral tone of his teaching and the example which he set to his pupils in the blamelessness of his private life. Greatly however as he was honoured by the Athenians, he steadily refused the offer of their citizenship, and on one occasion, when holding an official position, insisted on being described as a citizen of Citium. This devotion to his native town, whether a genuine sentiment of the heart or assumed in order to avow his conviction of the worthlessness of all civic distinctions, seems to have been appreciated by his countrymen, who erected his statue in their market-place, where it was afterwards seen by the elder Pliny.

In the later years of his life, Zeno's fame extended beyond the limits of Athenian territory; there is ample record of his intimacy with Antigonus Gonatas, the son of Demetrius Poliorcetes and king of Macedon, and from one anecdote we learn that he had attracted the attention of Ptolemy Philadelphus. Now that Athens had completely lost her freedom, she became a hotbed of political intrigue in the interests of the various successive pretenders to the Macedonian throne; some beguiled her with the promise of liberty, but by far the most potent instrument to gain her favour was gold. Thus, while the internal politics of Athens had become of purely municipal interest, the greatest services to which Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, could lay claim as meriting the gratitude of the Athenians were the substantial money presents

2 Diog. L. vii. 12.
3 Diog. L. vii. 6.
4 H. N. xxxiv. 19. 32.
6 See note on apoph. 25.
7 So Demetrius Poliorcetes: Grote vol. xii. p. 196.
which he had obtained for the treasury from Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Antipater\(^1\). We cannot be surprised that, in such a period as this, Ptolemy and Antigonus, hoping to gain him over by personal condescension and munificent liberality, should have eagerly courted the adherence of one, whose influence like that of Zeno extended over a wide circle among the youth of Athens. It seems clear however that, in general, Zeno avoided politics altogether\(^2\); and, although it may be doubtful whether his friendship for Antigonus may not have induced Zeno to espouse his political cause, we can at least be sure that the presents of the king were not accepted as bribes by the Stoic philosopher. If Zeno died in B.C. 264, he cannot have lived to see the conclusion of the so-called Chremonidean war, when Athens was besieged by Antigonus and defended by the joint efforts of Ptolemy and the Spartans, and it is impossible to say on which side his sympathies were enlisted, although he is said to have been a lover of Chremonides\(^3\).

In voluntarily hastening his own end, Zeno only illustrated the teaching of his school. One day, on leaving the Stoa, he stumbled and fell, breaking one of his fingers in his fall. Regarding this as a warning of Providence, which it was folly to neglect, and convinced that the right course for a wise man is willingly to assist in carrying out the decrees of destiny, he returned home and at once committed suicide\(^4\).

His personal appearance was evidently not attractive. Timotheus\(^5\), in his work \(\pi\epsilon\iota\ \beta\iota\nu\nu\), described him as wrynecked, while Apollonius called him lean, rather tall, and of a dark complexion\(^6\), with thick calves, flabby flesh, and a weak

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1 See Grote vol. xii. p. 214.
2 Cf. Seneca de Tranq. An. i. 7 Zenonem Cleanthem Chrysippum, quorum nemo ad rempublicam accessit.
3 Zeno apoph. 44.
4 Zeno apoph. 56.
5 Nothing seems to be known of the date of this writer: see Dict. Biog. These authorities are quoted by Diog. L. vii. 1.
6 An uncomplimentary epithet, cf. Theocr. x. 26 Βομβίκα χαριεσσα Σφραν καλέντι τυ πάντες, ισχυνάν ἀλίδκαντον, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος μελιχλωρον. id. iii. 35 ἀ μελαράχρως.
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digestion. The last-named defect is said to have been the cause of his frugal diet\(^1\), but this was no doubt also recommended to him by his philosophical views. In spite of his habitual abstinence, he enjoyed the company of his friends at a convivial banquet, where his severity relaxed with the wine he drank, just as (to use his own comparison) beans are improved by soaking\(^2\). For the rest, he seems to have been a man of few words, but quick at repartee, disliking all display and effeminacy, and generally of a somewhat stern and reserved cast of mind, though not without consideration for the wants of others.

\section*{§ 2. Stoicism as established by Zeno.}

It will be convenient at this point to summarise those leading doctrines which the evidence here collected establishes as having been introduced by Zeno into the Stoic school, without paying regard to isolated expressions or to views of minor philosophical importance.

Zeno divided philosophy into three parts, logic, physics and ethics, and we may take them in the order named, as being that which he recommended.

To the formal side of logic Zeno paid but little attention, regarding it as useful only for the detection of error, rather than as a means towards the establishment of truth. The doctrine of the four categories, and the elaborate treatment of \(\alpha\xi\omega\mu\alpha\tau\alpha\) and syllogisms, belong almost entirely to Chrysippus, and, when we remember that out of 750 books which he is said to have written no fewer than 311 were devoted to logical studies, it is not improbable that he owed much of his reputation to his performances in this branch. In Zeno's eyes the most important division of logic was the question of the standard of knowledge, although strictly speaking this should rather be considered as belonging to psychology. He

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\(^1\) \textit{εἰς ἄρτος, ὅφον ἰσχύς, ἐπιτείειν ὦδωρ.} Philemon ap. Diog. L. vii. 27.

\(^2\) See Zeno apoph. 27.
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held that, though the senses themselves are unerring, the impressions they convey are often erroneous, and that only such impressions are to be trusted as are in themselves perspicuous. The ultimate test of truth resides in the strength of tension in the impression, as it strikes the sense-organ. If satisfied in this way that the impression is such that it must proceed from a real object, the mind in the exercise of its ever present activity grasps the impression, and assents to it. This is the meaning which Zeno expressed by saying that φαντασία καταληπτική is the criterion of truth. Diogenes Laertius, however, mentions certain ἄρχαιωτεροι τῶν Στωικῶν as teaching that ὀρθὸς λόγος is the standard of truth. This passage has been treated by Hirzel (in whose judgment other authorities have concurred) as proving that Zeno and Cleanthes were the philosophers indicated, and that Chrysippos was the first to introduce the definition of the φαντασία καταληπτική. The only other evidence, by which he connects Zeno with ὀρθὸς λόγος, is Philo quis virtuti studet p. 880 appearing in our collection as frag. 157. To this might have been added Arr. Epict. diss. iv. 8. 12 (frag. 4) and Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβ. col. 8 (frag. 117). It is submitted, however, that these passages by no means prove the point in question, as against the positive testimony which attributes to Zeno the φαντασία καταληπτική. In Philo there is no question of a logical criterion at all, but Zeno is

1 As the matter is one of considerable importance, in order to relieve the notes, it is desirable to quote Stein’s remarks (Erkenntnistheorie, p. 174):—“Mit Zeller muss man annehmen, dass das καταληπτικὸν ursprünglich einen aktiven Sinn halte, da der Tonus desselben Zweifels-ohne auf die διάνοια einwirkt. Andererseits muss man Hirzel wieder darin Recht geben, dass die διάνοια sich unmöglich rein leidend verhalten kann, dass vielmehr das καταληπτικὸν auch einen passiven Beigeschmack hat. Und doch lassen sich beide, sich scheinbar ausschliessende Standpunkte vereinigen, wenn man in das καταληπτικὸν den von uns vermuteten Doppelsinn hineinlegt, den Zeno wohl absichtlich andeuten wollte. Danach wären die φαντασία und διάνοια bei der κατάληψις gleicherweise teils aktiv, teils passiv, woraus sich die schwankende Anwendung dieses Ausdrucks sehr wohl erklärt.” For the connection of τῶν with καταληψις, which is not however proved to be Zenonian, cf. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 408 ἀλλὰ γὰρ αὐτή μὲν ἡ ἀπαραλλαξία τῶν τε καταληπτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἀκαταληπτῶν φαντασιῶν κατὰ τὸ εναργές καὶ ἐντονον ἰδώμα παρίσταται.
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speaking of the state of mind of the wise man, whose soul is in perfect conformity with the law of reason, and who has mastered all his impulses and passions. This is still more plain in the extract from Philodemus, where ὁρθός λόγος are coupled with σπουδαίας διαθέσεις. The weight of evidence the other way must remain to be stated hereafter, but it may be remarked that, even if Cicero's testimony is discredited, the fact of the controversy between Zeno and Arcesilas is not thereby disproved. Again, if Zeno defined φαντασία as a τιτωσις, and discriminated between the truth of various φαντασίαι, he must have pursued the subject still farther; and, if art and memory are defined with reference to κατάληψις and opinion is distinguished therefrom, it follows of necessity that he must have defined κατάληψις itself. Still, even admitting to the full the ethical significance of ὁρθός λόγος, the passage in Diogenes is not thereby disposed of, for if Zeno and Cleanthes are not indicated by the words ἀρχαίωτερον τῶν Στωικῶν to whom does this expression refer? Must we, then, suppose that Zeno put forward two criteria of knowledge, rational thought (ὁρθός λόγος) as well as the experience of sense (κατάληψις)? Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the clearness and directness of Zeno's teaching. The only way out of the difficulty is to adopt the theory of Stein, who regards the doctrine of ὁρθός λόγος as a concession to rationalism. ὁρθός λόγος becomes, in this view, a subsidiary and secondary criterion, so that the results of thought must be confirmed by experience. In other words, the potential notions inspired in us by the divine λόγος require to be completed and corrected on the side

1 For Epict. 1. c. see note on Zeno frag. 4.
2 It is satisfactory to find that Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 341, claims for Zeno the φαντασία κατάληπτική on precisely similar grounds to those stated in the notes to frag. 11.
3 For this see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie pp. 259—264.
4 It should be mentioned that Corssen de Posidonio Rhodio (1878) pp. 17—19 proposed to eliminate Στωικῶν as a blunder of Diogenes or his authority, assuming that Posidonius was speaking of Empedocles, the Pythagoreans, and Plato.
5 The meaning of the word ἀπολειτονοσιν should in this case be pressed. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 259.
of sensible experience before they can attain to objective actuality\(^1\).

From this point of view, then, it is not unreasonable to credit Zeno with the substance of the teaching recorded in Cic. Acad. i. 41, 42. If so much be admitted, it is most unlikely that he should have refrained from enquiring into the nature of knowledge and ignorance, which carry with them the doctrine of assent. On the other hand, it is most probable that he only touched lightly the doctrine of \(\varepsilon\nu\nu\omicron\omega\alpha\iota\) and not at all that of \(\pi\rho\omicron\lambda\eta\upsilon\psi\epsilon\iota\)\(^2\).

The remainder of the logical fragments are not of much importance as regards the positive teaching of the school. They include a nominalistic criticism of the Platonic theory of ideas, a curious statement of the nature of causation, a few scraps dealing with various rhetorical terms, a definition of geometry, some discussion as to the meaning of the word \(\sigma\omicron\lambda\omicron\alpha\omicron\kappa\omicron\sigma\), and a symbolical explanation, recorded by Cicero, of the different degrees of knowledge.

Zeno's contributions to Physics have been unduly depreciated by some authorities but, while it is true that the development of this branch is largely due to Cleanthes, still a fair estimate of the fragments here collected will lead us to the conclusion that the essential groundwork of the Stoic physical teaching was laid by the founder of the school\(^3\). Zeno started from the proposition that nothing exists but the material, inasmuch as body alone is capable of acting and being acted upon. All body is thus either active or passive and the material world is itself the result produced from the

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\(^1\) Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 314, 315.

\(^2\) Stein holds that \(\pi\rho\omicron\lambda\eta\upsilon\psi\epsilon\iota\) was substituted by Chrysippus for Zeno's \(\delta\rho\theta\delta\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\sigma\), in so far as the latter is concerned with epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie p. 269, 270).

\(^3\) See Stein, Psychologic p. 56 and n. 77, whose reference to the number of fragments in Wachsmuth's collection is however misleading. As regards Zeno, Wachsmuth's fragments are only intended to be supplementary to Wellmann's article in Fleckesien's Jahrb. for 1873, so that no inference can be drawn from the fact that there are more physical than ethical fragments. It will be seen from the present collection that the numbers are very nearly equal.
operation of these two principles. The active principle is God, and the passive is matter. God is more closely defined as the fiery aether\(^1\), which permeates the whole of the universe, even as honey passes through the honeycomb. He is at once the embodiment of reason and of law, and the power which binds in one the various portions of the universe, who, though his essence is constant, appears in different forms in everything that exists. Nature, forethought and fate are thus only different names for the same being; as nature he creates the world, and creates it in entire harmony with the law of fate. Matter, on the other hand, is formless and indeterminate, though limited in extent, and can exist only in conjunction with some active quality: although it is itself eternal, its parts are subject to change. The creation of the world is brought about by the action of God upon matter, whereby the creative fire through an intermediate watery stage passes into the four elements fire, air, water and earth out of which everything else is formed. To explain the production of the individual thing by the intermingling of its elements, Zeno broached the celebrated theory of \(\kappa \rho \alpha \sigma \sigma \iota \varepsilon \delta \iota \delta \alpha \lambda \omicron \upsilon \nu\), which is in effect a denial of the axiom that two bodies cannot occupy the same space.

The world, however, will not last for ever, nor are we left without indications of its destructibility. In the inequality of the earth's surface, in the retrocession of the sea, in the mortality of every substance with which we are acquainted, and lastly in the fact that the human race and all living creatures can be shown to have had a beginning in time Zeno saw clear proofs that the universe itself is destined to pass away. There will come a time when by the unceasing law of fate the world and all that it contains will again be merged in the primeval fire, only to be created anew, as the embryo is formed from the seed. For the process is unvarying no less than never-ending; a new Heracles will free a young world from its plagues, and a new Socrates will plead his cause against the same accusers.

\(^{1}\) Stein, Psychologie p. 58, remarks that there is no evidence of Zeno having used the term \(\pi \nu \epsilon \theta \mu \alpha\) in this connection.
The individual and the cosmos are thus partakers in the same decree of fate, but their likeness does not stop here. Not only is the world a unity, but also a living unity; it is moreover sentient, rational, intelligent, and wise.

Two characteristics are especially prominent in Zeno's system, first, his metaphysical contrast between God and matter, and, secondly, his materialism. He seems to have been animated by a desire to combine the results of later thought with the simplicity and directness of the early Ionian physicists. All is to be evolved out of fire: but fire is clothed with divine attributes, and sharply contrasted with the passive material on which it works. But Zeno did not observe that the combination is in reality self-destructive, and that with a materialistic system metaphysics are superseded. It remained for his successors to eradicate the dualism which is here involved, and, while thrusting into the background the points borrowed from Aristotle, to take their stand upon pantheism pure and simple.

Passing from the account of the cosmogony to the description of the different component parts of the universe, we find that the circumference of the sphere is occupied by a revolving belt of aether, in which are the sun, moon and stars, divine beings formed of creative fire. No void exists within the world, but outside it there is unlimited void; at the same time the world is kept together and preserved from dissolution into space by the attraction of its parts to the centre, in which the earth is placed. Zeno also explains certain natural phenomena such as eclipses, lightning, thunderbolts and comets, and defines time and colour.

We proceed to his anthropology, in which the account of the soul is most important. Although he apparently omitted to describe God, who is the soul of the universe, as fiery breath, yet the soul, which is the moving principle of the body, is defined as a warm breath, or (after Heraclitus) as a sentient exhalation. For the soul is fed by exhalation from the blood, just as the heavenly bodies are by particles from the lower
elements. Moreover, it is corporeal and grows up with the body, gradually expanding under the influence of external impressions, so that the perfect power of reason is only developed at the age of puberty. Though it is a simple essence, its faculties are diverse, and being extended from the γγεμονικόν which is situated in the heart to the various organs of sense, it is said to have eight parts, namely, the γγεμονικόν itself, the five senses, and the capacities of speech and generation. The soul entirely permeates the body, and at its departure the composite structure of soul and body is destroyed. The soul itself endures for a time after its separation from the body but is not immortal, and its condition after death is determined by the grade of purity to which it has attained. Such, at least, seems to be a fair inference from a passage of Lactantius in which Zeno speaks of the separation of the unholy from the holy and contrasts the misery of the former with the blessedness of the latter. On his discussion of the voice, sleep, vision, and the seed we need not dwell.

It remains to consider Zeno's attitude towards the popular religion. Although, in the strict sense, he teaches that there is but one God, yet he admits that there is a certain amount of truth in polytheism, as implying a recognition of the ubiquity of the divine presence. The manifestation of God in the powers of nature is symbolised by Zeus, Here and Poseidon, who represent the aether, the air, and the water respectively. In his interpretation of Hesiod's Theogony he gives the reins to his etymological fancy, so as to bring the cosmogony of the poet into accordance with Stoic views. Lastly the existence of divination is inferred from the forethought, which characterises the divine government.

Ethics, which are the crowning point of the Stoic system, come next in order. The aim and object of life is to live in agreement with nature, which is, in other words, to live according to virtue: for this is the goal to which nature conducts us. It would seem that Zeno did not accurately explain what he meant by nature, since Chrysippus and
Cleanthes took divergent views of its character, but, recognising the manner in which the different branches of the Stoic system are interlaced with one another, we may reasonably conclude that by the prominence given to nature Zeno desired to connect his moral teaching with the divine creative aether, which permeates the universe. Our first impulses, however, tend not to virtue but to self-preservation, and virtue is impossible in the child or the brute, since neither of them possesses the informing power of reason. These natural impulses require the guidance of reason, and in their proper subordination to it is to be found the condition of happiness, which may be described as the unruffled flow of life. For happiness nothing is required but virtue, and no external circumstances, nothing but what is morally evil, can diminish the satisfaction belonging to the virtuous. In this way we are led to discriminate between ἀγαθὰ and κακά: only virtue and vice or their accessories can be classed as good and evil; everything else, even life and death, is morally indifferent. But this classification does not exhaust the capacities of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν. The value of virtue is absolute and for all time: but, just as the supremacy of the monarch does not imply the absolute equality of his subjects, so the ἀδιάφορα are ranged between virtue and vice in a graduated scale of negative and positive value (ἀπαξία and ἀξία), the middle place being occupied by τὰ καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα, i.e. such matters as having an even or odd number of hairs in one's head. Everything possessing ἀξία is κατὰ φύσιν, and everything possessing ἀπαξία is παρὰ φύσιν. At the same time ἀξία is not a permanent attribute of any ἀδιάφορον, for that which is at one time κατὰ

2 Hirzel, Untersuchungen ii. p. 108, thinks otherwise and the point is certainly a doubtful one. If Zeno spoke only of human nature, Cleanthes may have here, as elsewhere, shown the connection of ethical with physical doctrine by explaining φύσις as κοινὴ φύσις. Then Chrysippus would have united both views. If this was the real development, there would be some pretext for Stobaeus' assertion that Cleanthes added τῷ φύσει to the definition, while the authority of Diogenes Laertius would remain unimpaired. See however Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 260.
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\[\phi\sigma\nu\] might, under certain circumstances, become \(\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\ \phi\sigma\nu\). Herein lies the vital distinction between \(\alpha\delta\iota\alpha\phi\rho\alpha\) and \(\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\alpha\), for the latter are unaffected by any possible change of circumstances: a virtuous action can never be contrary to nature. Still, although there is not an absolute, there is yet a practical permanence in the value of certain things, which in the absence of some paramount objection (= \(\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \pi\rho\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\mu\epsilon\omicron\nu\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu\) or \(\alpha\nu\nu\epsilon\nu\ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\omicron\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\epsilon\omicron\nu\)) we shall always choose in preference to their contraries. These then are the \(\pi\rho\omicron\gamma\mu\epsilon\iota\alpha\). Corresponding with this classification of objects, we have a scale of actions ranging from \(\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\rho\omicron\theta\omicron\omega\mu\alpha\) (virtuous action) to \(\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\iota\nu\mu\alpha\) (sinful action), wherein \(\kappa\alpha\theta\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\) answers to the class of \(\alpha\delta\iota\alpha\phi\rho\alpha\). Every \(\kappa\alpha\theta\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\) is thus directed to the choice of \(\tau\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \phi\upsilon\sigma\nu\) and the avoidance of \(\tau\alpha\ \pi\alpha\rho\alpha\ \phi\upsilon\sigma\nu\). The doctrines of \(\kappa\alpha\theta\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\) and \(\pi\rho\omicron\gamma\mu\epsilon\iota\nu\) are not to be regarded as an excrescence foisted on to the Stoic system in consequence of the pressure of the arguments of opponents, but are an integral and necessary portion of the original structure as established by Zeno. The apparent inconsistency, which the application of these doctrines sometimes produces e.g. in the remarks on marriage, often disappears when we remember that the \(\pi\omicron\lambda\omicron\iota\tau\epsilon\omicron\alpha\) proposed to establish a socialistic constitution under which the importance of \(\alpha\delta\iota\alpha\phi\rho\alpha\) would be reduced to a minimum.

Zeno held further that virtue is one and indivisible, springing from the \(\eta\gamma\epsilon\mu\omicron\omicron\nu\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\), of which it is a fixed and permanent condition. Consistently with this, he maintains that all sinful actions are equally wrong, since all alike imply an aberration from a standard, which excludes increase or diminution. None the less, however, can we distinguish between different manifestations of virtue or separate virtues: virtue itself is identical with wisdom (\(\phi\rho\omicron\nu\rho\sigma\iota\sigma\iota\)), and justice, courage, and temperance are the particular applications of wisdom in diverse spheres. Whether Zeno also distinguished between two different kinds of \(\phi\rho\omicron\nu\rho\sigma\iota\sigma\iota\), one as the groundwork, and the other as a particular species of virtue, must
remain doubtful. Hirzel (l.c. p. 99) infers that he did, but Plutarch’s words do not necessarily lead to such a conclusion, and we ought to hesitate to attribute such an inconsistency to Zeno without direct evidence. No doubt the Stoic school generally put forward four cardinal virtues \( \phi r\o n\eta \tau i s, \delta ik a i o s u n\tau \i, \ \alpha \nu \delta \rho \varepsilon \i a \) and \( \s o \varphi r o s u n \tau \i \), but inasmuch as Zeno’s position was admittedly modified by his successors we are left to judge of his views entirely from the two passages in Plutarch, in which he is mentioned by name.

The theory of the emotions, which was introduced by Zeno, constitutes one of the most distinctive features of Stoic ethics. Whereas Plato and Aristotle agreed in admitting the legitimacy of certain emotions, Zeno declared all alike to be sinful, as being due to an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or an excess of impulse. The four chief emotions are pleasure, grief, fear and desire, and Zeno in describing their nature dwelt, if we may trust Galen’s statements, rather on the psychological effects of the irrational impulse upon the soul than on the mental conditions which produce them. The special difficulties surrounding this subject will be discussed in the notes to the fragments themselves.

The whole of mankind was divided by Zeno into two classes, entirely distinct from one another, that of the wise and that of the foolish. Every action of the wise man is prompted by virtue and every action of the fool by vice. Hence it is generally true that the wise man performs every action well, and the fool fails in everything. Friendship, freedom, piety, riches, beauty, the arts of kingship and generalship, even success in culinary operations belong to the wise man alone: he is never mistaken, never regrets what he has done, feels no compassion, and is absolutely free from every form of emotion. At the same time, it is clear that Zeno contemplates a progress from the state of folly to that of wisdom as practicable; this advance is characterised by the purgation of the soul from emotional and delusive affections under the influence of reason. Even though he ultimately
emerges from the conflict with success, the wise man still feels the scars from the wounds he has received during its course, and is often reminded of his former evil impulses after he has completely suppressed them. Finally, since death belongs to the class ἀδιάφορα, suicide is justifiable in the wise man, if circumstances prescribe such a course.

It is obvious that a teacher, whose ethical views were of the nature, which we have just indicated, could not rest satisfied with the existing constitution of civic life in Greece. Equally unsatisfactory to him was the aristocratical community of Plato, with the sharply drawn dividing line between the guardians and the rest of the citizens. For this reason Eros, the god of friendship and concord, is taken as the presiding deity of Zeno's ideal state, a state which in no way corresponds to the Greek πόλις, but comprises the whole of mankind living together like a herd of cattle. In this state there will be no temples, law-courts, or gymnasia; no work of human craftsmen is worthy of divine acceptance; the state must be adorned not with costly offerings, but by the virtues of its inhabitants. Zeno likewise advocates an abolition of coinage, a community of wives, and a thorough revolution of the current system of education.

The remaining fragments, dealing mainly with particular καθήκοντα, do not require to be summarised here.

§ 3. Zeno's relation to previous philosophers.

The opponents of the Stoic school were fond of accusing its members of plagiarism and want of originality. Zeno is the keen Phoenician trader, pilfering other men's wares, and passing them off as his own: if all that belongs to others were withdrawn from the voluminous writings of Chrysippus, we should have a blank page. Antiochus, in Cicero, represents

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2 Cf. Diog. L. vii. 25.
3 Diog. L. vii. 181.
4 Acad. i. 43. The same argument is put forward by Cicero himself against Cato in the 4th book of the de Finibus.
the views of Zeno as merely immaterial changes in minor points of the genuine Academic doctrine, while Juvenal only repeats current opinion in speaking of the Stoic dogmas as "a Cynicis tunica distantia". Even a slight acquaintance with the Stoic system is sufficient to refute these gross charges: indeed, its originality is abundantly vindicated when we point to the influence it exercised for several centuries on the intellectual life of Greece and Rome. At the same time it must be admitted that Zeno was largely indebted to his predecessors—especially to Antisthenes and Heraclitus—for the bricks and mortar with which he constructed so splendid an edifice. Of Cynicism in particular he appropriated the kernel, while discarding the husk. It is, however, when we look at Stoicism as a whole that we are able to appreciate the skill with which its incongruous elements were fused, and the unity of thought which pervades a variety of detail. The Stoic wise man is as far removed from Diogenes in his tub, as is the all permeating aether from the fiery element of Heraclitus.

We proceed to discuss in detail the various points in which Zeno's obligation to previous thinkers is most strongly marked.

A. To Antisthenes and the Cynics.

The resemblances between Zeno and the Cynics are naturally to be found chiefly in their ethical doctrines. Physics were almost entirely neglected by the Cynics, and their nominalistic logic was not of great importance for Stoicism, although we may observe in passing that both schools maintained in similar terms that Plato's ideas were a mere fiction of the brain and had no objective existence. The Stoic doctrine of life in accordance with nature finds its historical origin in the

1 XIII. 121.
2 "Die Stoa war vielmehr die weitaus selbständigste Schule der nacharistotelischen Philosophie," Stein, Psychologie p. 10.
teaching as well as in the life of Diogenes. Like Zeno, Antisthenes teaches that virtue is in itself sufficient to secure happiness, that nothing is a Good but virtue, nothing an Evil but vice, and that everything else is indifferent. Accordingly Diogenes held that death, since it involves no disgrace, cannot be an Evil. Hence it is not surprising to learn that many of the Cynics put an end to their lives by suicide, though we have sayings both of Antisthenes and Diogenes on record denying the legitimacy of such a course. Virtue itself is described, after Socrates, as consisting in wisdom and prudence: "prudence," says Antisthenes, "is the safest wall; it cannot be undermined or betrayed." At the same time the futility of the ordinary course of Greek education is strongly insisted on. The distinction between virtue and vice draws with it that between the wise and the foolish; the philosopher's wallet preserves a chosen few from a condition bordering on madness.

We are told, on the authority of Diogenes Laertius, that Zeno adopted the Cynic form of life. This is probably to be taken with some limitation, as the incidents recorded of his life only partially agree with it. It is certain, however, that his life was one of abstinence and simplicity, and for this reason he became the butt of the comic poets, who thus unconsciously testified to his merit. Apollodorus Ephillus, a later Stoic writer, declared that the wise man would cynicise, and that Cynicism was a short cut to virtue. It should, however, always be borne in mind that the Stoic ideal was

1 Diog. L. vi. 71 ἀντὶ τῶν ἄχρηστων πόνων τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔλομένως ἔγη εὐδαιμόνις. Zeno frag. 120.
2 Diog. L. vi. 11. Zeno frag. 125.
7 Diog. L. vi. 103. Zeno frag. 167.
9 Diog. L. vi. 104.
10 Diog. L. vii. 26, 27.
11 Diog. vi. 104. vii. 121.
humanised and elevated to an extent entirely incompatible with Cynicism, mainly owing to the attention which was bestowed on mental culture.  

Turning to the views of the two schools in applied moral science, we find a curious agreement as to the relations of the sexes: Zeno and Diogenes both held that, in the ideal state, there should be a community of wives, and neither saw anything revolting in marriage between the nearest relations.  

At the same time marriage and the begetting of children are recommended for the wise man both by Zeno and Antisthenes, and apparently we must regard this as intended to apply to the existing condition of life, in which marriage was a civil institution.  Both teachers allow to the wise man the passion of love, as he alone will be able to select a suitable object: both maintain that the virtuous alone are capable of genuine friendship.  

Lastly, Zeno copied Antisthenes in his treatment of the Homeric poems, and particularly in explaining certain apparent contradictions as due to the fact that the poet speaks at one time κατὰ δόξαν and at another κατ' ἀληθείαν. The allegorising method of interpretation is common to both, and was afterwards developed to an excessive degree by Cleanthes and Chrysippus.  

Though we have thus seen that Zeno's ethical teaching is largely founded on Cynicism, we must not forget the many points of divergence. Thus, for example, we find the Cynics treating honour and wealth as absolute evils; these things,

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1 The difference of spirit in the two schools is well put by Sir A. Grant (Ar. Eth. vol. i. p. 317 ed. 3).
2 Diog. L. vi. 72. Dio. Chrys. x. 29. Cf. Zeno frags. 176 and 179. These passages are from the πολιτεία of Zeno, which is supposed to have been written while he was still an exponent of orthodox Cynicism. Chrysippus, however, is reported to have also held this repulsive doctrine.
3 Diog. L. vi. 11. Zeno frag. 171.
4 Diog. L. vi. 11. Zeno frag. 172.
7 See Cic. N. D. ii. 63 foll.
8 See the passages collected by Zeller Socrates, etc. E. T. p. 304.
according to Zeno, belonged to the class of \( \pi o\eta /\mu\epsilon\alpha \). Again, to take their attitude towards the popular religion, we know that Zeno expressly countenanced divination, while the existence of prophets made Diogenes think man the most foolish of animals.

B. To Heraclitus.

There can be no doubt that Zeno borrowed some important principles in his physical teaching from the writings of Heraclitus, and particularly from his account of the cosmogony. There is, however, a difficulty in comparing the doctrines of the two schools minutely, owing to the obscurity in which our knowledge of the Heraclitean theories is involved, and which is often increased by the doubt as to whether some particular doctrine belonged equally to the Stoics and the philosopher of Ephesus, or whether some later development, introduced by the former, has not been wrongly ascribed to the latter by our authorities. For instance, it was at one time stoutly maintained that the conflagration of the world was not taught by Heraclitus but that it was first propounded by Zeno, although the contrary opinion seems now to prevail. Again, it is not entirely clear whether we are to class Heraclitus, as Aristotle does, with the early Ionian physicists, starting from his dogma that all things are fire, or whether we are to regard this principle as a metaphysical abstraction, metaphorically shadowing forth the eternal flux of all things, a view which is more in accordance with Plato’s criticism in the Theaetetus.

However this may be, Heraclitus is essentially a hylozoist, who, following Anaximenes, chooses fire as being the rarest element, and insists on the continuity of change in order to escape from the mechanical theories of Anaxagoras and Em-

1 Diog. vi. 24 and contrast Zeno frag. 118.
3 Met. 1. 3. 8. This is the view of Ueberweg p. 40 and is also held by Dr Jackson.
4 Zeller’s position (p. 20 foll.) combines the two views.
pedocles on the one hand, and the Parmenidean immobility on
the other. The λόγος ςως is with him the expression of the
truth that nothing can be known but the law of mutability,
the harmony in difference, which he likens to the stretching of
a bowstring. This law he calls γνώμη, δίκη, εἰμαρρένη. τὸ
περιέχον ἡμῶς λογικὸν τε ὄν καὶ φρενῆρες, and ὁ Ζεύς,
but these terms are mere metaphors and we should be wrong in straining
their philosophic import: they represent, in fact, the law of
change and nothing more. Still, there can be no doubt that
the use which Heraclitus made of his formula λόγος was one
of the chief points in his system which attracted the attention
of Zeno. As a disciple of Cynicism he was familiar with
λόγος as a dialectical and an ethical principle: neither of these
aspects of λόγος was discarded by him in broaching his own
system. Yet, through the help of the Heraclitean λόγος, he
was enabled to take one step further. Just as Plato gave to
the Socratic ὑπόθεσις or general conception a metaphysical
existence in the form of the idea, so did Zeno elevate the λόγος
of Antisthenes from its position as a criterion for thought and
duty to that of the physical cause of being and movement. The
Stoic deity is, like the Heraclitean λόγος, provided with
many names, such as God, Mind, the all pervading Aether,
Fate, Forethought, and Zeus, but on the other hand it belongs
to an essentially later period of thought. We have here set
forth the teleological view of Nature, which is regarded as
creating all things out of itself for a good purpose. The
Stoics, at least after Cleanthes, are also pantheists in so far as
they acknowledge that God and the world are identical. Even
where Zeno followed Heraclitus most closely there are essential
differences in treatment. The fire of Heraclitus becomes

1 Heraclitus frag. 56 ed. Bywater. Hirzel finds here the origin of the
Stoic τῶν, but this is very questionable.
2 For a detailed statement see Krische, Forschungen p. 368 foll.
3 The comparison is suggested by Hirzel α. p. 42. But Hirzel very
much underestimates the influence of Heraclitus on Zeno, as Heinze has
pointed out. It is quite contrary to the evidence to attribute the Hera-
clitean tendencies of the Stoa solely, or even mainly, to Cleanthes.
4 Cic. N. D. α. 58.
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aether or πετρ ςεχυτικὸν—for this distinction is unknown to the Ephesian—and is thereby spiritualised and rarefied. Instead of three elements the Stoics have four, according to the universal practice of post-Aristotelian writers. Cleanthes, at least, regarded these four elements merely as gradations of τόνος, a notion entirely alien to Heraclitus. The doctrine of πάντα ζέι is replaced by that of μεταβολή, and ἀλλαιώσεις gives way to the characteristic theory of the mixture of substances, known as κράσις δ' οἶλων. In stating the differences between the two schools we have indicated how the Stoic physics were built upon Heraclitus. The remaining resemblances are comparatively unimportant. It was a natural corollary to both systems to maintain the unity of the cosmos. Zeno seems to have adopted Heraclitus' definition of the soul as an ἀναθηματικός, but, instead of regarding this exhalation as imbibed from the outer air (τὸ περιέχον), he taught that the soul was fed by emanation from the warm blood. Where Heraclitus regarded dryness as an essential characteristic of the wise soul, the Stoics rather looked for warmth or εὐκρασία. Lastly, we may observe that Heraclitus attributed immortality to the soul, and that in Ethics he counselled submission to the common law and the regulation of speech and thought in accordance with the demands of nature.

C. To Plato and Aristotle.

It has often been observed as a remarkable fact that the influence exercised both by Plato and Aristotle on their immediate successors was comparatively small. Zeno and Epicurus sought the groundwork of their ethics in the systems of Antisthenes and Aristippus, and followed in their physics, with surprising closeness, the pre-Socratic philosophers Heraclitus and Democritus. Indeed, the Peripatetic school itself showed no great vitality after Theophrastus, the new Academy.

1 Stob. Ecl. i. 22, 3 b p. 199, 10.
2 Heracl. frag. 74, Bywater.
3 Stob. Floril. iii. 84.
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of Arcesilas and Carneades bore no resemblance to that founded by Plato, and Antiochus owed more to the Stoa than to the old Academy which he professed to resuscitate. In the post-Aristotelian philosophy, taken as a whole, we find a universal tendency to materialistic views, a striking decline of interest in purely intellectual research, as an end in itself, and a general agreement in confining the area of speculation to the two questions of the standard of ethics and the logical criterion. However we are to explain this phenomenon, and even if we consider inadequate the explanation of Zeller, who attributes this result to the loss of political freedom and the consequent concentration of thought on the needs of the individual, we are more concerned with the fact itself than with its possible causes. It is enough to say that the system founded by Zeno was in no sense the offspring of those of Plato and Aristotle, although in many points it presupposes their existence.

In the case of Chrysippus we may go further, for there is no doubt that his logic was largely a development, and that not a very happy one, of the Aristotelian doctrine of the syllogism. Zeno, however, although the titles of several of his logical treatises have come down to us, was not considered to have paid great attention to this branch of philosophy. The principal contribution made by Zeno to the theory of knowledge is the establishment of the φαντασία καταληπτική as the criterion: in this, the essential point, whereby the convincing power of the impression is made the test of its reality, is due entirely to Zeno, but he was obviously influenced by the Aristotelian treatment of φαντασία, in which it appears as "decaying sense," and is more accurately defined as "the movement resulting from the actual operation of the sense faculty." Again, in the Zenonian definitions of memory and art there will be found a familiarity with the progressive stages in the growth of knowledge, as enunciated by

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1 This question is discussed in Benn's Greek Philosophers (Preface).
2 Rhet. i. 11. 1370 a 28.
3 de An. iii. 3. 429 a 1.
Aristotle, and his terminology, at any rate, is recognisable in a logical fragment preserved by Stobaeus.

Diogenes Laertius introduces his discussion of the Stoic physics by stating that the two ἀρχαί posited by the school were God and Indeterminate Matter: here we have not only the well-known Aristotelian distinction between the formal and the material cause, but also his description of matter as that which is entirely formless and contingent. The aether, the so-called quinta essentia of Aristotle, of which the heavenly bodies were composed, has its representative under the system of Zeno, who held that the circumference of the world was surrounded by a moving belt of aether.

Cicero puts into the mouth of professed Antiocheans, and, when speaking in the character of Antiochus, himself makes the charge that Zeno’s Ethics are identical with those of the Academy, and that the only change is one of terminology. This is developed at length in the fourth book of the de Finibus, where Cicero points out the inconsistency of denying that external goods contribute to happiness, while admitting that they have a certain positive value. There is considerable force in the objection in so far as it lays bare a weak point in the Stoic stronghold, but, if it is meant for a charge of plagiarism, it is grossly unfair. In fact, as has been remarked, Antiochus, who himself stole the clothes of Zeno, was always anxious to prove that they never belonged to Zeno at all. As we know, however, that Zeno was a pupil of Polemo, it is not unnatural to find that he was to some extent influenced by his teaching. Thus, life according to nature was one of Polemo’s leading tenets, and Clement of Alexandria has preserved the title of one of his books which deals with this subject.

1 Met. i. 1. Anal. Post. ii. 19.
2 Zeno frag. 24.
3 Metaph. vi. 3, 1029 a 20 Ἀγω ὅ ἐλπὶ ἣ καθ’ αἰτὴν μὴ τε μὴ τοιοῦ μὴ ἄλλο μηδὲν Κέρτεσαι οἷς ἠρισταί τὸ ὅν.
4 Cic. Fin. iv. 6. 14. Clem. Alex. Strom. viii. p. 304 Sylb. Polemo himself is represented as saying to Zeno:—οὐ λαρθάνεις, ὃ Ζήρων, ταῖς κηπαισι παρεσφέων θύραις, καὶ τὰ δογματα κλέπτων φωνικῶς μεταφεινοῖς (Diog. L. vii. 25). One of the doctrines, which were in this way appro-
sums up the extent of Academic influence when he says that "such points in Platonism as the Socratic building of virtue on knowledge, the comparative depreciation of external goods, the retreat from sensuality, the elevation and the purity of moral idealism, and, in the older Academy, the demand for life according to nature, the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of virtue and the growing tendency to confine philosophy to practical issues—all these were questions for a Stoic full of interest." Amongst the particular points, in which Zeno seems to have felt the influence of Plato, may be mentioned the doctrines of the cardinal virtues (frag. 134) and the πάθη (frag. 142) and the explanation of the world as ζωον ἐμψυχον (frag. 62).

We have endeavoured briefly to indicate certain leading points of doctrine in which Zeno was influenced by his predecessors, leaving minor resemblances to be pointed out in the notes.

§ 4. The writings of Zeno.

A list of the titles of Zeno's works is preserved in Diog. L. vii. 4, but is admittedly incomplete, as the same writer himself makes additions to it in his exposition of the philosophical views of the Stoic school. This list was probably derived by Diogenes from two distinct sources, as it is divisible into two separate portions. The first or main division gives the names of 13 (or 14) works, of which 6 deal with ethical, 4 with physical, and 3 (or 4) with logical and miscellaneous subjects; then follows a kind of appendix giving 4 (or 3) additional titles. Apollonius Tyrius has been with much probability suggested as the authority to whom the main division is due²,
for not only does Diogenes in several places cite him by name (e.g. § 2) but also Strabo (xvi. 2. 24, p. 757) expressly mentions a work of his with the title πίναξ τῶν ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν βιβλίων; who supplied Diogenes with the appendix has not been determined.

The works, of which any record has survived to us, may be divided into four classes:—

I. Logical.

(1) περὶ λόγου. From this work, not mentioned in the general catalogue, Diog. L. (vii. 39. 40) cites the triple division of philosophy and the order of arrangement for its study, which Zeno recommended. According to Susemihl, this book contained Zeno's epistemology, but, being superseded by the writings of Chrysippus, lost its place in the canon.

(2) καθολικά. Nothing is known of this work but the title (Diog. 4). Wachsmuth thinks that καθολικά περὶ λέξεων is the title of a single work.

(3) περὶ λέξεων (Diog. 4). In Stoic terminology λέξεως is defined as φωνή ἐγγράμματος as opposed to λόγος which is φωνή σημαντικὴ ἀπὸ διανοής ἐκπεμπομένη (Diog. vii. 56). It is probable, therefore, that this work dealt specially with the definition of terms, and to it may perhaps belong the fragments in which Zeno explains the proper meaning of σολοκίζεων (frags. 30 and 31). Wellmann (Neue Jahrb. für Philol. 107, p. 478) suggests that this treatise gave rise to the oft-repeated accusation made by Cicero that Zeno's innovations in philosophy were solely of a verbal character, and that Chrysippus had defended his master from a similar charge in the work περὶ τοῦ κηρύκως κεχροήσθαι Ζήνων τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.

(4) τέχνη (Diog. 4). This is identified by Zeller and Magnesia, who is specified by name with reference to Xenophon's works (Diog. L. ii. 57). Susemihl (Jahrbücher für Philol. 123, p. 741) thinks that the Diogenes catalogue comprises only those writings of Zeno which were included in the Stoic canon, and that the πολειτεία, the τέχνη ἐρωτική, and the διατριβάλ were treated as apocryphal while their genuineness was admitted.

1 See however on frag. 23.
Wellmann with the ἐρωτική τέχνη of § 34, while Wachsmuth writes τέχνη καὶ λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι β' as one title. The third course, which at first sight seems the most natural inasmuch as τέχνη bears this special meaning from Corax and Tisias downwards, is to regard it as an art of rhetoric. The objection to this view is that it is inferred from Cicero de Fin. iv. 7 that no work of Zeno bearing this title was known to Cicero or his authority, but too much reliance need not be placed on this, as it is clear that Zeno's logical treatises had been cast into the shade by the more elaborate performances of Chrysippus. On the other hand, there is a fair amount of evidence to show that Zeno did to some extent busy himself with rhetoric (frags. 25, 26, 27, 32), and though Zeller suggests that the definitions of διήγησις and παράδειγμα may belong to some other Zeno, this does not apply to the passages in Sextus and Quintilian.

(5) λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι β' (Diog. 4). Possibly owing to the influence of Stilpo the Megarian, Zeno may have devoted some attention to this branch of logic, which in general he regards as of less importance¹: see frag. 6.

II. Physical.

(6) περὶ τοῦ ὀλού (Diog. 4) seems to have been the most important of Zeno's physical writings. Diogenes refers to it as containing Zeno's views about the elements (vii. 136) and the creation and destruction of the world (ib. 142), and quotes from it the statement that there is only one world (ib. 143). It also contained an account of the eclipses of the sun and moon (ib. 145), and explanations of the phenomena of thunder and lightning (ib. 153).

(7) περὶ φύσεως cited by Stobaeus Ecl. 1. 5. 15. p. 78, 18, for Zeno's views on the subject of εἴμαρμένη: Krische (p. 367) would identify it with the last named treatise.

¹ This is the only work which deals with the formal side of logic, so that Stein's argument in Erkenntnistheorie n. 689 might have been put more strongly. He follows the old reading and speaks of two treatises, τεχνική λύσεις and ἔλεγχοι β'.
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(8) περί οὐσιάς unnecessarily identified by Wellmann (l.c. p. 442) and Susemihl with περί ὁλον and περί φύσεως is quoted by Diog. (134) for Zeno's definition of the two first principles, God and Matter.

(9) περί σημείων: a treatise on divination (Diog. 4). Thus μαντικὴ is defined in Stob. Ecl. II. 122, 238 as ἐπιστήμη θεωρητικὴ σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπων βίων συνειδώτων. This is no doubt the work referred to by Cic. de Div. i. 3, 6 sed cum Stoici omnia fere illa diffunderent quod et Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset. Its position in the catalogue makes against Prantl's hypothesis, who classes it as a logical work.

(10) περί ὄψεως only known by its title (Diog. 4) is regarded as logical by Stein.

(11) Πνευματικά (Diog. 4) classed by Wachsmuth as a physical book owing to its position in the catalogue, but nothing else is known concerning it.

III. Ethical.

(12) περί τοῦ καθήκοντος (Diog. 4). Here must belong Zeno's definition of duty (frag. 145), from the terms of which Wellmann conjectures without much probability that we should identify this treatise with the following.

(13) περί τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν βίου (Diog. 4).

(14) περί ὀρμής ἢ περί ἀνθρώπων φύσεως (Diog. 4). Diogenes quotes the Zenonian definition of the summum bonum from this book (vii. 87); Fabricius (Bibl. Gr. III. 580) proposed to separate this title reading η = octo, and Weygoldt adopting this further identified περί ἀνθρώπων φύσεως with περί φύσεως, but the latter is not an anthropological work.

(15) περί παθῶν (Diog. 4) containing the general definition of emotion and the discussion of its several subdivisions, pain, fear, desire and pleasure (ib. 110).

(16) πολιτεία. This seems to have been the most generally known, as it is certainly the most often quoted, of Zeno's writings; it was also one of the earliest in point of

1 i. p. 458. So also Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 689.
time, having been written while its author was still under the influence of Cynicism (Diog. 4). Plutarch informs us that it was written as a controversial answer to Plato's Republic. The allusions to it are too numerous to be specified here in detail.

(17) \( \text{περὶ νόμον} \) (Diog. 4). From its position in the catalogue this work must have belonged to the political side of ethics, and Krische's supposition (p. 368) that it treated of the divine law of nature is therefore rebutted. Themist. Or. xxiii. p. 287 A speaks of the νόμοι of Zeno but appears to be referring generally to his philosophical precepts.

(18) \( \text{περὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας} \) (Diog. 4): cf. frag. 167, which however is stated to belong to the πολιτεία.

(19) \( \text{ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη} \) (Diog. 34). To this book probably belongs the interesting fragment (174) preserved by Clem. Alex. relating to the behaviour suitable to young men.

(20) \( \text{διατριβαὶ} \) (Diog. 34): a similar work, as we are told by Diog. whose statement is confirmed by the passages (frags. 179, 180) quoted from it by Sextus. As we are told by Plutarch that something of the same kind was contained in the πολιτεία, we may believe that this and the last three works were written in close connection with it, as shorter appendages dealing with special topics, and before Zeno had worked out the distinctive features of Stoicism. From the general meaning of "lectures, discussions" (for which cf. Plat. Apol. 37 καὶ τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους) \( \text{διατριβή} \) seems to have assumed the special sense of a short ethical treatise, if we may trust the definition of Hermogenes (Rhett. Gr. ed. Waltz, t. iii. p. 406) \( \text{διατριβή ἐστὶ βραχέως διανοήματος ἡβικοῦ ἐκτασίας} \). Zeller's identification with the \( \text{χρεῖαι} \) is improbable, and Susemihl

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1 A summary will be found in Wellmann l. c. p. 437 foll. As regards its Cynic tendencies Susemihl observes:—Wer den Witz machte, er sei bei ihrer Abfassung wohl schon über den Hund gekommen, aber noch nicht über den Schwanz, schrieb eben damit dies Werk einer etwas spätern Zeit, zu frühesten etwa als er von Krates zu Stilpon übergegangen war.
believes that the διατριβαὶ was excluded from the πίας as being an earlier Cynic work.

(21) ἡθικά (Diog. 4). The title is somewhat doubtful, as Wachsmuth reads ἀπορμηνοεύματα Κράτητος ἡθικά as a single title, and Wellmann would emend ἥ χρεῖαι for ἡθικά: more probably however it was a collection of short ethical προβλημάτα.

IV. Miscellaneous.

(22) προβλημάτων Ὄμηρων ε’ (Diog. 4): we learn from Dio. Chrys. 53, 4 that Zeno wrote on the Iliad, Odyssey and Margites, and that his object was to show the general consistency of Homer by explaining that a literal meaning was not to be applied throughout the poems, which ought in many instances to be interpreted allegorically. That he in some cases proposed emendations may be seen from Strabo vii. 3. 6, cf. ib. i. p. 41, xvi. p. 1131. Krische p. 392 shows that there is no foundation for the suggestion that Zeno attributed the Iliad and the Odyssey to different authors.

(23) περὶ πνευτικῆς ἀκροάσεως (Diog. 4). Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 689, speaks of this work, the προβλ. Ὅμηρ. and the περὶ Ἐλλην. παίδ. as an educational series, and regards them as an appendix to the πολιτεία.

(24) ἀπορμηνοεύματα Κράτητος (Diog. 4) also mentioned by Athen. iv. 162 B as Ζήνωνος ἀπορμηνοεύματα, from which Persaeus is said to have made extracts. There seems little doubt that this was identical with the χρεῖαι mentioned in Diog. vi. 91 in connection with Crates, or that Wachsmuth is right in referring to this book the story of Crates and the cobbler (frag. 199). Aphthonius' definition of χρεῖαι runs thus:—ἀπο-μηνοεύμα σύντομον εὐστόχως ἐπὶ τι πρόσωπον ἀναφερόμενον.

(25) ἐπιστολαί (Maxim. Floril. ed. Mai, c. 6). This reference was first pointed out by Wachsmuth, see frag. 190.

The passage in Cic. N. D. i. 36 (cum vero Hesiodi Theogoniam interpretatur) led Fabricius to insert among his list of Zeno's writings (iii. p. 580) ἀπομηνοέμα εἰς τὴν Ἑσιόδου
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and there can be no doubt from the statements in Proclus and the other Scholiasts that Zeno’s labours extended to Hesiod as well as to Homer. It is, however, impossible to say in what work these fragments appeared, and we do not feel much inclined to accept Krische’s view (p. 367) that the allegorical explanations of Hesiod were worked into the περὶ ὀλον. May they not belong to the περὶ θρησκῆς ἀκροάσεως?

It remains to call attention to Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 9, 58 p. 245, S. p. 681, P. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ λέγουσι Ζήνων τῷ πρώτῳ γεγράφατι τια ἡ μη ρᾳδίως ἐπιτρέπουσι τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἀναγνώσκειν μη οὐχὶ πειραν δεδωκόσι πρότερος εἰ γνησίως φιλοσοφοῖν, but similar suggestions of esotericism are made against all the post-Aristotelian schools, and especially against the New Academy. (Mayor on Cic. N. D. i. 11.)

§ 5. Zeno’s style.

The fragments which survive of Zeno’s writings are not sufficient to enable us to form any satisfactory opinion of his style, and it would be unsafe to generalise from such scanty data. We shall therefore only attempt to point out those characteristics about which there can be no doubt.

The later Greek philosophers troubled themselves but little with the graces of literary ornament. Philosophy had now become scientific in its treatment and ceased to be artistic in form. Zeno was no exception to this rule, and was satisfied if he presented his arguments to his readers with directness and perspicacity. In this respect, he has been successful in avoiding obscurity, though he lays himself open to the charge of

1 See Flach, Glossen und Scholien zur Hesiodischen Theogonie, p. 29 foll.
3 Zeller who formerly supported this view (Stoics p. 40) now thinks otherwise (Ph. d. Gr. iii. 32).
abruptness and want of finish. To this tendency was due his
custom of couching his arguments in syllogistic formulae,
which often served to cloak a somewhat obvious fallacy. This
formally logical style subsequently grew so habitual with
the Stoics that they earned for themselves the title of διαλεκ-
τικοί. Cicero (N. D. III. 22) especially observes on Zeno's
fondness for certain "breues et acutulas conclusiones," and
several examples of these are to be found in his remaining
fragments. "That which is reasonable is better than that
which is unreasonable: but nothing is better than the world:
therefore the world is reasonable." "That thing at whose
departure the living organism dies is corporeal: but the living
organism dies when the breath that has been united with it
departs: therefore this breath is corporeal: but this breath is
the soul; therefore the soul is corporeal." "That is altogether
destructible all whose parts are destructible: but all the parts
of the world are destructible; therefore the world is itself
destructible," cf. also frags. 59, 60, 61, 129, 130.

Passing to quite a different characteristic, we remark in
Zeno's style a certain picturesqueness and love of simile, which
perhaps may be regarded as traceable to the Oriental influence
of his birth-place. Particularly striking is his observation
that those who are in a state of προκοπή may from their
dreams discover whether they are making progress, if then
the imaginative and emotional part of the soul is clearly
seen dispersed and ordered by the power of reason, as in the
transparent depth of a waveless calm (frag. 160). Zeno,
says Cicero (N. D. II. 22), "similitudine, ut saepe solet, rationem concludit hoc modo." "If tuneful flutes were pro-
duced from an olive should not we regard some knowledge of

1 In Cic. N. D. II. 20 the Stoic claims that such arguments "apertiora sunt ad reprehendendum." Elsewhere Cicero calls them "contortulis quibusdam et minutis conclusiunculis nec ad sensum permanentibus." Tusc. II. 42.
flute-playing as inherent in the olive?” (frag. 63). In like manner he uses the simile of the minister in a royal court to explain his doctrine of the προηγμένον (frag. 131), and likens his ideal commonwealth to a herd grazing on a common pasture (frag. 162).

Not only in elaborate comparisons but also in single expressions may the same picturesque touch be seen. Thus character is said to be the fountain of life (frag. 146), emotion a fluttering of the soul (frag. 137), and happiness the unruffled flow of life (frag. 124).

It will be remembered that Cicero, or his authority, constantly taunts Zeno with being the inventor of new words, and new words only¹. When scrutinised, this appears to mean not so much that he was a coiner of new expressions, as that for the purposes of his system he appropriated words already in existence as part of his special terminology. Putting aside προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον, which stand on rather a different footing, we may instance προκοπή, ἐνάργεια, συγκατάθεσις, κατόρθωμι, κατάληψις, καθήκον, ἐννοια(?), and τύπωσις: πρόληψις is certainly not due to Zeno. Yet, although none of these words are new coinages, κατάληψις and καθήκον are instances specially selected by Cicero in support of his statement.

Diog. Laert. x. 27 speaking of Chrysippus observes:—καὶ τὰ μαρτύρια τοσαίτα ἐστίν, ὡς ἐκεῖνως μόνων γέμειν τὰ βιβλία, καθάπερ καὶ παρὰ Ζήνωνι ἐστιν εὑρεῖν καὶ παρὰ 'Αριστοτέλει. The existing fragments however do not justify this assertion.

Finally, although doubtless the circumstances under which the fragments have been preserved render this tendency more noticeable than it otherwise would be, we shall not be wrong in attributing to Zeno a love of precise definition. The school afterwards became famous for their definitions (cf. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 205—212), and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the habit originated with the founder. Instances of this

¹ Cic. Fin. iii. 5. 15. Tusc. v. 32. 34. Legg. i. 38, etc. Cf. Galen de diff. puls. viii. 642 ed Kühn Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἔτι πρότερον ἐτόλμησε καινοτομεῖν τε καὶ ὑπερβαίνειν τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων έθος ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.
will occur passim. In fact, his writings in their general character were dogmatic and terse rather than discursive and polemical. The longest extract in the following pages is of dubious authenticity, and therefore for a specimen of the style of our author we would refer to the description of youthful modesty in frag. 174.

§ 6. Cleanthes.

In discussing the dates of Zeno's life we have seen that there is good reason to believe that Cleanthes was born in the year B.C. 331, and if so he was only five years younger than Zeno. We also saw that he lived to the age of 99 and presided over the Stoa for 32 years from B.C. 264 till his death in B.C. 232. Against this computation there is to be taken into account the fact that Diogenes (vii. 176) states that he lived to the age of 80 and was a pupil of Zeno for nineteen years. Unless we are prepared to reject the authority of the papyrus altogether, we have in Diogenes' account either a different tradition or a stupid blunder. In any case, Cleanthes was well advanced in life when he became head of the Stoic School.

He was born at Assos, a town in the Troad, but at what age he came to Athens or under what circumstances he became a pupil of Zeno we have no information. His circumstances were those of extreme poverty: he is said to have been a boxer before he embraced philosophy, and the story is well known how he earned his living by drawing water at night, in order to devote his daytime to study. Hence the nickname of 

1 Rohde l. c. p. 622 n. 1 suggests that Diogenes subtracted the 19 years passed under Zeno's tuition from the years of his life, but this is hardly credible.

2 Diog. L. vii. 168.
characterised his life are no less apparent in his teaching. Whatever he did was marked by energy and completeness and was grounded on deeply-rooted conviction. Philosophy with him was not merely an intellectual exercise, but far more a religious enthusiasm. This religious fervour led him to regard the theological side of philosophy as of the highest importance, and, feeling that the praise of the divine majesty should be set forth in something higher than sober prose, his genius expressed itself in poetical compositions of the greatest merit. It is easy to believe that a man of this character may have proved an unsuccessful teacher, and there is some evidence that under his presidency the Stoic school was in danger of losing ground, cf. Diog. L. vii. 182 οὔτος (Chrysippus) ὀνειδισθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος ὃτι οὐχὶ παρὰ Ἀρίστων μετὰ πολλῶν σχολάζοι, εἰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, εἰπὲ, προσείχον, οὐκ ἂν ἐφιλοσόφησα. His apparent want of success possibly stimulated the unfavourable estimate with which his written works were received by antiquity. The Stoa was now fiercely assailed by various opponents—its ethics by the Epicureans, and its logical theories by Arcesilas. Skill in controversy was more than ever needed, if the position won by Zeno’s efforts was to be maintained. Herein lay the special strength of Chrysippus, who was very probably employed in defending Stoicism during his predecessor’s life, and who surpassed Cleanthes in fineness and subtlety, even if he was inferior to him in depth. Most suggestive, in this view, becomes the passage in Diog. L. vii. 179 διηνέχθη (Chrysippus)...πρὸς Κλεάνθην ὃ καὶ πολλάκις ἔλεγε μόνης τῆς τῶν δογμάτων διδασκαλίας χρήζειν, τὰς

1 There is no direct evidence for this, but the whole of Diogenes’ account implies it.
2 Cf. Diog. L. vii. 182 πρὸς δὲ τῶν κατεξανιστάμενον Κλεάνθους διαλεκτικῶν, καὶ προτείνοντα αὐτῷ σοφίσματα, πέπαινο, εἰπὲ παρέλκων τὸν πρεσβύτερον ἀπὸ τῶν πραγματικωτέρων, ἤμων δὲ τοῖς νέοις ταύτα προτιθεί.
3 So Hirzel ii. p. 180 "Kleanthes war keine die Begriffe zergliedernde, sondern eine anschauende Natur, er war wohl minder rührig aber vielleicht tiefer angelegt als sein Schüler," and Stein, Psychologie p. 171 "Kleanthes erscheint als der raubschaalige, mihsam stammelnde, aber tiefe Denker, Chrysipp dagegen als der feinere, leichtbewegliche, elegant vermittelnde Schöneredner."
The anecdote leads us to infer that Chrysippus was conscious of a want of originality in himself, and a want of combative force in his master.

The position of Cleanthes among the early leaders of the Stoic school has quite recently been subject to a considerable modification in current opinion. He has been generally regarded as merely the exponent of his master's teaching, and as having contributed no new views of his own to the development of the system. This opinion is not without justification in the ancient authorities. Diogenes Laertius expressly asserts that Cleanthes adhered to the same tenets as his predecessor (vii. 168), and that he did not object to be called an ass, declaring that he was only able to bear Zeno's burden (ib. 170). This estimate of his powers was for some time acquiesced in by modern investigators, so that even Zeller says of him (p. 41):—"Cleanthes was in every way adapted to uphold his master's teaching, and to recommend it by the moral weight of his own character, but he was incapable of expanding it more completely, or of establishing it on a wider basis" (see also Krische, Forschungen, pp. 417 and 418). Now however a reaction in his favour has set in, and from a closer scrutiny of the notices concerning him the opinion has been formed that "his contributions were more distinctive and original than those of any other Stoic" (Encycl. Brit. Art. Stoics). In a question of such importance it is singularly unfortunate that the hand of time has dealt so hardly with him, not only in the actual amount of the fragments which have been preserved to us, but also in their relative importance for his philosophic system. For one fragment of supreme value such as frag. 24 we have six or seven trifling etymologies of the names of the gods,

1 Hirzel has carried this view to an extreme, which the facts do not warrant. At p. p. 137 he curiously says:—"Da wir aber nichts unversucht lassen dürfen, um eine eigentümliche Lehre des Kleanthes herauszubringen." On the other hand, Windelband, writing as late as 1888, says of Cleanthes:—"als Philosoph ist er unbedeutend gewesen" (Müller's Handbuch, v. 292).
of so extravagant a character that it is hard to credit their seriousness. The happy chance that has preserved to us the Hymn to Zeus is counterbalanced by the consideration that we only know of his theory of tension through two or three passages.

Cleanthes divides philosophy into six branches, but in reality this is only the triple division of Zeno, logic being subdivided into dialectic and rhetoric, physics into physics and theology, and ethics into ethics and politics.

In his estimate of logic he resembles Zeno: at least it seems to have played only a subsidiary part in his system, judging both from the number of his recorded works on this subject (about 10 out of a total of 56) and from the insignificance of the fragments which remain. Four only are of any importance, and one of these, his criticism of the Platonic idea, is involved in such obscurity that it will be convenient to defer its consideration for the notes. As it is clear throughout all his teaching that Cleanthes was the most advanced materialist in the Stoic school, so we find that his epistemology rests on a still stronger empirical basis than that of his predecessor Zeno or his successor Chrysippus. Zeno had not defined φαντασία further than by describing it as an impression on the soul. Cleanthes explained this as an actual material concavity impressed by the object, an explanation which found no favour with Chrysippus. There is also high probability in the view which ascribes to Cleanthes the authorship of the "tabula rasa" theory, a theory made celebrated in modern philosophy owing to its adoption by Locke, namely, that when a man is born his mind is like a blank sheet of parchment ready to receive a copy. At least we know of no other Stoic philosopher to whom the introduction of this extreme result of sensualistic views so properly belongs. Since Chrysippus, in express opposition to Cleanthes, defined φαντασία as ἐτεροίωσις ἡγεμονίκοι, it is less likely that he should have propounded a theory which in its very terms carries out the more materialistic doctrine of his opponent.
We have therefore, in accordance with Stein's view, included the passage of Plutarch, which attributes the doctrine to the Stoics in general, among the fragments of Cleanthes. Stein, however, goes further. Zeno had conceded this much to rationalism, that we derive directly from God the capacity for abstract thought, and that certain notions are the product of this potentiality when actualised by experience. In an ingenious and closely-reasoned argument, whose force it is difficult to reproduce within short limits, Stein contends that this position was thrown over by Cleanthes. According to the latter, the capacity given us by nature is solely that for moral and not for intellectual activity. The belief in God himself does not, as with Zeno, arise from a "certa animi ratio" but rather from induction founded on empirical observation. The conclusion is that Cleanthes is a thorough-going advocate of empiricism. But a divergence from the rest of the school in a matter of such importance ought not to be assumed on mere inference resting on ambiguous statements, although were this doctrine explicitly ascribed to Cleanthes in a single passage we should not hesitate to accept it, as being in entire consonance with his general bent of mind. What then is the evidence which Stein produces apart from the passage of Cicero just referred to, which is by no means conclusive? In the first place he appeals to two passages which prove that moral impulses are transmitted to us from our parents and implanted in us by nature, and lays stress on the fact that intellectual powers are not included. This, however, is only negative evidence, and for positive proof we are referred to frags. 106 and 100; in the first of these we read that the uneducated differ from the brutes only in shape, and in the second that the undiscerning opinion of the many should be totally discarded. Surely these grounds are insufficient to support the conclusion:

1 Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 322–328.
2 Cleanth. frags. 82 and 36.
3 Cleanth. frag. 52. (Cic. N. D. ii. 13.)
Plato himself might have greeted these sentiments with approbation. But a more serious stumbling-block remains in the oft quoted passage from Diog. L. vii. 54. If, as Stein himself admits, Chrysippus substituted πρόληψις for the Zenonian ὁρθὸς λόγος, Cleanthes must of necessity be included in the term ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωικῶν, for there is no one else to whom the words could apply. Were further positive evidence of Cleanthes' "concession to rationalism" required, it would surely be as reasonable to supply it from frag. 21 ψυχή...ἡς μέρος μετέχοντας ἡμᾶς ἐμψυχοῦσθαι as to deduce the contrary from frags. 100 and 106. For these reasons we feel bound to withhold assent to Stein's hypothesis, until some weightier proof is put forward to support it.

Cleanthes was also involved in a controversy with reference to the sophism known as ὀ κυριεύων and first propounded by the Megarian Diodorus. This sophism was concerned with the nature of the possible; and Cleanthes tries to escape from the dilemma in which Diodorus would have involved him by denying that every past truth is necessary, or, in other words, by asserting that since that which is possible can never become impossible, it is possible for the past to have been otherwise, in the same way that it is possible for a future event to occur even though that event will never take place. Besides this we learn that he introduced the term λεκτόν in the sense of κατηγόρημα, that he left definitions of art and rhetoric, and that he explained the names given to a certain kind of slippers and a drinking-cup.

The first five of the physical fragments need not detain us here, containing, as they do, with one exception, merely a restatement of positions already taken up by Zeno. The exception referred to is the introduction of πνεύμα as the

1 Stein himself supplies the materials for his own refutation. At p. 267 in dealing with a similar question he says:—"Ohne Not sollte Niemand unter ἀρχαιότεροι andere Stoiker als Zeno Kleanthes und Chrysipp verstehen." Chrysippus is here excluded by the nature of the case: the inference need not be stated.

2 See Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 327.
truest description of the divine permeating essence, which Zeno had characterised as aether. With frag. 17 however we are on a different footing. Cleanthes teaches, according to Cicero's account, that the world is God, and it is significant that, although the same doctrine is attributed by him to Chrysippus (N. D. i. 39), no such statement is found with regard to Zeno (ib. 36). Zeno had indeed declared that God permeates every part of the universe: would he have gone so far as to identify the universe with God? It is true that we find among his fragments (frag. 66) οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οἰκονόμον, but this is not conclusive. Not only the general cast of the expression, but also the addition of the words καὶ τὸν οἰκονόμον, make us hesitate to ascribe to these words their full pantheistic sense. However, even if Cleanthes was not following in his master's footsteps, he was only carrying Zeno's teaching to its logical conclusion. The dualism of God and Matter was inconsistent in a materialistic system. But Cleanthes went further. Teaching that God creates the world through the medium of the four elements, and teaching that these elements themselves do not remain stable but are in a restless and continual mutation, he was led to search for the cause of this ceaseless movement. The question may be put in another form, why did God create the world? The answer was found in a comparison of the structure of individual things. Every creature is produced at the proper time by means of certain proportions of the soul's parts, which are found in the seed. The soul, however, is material and is braced up by that tension which is elsewhere described as "a stroke of fire." This tension is ever varying and is the cause of movement in the human frame. Now, since the individual is a pattern of the universe, the cause of movement in the cosmos must be the tension which permeates all its parts.

1 Not three in spite of Hirzel's Excursus ii. 737—755. See Stein, Psychologie n. 113.
2 This is probably the meaning of 1. 4 in the Hymn to Zeus, where see note. For the doctrine of the macrocosm and the microcosm in general see Stein's Appendix to Psych. pp. 205—214.
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Thus the phenomenal world is created and again destroyed by the successive phases in the ever varying tension of the fiery breath, which is at once identified with God and with the universe.

As the \( \gamma\gamma\varepsilon\mu\omicron\nu\kappa\omicron\nu \) of the human soul is placed in the breast, so did Cleanthes teach that the ruling part of the world is in the sun, to which is due day and night and the seasons of the year. He was led to this opinion by his investigations in natural science. Observing that nothing can exist without warmth, he inferred that warmth constitutes the essence of things. Since however warmth is given to the whole world and to each individual thing from the sun, the sun must be the \( \gamma\gamma\varepsilon\mu\omicron\nu\kappa\omicron\nu \) of the world. In the sun is the fiery breath found in its purest form, and at the conflagration, when the world is destroyed, the sun will assimilate to itself moon and stars and all the heavenly bodies. If Aristarchus therefore taught that the earth revolves round the sun, he was guilty of impiety for displacing the earth, which is the hearth of the world. The sun is fed by exhalations from the sea, and moves in an oblique course through the zodiac. The stars are formed of the same fiery substance as the sun, and, as the sun is the cause of life to everything, its essence must be akin not to the earthly fire, which is destructive, but to the creative. As the sun strikes the world with his rays, he is called a plectrum. Sun, moon, and stars are alike conical in shape.

Cleanthes proved that the soul is material by two syllogistic arguments, founded on the mental resemblance between parents and children and the sympathy of the soul with the body. So far indeed did his materialism extend that he even maintained that the act of walking was the extension of \( \tau\omicron\nu\sigma\varsigma\alpha\mu\alpha \) from the \( \gamma\gamma\varepsilon\mu\omicron\nu\kappa\omicron\nu \) to the feet. In other respects he seems to have concurred in Zeno's psychology, teaching that the

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1 For the tension-theory in general see Stein, Psychologie, pp. 73 and 74, nn. 109 and 110. The notion of \( \tau\omicron\nu\sigma\varsigma\alpha\mu\alpha \) is not entirely unknown to Zeno: cf. Zeno frags. 56, 67, 103.
reasoning powers are developed by external impressions, and that all souls exist after death till the time of the general conflagration. His views on zoology comprise a statement that the pig was provided with a soul to keep him fresh for sacrifice and a curious anecdote proving the intelligence of ants.

To the theological branch of physics Cleanthes devoted considerable attention, but in practice no sharp dividing line can be drawn between physics and religion, since in the Stoic system they necessarily overlap. It is hardly necessary to analyze the Hymn to Zeus, but it may be observed that Cleanthes refuses to admit that evil is due to the divine agency, a remark which must be taken in connection with the statement of Chalcidius that, while Chrysippus identified fate with forethought, Cleanthes distinguished them. Five distinct reasons are given for the existence of God:—(1) the ascending series of organisms from plants to man, which shows that there must be some being who is best of all, and this cannot be man with all his imperfections and frailties, (2) the foreknowledge of coming events, (3) the fruitfulness of the earth and other natural blessings, (4) the occurrence of portents outside the ordinary course of nature, and (5) the regular movements of the heavenly bodies. Zeus i.e. πυρ ἀεικτετον is the only eternal god; the rest are perishable and will be destroyed at the οἰκπυρωσις. The popular religion is a representation of truth, but requires interpretation if we would understand its real significance. Thus, the Eleusinian mysteries are an allegory; Homer, if properly understood, is a witness to truth; the very names given to Zeus, Persephone, Dionysus, Apollo, and Aphrodite are indications of the hidden meaning which is veiled but not perverted by the current belief, and the same is true of the myths of Heracles and Atlas. It is difficult now-a-days to enter into the spirit with which the Stoic school pursued these etymological fancies. At times it is hard not to acquiesce in Plutarch's opinion (see

1 Cic. N. D. ii. 63, iii. 63.
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frag. 55), who attributes them to παιδιὰ and ἐρωτεία. But, if this is so; it is impossible to account for the extreme diligence, which was expended upon them. Rather, having once taken up the position that the popular belief can only be explained by Stoic methods, they were often driven to defend it by arguments which they must themselves have perceived to be of questionable validity. For example, Cleanthes may not have been satisfied with the derivation of Dionysus from διανύσαι, but his explanation could not be disproved, and he was bound to explain the name somehow, since, so long as it remained unexplained, it was a standing objection to his method.¹

The number of ethical works attributed to Cleanthes, 32 out of a total of 56, shows that he paid considerable attention to this branch of philosophy. Yet, in the main, he seems to have accepted the principles laid down by Zeno, except in those cases where his physical innovations demanded a separate treatment, and many of the fragments which have come down to us deal rather with the practical than with the theoretical side of morals. This agrees with what we are told as to the titles of his books (see infra, p. 52). Defining the aim of life and happiness in the same manner as Zeno, Cleanthes laid special stress on the agreement with the general law of nature, while Chrysippus is said to have emphasised the necessity for agreement with human nature no less than with nature in general. This view is thoroughly in consonance with the general bias of Cleanthes’ teaching. One of the most striking and important of his doctrines is the parallelism between the macrocosm of the world and the microcosm of the individual. The more, therefore, that man brings himself into harmony with the spirit which breathes throughout the universe, the more does he fulfil the rôle to which he is destined. The same spirit may be traced in the

¹ The etymologies of Plato in the Cratylus are quite as bad as any of these, but they are professedly in part at least playful. The most recent exposition of this dialogue is by Mr Heath in the Journal of Philology xvii. 192.
lines in which the subordination of the individual to the decrees of Zeus and of destiny is so forcibly advocated. Cleanthes is perhaps the author of a distinction which subsequently became of some importance whereby happiness is described as σκοπός, and the attainment of happiness as τέλος.

The doctrine of τόνος was applied by Cleanthes, with important results, to two branches of his master's ethical system, namely, the nature of virtue and the emotions. Zeno had identified virtue with φρόνησις, but Cleanthes, while retaining the intellectual basis which Zeno made the groundwork of virtue, sought to explain its character more precisely. Again he had recourse to his physical theories. Every body contains within it a material air-current with ever-varying tension. When this tension is strong enough to perform its fitting duties it is regarded as strength and power, and this strength and power as applied to different spheres of activity gives rise to the four virtues ἐγκράτεια, ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, and σωφροσύνη. It will be observed that ἐγκράτεια here occupies the position which by Chrysippus and his followers is assigned to φρόνησις. Thus Cleanthes fortifies his main position, that strength of tension is the necessary starting-point of virtue, by a tacit appeal to the authority of Socrates, who had pointed to ἐγκράτεια as κρητὶς ἀρετῆς. A recurrence to the same teacher may also be recognised in the approbation with which his identification of τὸ συμφέρον with τὸ δίκαιον is cited. To return to τόνος; when the tension is relaxed, a weakness of soul follows, and in this weakness is to be found the explanation of the πάθη. Thus the essence of virtue and emotion, which Zeno had left unexplained on the physical side, is traced to a single source, and this source is the same power which is the origin of all movement and life.

The application of τόνος to the πάθη leads us to the consideration of another question, not indeed directly raised by the fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, but having an important

1 See however Hirzel ii. p. 557.
bearing on our general view of their ethical doctrines. What position do the πάθη occupy in the classification of goods? Zeno classified ηδονή and therefore presumably the other πάθη among the ἀδιάφορα, and the reason is not far to seek. He regarded πάθη as distinct from vice, because they have nothing to do with ignorance (Plut. Virt. Mor. 10 τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὐ φασὶ γένεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἐν ἦ τὸ ἀμαρτητικὸν). Only κακία or τὸ μέτεχον κακίας is κακὸν, according to Zeno, and πάθος is neither, but rather an ἐπιγέννημα. (Cf. τὰ ἐπιγεγνόμενα κρίσεων Zeno frag. 139 and for the distinction between ἐπιγεγνήματα and μετέχοντα cf. Diog. L. vii. 95.) That this applies to all the πάθη and not merely to ηδονή is made clear by the following considerations. In frag. 169 Zeno recommends the rational use of wealth ὅπως ἀδεή καὶ ἀδιάφαστον πρὸς τὰλλα τὴν διάθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐχοντες ὁσα μὴτε καλὰ ἐστι μὴτε αἰσχρὰ τοῖς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὁς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἄρωνται τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων μηδὲν δεδοκότες λύγῳ καὶ μὴ φοβῆ ποτῶν ἀπέχωνται. This shows that the ἀδιάφορα are the field of φόβος, and for λίπη we may refer to Cic. Tusc. iii. 77 nihil enim esse malum quod turpe non sit si lucenti persuaseris...et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando negritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes ipse fateatur. It is noteworthy, moreover, that Cleanthes, who is allowed to have been the severest opponent of pleasure¹, declares ηδονὴν μὴτε κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι μὴτε ἄξιαν ἐχεῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ (frag. 88) but does not venture to class it as κακὸν. The result of this discussion is that Zeno and Cleanthes did not class λίπη and φόβος with κακά, and therefore Wachsmuth cannot be right in attributing to Zeno a passage in Stobæus² where this classification is implied.

¹ Zeller, Stoics p. 237. The remarks in the text are intended to obviate the difficulty as to the classification of ηδονή suggested by Heinze, de Stoicorum affectibus p. 37.
² See Wachsmuth’s Stobaenus vol. ii. p. 58. That this question was much debated appears from Cic. Tusc. iv. 29. Some appear to have held that πάθος was κακὸν but not κακία (Stob. 1. c.), because πάθος is κίνησις but κακία is διάθεσις (Cic. 1. c. 30).
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That this view did not continue to be the orthodox view of the school after their time is possible, but to pursue the subject further would be foreign to our purpose.

The uncorrupted impulses given by nature tend towards virtue, and, when they are suitably developed, wisdom founded on firm apprehension, so that it can never be lost, follows in due course. Secure in the possession of virtue, the wise man partakes of the same excellence as God.

In the treatise περὶ ᾨδονῆς Cleanthes seems to have engaged in a spirited controversy with the Epicureans, and to have attacked their moral teaching, just as he perhaps assailed their physics in the work περὶ ἀτόμων. Pleasure is a mere useless ornament: it possesses no value whatever, nay, it is absolutely contrary to nature. If, as we are told, pleasure is the ultimate goal of life, it was an evil spirit which gave to mankind the faculty of wisdom. He sarcastically likened his opponents' position to an imaginary picture in which Pleasure, seated on a throne in gaudy apparel, is ministered to by the virtues, who form her willing slaves, declaring that this service is the sole reason of their existence.

Passing to those fragments, which seem more strictly to belong to the παρανυτίκος or ύποθετικός τόπος (i.e. the region of applied morals), we notice that Cleanthes frequently refers his precepts to the general principle, which is a leading characteristic of Stoic morals, namely, that virtuous conduct depends not on the nature of the deed but on the disposition of the agent. The same action may be either vicious or virtuous, according to the motive which prompts its performance. To many of the subjects which fall under this branch separate treatises were devoted, among which are the books περὶ εὐβουλίας, περὶ χάριτος, περὶ φθονερίας, περὶ τιμῆς, περὶ δόξης, περὶ φιλίας, περὶ συμπτοσίων κ.τ.λ. To the book περὶ χάριτος we may assign three of the extant fragments (frags. 97, 98, 99) all of which are preserved by Seneca in the de Beneficiis. The theory of consolation (frags. 93 and 94) may belong either to the περὶ ἀρωγῆς or the περὶ φιλίας. Frags. 100-103 all in
verse and one in hexameter metre ought to be referred to the περὶ δόξης.

One solitary fragment attests the political studies of Cleanthes, to which at least four of the works in the catalogue must be referred.

The result of our investigation has been to show conclusively that all those doctrines which are most characteristic of the true essence of Stoicism were contributed by Zeno and Cleanthes. To Zeno belong the establishment of the logical criterion, the adaptation of Heraclitean physics, and the introduction of all the leading ethical tenets. Cleanthes revolutionised the study of physics by the theory of tension, and the development of pantheism, and by applying his materialistic views to logic and ethics brought into strong light the mutual interdependence of the three branches. The task of Chrysippus was to preserve rather than to originate, to reconcile inconsistencies, to remove superfluous outgrowths, and to maintain an unbroken line of defence against his adversaries. Although it might seem to many that this less ambitious rôle requires less brilliant capacities in its performer, yet Chrysippus was commonly regarded as the second founder of the Stoa, and the general opinion of his contemporaries is aptly summed up in the line εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρυσίππου οὐκ ἂν ἦν Στοὰ (Diog. L. vii. 183). The reason of this has been already indicated. The extraordinary fertility of the writer commanded admiration even where it failed to win assent, nor was his dialectical skill (Diog. L. vii. 180) a matter of small moment. Though logic was only the preparaedicte of philosophy, it was the battleground of the fiercest controversy. Vitally opposed in other respects, Epicureans and Stoics here at least were allied in maintaining the possibility of knowledge against the universal scepticism of the New Academy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the foremost champion of dogmatism should have taken the highest place in the Stoic triad.
§ 7. The writings of Cleanthes.

The relation of the poetical to the prose writings of Cleanthes has not been accurately determined, and the evidence does not enable us to decide whether the former were published separately from, or in conjunction with the latter. The only indication we possess is in frag. 49, in which Cleanthes describes poetry as being peculiarly adapted to theological subjects. Yet the only book in the catalogue with a distinctively theological title is the work περὶ θεῶν, and there is direct evidence that this contained etymological explanations of the names of the gods, and that part of it, at any rate, was written in prose. Krische p. 422 supposes that the Hymn to Zeus was a poetical supplement incorporated with this treatise, but such treatment would surely have produced highly incongruous results. It is possible that we ought to separate Cleanthes the philosopher from Cleanthes the poet, and to infer that works published by him in the latter capacity were not included in the list of his philosophical treatises. At the same time we should remember that Chrysippus (Galen. plac. Hipp. et Plat. p. 315) and Posidonius (ib. p. 399 ῥήσεις τε ποιητικῶς παρατίθεται καὶ ἱστορίας παλαιῶν πράξεων μαρτυροῦσας ὀς λέγει) were accustomed to freely interpolate poetical quotations in their prose writings, and Cleanthes may have composed his ἄον florilegia, just as Cicero translated from the Greek where the Latin poets failed him (Tusc. D. ii. 26). A catalogue of the titles known to us is subjoined; where not otherwise indicated, the source of reference is Diog. L. vii. 174, 175.

I. Logical.

(1) περὶ ἰδίων. For ἰδια cf. Ar. Top. i. 5, p. 102 a 17: the essential attributes of a thing are its ἰδια: thus γραμματικῆς δεκτικὸς is an ἰδιον of man.

(2) περὶ τῶν ἀπόρων.

(3) περὶ διαλεκτικῆς.

H. P.
(4) περὶ τρόπων. Probably this is logical rather than rhetorical.

(5) περὶ κατηγορημάτων. To this book may be referred frag. 7.

(6) περὶ μεταλήψεως (Athen. x1. 467 d, 471 b).

(7) περὶ τοῦ κυριεύοντος (Arr. Epict. ii. 19. 9). Krische p. 427 n. gives to this work the title περὶ δυνατῶν, but Epict. distinctly contrasts Chrysippus' work bearing the general title with a treatise by Cleanthes on the particular fallacy (Κλεάνθης δ' ίδια γέγραφε περὶ τούτου), Wachsmuth, Comm. i. p. 18.

(8) περὶ τέχνης may be the same work as the ars rhetorica mentioned in Cic. Fin. iv. 3, but if so it is out of its place in the catalogue, where it appears between nos. 4 and 5 of the physical books.

(9) περὶ τοῦ λόγου γ'. This and the following book appear in the catalogue among the ethical works.

(10) περὶ ἐπιστήμης.

Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 722, counts among the logical works the books περὶ χρόνου περὶ αἰσθήσεως and περὶ δόξης, but omits, probably by an oversight, the book περὶ τρόπων. He also observes that from the number of books treating of the theory of knowledge Cleanthes must have displayed more activity in treating of the subject than the remaining fragments would lead us to suppose.

II. Physical.

(1) περὶ χρόνου.
(2) περὶ τῆς Ζήνωνος φυσιολογίας β'.
(3) τῶν Ἡρακλείτου ἐξηγήσεων δ'. Cf. Diog. L. ix. 15 πλείστοι τε εἰσίν ὅσοι ἐξήγησαν αὐτοῦ τὸ σύγγραμμα. καὶ γὰρ Ἀντισέλενθι καὶ Ἡρακλείδης οἱ Ποντικὸς Κλεάνθης τε καὶ Σφαῖρος ὁ Στωκός. The influence of Heraclitus on Cleanthes has been variously estimated. Hirzel is the chief advocate in favour of it, holding e.g. that Cleanthes agreed with him in his hypo-
thesis of three elements, and that τόνος is traceable to παλίν-
tόνος (or παλίντροπος) ἄρμονία. Stein's more moderate estimate
appears to us truer.

(4) περὶ αἰσθήσεως.

(5) πρὸς Δημόκριτον, perhaps the same as περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων
(Diog. L. vii. 134) so Krische p. 430.

(6) πρὸς Ἀρίσταρχον, see on frag. 27. Some have erro-
neously supposed that the Aristarchus here referred to was
the Homeric critic, whose date is a century later than
Cleanthes; cf. Krische p. 394 and Wilamowitz-Moellendorf in
Hermes xx. 631.

(7) ὑπομνήματα φυσικά (Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 8).

The books next in order treat of θεολογικάν.

(8) ἀρχαιολογία has been identified with μυθικά (Athen.
xii. 572 e, Porphyry. vit. Pyth. c. 1), but the genuineness of the
latter work is seriously questioned. Müller frag. hist. Gr. ii.
p. 5. 9. 11 thinks that the τὰ κατὰ πόλειν μυθικά of Neanthes
of Cyzicus (cf. Plut. quaest. syrup. i. 10) is referred to in both
passages and Zeller Pre-Socr. i. p. 308 says:—The Cleanthes
of Porphyry is certainly not the Stoic but most likely a mis-
spelling for Neanthes of Cyzicus.

(9) περὶ θεών, cf. Plut. de vit. aer. alien. c. 7. To this
work Wachsmuth refers frags. 47. 54. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.
62. 63. Krische (p. 418, 422) also the statements in Cic.
N. D. i. 37 (frags. 14—17) and the hymn to Zeus (frag. 48).
See also Osann Praef. Cornut. p. ix.

(10) περὶ γιγάντων.

(11) περὶ 'Ῥμεταίων. This is a curious title. Perhaps it
should rather be classed as ethical. Cf. Persaeus' book περὶ
γάμον (Diog. L. vii. 36).

(12) περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν. This book treated of the interpre-
tation of Homer, and Wachsmuth accordingly refers to it
frags. 55. 65. 66. 67. To these should be added frag. 63 and
perhaps frag. 54.

(13) θεομαχία (ps.-Plut. de Fluv. v. 3. 4) was identified
by Krische with the book περὶ γιγάντων supra (p. 434) but this

4—2
and the next book are rightly described by Wachsmuth as "ficta ab impostore ps.-Plutarcho," see note on frag. 69.

(14) περὶ ὅρων, ib. v. 17. 4.

Fabricius Bibl. Gr. III. p. 552 infers from Simplic. in Epict. Man. c. 78 that one of Cleanthes' works bore the title Ἰαμβεῖα, but the words simply mean "in his well known Iambic lines."

III. Ethical.

(1) πρὸς Ἡριλλον. For Herillus see Zeller p. 42.
(2) περὶ ὀρμής β′.
(3) περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος γ′.
(4) περὶ εὐβουλίας.
(5) περὶ χάριτος.
(7) περὶ ἀρέτῶν.
(8) περὶ εὐφνίας.
(9) περὶ Γοργύππουν "num πρὸς Γόργυππον qui idem fuerit atque Γοργύππιδος ad quem complura scripta Chrysippus misit?" Wachsm. Mohnikike p. 100 wishes to read Γοργύππιδον.
(10) περὶ φθονερίας.
(11) περὶ ἔρωτος. Here belongs perhaps frag. 108.
(12) περὶ ἑλευθερίας.
(13) ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη.
(14) περὶ τιμῆς.
(15) περὶ δύεις.
(17) περὶ βουλῆς.
(18) περὶ νόμων.
(19) περὶ τοῦ δικαίου.
(20) περὶ ἁρωγῆς.
(21) περὶ τέλους.
(22) περὶ καλῶν.
(23) περὶ πράξεων.
(24) περὶ βασιλείας.
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(25) περὶ φιλίας.

(26) περὶ συμμοσίου. Persaeus wrote συμποτικὰ ύπομνήματα or διάλογοι (Athen. iv. 162 b, xiii. 607 a).


(28) περὶ τοῦ τῶν σοφῶν σοφιστεύειν.

(29) περὶ χρείων.

(30) διατριβῶν β'.

(31) περὶ ἡδονῆς. For this book see Krische p. 430 foll.

(32) περὶ χαλκοῦ (Diog. L. vii. 14). The title of this book has been much discussed. It was altered to περὶ χάριτος by Casaubon, to περὶ χρόνου by Menagius, Fabricius and Mohriake, and to περὶ χρείων by Wachsmuth. It is possible that χαλκοῦ is due to the scribe’s eye catching the word χαλκοῦ which closely precedes in the citation, and, if so, we have no clue to the true title.

(33) περὶ στοάς. This book is supposed to have existed from a mutilated passage of Philodemus περὶ φιλοσόφων in vol. Here. viii. col. 13 v. 18 ὡς ἀεὶ τ’ ἀναγραφαὶ τῶν π(τ)νάκων (αδ)test βιβλιοθήκαι σημαίνοντιν, (παρὰ Κλ)εώνθη ἐν τῷ περὶ στ(οὰς ἐ)σ(τιν) Διογένους αὕτη ἡ μνήμη. See hi. 1162 a 41.
THE FRAGMENTS OF ZENO.

1. Diog. L. vii. 39, τριμερή φασίν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου. εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν τι φυσικὸν· τὸ δὲ ἡθικὸν· τὸ δὲ λογικὸν. οὕτω δὲ πρῶτος διείλε Ζήνων ὁ Κιτεύς ἐν τῷ περὶ λόγου.

The triple division of philosophy was first brought into prominence by Zeno and the Stoics, though it seems to have been adopted before them by Xenocrates and the Peripatetics, cf. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 16 ἐντελέστερον δὲ...οἱ εἰσόντες τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἡθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικὸν· ὅν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἔστιν ἀρχηγὸς, περὶ πολλῶν μὲν φυσικῶν πολλῶν δὲ ἡθικῶν οὐκ ὁλίγων δὲ λογικῶν διαλεξθεῖσα· ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐνικράτην καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἐτί δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στόιχεως ἔχονται τῆς τῆς διαίρεσεως. Ar. Top. i. p. 105 b 19 ἔστι δ' ὡς τύπῳ περιλαβεῖν τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν προ- βλημάτων μέρη τρία· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡθικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ, αἱ δὲ λογικαὶ must not be taken as indicating that Aristotle had in view the triple division (see Waitz in loc.). Cicero speaking of Speusippus, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Polemo, and Theophrastus says (de Fin. iv. 4):—totam philosophiam tres in partes disserunt, quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus. In Acad. i. 19 he wrongly attributes the division to Plato (fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex): Diog. L. iii. 56 only says that Plato introduced the διάλεκτικὸς τόπος, not that
he recognised the triple division. With the Stoics it became so fundamental that they did not hesitate to refer to it the three heads of Cerberus and Athene's name Τριτογένεια (Zeller, pp. 363, 364). Hirzel (de logica Stoicorum in Sauppe's Satura Philologa, p. 71) thinks that Zeno was the inventor of the term λογική in place of Xenocrates' διάλεκτική.


As logic is obviously the least important to the Stoics of the three divisions, Zeno regarded Ethics, not Physics, as the kernel of his system. The authorities are however very confusing on this point, for of Chrysippus, who is coupled with Zeno in Diog., Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 1 says:—τούτων (μερῶν) δὲιν τάττεσθαι πρῶτον μὲν τὰ λογικά, δεύτερα δὲ τὰ ἡθικά, τρίτα δὲ τὰ φυσικά—and yet in the same passage we find attributed to Chrysippus the statement οὐδὲ ἀλλοι τινὸς ἑνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραληπτῆς οὐσίας ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διάστασιν, which shows that he must have regarded ethics as containing the consummation of philosophy. Again, the Stoics compared the three parts of philosophy to a fruit garden surrounded by a wall and also to an egg, but whereas according to Diog. (vii. 40) physics are likened to the fruit of the garden and the yolk of the egg, in Sextus (adv. Math. vii. 17—19) they are compared to the trees in the garden and the white of the egg, having changed places with ethics. But both alike in recording the comparison, which Posidonius thought more apt, yield the place of honour to ethics, which are compared to the soul of man. It is not improbable, as Wellmann and Stein (Erkenntnistheorie, p. 302) think, that the two former of
these similes may be due to Zeno, on whose fondness for such similes we have remarked in the Intro. p. 33, but there is no evidence to decide. The confusion about the whole matter seems to have arisen from the distinction made by the Stoics between the order of relative importance and the order of teaching (cf. Sext. l. c. 22, 23). At any rate, as regards Zeno, it is most natural to suppose that the pupil of Crates and the admirer of Socrates placed ethics in the forefront of his system. [Ritter and Preller, §390 n. and Ueberweg, p. 192 apparently regard as the earlier view that which gave physics the most important position, but see Stein, Psychologic n. 7.]

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3. Arr. Epict. diss. iv. 8, 12, θεωρήματα τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦ...ἀ' Ζήνων λέγει γνώναι τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα, ποῖον τί ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς ἀρμόττεται πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα ἐστὶ.

It is difficult, in the absence of Zeno's context, to decide the exact meaning of τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα. There is no doubt that the Stoics used this phrase in the sense of "parts of speech" (Diog. vii. 58 ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ... στοιχείον λόγου ἀπτωτων), but this meaning is not general enough and is certainly excluded by the words immediately preceding in Epictetus τί τέλος; μὴ τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὐ, ἄλλα τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. It is suggested, therefore, that Zeno is here expressing, possibly in an earlier work, the nominalism of Antisthenes and that λόγον στοιχεῖα = the (indefinable) elements of definition. It is now generally admitted (see e.g. Dr Jackson in Journ. Phil. xiii. 262) that the opinion stated at some length by Socrates in Theaet. p. 201 E—202 C is that of Antisthenes, and the words στοιχείον and λόγος in this sense must have belonged to his terminology (see the
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whole passage and especially τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἰονπερὲ 
στοιχεῖα...λόγον οὗκ ἔχει 201 Ε, οὗτο δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα 
ἀλογα καὶ ἰγνωτα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δὲ, cf. 206 Ε τὸ ἐρωτη-
θέντα τί ἐκαστὸν δυνατῶν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν 
στοιχείων ἄποδούναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ: with this should be 
compared the passages in Ar. Metaph. viii. 3. 1043 b 23, 
xiv. 3. 1091 a 7 ὡστ' οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἦς ἐνδεχεται εἶναι 
ὅρον καὶ λόγον οἶον τῆς συνθέτου εἰν τε αἰσθητῆ εἰών τε 
νοητὴ γ' ἐξ ὧν δ' αὐτὴ πρῶτων οὗκ ἔστων. It is not a 
necessary inference from this passage that Zeno treated 
ὅρθος λόγος as κριτήριον ἀληθείας, or that he and 
Cleanthes are the ἄλλοι τινες τῶν ἄρχαιοτέρων Στωικῶν 
whom Diogenes (vii. 54) mentions as holding this opinion, 
although Hirzel thinks this established, comparing frag. 
157 (Untersuchungen, II. pp. 14 f. 23). Indeed it is 
difficult to understand how, except on the hypothesis of 
a change of opinion, this is reconcilable with the fact that 
Zeno introduced the φαντασία καταληπτική, as will 
appear hereafter. Hirzel further remarks:—"Unter den 
τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοάς τινες des Alexand. Aphrod. zur Topik 
(schol. Arist. p. 256 b 14) welche den λόγος durch τί ἦν 
δει βεβαία Zenon gemeint sein." The latter part 
of this note requires some modification if Stein's view 
referred to in the Introd. p. 9 be accepted. The same 
writer (Erkenntnistheorie, p. 90, 91) explains γνώναι τὰ 
τῶν λόγον στοιχεῖα as "die Erkenntnis der Elemente des 
Denkens d. h. wie das Denken beschaffen sei und worin 
die gegenseitige Verbindung der Gedanken bestehe und 
welche Konsequenzen sich aus dieser Gedankenverbind-
ung ergeben."

4. Arr. Epict. diss. i. 17. 10, 11, καὶ τὰ λογικὰ 
ἀκαρπά ἐστι...καὶ περὶ τούτου μὲν ὤψόμεθα, εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ 
τούτο δοίη τις, ἐκεῖνα ἀπαρκεῖ, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ
διακριτικά καὶ ἐπισκεπτικά καὶ ὡς ἂν τίς εἴποι μετρητικά καὶ στατικά· τίς λέγει ταῦτα; μόνος Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης;

This and the two following fragments show us the view which Zeno took of the value of logical studies, which were recommended not so much on account of the value of the results obtained, as because they enable us to test the theories and expose the fallacies of others and to clear the ground for further enquiries, cf. Ar. Top. i. 104 b 1 τοῦτο δ’ ἵδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἴκειον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστιν ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἀπασών τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὡδὸν ἐξει, cf. also the title ὅργανον given to Aristotle’s logical treatises (Waitz II. 294) and the name κανονικὴ adopted by the Epicureans. For the distinction between the Peripatetic and Stoic views of logic see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 207. Hirzel’s remarks about Zeno (de log. Stoic. p. 72) do not take into account this evidence.

στατικά, “weighing.” The word is used by Plato, cf. Phileb. 55 E οἶον πασῶν ποιν τεχνῶν ἄν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικὴν, ὡς ἔπος εἶπείν. Charmid. 166 B.

5. Stob. Ecl. ii. 2. 12 p. 22, 12 Wachsm. [vulgo Floril. lxxxii. 5], Ζήνων τὰς τῶν διαλεκτικῶν τέχνας εἰκαζε τοῖς δικαίως μέτρως οὐ πυρὸν οὐδ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν σπουδαίων μετροῦσιν ἄλλ’ ἀχυρα καὶ κόπτρα.

At first sight this and the next fragm. appear contradictory, but probably this is directed against some particular opponents. The Megarians, the Eristics of this period, are most likely to be meant, and we know that they were often called διαλεκτικοῖ, as the Stoics themselves are by Sextus (Zeller, Socrates etc. p. 250 n. 3). Moreover Alexinus was a determined opponent of Zeno
(Diog. ii. 109 διεφέρετο δὲ μάλιστα πρὸς Ζήνωνα) and Sextus tells us how he controverted Zeno’s proof that the world is λογικός (Math. ix. 107). Stein thinks that the inconsistency is to be explained by the importance attributed by Zeno to the question of the criterion (Erkenntnistheorie, p. 303), but surely διαλεκτικών in frag. 5 and διαλεκτικῆν in frag. 6 must refer to the same branch of logic. The explanation is however perfectly valid to explain the difference of statement between Cic. Fin. iv. 9 and id. Acad. i. 40. τέχνας = treatises.

δικαίοις: so the three best mss AM and S: εἰκαίοις adopted by Mein. from ms B (late and untrustworthy) is virtually a conjecture. Wachsm. suggests χυδαίοις but, on the interpretation given above, δικαίοις is more forcible: the methods are good enough (cf. μετρητικά frag. 4) but they are put to base uses, i.e. to mere quibbling. After μέτροις Gaisf. add. oίς.

If the fragment be interpreted quite generally as a depreciation of logical studies, we have here an approximation to the position of Aristo (Stob. Ecl. ii. 2. 14, 18, 22 = Floril. lxxxii. 7, 11, 18) in one of the points on which he severed himself from the Stoic school.


σοφίσματα, cf. the anecdote related by Diog. vii. 25. A logician showed Zeno seven διαλεκτικαὶ ὁδεῖαι in the Reaper fallacy, and received 200 drachmas, although his fee was only half that amount, ib. vii. 47 οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ

For the use of τύπωσις see Introd. p. 34. That Zeno did not define his meaning further than by the bare statement is evident from the controversy which afterwards arose between Cleanthes and Chrysippus as to the exact meaning of τύπωσις: for which see on Cleanth. frag. 3. It would seem however from the expressions "effictum" and "impressum" in Zeno’s definition of **fantasia καταληπτική** (frag. 11) that Cleanthes is a truer exponent of his master’s teaching in this matter than Chrysippus. Zeno must have been influenced by Aristotle's treatment of **fantasia** (de An. iii. 3): see Introd. p. 24. See further Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 157.

8. **τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεὶς τῶν δὲ **fantasian τὰς μὲν ἀληθεὶς τὰς δὲ **ψευδεῖς.** This is attributed to the Stoics generally by Stob. Ecl. i. 50. 21, Plut. plac. iv. 8. 9, but must belong to Zeno having regard to Sext. Emp. adv. Math. viii. 355, Δημόκριτος μὲν πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν ύπαρξιν κεκινηκεν, Ἐπικουρος δὲ πᾶν αἰσθητὸν ἐλεξε βέβαιον εἶναι ο δὲ Στωικὸς Ζήνων διαιρέσει ἔχρητο; Cic.
N. D. i. 70 urgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret quae sensibus viderentur; Zeno autem nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia; Cic. Acad. i. 41 visis non omnibus adjungebat fidem.

Zeno is not entirely a sensualist: Stein, Erkenntnistem. For the general doctrine see ib. p. 142—151. Zeno is here again following the lead of Aristotle, cf. de An. iii. 3. 7 eita ai mев (scil. aiσθήσεις) άληθείς άιέ, ai dè φαντασίαν γίνονται ai πλείους ψευδείς. On the other hand Epicurus held πάσας τὰς φαντασίας άληθείς εἶναι (Sext. Math. vii. 204).

9. Cic. Acad. i. 41, (Zeno) adjungebat fidem...iis (visis) solum, quae propriae quidam habere de declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur.

Cicero is here speaking of the Greek ἐνάργεια, for which he elsewhere suggests as translations perspicuitas or evidentia (ib. ii. 17). Every sense impression is ἐναργείς according to the Epicureans (Zeller, p. 428), but with Zeno ἐνάργεια is simply introduced as an attribute of καταληπτική φαντασία: cf. Sext. Math. vii. 257 speaking of the κ. φ. αὐτή γὰρ ἐναργῆς οὕσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν λαμβάνεται καταστῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δεομένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτη προσπίπτειν ἢ εἰς τὸ τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας διαφορὰν ὑποβάλλειν. Hirzel (Untersuchungen, ii. pp. 3, 6) attributes ἐναργεία to the Cynics but his authorities merely show that Diogenes proved the possibility of motion by walking about (Diog. vi. 39), which Sextus (Math. x. 68) calls a proof δι' αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας.

10. Sext. Math. vii. 253, ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἄρχαιο-τεροί τῶν Στωικῶν κριτηρίων φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. Ib. 227 κριτηρίων ἀληθείας εἶναι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. This is to be at-
tributed to Zeno partly as an inference from the word ἀρχαῖοτέροι, partly as a necessary corollary from the next fragment, and partly in accordance with the testimony of Cic. Acad. I. 42 sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam (κατάληψιν) quam dixi collocabat eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat sed soli credendum esse dicebat. Diog. L. vii. 46 refers the citation to the school generally and in 54 quotes it from Chrysippus ἐν τῇ δυσδεκάτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν.

For the doctrine of the κατάληπτική φαντασία see Zeller, pp. 87—89. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 167 foll. Four different explanations of the meaning of the term have been given (1) καταλ. active. The irresistible character of the impression compels assent, Zeller. (2) καταλ. passive: the perception is grasped by the mind, Hirzel. (3) The object of representation (τὸ ὑπάρχον) and not the perception is grasped by the mind, Ueberweg, p. 192 (now given up by Heinze). (4) καταλ. both active and passive, Stein, thus reconciling the apparent contradiction between Cic. Acad. I. 41, and Sext. Math. vii. 257.

For the exact meaning of κατάληψις(καταληπτική) φαντασία cf. Sext. Emp. Math. xi. 182 κατάληψις ἐστι καταληπτικής φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις: a distinction, possibly due to Zeno, which tends to disappear in practice. See also Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 182. κατάληψις καταληπτική, etc. were new terminology invented by Zeno, according to Cic. Acad. I. 41 comprehensionem appellabat similem iis rebus, quae manuprehenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc dixerat cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus est, ib. II. 145, but the verb καταλαμβάνειν had been used by Plato in the sense “to grasp with the mind,” Phaedr. 250 D perὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὡσπερ εὑπομεν, μετ' ἐκείνων τε ἐλαμπτεν ὃν, δεύρῳ τε ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν
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11. Sext. Math. vii. 248, fantasia kataluptikē ēstiv ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος, ib. 426, Pyrrh. ii. 4. Diogenes gives the definition in substantially the same words in § 50 adding however καὶ ἐναποτετυπωμένη after ἐναπο- μεμαγμένη: in § 46 he omits ὅποια—ὑπάρχοντος but adds:—ἀκατάληπτον δὲ τὴν μὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, μὴ κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον τὴν μὴ τραυῇ μηδὲ ἐκτυποῦ, which very possibly belongs also to Zeno. The evidence attaching the definition to Zeno is as follows:—Cic. Acad. ii. 18 si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum impressum effectumque ex eo unde esset quale esse non posset ex eo unde non esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus; ib. 113, ib. i. 41 id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur comprehendibile (of Zeno) ib. ii. 77. Speaking of the controversy between Arcesilas and Zeno, Cic. states that the last words of the definition were added by Zeno because of the pressure put upon him by Arcesilas. Numenius ap. Euseb. P. E. xiv. 6, p. 733 τὸ δὲ δόγμα τούτο ἀυτοῦ (scil. Ζήνωνος) πρώτου εὑρομένου κατὰ τὸ ὁνόμα βλέπων εὑδοκιμοῦν ἐν ταῖς Ἀθηναῖς τὴν καταληπτικὴν fantasiāν πάση μὴχανῆ ἔχριτο ἐπ’ αὐτὴν (of Arcesilas). August. c. Acad. iii. 9, 18 sed videamus quid ait Zeno. Tale scilicet visum comprehendi et percipi posse, quale cum falso non haberet signa communia.

The controversy between Arcesilas and Zeno is a historical fact about which there can be no doubt, and, apart from direct evidence, the chronology proves that our defi-
nition can hardly be due to Chrysippus, who only succeeded to the headship of the Stoa eight years after the death of Arsesilas (cf. Plut. Com. Not. c. 1). This question of the criterion was the chief battle-ground of the Stoics and the New Academy, and in later times Carneades maintained ἀκατάληπτα πάντα εἶναι οὐ πάντα δὲ ἀδηλα (Zeller, p. 535). In the second book of Cicero's Academica the question is discussed at length. Sext. Math. vii. 248—252 shows in detail the reason for the insertion of each member of the definition: the impression must be from the object to exclude the visions of madmen, and with reference to the object to exclude a case like that of Orestes, who mistook his sister for a Fury. It must be imprinted and stamped on the mind to ensure that the peripient shall have noticed all the characteristics of the object. Lastly, the addition ὁποῖα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μή ὑπάρχοντος was inserted to meet the Academic objection that two impressions, one true and the other false, might be so entirely alike (ἀπαράλλακτον) as to be incapable of distinction, which of course the Stoics did not admit. For ἐναπομεμαγμένη cf. Ar. Ran. 1040 θεν ἡμὶ φρήν ἀπομαξαμένη πολλάς ἀρετὰς ἑποίησεν.


tekhnē σύστημα ἐστὶν ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων καὶ ἐπὶ τέλος εὑχρηστον τῷ βίῳ λαμβανόντων τὴν ἀναφοράν. The same definition partially in id. Pyrrh. III. 188, 241, 251, Math. i. 75, vii. 109, 373, 182. Wachsm. also quotes (Comm. i. p. 12), Schol. Dionys. Thrac. p. 649, 31, ib. p. 721, 25 οἱ Στωικοὶ οὕτως ὀρίζονται τὴν τέχνην τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα περὶ ψυχῆς γενόμενον εἰκαταλήψεων εἰγεγυμνασμένων κ.τ.λ. Cf. also Quintil. ii. 17, 41 Nam sive, ut Cleanthes voluit, ars est potestas via, id est, ordinem efficiens: esse certe viam atque ordinem in benedicendo nemo dubitaverit; sive ille ab omnibus fere probatus finis observatur artem constare ex praeceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem vitae utilem. Cic. frag. ap. Diomed 414 ed. Putsch ars est perceptionum exercitarum constructio ad unum exitum utilem vitae pertinentium. Cic. Acad. ii. 22 ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat. Fin. iii. 18 artes...constent ex cognitionibus et contineat quiddam in se ratione constitutum et via (illustrating also the next frag.). N. D. ii. 148 ex quibus (perceptis) collatis inter se et comparatis artes quoque efficiimus partim ad usum vitae...necessarias.

It is worth while to compare with Zeno's definition of art those to be found in Aristotle: both philosophers alike recognise its practical character (cf. Eth. vi. 4. 6 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἐξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθούς ποιητική ἐστιν) and that it proceeds by means of regulated principles (cf. Met. i. 1. 5 γινεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας εὐνοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις). Aristotle's distinction that τέχνη is concerned with γένεσις while ἐπιστήμη deals with ὄν (Anal. Post. ii. 19. 4) is of course foreign to Zeno's system.

Zeller's note on p. 266, 2 (Eng. Tr.) is inaccurate but appears correctly in the 4th German ed. (iii. 1. 247).

The authenticity of this fragment is rendered doubtful (1) by the fact that Zeno had defined τέχνη differently, as we have seen, (2) because Cleanthes defined τέχνη as ἐξὶς ὀδὸ πάντα ἀνύνουσα (frag. 5). It is of course possible that Zeno left two alternative definitions as in the case of πάθος (frags. 136 and 137), and that Cleanthes adopted one of these with verbal alterations, but it seems most probable that the Schol. has made a mistake, and certainly ὀδοποιητικὴ has a suspicious look. Stein however, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 312, accepts the definition.

14. μνήμη θεσαυρισμός ἐστι φαντασιῶν.

These words are shown to belong to Zeno by the following considerations. Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 372 foll. is describing the controversy between Cleanthes and Chrysippus as to the meaning of Zeno’s τύπωσις and introduces one of Chrysippus’ arguments εἰ γὰρ κηροῦ τρόπον τυποῦται ἢ ψυχὴ φανταστικῶς πάσχουσα ἢ εἰ τὸ ἔσχατον κίνημα ἐπισκοτήσει τῇ προτέρᾳ φαντασίᾳ, ὥστε καὶ ἢ τῆς δευτέρας σφραγίδος τύπος ἐξαλειπτικὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ προτέρου. ἄλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, ἀναρεῖται μὲν μνήμη, θεσαυρισμὸς οὕσα φαντασιῶν, ἀναρεῖται δὲ πᾶσα τέχνη σύστημα γὰρ ἣν καὶ ἄθροισμα καταλήψεων κ.τ.λ. Now one might suspect from internal evidence alone that Chrysippus is appealing to the school definitions of Memory and Art as established by Zeno in support of his argument against Zeno’s pupil, but the inference becomes irresistible when we find that the definition of Art is certainly Zeno’s, as has already been shown. Cf. Cic. Acad. ii. 22 quid quisquam meminit quod non animo comprehendit et tenet? ib. 106 memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque

15. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 151, δόξαν εἶναι τὴν ἀσθενή καὶ πεινᾶ ἑξικατάθεσιν attributed to Zeno by Cie. Acad. i. 41 ex qua (inscientia) exsisteret etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis, cf. ib. Tusc. iv. 15 opinationem autem...volunt esse imbecillam assensionem. Stobaeus speaks of two Stoic definitions of δόξα Ecl. ii. 7. 11m, p. 112, 2 [= ii. 231] διττάς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτω συγκατάθεσιν, τὴν δ’ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ, cf. ib. ii. 7. 10. p. 89, 1 [= ii. 169] παραλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦσ ὑπολήψεως. It is possible from a consideration of the next frag. that Zeno’s word was οἴησις. Thus, as with Plato, δόξα and ἀγνοία are ultimately identical. See further Stein, Erkenntnistheorie pp. 204, 205.

16. Diog. L. vii. 23, ἐλεγε δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι τῆς οἰησεως ἀλλοτριώτερου πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. The plural is used because ἐπιστήμη in the narrower sense in which Zeno used the word is a single κατάληψις. The Stoics also defined ἐπιστήμη as a σύστημα (cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 51 p. 73, 21 = ii. 129) of such perceptions. At the same time we must beware of supposing that ἐπιστήμη is according to Zeno identical with κατάληψις. ἐπιστήμη is the conscious knowledge of the wise man, whereas κατάληψις may be possessed by the φαύλος. The latter may occasionally and accidentally assent to the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, but the former’s assent is regular and unerring. Cf. Sext. Math. vii. 152 δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην εἰν μόνοις ὑφίστασθαι λέγουσι τοῖς σοφοῖς, τὴν δὲ δόξαν εἰν μόνοις τοῖς φαύλοις.
We have here, in fact, the Platonic distinction between δόξα ἀληθής and ἐπιστήμη in another form.

17. Cic. Acad. i. 41, si ita erat comprehensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam sin aliter inscientiam nominabat (Zeno).

The Greek sources for this will be found in Stob. Ecl. ii. 7, 51 p. 73, 19 = ii. 129 εἴναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου, ib. 11" p. 111, 20 = ii. 231, τὴν ἀγνοιαν μεταπτωτικῆν εἴναι συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἀσθενῆ, cf. Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 151, ἐπιστήμην εἴναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βεβαιὰν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ὑπὸ λόγου κατάληψιν, see also Stein, p. 311 and n. 711, who concludes that these definitions are Zenonian. Diog. l. vii. 47, αυτὴν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ, ἢ ἔξιν ἐν φαντασίων προσδέξει, ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. The definition of ἐπιστήμην as ἔξις κ.τ.λ. is due to Herillus, cf. ib. vii. 165, but I am mable to see why on that ground Zeller, p. 82, n. 1, and Wellmann, p. 480, should also infer that it was introduced by Zeno. It is far more natural to suppose that the simplest form of the definition was first put forward by the founder of the school, and that it was subsequently modified by his successors in accordance with their different positions: thus Herillus' definition is undoubtedly modelled on Zeno's, but is adapted to his conception of ἐπιστήμη as the ethical τέλος.

18. Cic. Acad. i. 42, inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat.

Cf. Sext. Math. vii. 151, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἐν μεθορίᾳ τούτων τεταγμένην κατάληψιν...κατάληψιν δὲ
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tην μεταξὺ τούτων: ib. 153, ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος...δεικνὺς ὅτι οὐδέν ἔστι μεταξὺ ἑπιστήμης καὶ δόξης κριτήριον ἢ κατάληψις. (It will be observed that where Cicero speaks of inscientia Sextus mentions δόξα, but, as has been shown, they are practically identical.) Wellmann, p. 484, thinks that either there is some mistake in the text or that Cicero has misunderstood his authorities, but the passage in Sextus l.c. 151—153 makes the meaning perfectly clear: see the note on frag. 16. The latter part of Cicero’s statement may be either an inference by his authority ex silentio, or a record of an express statement by Zeno. In any case, it derives its force here simply from the antithesis to scientia and inscientia: thus the Stoics classed certain virtues (goods) as ἑπιστήμαι and certain vices (evils) as ἀγνοιαί, cf. Stob. Ecl. π. 7. 5β, p. 58, 5—59, 3 = π. 92—94.

19. Cic. Acad. i. 41, Zeno ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adiungit animorum: quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntarium.

In this case it is impossible to recover Zeno’s actual words, nor can we tell how much of the Stoic doctrine handed down by Sext. Math. viii. 397, belonged to Zeno; cf. especially συγκατάθεσις ἤτις διπλοῦν ἐοικεν εἶναι πρῶγμα καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἐχειν ἀκούσιον τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ κρίσει κεῖμενον. A full list of authorities is given by Zeller, Stoics, p. 88, n. 1. The free power of assent must be understood only in the limited sense in which free will is possible in consequence of the Stoic doctrine of εἰμαρμένη: see Wellmann, l. c. pp. 482, 483. It is moreover only the wise man who can distinguish accurately the relative strength of divers impressions, and he alone will consistently refuse assent to mere φαντάσματα.
20. Cic. Acad. i. 41, Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appellabat.

For the different meanings of αἰσθησις in the Stoic school, see Diog. L. vii. 52 αἰσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τὸ τε ἄφ’ ἣγεμονικὸν πνεῦμα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διήκον, καὶ ἢ δὲ αὐτῶν κατὰληψις, καὶ ἢ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ’ ἣν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται: the second of these definitions is thus attributed by Cicero to Zeno. So Dr Reid: it is however possible that sensum is past part. pass. of sentio and is a translation of αἰσθητὸν or αἰσθητικὸν rather than of αἰσθησις, in which case cf. Diog. L. vii. 51 τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν αἰσθητικαὶ αἱ δ’ οὐ. αἰσθητικαὶ μὲν αἱ δὲ αἰσθητήριοι ἢ αἰσθητηρίων λαμβανόμεναι κ.τ.λ.

21. Cic. Acad. i. 42, Zeno sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat quod comprehensio facta sensibus et vera illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinquueret quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae reperiantur.

For the general sense see Zeller, p. 80, n. 1.

non quod omnia: Dr Reid cites Sext. Pyrrh. i. 92 ἐκαστὸν τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῶν αἰσθητῶν ποικίλον ὑποπίπτειν δοκεῖ οἶνον τὸ μῆλον λειόν εὐώδες γλυκὺ ξάνθων. ἂδηλων οὖν πότερον ποτε ταύτας μόνας ὄντως ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας ἡ μονοποιῶν μὲν ἐστὶ παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων διάφορον φαίνεται ἡ καὶ πλείονας μὲν τῶν φαινομένων ἔχει ποιότητας, ἡμῶν δὲ οὐ ύποπίπτουσί τινες αὐτῶν, ib. 97. These passages however do not refer to Stoic teaching but are used in furtherance of the Sceptical argument.
notiones: a translation of ἐννοιαὶ. It seems certain that the distinction between προλήψεις and ἐννοιαὶ (for which see R. and P. § 393 and note c. and Stein, Erkenntnis-theorie, p. 237) is not at least in terms Zenonian, though he may have spoken of κοιναὶ ἐννοιαὶ. Reid (on Acad. II. 30) suggests that the word προλήψεις was introduced by Zeno, but cf. Cic. N. D. i. 44 ut Epicurus ipse προλήψεις appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat, so that it is more probable that Chrysippus borrowed it from the rival school; but see Stein, l. c. p. 248—250. ἐννοια, on the other hand, used by Plato (Phaed. 73 c) in quite a general sense, and defined by the Peripatetics as ὁ ἀθροισμὸς τῶν τοῦ νοῦ φαντασμάτων καὶ ἡ συνηκεφαλαίωσις τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους εἰς τὸ καθόλου (Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 224) must have received its special Stoic sense from Zeno.

principia: it is difficult to determine whether this is a translation of a Stoic technical term, cf. Acad. II. 21.

22. Cic. Acad. i. 42, Errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicacionem et uno nomine omnia quae essent aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis a virtute sapientiaque removebat.

With this may be compared the Stoic definitions of ἀπροπτωσία, ἀνεικαίωτης, ἀνελεγξία, and ἀματαιότης quoted by Diog. L. vii. 46, 47. Temeritas is probably a translation of προπέτεια, a favourite word with Sextus when speaking of the dogmatists (e.g. Pyrrh. I. 20) but also used by the Stoics (Diog. vii. 48). Reid also quotes (on Ac. II. 66) Epict. d. iii. 22. 104 προπετῆς συγκατά-θεσις.

Ταῦτα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἱδεὰς προσαγορεύεσθαι. τῶν γὰρ κατὰ τὰ ἐννοήματα ὑποπιπτόντων εἶναι τὰς ἱδεὰς, οἷον ἀνθρώπων, ὑππων, κοινότερον εἴπειν πάντων τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόσων λέγουσιν ἱδεὰς εἶναι. [ταῦτα] δὲ οἱ Στοικοὶ φιλόσοφοι φασίν ἀνυπάρκτους εἶναι καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐννοημάτων μετέχειν ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ πτῶσεων, ὡς δὴ προσηγορίας καλοῦσι, τυγχάνειν).


Wellmann, p. 484, (followed by Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, n. 689) suggests that this may have come from the book entitled καθολικά. Possibly this criticism of the ideas formed part of the attack upon Plato mentioned by Numenius, ap. Euseb. P. E. xiv. 6, p. 733, ὁ δ' (Ζήνων) ἐν τῷ ἀσθενεστέρῳ ὁν ἰσχύιαν ἄγων οὐ δυναμενος ἑαυτοῦ ἀρκεσιλάοι μὲν ἄφιετο, πολλὰ ἄν εἰπεῖν ἐχων, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἥθελε, τάχα δὲ μᾶλλον ἄλλος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν οὐκέτι ἐν ζώσιν ὑντα Πλάτωνα ἐσκιαμάχει, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ἀμάξης πομπείαν πάσαν κατεθρούβει, λέγων ὡς οὔτ' ἄν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀμυνομένου, ὑπερδικέν τε αὐτοῦ ἄλλω ὡδένι μέλου' εἰτε μελησειν ἀρκεσιλάοι, αὐτός γε κερδανεῖν χετο ἀποκυρτισμενος ἄφ' ἐαυτοῦ τὸν ἀρκεσιλαον. τοῦτο δὲ ἴδη καὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα τὸν Συρακοσίων ποίησαντα τὸ σῴφισμα ἐπὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. Δεκαθαυτοτην τοις αἰτίας. Αὐτοὶ τι ποίοι, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τι

ἐννοήματα. For the definition cf. Plut. Plac. Iv. 11 ἐστὶ δὲ νόημα φαντάσμα διανοίας λογικοῦ ζώον, ἰ.ε., as he goes on to explain, ἐννοήμα stands to φαντάσμα in the relation of εἴδος to γένος: φαντάσματα are shared with us by all other animals whereas ἐννοήματα belong to the gods and mankind alone. Diog. vii. 61, ἐννοήμα δὲ ἐστὶ φαντάσμα διανοίας, οὔτε τι ὁν οὔτε ποιῶν, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τι
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οὐ καὶ ὀσανεὶ ποιῶν, οἶον γίνεται ἀνατύπωμα ἵππου καὶ μὴ παρόντος.

τινα...ποιά, i.e. they have no existence or definiteness. For the Stoic conception of τι and ποιῶν, see Zeller, pp. 98 f. and 102 f. It has been inferred from this passage that the doctrine of the four categories does not belong entirely to Chrysippus (Petersen, Chrys. phil. fundam. p. 18).

ίδεας. The meaning is that the Platonic ideas are identical with ἐννοήματα, inasmuch as they possess no objective existence, but are mere figments of the mind. Plato himself deals with this very point, Parm. 132 β ἀλλα...μη τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῶ προσήκη ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς. Antisthenes had already criticised the theory of ideas from this point of view: see Introd. p. 18.

ὑποπιπτόντων: the regular word for the presentation of external impressions to the organs of sense (e.g. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 40 οὐχ οἴανταί...ὑποπίπτουσι φαντασίαι).

ὀπόσων, κ.τ.λ. So far as it goes this passage is in agreement with Aristotle's statement that Plato recognised ideas of ὀπόσα φύσει only (Metaph. Α. 3. 1070 a 18): see Dr Jackson in Journ. Phil. x. 255, etc.

ταύτας—τυγχάνειν. These words are not expressly attributed to Zeno: hence Diels followed by Wachsm. adds to the lemma Ζημωνος the words καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.

τῶν δὲ πτώσεων, κ.τ.λ. This passage is extremely difficult and is supposed to be corrupt by Zeller, ΠΠ. 2. 79 and Wachsmuth. The latter suggests τὰς δὲ ποιότητας ἐπωνυμῶν, κ.τ.λ. or if πτώσεων is corrupt for ἐπωνυμίων "in fine talia fere interciderint τὰς κοινὰς ποιότητας, cf. Diog. vii. 58," the former (coll. Sext. Math. vii. 11) would read τὰ τυγχάνοντα in place of τυγχάνειν (die Gedanken
seien in uns, die Bezeichnungen gehen auf die Dinge). The text, as it stands, has been interpreted in three ways: (1) notitia rerum rationi nostrae insitae sunt, nomina fortuito obveniunt, Diels. (2) \( \pi\tau\omega\sigma\iota \sigma\varepsilon\iota \) = omnes singulae res cuiusque qualitatis\( ) (\gamma\epsilon\nu\iota\kappa\alpha\nu\iota\alpha\iota, i.e. \( \iota\delta\varepsilon\iota \). These impress themselves on the mind of man (\( \tau\nu\gamma\chi\alpha\nu\epsilon\iota\nu \)), Petersen, l.c. p. 82, foll.: but this interpretation of \( \pi\tau\omega\sigma\iota \) is unwarranted and is founded on a misconception of Diog. L. vii. 58. (3) Prantl’s interpretation (l. p. 421, n. 63) is a combination of these two views. That the text is sound in the main is, I think, proved by Simplic. Cat. p. 54 (quoted by Petersen) \( \omicron \delta \varepsilon \alpha\pi\delta \tau\iota \) \Akolouv \ta\ \me\thekta\ \ap\delta\ \tau\ou\ \mu\et\e\x\e\theta\sigma\tau\ai\ \kai\ \tau\as\ \pi\tau\omega\sigma\iota\ \tau\v\nu\ktau\as\ \ap\delta\ \tau\ou\ \tau\nu\gamma\chi\alpha\nu\v\e\theta\tau\ai \), and Clem. Alex. viii. 9. 26: after saying that the \( \pi\tau\omega\sigma\iota \) for the \( \kappa\a\ta\i\gamma\omicron\omicron\omicron\micron\alpha\)a “\( \tau\omicron\ \t\e\mu\nu\e\theta\sigma\tau\ai \)” is “\( \tau\omicron\ \t\e\mu\nu\e\theta\sigma\tau\ai \)” and for \( \nu\a\nu\iota \) \( \gamma\i\gamma\nu\v\e\nu\tau\ai \) “\( \tau\omicron\ \nu\a\nu\ \gamma\i\nu\v\e\theta\sigma\tau\ai \)” and explaining that Aristotle called the \( \pi\tau\omega\sigma\iota \) \( \pi\ro\sigma\si\nu\g\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\iota \) he proceeds \( \omicron \pi\tau\omega\sigma\iota \ \delta \ \a\si\o\mu\ma\tau\os\iota\ \e\nu\i\nu\ \om\l\o\g\o\e\i\tau\ai \): \( \di\omicron \ \kai\ \tau\ou\ \s\o\f\i\si\ma\ \e\k\e\i\nuo\ \l\u\e\t\ai \), \( \delta \ \l\e\g\e\i\si\ \d\i\e\r\c\h\e\ta\i\ \s\o\u\ \d\i\a\ \tau\ou\ \s\t\o\m\a\tau\os\), \( \ou\p\e\r\ \a\l\h\i\t\h\e\s\), \( \o\i\k\i\a\ \d\e\ \l\e\g\e\i\si\ \o\i\k\i\a\ \a\r\a\ \d\i\a\ \tau\ou\ \s\t\o\m\a\tau\os\ \s\o\u\ \d\i\e\r\c\h\e\ta\i\ \ou\p\e\r\ \p\e\\e\d\os\): \( \o\i\d\e\ \g\a\r\ \t\i\nu\ \o\i\k\i\a\ \l\e\g\o\m\e\n\ \s\o\m\a\ \o\u\s\a\n\), \( \a\l\l\a\ \t\i\nu\ \pi\t\o\si\ni\ \a\si\o\m\a\o\u\s\a\n\), \( \i\z\ \o\i\k\i\a\ \t\u\gamma\chi\a\nu\e\i\). A consideration of the latter passage, which it is surprising that no one has cited, warrants the suggestion that \( \tau\a\ \up\pi\a\r\x\o\nu\t\a\) or some such words have fallen out after \( \tau\nu\gamma\chi\a\nu\e\i\). All would then be plain:\( \pi\t\o\si\ni\ = \a\mathrm{name}\ ) (\( \e\nu\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\ma = \mathrm{thought} \). \( \pi\t\o\si\ni\ \a\\mathrm{was}\ \a\\mathrm{also} \) (\( \k\a\ta\i\gamma\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omega\mu\a\)a as noun to verb (Plut. qu. Plat. x. 1, 2). For the present use of \( \pi\t\o\si\ni\), cf. also Sext. Math. xi. 29, vi. 42, for \( \pi\t\o\si\ni\) in Aristotle see Waitz, Organon, vol. i. p. 328, 329. \( \pi\rho\ro\si\nu\g\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\iota \) is a common noun, such as “\( \mathrm{man} \)” “\( \mathrm{horse} \)” (Diog. vii. 58, Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14) tending in practice to become identical with \( \pi\t\o\si\ni\), though theoretically narrower.

It is difficult to understand why Zeller, Stoics, p. 95, n. 2, regards the main point of this fragment as a grammatical distinction between noun and verb: it appears rather that Zeno is discussing the nature of αἵτιον from a logical standpoint, and that κατηγόρημα is introduced to explain αἵτιον and not vice versa. The fragments of Chrysippus and Posidonius which follow our passage in Stobaeus should be compared with it. Zeno did not adopt the four Aristotelian causes because his materialistic views led him to regard the efficient as the only true cause.

συμβεβηκός = "result" or "inseparable consequence," cf. Stob. Ecl. 1. 13 ad init. αἵτιον ἐστὶ δὲ ὁ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἢ δὲ ὁ συμβαίνει τι. This meaning of συμβεβηκός is also to be found in Aristotle, who uses the word in two distinct senses: see an elaborate note of Trendelenburg on de An. 1. 1 p. 402 a 8 who quotes amongst other passages Metaph. Δ 30 1025 a 30 λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως συμβεβηκός οἱ οὐσία ὑπάρχει έκάστῳ καθ’ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὕτα οἷον τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δόο ὀρθᾶς ἐχειν. That συμβεβηκός must be used in this sense here and not in its more common Aristotelian sense of "accident" seems indubitable, when we read infra that the αἵτιον can never be present unless accompanied by the οὐ αἵτιον.
σώμα: the materialism of the Stoics is well known: to what lengths it was pushed may be seen from Zeller, Stoics pp. 127—132, with the examples given in the notes.

κατηγόρημα: the οὖ aιτίου was therefore something incorporeal, and Chrys. and Posid. accordingly speak of it as non-existent. Probably this inference did not present itself to Zeno's mind, as the question of the ὑπαρξία of λεκτά only arose later: see further on Cleanth. frag. 7. The present passage is illustrated by Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14 οἱ μὲν οὖν σώμα, οἱ δ' ἀσώματον τὸ αίτιον εἶναι φασὶν. δόξαι δ' ἂν αίτιων εἶναι κοινότερον κατ' αὐτούς δι' ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἷον ὥς ὁ ἱλιος ἡ ἡ τοῦ ἤλιου θερμότης τοῦ χείσθαι τὸν κηρὸν ἡ τῆς χύσεως τοῦ κηροῦ. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ διαπεφωνήκασιν, οἱ μὲν προσηγοριῶν αἵτιων εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον φάσκοντες, οἷον τῆς χύσεως, οἱ δὲ κατηγορημάτων, οἷον τοῦ χείσθαι. ib. Math. ix. 211 Στωικοὶ μὲν πάν αἴτιον σώμα φασὶ σώματι ἀσώματον τινὸς αἴτιων γενέσθαι, οἷον σώμα μὲν τὸ σμίλιον, σώματι δὲ τῇ σαρκὶ, ἀσώματον δὲ τοῦ τέμνεσθαι κατηγορημάτως, καὶ πάλιν σώμα μὲν τὸ πῦρ, σώματι δὲ τῷ ξύλῳ, ἀσώματον δὲ τοῦ καλεσθαι κατηγορημάτως.

φρόνησιν κ.τ.λ. A parallel to this will be found at Stob. Ecl. ii. 7 11f p. 98, 3 τὴν γὰρ φρόνησιν αἴροιμεθα ἔχειν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, οὐ μᾶ Δία τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἀσώματα ὄντα καὶ κατηγορημάτα. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 307, infers from this passage that, according to Zeno, not a single moment in life passes without thought, but that the ἡγεμονικὸν always thinks.

Perhaps this frag. comes from the τέχνη of Zeno: see Introd. p. 27. Zeller is inclined to doubt whether the words do not belong to some other Zeno, but inasmuch as this anonymous writer also quotes Chrysipppus (p. 454, 4), the presumption is that he refers to Zeno of Citium, and there is no a priori reason to discredit his authorship.


This frag. must stand or fall with frag. 25.


27. Quintil. Inst. Or. iv. 2. 117 hic expressa (verba) et ut vult Zeno sensu tineta esse debebunt.

It has been supposed by some that these words are a reference to apoph. 13, but inasmuch as sensu is a very inappropriate translation of ἐς νοῦν, and Quintilian is speaking of the narrative portion of a speech, the meaning is rather "coloured by the actual impressions of sense" i.e. giving a vivid and clear representation of the actual facts.


This frag. is due to Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 12) who emends as above for the meaningless ἐξίν πρὸς δὲ ἔξιν φαντασιῶν ἀμεταπτωτοὶ ύποδίκου, coll. Diog. L. vii. 45.

It is barely credible that Zeno can have defined geometry in the same words by which Herillus certainly and he himself possibly defined knowledge. There is doubtless some mistake in the tradition: possibly μαθηματικῶν has
dropped out. I cannot find any evidence to illustrate Stoic views on mathematics.

29. Plut. Sto. Rep. 8, 1, πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα μηδὲ δίκην δικάσης πρίν (qu. add ἀν) ἄμφοιν μῦθον ἀκούσης ἀντέλειγεν ὁ Ζήνων, τοιούτῳ τινὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος· εἰτ’ ἀπεδείξεν ὁ πρότερος εἰπὼν οὐκ ἀκουστέον τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος· πέρας γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ζητούμενον’ εἰτ’ οὐκ ἀπεδείξεν’ ὥμοιον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μηδὲ ὑπήκουσε κληθεῖς ἢ ὑπακούσας ἐπερέτισεν· ἦτοι δ’ ἀπεδείξεν ἢ οὐκ ἀπεδείξεν’ οὐκ ἀκουστέον ἄρα τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος. The same is preserved by Schol. ad Lucian. Cal. 8 with unimportant variations.


λόγως. The argument is couched in the syllogistic form which Zeno especially affected: see Introd. p. 33. Whether the first speaker proves his case or not, the argument of the second speaker is immaterial; but he must have either proved his case or failed to do so: therefore the second speaker should not be heard.

ὑπήκουσε: appeared in court when the case was called on—answered to his name: cf. Dem. F. L. p. 423 § 257 ἡτίμωσεν ὑπακούσαντά τιν’ αὐτοῦ κατηγορον “procured the disfranchisement of a man who had actually appeared as his accuser.” The word was used indifferently of plaintiff and defendant, ib. p. 434 § 290 οὐδ’ ὑπακούσαι

κληθεὶς: either (1) by the presiding magistrate, cf. Dem. Olymp. p. 1174 ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐκάλει ὁ ἄρχων εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀπαντᾷ τοὺς ἀμφισβητούντας κατὰ τῶν νόμων. Ar. Vesp. 1441 ὑβρις' ἔως ἄν τὴν δίκην ἄρχων καλή, or (2) by the officer of the court solemnly calling him by name. We know that this procedure (κλήτευσις) was adopted in the case of a defaulting witness, and it may also have been applied if one of the parties failed to put in an appearance.

30. Diog. L. vii. 18, ἐφασκε δὲ τοὺς μὲν τῶν ἀσολοίκων λόγους καὶ ἀπηρτισμένους ὁμοίους εἶναι τῷ ἄργυρῳ τῷ Ἀλεξανδρείῳ εὐοφθάλμους μὲν καὶ περιγεγραμμένους, καθὰ καὶ τὸ νόμισμα, οὐδὲν δὲ διὰ ταύτα βελτίωνας. τοὺς δὲ τούναντιον ἀφομοίου τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς τετραδράχμοις εἰκή μὲν κεκομμένους καὶ σολοίκως, καθέλκειν μὲντοι πολλάκις τὰς κεκαλλιγραφημένας λέξεις.

λόγους. For the comparison of words to coins cf. Hor. A. P. 59 licuit semperque licebit signatum prae sente nota producere nomen. Juv. vii. 54 qui communi feriat carmen triviale Moneta and Prof. Mayor’s note. Possibly this and the following frag. came from the work περὶ λέξεων.

Ἀλεξανδρείῳ: in this phrase which recurs at viii. 85 I have followed Köhler (Rhein. Mus. xxxix. 297) in reading Ἀλεξανδρείῳ for Ἀλεξανδρίῳ. It appears that Alexandria had struck no coinage in the reign of the Ptolemies (Head, Historia Numorum p. 718); on the other hand the tetradrachm of Alexander was part of the
current coinage all over Greece (ib. p. 198 foll. and see Hultsch, Gr. and Rom. Metrologie pp. 243—245).

keκομμένους...σολοίκως. MSS. keκομμένοις. Bywater (Journ. Phil. xvii. 76) reads keκομμένους καὶ σολοίκους and the former certainly seems necessary to restore the balance of the sentence.

καθάλκειν: this meaning of καθέλκω is omitted by L. and S. s. v.

λέξεις bracketed by v. Wilamowicz and Köhler is rightly retained by Bywater.


σολοίκιζειν. Zeno is not alone in using the word in this extended sense, cf. Xen. Cyr. viii. 3. 21 Δαἰφέρνης ἐκ τις ἡν σολοικότερος αὐθρωπος τῶν τρόπων.

ἐπὶ ἐνδυμάτων. The Athenians attached great importance to κοσμιότης in dress as in other matters of personal behaviour. The cloak was required to be of a certain length, cf. Theophr. Char. 24 (Jebb) of the Penurios Man:—φοροῦντας ἐλάττω τῶν μηρῶν τὰ ἱμάτια; and to wear it in the fashionable style (ἐπὶ δὲξία ἰναβάλλεσθαι) was a mark of sobriety. Cf. Ar. Av. 1567 οὕτως τί δρᾶς; ἐπὶ ἀριστέρ' οὕτως ἀμπέχει; οὐ μεταβαλέεις θοιμάτιον ὡδ' ἐπὶ δεξιάν;

ἀτάκτως ἐσθίη. How carefully children were trained
in this respect may be seen from three passages of Plutarch cited by Becker, Charicles, E. T. pp. 236, 237. Cf. e.g. de Educ. Puer. 7 τῇ μὲν δεξιᾷ συνεθίζειν τὰ παιδία δέχεσθαι τὰς τροφάς, κἂν προτείνειε τὴν ἀριστεράν, ἑπιτιμάν.

ἁκόσμως περιτατῇ. Fast walking in the streets was so severely criticised that it was a circumstance which might be used to damage an opponent before a jury; cf. Dem. Pantaen. p. 981 § 52 Νῖκόβουλος δ’ ἐπίφθωνός ἐστι, καὶ ταχέως βαδίζει καὶ μέγα φθέγγεται, καὶ βακτηρίαν φορεῖ and see Sandys on id. Steph. i. §§ 68, 77. Lysias protests against such matters being considered of any importance in a law court, Or. xvi. § 19 πολλοί μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν διαλεγόμενοι καὶ κοσμίως ἀμπεχόμενοι μεγάλων κακῶν αὑτοί γεγόνασιν, έτεροι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἀμελοῦντες πολλὰ καὶ γαθὰ ύμᾶς εἴσιν εἰργασμένοι.

32. Sext. Emp. Math. π. 7, ἐνθελ γονὴι καὶ Ζήμων ὁ Κιτιεύς ἔρωτηθείς ὅτω διαφέρει διαλεκτικὴ ρητορικὴ συντρέψας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ πάλιν ἐξαπλώσας ἐφη "τούτῳ" κατὰ μὲν τὴν συστροφὴν τὸ στρογγύλων καὶ βραχὺ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τάττων ἰδίῳμα διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐξαπλώσεως καὶ ἐκτάσεως τῶν δακτύλων τὸ πλατύ τῆς ρητορικῆς δυνάμεως αὑπτόμενος. Cic. Fin. π. 17 Zenonis est inquam hoc Stoici omnem vim loquendi, ut jam ante Aristoteles, in duas tributam esse partes, rhetoriae palinam, dialecticam pugni similem esse dicebat, quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. Orat. 32, 113 Zeno quidem ille, a quo disciplina Stoicorum est, manu demonstrare solebat quid inter has artes interesset, nam cum compresserat digitos pugnumque fecerat, dialecticam aiebat eiusmodi esse; cum autem diduxerat et manum dilataverat, palmae illius similem eloquentiam esse dicebat. Quint. Inst. Or. π. 20 Itaque cum duo sint genera orationis, altera perpetua, quae rhetorice dicitur, altera
concisa, quae dialectice; quas quidem Zeno adeo con-
iunxit ut hanc compressae in pugnum manus, illam
explicitae, diceret similem.

Although this extract and the next purport to be
merely spoken remarks of Zeno, it has been thought
better to insert them at this place, as distinctly belonging
to λογική. Very probably in their original form they
came from some written work.

τὸ στρογγύλων is used of a terse and compact as
opposed to a florid and elaborate style: thus Dion. Halic.
in contrasting the styles of Lysias and Isocrates says:—
ἐν τῷ συστρέφειν τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρειν
ός πρὸς ἀληθινούς ἀγώνας ἐπιτηδείουν Λυσίαν ἀπεδεχόμην
(Isocr. 11). The translation “well rounded” while seeming
to preserve the metaphor conveys a false impression.

33. Cic. Acad. ii. 145, At scire negatis quemquam
rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et hoc quidem Zeno gestu
conficiebat. Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum
ostenderat, “visum” inquiebat “huiusmodi est.” Deinde,
cum paullum digitos contraxerat, “adsensus huiusmodi.”
Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, com-
prehensionem illam esse dicebat: ·qua ex similitudine
nomen ei rei quod antea non fuerat κατάληψιν imposuit.
Cum autem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum
arte vehementerque compresserat scientiam talem esse
dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem.

Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 181, 313, finds in this
passage an indication of the tension theory, but surely
this is somewhat far-fetched, for although it is no doubt
true that the Stoic theory of knowledge is often made to
depend on τόνος, yet probably the introduction of τόνος
is later than Zeno. He suggests with more reason p. 126
that the activity of the ἡγεμονικὸν in the process of
reasoning may be inferred from this, i.e. the ἡγεμονικὸν is not merely receptive (κατὰ πείσων) but also productive (κατ’ ἐνέργειαν).

scire: we have already seen that ἐπιστήμη is peculiar to the wise man, while κατάληψις is also shared by the φαύλος: see note on frag. 16. Sextus speaking of the inconsistency of the Stoics, who would not admit that even Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus had attained to perfect wisdom, cites as a Stoic dogma πάντα ἀγνοεῖ ὁ φαύλος (Math. vii. 434). Reid quotes Sext. Pyrrh. π. 83 διόπερ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἐν μόνῳ σπουδαίῳ φασίν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλήθες καὶ ἐν φαύλῳ εἶνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν φαύλον ἀληθὲς τι εἶπεῖν.

visum = φαντασίᾳ frag. 7. adsensus = συγκατάθεσις frag. 19. comprehensionem = κατάληψιν, see on frag. 10. scientiam, frag. 17.

PHYSICA.

34. Cic. Acad. i. 39, (Zeno) nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea (scil. natura) quae exprs esset corporis nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus.

Zeno adopted the Platonic dogma that everything which exists is capable either of acting or being acted upon, cf. Soph. 247 Γνὸν δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν κεκτημένον δύναμιν, εἰτ’ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἔτερον ὁτιοῦν ψευδος, εἰτ’ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, καὶ εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, πάν τούτο ὑντὸς εἶναι: he differed, however, widely from Plato in limiting these things to material objects. For Stoic materialism cf. Plut. plac. iv. 20 πάν γὰρ τὸ δρόμον ἥ καὶ ποιοῦν σῶμα (quoted by Zeller, Stoics p. 126) and further references ap. Stein, Psychologie n. 21. For the application of this doctrine
to theories of sensation and thought see the authorities collected in Dr Reid's note.

35. Diog. L. vii. 134, δοκεῖ δ’ αυτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὀλων δύο τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἀποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὑλην· τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τούτου γὰρ ὄντα αἴδιον διὰ πάσης ὑλῆς δημιουργεῖν ἐκαστα. τίθησι δὲ τὸ δόγμα τούτο Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς ἐν τῷ περὶ οὐσίας. Plut. plac. i. 3. 39 Ζήνων Μυασέου Κιτιεύς ἀρχὰς μὲν τὸν θεόν καὶ τὴν ὑλην, ὥν ὁ μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν αἰτίος ἢ δὲ τοῦ πάσχειν. στοιχεία δὲ τέτταρα. Stob. Ecl. i. 10. 14 f. 126, 17 Ζήνων Μυασέου Κιτιεύς ἀρχὰς τὸν θεόν καὶ τὴν ὑλην στοιχεία δὲ τέτταρα. Diels, p. 289, adds the following passages:—Achill. Tat. p. 124 Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς ἀρχὰς εἶναι λέγει τῶν ὀλων θεόν καὶ ὑλην, θεόν μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὑλην δὲ τὸ ποιοῦμενον, ἀφ’ ὧν τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεία γεγονέναι. Philo, de Provid. i. 22 Zeno Mnaseae filius aereum deum materiam et elementa quantor [aerem is a blunder arising from ἀρχὰς (Diels), which seems better than Stein's suggestion (Psych. n. 31) to substitute aethera]. Theodoret, Gr. cur. aff. iv. 12 Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεύς, ὁ Μυασέος, ὁ Κράτητος φοιτητής ὁ τῆς Στωικῆς ἀρχὰς αἱρέσεως τὸν θεόν καὶ τὴν ὑλην ἀρχὰς ἔφησεν εἶναι.

Cf. Sext. Math. ix. 11: further authorities for the Stoic school in general are given by Zeller, p. 141.

In distinguishing between God as the active efficient cause of the universe and formless indeterminate matter as its underlying substratum Zeno is following on the lines laid down by Plato in the Timaeus and by Aristotle, cf. Theophr. frag. 48 Wimmer (speaking of Plato) δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς βούλεται ποιεῖν τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὑλην, ὃ προσαγορεύει πανδεχές, τὸ δ’ ὃς αἰτίον καὶ κινοῦν, ὃ περιάπτει τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῇ τάγαθου δυνάμει: see Introd. p. 25. When we remember that God is by the
Stoics identified with fiery breath, the purest and rarest of all substances, while on the other hand the world itself is merely a temporal manifestation of the primary fire, it becomes apparent that the Stoic dualism is ultimately reducible to a monism and that the system is essentially hylozoistic, like those of the early Ionians (Zeller, Stoics, p. 155, 6. Stein, Psychologie n. 25, collects the passages which prove this). How far this was worked out by Zeno may be doubted: indeed there is no evidence to show that he ever passed beyond the stage of regarding the dual origin of the world as fundamental, and the opinion is now prevalent that Cleanthes by his principle of τόνος was the first to consciously teach the pantheistic doctrines, which subsequently became characteristic of Stoicism.

δημιουργεῖν: a favourite Platonic word, recalling the δημιουργός of the Timaeus. For the distinction between ἄρχαι and στοιχεία cf. Diog. L. vii. 134 διαφέρειν δὲ φασίν ἄρχας καὶ στοιχεία· τὰς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἀγεννήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους· τὰ δὲ στοιχεία κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν φθείρεσθαι.

36. Hippolyt. Philosop. 21, 1. p. 571 Diels Χρύσιττος καὶ Ζήνων οἱ ὑπέθεντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄρχην μὲν θεόν τῶν πάντων σῶμα ὅντα τὸ καθαρώτατον διὰ πάντων δὲ διάκειται τὴν πρόωναν αὐτοῦ. Galen. Hist. Philos. 16. p. 241. Diels p. 608 Πλάτων μὲν οὖν καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς περὶ τῆς οὑσίας τοῦ θεοῦ διεληλυθότες οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ταύτης διενοθησάν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Πλάτων θεόν ἀσώματον, Ζήνων δὲ σῶμα περὶ τῆς μορφῆς μηδὲν εἰρηκότες [if we may rely on Diels' text here, some modification will be required in Stein, Psychologie n. 88, where Kühn's reading οὐ κόσμου ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα...τι ἄλλο is adopted].

"God is spoken of as being Fire, Aether, Air, most commonly as being πνεῦμα or Atmospheric Current, pervading everything without exception, what is most base and ugly as well as what is most beautiful," Zeller, Stoics p. 148, who gives the authorities in the notes. καθαρωτατον is used with special reference to διήκειν, cf. Sext. Emp. vii. 375 οὐδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα φύσιν ἔχει πρὸς τοῦτο [τύπωσιν] ἐπιτίθειον, λεπτομερέστατον καὶ εὐροῦν παρὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωμάτων ὑπάρχον. Ar. Metaph. i. 8. 3, 4 (speaking of those of his predecessors who had explained generation by σύγκρισις and διάκρισις) τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἃν δοξεῖ στοιχειωδέστατον εἶναι πάντων ἐξ οὗ γέγονονται συγκρίσει πρώτον, τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ μικρομερέστατον καὶ λεπτότατον ἀν εἰῇ τῶν σωμάτων. διόπερ ὀσοὶ πῦρ ἀρχὴν τιθέασι μιᾶστα ὁμολογομένως ἀν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ λέγοιεν. Krische, Forschungen p. 382.

πρόνοιαν like rationem in the next frag. brings into prominence the spiritual side of the Stoic conception of God, which is everywhere strangely blended with the material.


38. Tertullian, ad Nat. ii. 4, ecce enim Zeno quoque materiam mundialen a deo separat et eum per illam tamquam mel per favos transisse dicit. Cf. id. adv. Hermog. 44 Stoici enim volunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse quomodo mel per favos (quoted by Stein, Psychologie, p. 35, n. 43).

favos: κηρία. Zeno's fondness for simile has been
observed upon in the Introd. p. 33. Virgil's lines are well known, Georg. iv. 219 sqq. His quidam signis atque haec exempla secuti Esse apibus partem divinae mentis et haustus Aetherios dixere; deum namque ire per omnes Terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum. It is curious that bees should have suggested themselves to both writers, though in a different way, in connection with the same thought, cf. Cic. Acad. ii. 120 cuius (divinae sollertiae) vos majestatem deducitis usque ad apium formicarumque perfectionem ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis minutorum opusculorum fabricatoruisse videatur.

separat: if this is pressed, we must conclude that Zeno never identified God with matter: see n. on frag. 35.


Cf. Diog. L. vii. 88, ὃς ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς ὁπερ ἐστίν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος ὁ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῷ Δίῳ καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοική-σεως ὄντι. Schol. on Lucan ii. 9 hoc secundum Stoicos dicit, qui afirmant mundum prudentiam ac lege firmatum, ipsique deum esse sibi legem. Law regarded in its moral rather than its physical aspect is defined in similar terms in Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11d p. 96, 10 = Floril. 46, 12 τὸν τε νόμον σπουδαίον εἰναὶ φασὶ λόγον ὀρθὸν ὄντα προσ-τακτικοῖν μὲν ὑπὸ ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικοῖν δὲ ὑπὸ ποι-ητέων repeated at ii. 7. 111, p. 102, 4.

Gods and men are influenced by the same law "quae est recti praeceptio pravique depulsio" Cic. N.D. ii. 78.
Law is the human counterpart of the "ratio summa insita in natura" id. Leg. i. 18. The origin of law is simultaneous with that of the divine mind: quamobrem lex vera atque princeps apta ad judendum et ad vetandum ratio est recta summi Iovis, id. ib. II. 10. For Zeno Right exists φύσει and not merely θέσει, cf. Krische p. 371. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 708.

40. Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβ. c. 8, δεῖ τὴν <δ>ύναμιν ὀψαν συνα<π>τικὴν οίκε<ν>ας τῶν μερῶν πρὸ<ν>αληλα καὶ ἐκ...ων τὴν δ′ ανα<τολὴ>ν ή<λί>ον καὶ κυ<κλησιν> ή περίοδον.

The position of these words with reference to their context corresponding to Cic. N.D. i. 36 points to Zeno's authorship. "Stoica frustula dubitanter ad Zenonem refero" Diels p. 542.

τὴν δύναμιν. This is evidently a Stoic description of God as the power which binds the parts of the world together and keeps them in union.

συναπτικὴν. We should expect συνεκτικὴν, which is the more natural word in this connection. Sext. Math. IX. 84 ἀνάγκη ἁρᾳ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρίστης αὐτὸν (τὸν κόσμον) φύσεως συνεχεσθαι ἐπεὶ καὶ περιέχει τὰς πάντων φύσεω<ν> τοιαύτῃ δὲ τυχάνουσα θεὸς ἑστὶν. On the other hand συνάπτω συναφῆ and the like are technically applied to the structure of manufactured articles, which are said to be ἐκ συναπτωμένων (ἡμομένα: ib. 78 ἐκ συναπτωμένων δὲ τὰ ἐκ τε παρακειμένων καὶ πρὸς ἐν τι κεφάλαιον νευόντων συνεστώτα ὃς ἰλύσεις καὶ πυργίσκοι καὶ νῆες.

is pressed here, it points to the exception of Cleanthes, but see on Cleanth. fr. 15].

_aëthera_ not to be confounded with _αἰθήρ_, which is one of the four elements and subject to destruction; aerem in Tertull. is probably a blunder, unless with Stein, Psych. n. 80, aut should be read for et. The aether here in question is an equivalent of _πνεῦμα_ or of _πῦρ_ _τεχνικόν_, i.e. it is merely one of the labels convenient to express the material essence of God. Neither _πῦρ_ nor _αἰθήρ_ is regarded in itself as a complete description. For the distinction between the Stoic _αἰθήρ_ and the Heraclitean _πῦρ_ see Stein, Psychologie p. 26 and n. 31. The Stoic deity is at once corporeal and rational: but how far it may be said to have been personified cannot be determined; in fact, as has been remarked, the ancients seem to have grasped the notion of personification with much less distinctness than modern thinkers.

42. Stob. Eel. i. 1. 29\(^h\) p. 35, 9, _Ζήμων_ ὁ _Στωικὸς_ νοῦν κόσμου πῦρινον (scil. θεὸν _ἀπεθείματο_). August. adv. Acad. III. 17. 38 nam et deum ipsum ignem putavit (Zeno).

Cf. Stob. Eel. i. 1. 29\(^h\) p. 38, 2 _ἀνωτάτω_ _πάντων_ νοῦν _ἐνανιθέριον_ _ἐναι_ _θεόν_.

For the Stoic conception of the World-Soul see Stein, Psychologie p. 41, who distinguishes the world soul from the Aether God, the former being an offshoot from the latter. "Die Weltseele ist nur ein Absenker jenes Urpneumarestes der als Gott Aether unser Weltganzes umspannt; sie ist als Ausfluss der Gottheit jenes künstlerische göttliche Feuer (_πῦρ_ _τεχνικόν_) das die Keimkräfte (_σπερματικοὺς_ _λόγους_) der Weltbildung im allgemeinen und der Einzelbildungen insbesondere in sich enthält." In regarding _νοῦς_ as an indwelling material essence Zeno revived the position formerly taken up by Diogenes of
Apollonia in opposition to Anaxagoras: see the fragment quoted by Zeller, Pre-Socratics, E. T. i. p. 287 n. 7.

The MSS κόσμου was corrected to κόσμου by Krische p. 378, who supplies θεών ἀπεφήματο. Hirzel ii. p. 220, 2 prefers to put a comma after κόσμου: otherwise καὶ πῦρινον is necessary.


This same force, appearing in different substances, is called ἐξις as the bond of union for inorganic matter, φύσις in the case of plants, ψυχὴ in the case of animals, and νοῦς as belonging to rational beings. Diog. L. vii. 139 δι' ὅν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἐξις κεχώρηκεν ὡς διὰ τῶν ὀστῶν καὶ τῶν νευρῶν δι' ὅν δὲ ὡς νοῦς ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, cf. Cleanth. Frag. 51. Some Stoics seem however to have denied this distinction between ψυχῆ and νοῦς. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 1 (quoted by Stein, Psych. pp. 92, 3) τινὲς δὲ οὐ διέστειλαν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν νοῦν ἀλλὰ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι τὸ νοερὸν ἡγοῦνται. Stein however is not justified in holding that the living principle of animals occupies a position midway between φύσις and ψυχῆ, as will be shown on Cleanth. frag. 44. That the passage is good evidence that the distinction between ἐξις, φύσις and ψυχῆ is Zenonian may be inferred from the words σύμφωνος ἡ δόξα.

44. Lactant. de Vera Sap. c. 9, Zeno rerum naturae dispositorem atque artificem universitatis λόγον praedicat quem et fatum et necessitatem rerum et deum et animum Iovis nuncupat. Tertull. Apol. 21 Apud vestros quoque sapientes λόγον id est sermonem atque rationem constat artificem videri universitatis. Hunc enim Zeno determinat


μὴ διαφέρειν. God receives different names, while his essence is constant, owing to the various phases of his union with matter (τὰς προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνειν δὲ ὕλης τῆς ὕλης δι’ ἥς κεχώρηκε παράλλαξεν Stob. Ecl. i. 1. 29 b p. 37, 23, according to Diels and Wachsmuth a mistake for διὰ τὰς τῆς ὕλης δι’ ἥς κεχώρηκε παράλλαξεις). Thus he is Fate as acting in accordance with a constant law, Forethought as working to an end, and Nature as creator of the word. Cf. Athenag. Supplie. c. 6. p. 7 b οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοιχείως καὶ τὰς προσηγορίας κατὰ τὰς παράλλαξεις τῆς ὕλης, δι’ ἥς φασι τὸ πνεῦμα χωρεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ, πληθύνωσι τὸ θείον τοῖς ὄνομασι, τῷ γοῦν ἐργῷ ἕνα νομίζουσιν τὸν θεόν εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὄντος βαδίζον ἑπὶ γενέσεις κόσμου ἐμπεριειληφός ἀπαντάς τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους καθ’ οὓς ἔκαστα καθ’ εἰμαρμένην γίνεται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ διήκει δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, ο θεὸς εἰς κατ’ αὐτοὺς Ζεὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ θέον τῆς ὕλης ὄνομαξόμενος "Ἡρα δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἄερα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθ’
In this connection it may be observed that Gercke (Chrysippea, p. 697) is mistaken in speaking of a fragment of Zeno as preserved by Aristocles ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 14. The reference there is to the Stoics generally and not to Zeno in particular.

45. Diog. L. vii. 149, καθ’ εἰμαρμένην δὲ φασὶ τὰ πάντα γένεσθαι Χρύσιππος...καὶ Ποσειδώνιος...καὶ Ζήνων Βοηθὸς δὲ.

Since εἰμαρμένη is identical with πρόνοια, it follows that everything is produced κατὰ πρόνοιαν. Cleanthes, however, demurred to this (frag. 18).


The Greek of the definition is ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὅδὸ βαδίζου εἰς γένεσιν, Diog. L. vii. 156. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 597. φύσις is only another name for God viewed in his creative capacity. Hence Stob. Eel. i. 1. 29b p. 37, 20 οἱ Στωικοὶ νοεροὶ θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὅδὸ βαδίζου ἐπὶ γενέσι κόσμου, ἐμπεριειληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους καθ’ οὓς ἀπαντᾷ καθ’ εἰμαρμένην γίνεται: Athenag. l. c. Wellmann, p. 472 and Weygoldt p. 35 think that λόγος σπερματικὸς is a Zenonian expression. So Stein, Psych. p. 49 and n. 87.
47. Tatian ad Graec. c. 3, p. 143 c, καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἀποδείχθησαι κακῶν κατ’ αὐτὸν (scil. Ζήνωνα) ποιητικές, εὖ ἀμάραις τε καὶ σκωληξί καὶ ἀρρητουργοῖς καταγινόμενος.

Cf. Clem. Alex. Protrept. 5 § 66 οὐδὲ μὴν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στούς παρελευσομαί διὰ πάσης ὀλης καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης τὸ θεῖον διῆκεν λέγοντας: οὐ κατασχύνουσιν ἀτεχνώς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν: Sext. Pyrrh. III. 218 Στωικοὶ δὲ πνεύμα διηκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἴδεχθων: Cic. Acad. II. 120 cur deus omnia nostra causa cum faceret—sic enim voltis—tantam vim natricum viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa et perniciosa terra marique disperserit? We have no information as to what answer Zeno made to this objection, but the later Stoics said that physical evils ultimately served a good purpose: so Chrysippus ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 4 quoted by Zeller, p. 189. As to the existence of moral evil see on Cleanth. fr. 48, l. 17 and Wellmann’s discussion at p. 472.

48. Cic. N. D. II. 58, Ipsius vero mundi qui omnia complexu suo coecret et continet natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque omnium.

An ingenious explanation of this difficult passage is given by Stein, Psychologie, pp. 42, 43 in accordance with his view of the distinction between World-Soul and Aether-God. “Die natura artificiosa ist unseres Erachtens die Weltseele, während die natura plane artifex sich auf den Gott Aether oder das ἥγεμονικόν der Welt bezieht.” The πνεύμα which permeates the universe is ignis artificiosus and only secondarily represents God, since it is an efflux from him. It cannot be described as plane artifex, a term which is applied to God (σῶμα τὸ καθαρώτατον), whereas the world-soul is less καθαρῶν from its combination with matter.

49. Chalcid. in Tim. c. 290, Plerique tamen silvam separant ab essentia, ut Zeno et Chrysippus. Silvam quippe dicunt esse id quod subest his omnibus quae habent qualitates, essentiam vero primam rerum omnium silvam vel antiquissimum fundamentum earum, suaepse natura sine vultu et informe: ut puta aes, aurum, ferrum, et cactera huius modi silva est corum, quae ex iisdem fabrefiunt, non tamen essentia. At vero quod tam his quam ceteris ut sint causa est, ipsum esse substantiam.

This passage shows that Zeno distinguished between οὐσία and ὑλη—the former the indeterminate and formless matter underlying the universe, and the latter the stuff out of which a particular thing is made. ὑλη is thus from one point of view the more general term, since οὐσία = πρωτή ὑλη (frag. 51). Cf. Dexipp. ad Cat. Schol. Arist. Brandis 45 a 21 ἐστί τὸ ὑποκειμένων διττόν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοὰς καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἐν μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον πρῶτον ὑπόκειμενον ὡς ἡ ἄποιος ὑλη ἤν δυναμεὶ σῶμα ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν δεύτερον δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιὸν ὃ κοινῶς ἡ ἰδίως υφίστατο κ.τ.λ. Similarly Arist. Metaph. vii. 4. 1044 a 15 distinguishes πρωτή and οἰκεία ὑλη and ib. iv. 24. 1023 a 27 says that material origin may be specified in two ways ἡ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον γένος ἡ κατὰ τὸ ύστετον εἶδος οἰον ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ἀπαντα τὰ τηκτὰ ἢ ὑδατος (i.e. brass as being fusible comes from water) ἐστὶ δ’ ὡς ἐκ χαλκοῦ ὁ ἀνθρώπ. The point of view of Poseidonius is different: he holds διαφέρειν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὑλῆς τὴν <ἀντίν> οὐσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοια μόνον. Stob. Ecl. i. 11. 5°, p. 133, 22. Wellmann (Neue Jahrb. vol. 115, p. 808) denies that it is a necessary inference
from this passage that Zeno taught the doctrine of the four Stoic categories. Stein, Psych. n. 73, explaining the passage generally as above, apparently identifies οὖσία with κοινῶς ποιόν, and ίλη with ίδίως ποιόν, but this distinction is a subordinate one, for οὖσία is entirely distinct from ποιόν, whether κοινῶς or ίδίως, as Dexipp. l.c. shows.

50. Chalcid. in Tim. c. 292. Deinde Zeno hanc ipsam essentiam finitam esse dicit unamque eam communem omnium quae sunt esse substantiam, dividuam quoque et usque quoque mutabilem: partes quippe eius verti, sed non interire, ita ut de existentibus consumantur in nihilum. Sed ut innumerabilium diversarum, etiam ceararum figurarum, sic neque formam neque figuram nec ullaam omnino qualitatem propriam fore censet fundamenti rerum omnium silvae, coniunctam tamen esse semper et inseparabiler cohaerere alieui qualitati. Cumque tam sine ortu sit quam sine interitu, quia neque de non existente subsistit neque consumetur in nihilum, non deesse ei spiritum ac vigorem ex aeternitate, qui moveat eam rationabiler totam interdum, nonnumquam pro portione, quae causa sit tam crebrae tamque vehementis universae rei conversionis; spiritum porro motivum illum fore non naturam, sed animam et quidem rationabiler, quae vivificans sensilem mundum exornaverit eum ad hane, qua nune illustratur, venustatem. Quem quidem beatum animal et deum adpellant.

finitam. This is in strong contrast with Epicurean teaching: it follows from the Stoic doctrine of the unity of the world, and is connected with that of the infinity of space, cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Eel. i. 18. 4d p. 161, 19 τὸν δὲ τὸπον (i.e. full space) πεπερασμένον διὰ τὸ μηδὲν σῶμα ἀπειρον εἰναι. καθάπερ δὲ τὸ σωματικὸν πεπε-
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rasmeonoi einaiv ouwos to aposmaton apeiron, Diog. vii. 150
swma de esti kat' autous h ouxia kal peperasmevnh. The
Stoic view is refuted by Lucr. i. 1008—1051, who con-
cludes thus: — infinta opus est vis undique materi.
Similarly Diog. L. x. 41 ei te gar iin to kevnd apeiron
ta de swmata dhrismena, oudamov an emene ta swmata, all
eferevo kata to apeiron kevnd diestrapmena, ouk echna
ta upereidonta kal stellonta kata tas antikopas.

unamque eam etc. See on frag. 51.
cerearum: wax is chosen as being one of the most
pliable substances. Cf. Sext. Math. vii. 375 o malakw-
tatos khrw...tupontai meu upo twnos ama nohmati dia tih
uhropeta ou synexei de ton typou. A very close parallel
will be found in Ov. Met. xv. 169: (of Pythagoras)
utque novis facilis signatur cera figuris,
nec manet ut fuerat, nec formas servat easdem,
sed tamen ipsa cadem est; animam sic semper
eandem
esse, sed in varias doceo migrare figuras.
neque formam etc. Cf. Posid. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 11. 5c
p. 133, 18 tnh tov olon ovstai kai uhnu apoin kai
amorfon einai kath' osou oudei apotegetamewon idion exei
xhma oude poihteta kath' autin de i de' en twn xhmati
ekai poihteti einai. In this respect the Stoics simply
1029 a 20 legw de uhnu i kath' autin mhte ti mhte poson
mhte alllo mhdewn legetai ois dhriastai to oin. Arist. ap.
Stob. Ecl. i. 11. 4, p. 132 foll. concluding thus: —dein gar
amfoin (i.e. uhnu kai eidozu) ths synodo pros tnh tou
swmatos upostasiv. The distinction between the two
schools is that, whereas the Stoics defined uhnu as swma
(Stob. Ecl. i. 11. 5b p. 133, 16), Aristotle declared it to be
swmatikh merely, but this distinction is more apparent
than real.
sine ortu: αἵδιος, σύγχρονος τῷ θεῷ, infra frag. 51.

neque de non existente: the denial of ἀπλῶς γένεσις ἐκ μὴ ὄντος is common to all ancient philosophy. See Tyndall, fragments of Science p. 91 (quoted by Munro on Lucr. i. 150), “One fundamental thought pervades all these statements, there is one taproot from which they all spring: this is the ancient notion that out of nothing nothing comes, that neither in the organic world, nor in the inorganic, is power produced without the expenditure of other power.” Cf. Posidonius ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 20. 7, p. 178, 2, τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὴν εἰς ὄνκ ὄντα (θθοράν καὶ γένεσιν)...ἀπέγνωσαν ἀνύπαρκτον οὐσαν. M. Aurel. iv. 4.

moveat, κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης, frag. 45.

non naturam: in apparent contradiction to frag. 46, but we shall probably explain: the πνεῦμα is not merely φύσις, it is also ψυχή, nay more it is ψυχή λόγον ἔχουσα, i.e. νοῦς.

animal, frag. 62. deum: observe that this is attributed to the school in general and not to Zeno in particular, cf. frag. 66.

51. Stob. Ecl. i. 11. 5a, p. 132, 26. Ζήνωνος: οὐσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν ἀἵδιον καὶ οὔτε πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττων· τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ ἀεὶ ταύτά διαμένειν ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχείσθαι. διὰ ταύτης δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν τῶν παντὸς λόγον, ὃν ἐνιοί εἰμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οὐάνπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα. Epiphan. Haeres. i. 5, Diels, p. 558, φάσκει οὖν καὶ οὕτως (Ζήνων) τὴν ὑλὴν σύγχρονον καλὸν τῷ θεῷ ἵσα ταῖς ἄλλαις αἱρέσεσιν, εἰμαρμένην τε εἶναι καὶ γένεσιν ἐξ Ἡς τὰ πάντα διοικεῖται καὶ πάσχει. Diog. L. vii. 150, οὖσίαν δὲ φασὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὑλὴν ὡς...Ζήνων...καλεῖται δὲ διχῶς οὐσία τε καὶ
The fragments of Zeno.

Cf. Chalcid. in Tim. c. 294, Stoici deum scilicet hoc esse quod sit vel etiam qualitatatem inseparabilem deum silvae, eundemque per silvam meare, velut semen per membra genitalia.

οὔτε πλεῖον. The ἀττοῖος ὑλή is, as we have seen, ὕπομένη and πεπερασμένη: being also ἄιδιος it is incapable of increase or diminution. Its parts however (i.e. matter as seen in the έδίως ποιόν or individually determined thing) are subject to destruction and change. See the further authorities cited by Zeller, Stoics, p. 101, n. 2.

diαίρεσις καὶ συγχυσία. Strictly speaking both these terms are to be distinguished from the theory of intermingling which was characteristic of Stoicism (κράσις ὑλῶν, and see infra). Thus διαίρεσις is the separation of substances which have been combined by παράθεσις, e.g. a heap of barley, wheat or beans, while συγχυσία is the chemical fusion of two distinct substances which lose their essential properties in consequence of the process (Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 17. 4, p. 154, 10—155, 14). The Stoic κράσις or μιξις is distinguished from the former by its implication of entire permeation, and from the latter owing to the retention of their properties by the ingredients.

52. Stob. Ecl. i. 17. 3, p. 152, 19. Ζήνωνα δὲ οὔτως ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαρρήδην: τοιαύτην δὲ δεήσει εἶναι ἐν περιόδῳ τὴν τοῦ ὑλοῦ διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς προπὴ εἰς ὕδωρ δὲ ἀέρος γένηται, τὸ μὲν τι υφίστασθαι καὶ γῆν συνίστασθαι [καὶ] ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ δὲ τὸ
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µἐν διαμένειν ὑδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀτμιζομένου ἄερα γίνεσθαι λεπτυνομένου δὲ τοῦ ἄερος πῦρ ἐξάπτεσθαι, τὴν δὲ μίξιν <καὶ> κράσιν γίνεσθαι τῇ εἰς ἅλληλα τῶν στοιχείων μεταβολῇ σώματος ὅλου δὲ ὅλου τινὸς ἐτέρου διερχομένου. Diog. L. vii. 135, 136, ἐν τε ἐστὶν θεὸν καὶ νὸν καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία πολλὰς τε ἐπέταις ὀνομασίαις προσ- ονομάξεσθαι. κατ' ἀρχὴς µὲν οὖν καθ' αὐτὸν ὄντα τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι' ἄερος εἰς ὑδωρ· καὶ ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται οὔτω καὶ τούτων σπερματικῶν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, τοιοῦτε ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ εὐεργόν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὑλὴν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐξῆς γένεσιν· εἰτὰ ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἄερα, γῆν. Λέγει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου. Diog. L. vii. 142, γίνεσθαι δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ἢ οὐσία τραπῆ δι' ἄερος εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἰτὰ τὸ παχυμέρες αὐτοῦ συστάν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ τὸ δὲ λεπτο- μερεῖς ἐξαερωθῆ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πλέον λεπτυνθὲν πῦρ ἀπο- γεννήσῃ· εἰτὰ κατὰ µίξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῴα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένη. περὶ δὴ οὖν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς τοῦ κόσμου φησὶ Ζήνων µὲν ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου, κ.τ.λ. Probus ad Verg. p. 10, 33 K. ex his (quatuor elementis) omnia esse postea effigiata Stoici tradunt Zenon Citieus et Chrysippus Solaeus et Cleanthes Assius.

ἐν περιόδῳ: these words seem to refer to the periodic renewal of the world after each ἐκπύρωσις and to a constantly recurring cycle in the course of the universe, rather than to the mutual interchange of the four elements which goes on during the actual existence of the world, cf. Marc. Aurel. x. 7, ὥστε καὶ ταῦτα ἀναληφθῆναι εἰς τὸν τοῦ ὅλου λόγον, εἰτε κατὰ περιόδον ἐκπυρομένου εἰτε κ.τ.λ. Numenius ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 18. 1, ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰρέσεως ταύτης ἐξυγροῦσθαι πάντα κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς μεγίστας εἰς πῦρ αἰθε- ρῶδες ἀναλυμένων πάντων.
The evolution of ὑδωρ from the πῦρ τεχνικῶν is first described and then the subsequent generation of the four elements from τὸ υγρὸν. This appears more clearly in the first extract from Diogenes than in the actual words of Zeno as reported by Stobaeus. Zeno is here following very closely in the footsteps of Heraclitus (πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτων θάλασσα· θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡμισὺ γῆ τὸ δὲ ἡμισὺ πρηστήρ, R. and P. § 30) but differs from him in adopting the theory of the four elements, and to this fact is due the introduction of the words δι’ ἀέρος. Cf. also the account of Anaximenes, ap. Simpl. Phys. p. 6 a, Ἀναξιμένης ἀραιούμενον μὲν τὸν ἀέρα πῦρ γίγνεσθαί φησι, πυκνούμενον δὲ ἄνεμον, εἰτα νέφος, εἰτα ἐτι μᾶλλον ύδωρ, εἰτα γῆν, εἰτα λίθους τὰ δὲ ἅλλα ἐκ τούτων. The ἄνω κάτω ὀδὸς appears clearly in the passage in Stobaeus, cf. Cleanth. frag. 21. There are certain difficulties in this account of the διακόσμησις, which, although not discussed in the authorities, it is right to state even if no satisfactory solution of them can be given. (1) Is the ἐξυγρωσις entirely distinct from and anterior to the formation of the four elements? If Diog.‘s account is based upon Zeno, this question must be answered in the affirmative, but in Stobaeus it appears rather as an ordinary stage in the κάτω ὀδὸς. That an entire resolution of the πῦρ τεχνικῶν into υγρὸν (except as regards τὸ ἐσχατον τοῦ πυρὸς) was taught by the Stoai is also clear from Cornut. c. 17, p. 85, Osann. ἔστι δὲ Χάος μὲν τὸ πρὸ τῆς διακόσμησιως γενόμενον υγρὸν, ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως οὐτως ὁνομασμένον, ἣ τὸ πῦρ, ὅ ἐστιν οἰονεὶ κάος...ἡν δὲ ποτε, ὁ παλιός πῦρ τὸ πᾶν καὶ γενησεται πάλιν ἐν περιόδῳ σβεσθέντος δ’ εἰς ἄέρα αὐτοῦ μεταβολὴ ἀθρόα γίνεται εἰς υδωρ. ὃ δὴ λαμβάνει τοῦ μὲν υφισταμένου μέρους τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ πύκνωσιν τοῦ δὲ λεπτυνομενου κατὰ ἀραιωσιν.
(2) Is the ἐξυγρωσίς merely a step in the creative process or is it to be regarded, as it apparently was by Cleanthes, as the antithesis of the ἐκπύρωσίς? Perhaps it is safest to regard Zeno as an exponent of the simple ὀδὸς ἀνω κάτω and to treat the complications in connection with the τόνος theory of Cleanthes (frag. 24).


λεπτυνομένου, κ.τ.λ. is the corr. of Wachsm. for the mss. ἐκ τινος δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος, coll. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 3. μήζν. The mixture of dry substances ἐκρασίων the fusion of moist. For a full discussion of the peculiar Stoic doctrine, see Zeller, Stoics, p. 136 foll. It carries with it practically a negation of the physical truth that two bodies cannot occupy the same space. Chrysippus, who devoted much attention both to the positive exposition and controversial defence of this doctrine, illustrated it by several practical examples, one of which, from its obscurity, deserves consideration: καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ πόσον ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται συμφθαρησεται (Diog. L. vii. 151), i.e. the disappearance of the wine particles can only be explained on the hypothesis of their equable distribution. Stein observes (Psych. nn. 29, 35) that the Ionian ἀλλοίωσις is not found in the Stoa before Marcus Aurelius, but this is inaccurate. Thus Posidonius, ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 25, p. 178, 7, after explaining that there are four kinds of μεταβολή, (1) κατὰ διαίρεσιν, (2) κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν, (3) κατὰ σύγχυσιν, (4) ἐξ ὀλῶν ορ κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν, proceeds:—τούτων δὲ τῇν κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τῇν οὐσίαν γίνεσθαι τάς δ’ ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς ποιούς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γινομένους.

53. Galen, εἰς τὸ Ἰπποκράτου ὑπόμνημα περὶ χυμῶν Ι. (XVI. 32 Κ.) Ζήνων τε ὁ Κιτιεὸς [ὅς] τὰς ποιότητας οὕτω
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καὶ τὰς οὐσίας δι’ ὅλου κεράννυσθαι ἐνώμιζεν, id. de nat. facult. i. 2, εἰ δ’ ωσπερ τὰς ποιότητας καὶ τὰς οὐσίας δι’ ὅλων κεράννυσθαι χρῆ νομίζειν, ὡς ὦστερον ἀπεφήνατο Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὸς. (Galen says that this theory was ultimately due to Hippocrates, from whom Aristotle took it.)

The best commentary on this frag. is to be found in Sext. Pyrrh. III. 57—62, which contains a statement and refutation of the doctrine here referred to. The following short summary will make the meaning clear:—Things which are subject to the influence of κράσις are themselves a combination of οὐσία and ποιότητες: when mixture takes place, we must either say that the οὐσίαι are mixed or that the ποιότητες are mixed, or that both or neither are mixed. The last alternative is obviously absurd, and the same may be shown to be the case with either of the two first, λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι καὶ αἱ ποιότητες τῶν κερναμένων καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι χωροῦσι δι’ ἀλλήλων καὶ μιγνύμεναι τὴν κράσιν ἀποτελοῦσιν (§ 59). But this is still more absurd. Mix one spoonful of hemlock juice with ten of water: if both entirely permeate each other, they must occupy the same space and be equal to each other. The result of the mixture ought therefore to give us either 20 spoonfuls or 2. The whole discussion is one which strikes a modern reader as particularly barren and pedantic, but it should never be forgotten that to the Stoics ποιότης was material no less than οущества. "Aristotle’s ἐἴδος becomes a current of air or gas (πνεῦμα), the essential reason of the thing is itself material, standing to it in the relation of a gaseous to a solid body." (Encycl. Brit. Art. Stoics.)

54. Stob. Ecl. i. 20. 1o, p. 171, 2. Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλείνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν ὅσον εἴς σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτε-
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λείσθαι τήν διακόσμησιν οία πρότερον ἦν. Euseb. P. E. xv. 18. 3, ἀρέσκει γὰρ τοῖς Στοικοῖς φιλοσόφοις τήν ὅλην ὀυσίαν μεταβάλλειν εἰς πῦρ οἶον εἰς σπέρμα καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτον αὐτήν ἀποτελεῖσθαι τήν διακόσμησιν οία το πρότερον ἦν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ πρεσβύτατοι προσήκαντο Ζήνων τε καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Χρύσιππος. Arnob. ad Nat. ii. 9, qui ignem minatur mundo et venerit cum tempus arsurum, non Panaetio, Chrysippo, Zenoni (credit)?

The Stoic authorities for the doctrine of ἐκπύρωσις will be found collected in Zeller, p. 164 n. 2. On this point they were opposed to the Peripatetics who held the ἀφθαρσία of the κόσμος, and even some of the later Stoics, notably Panaetius and Boehthus, diverged from the teaching of their predecessors. It is doubtful whether Zeno derived the ἐκπύρωσις from Heraclitus (see Introd. p. 21): it may however be observed that it was far more in accordance with his historical position to maintain the destructibility of the world, at any rate, so long as we concede any materiality to his primal fire; if fire is a mere metaphor to express πάντα ρέει, the case is of course very different. Cf. Marc. Aurel. iii. 3. The Christian writers often allude to the ἐκπύρωσις, which serves at once as a parallel and a contrast to their own doctrine, e.g. Tatian, adv. Graec. c. 25, p. 162 c, ἐκπύρωσι (λέγει τίς) ἀποβαίνει κατὰ χρόνους ἐγὼ δὲ εἰσάπαξ. Justin Martyr, Apol. i. 20. 20, p. 66 D.

τὸ πῦρ, add. εἰς Heeren whom Heinze, Logos, p. 111, follows, but the alteration is needless. For σπέρμα cf. M. Aurel. iv. 36.

55. Tatian, adv. Graec. c. 5, τὸν Ζήνωνα διὰ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως ἀποφαινόμενον ἀνιστασθαι πάλιν τοὺς αὐτούς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, Λέγω δὲ "Ἀνυτον καὶ Μέλητον ἐπὶ τῷ κατη-
The exact repetition in some future cycle of the world's course of the events that have already happened was maintained also by the Pythagoreans, cf. Simpl. Phys. 173 a, εἰ δὲ τις πιστεύσει τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὡς πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῷ, κἀγὼ μυθολογεύσω τὸ ρᾷβδίον ἐχὼν ύμῖν καθημένοις οὕτω, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὀμοίως ἔξει καὶ τὸν χρόνον εὐλογὸν ἐστὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι (quoted by Zeller, Pre-Socratics i. p. 474, n. 2). The Stoics were the more inclined to adopt such a view in consequence of their belief in the unswerving operation of the decrees of destiny. Somewhat analogous are the consequences which flowed from the Epicurean theory of an infinite number of worlds: cf. Cic. Acad. ii. 125, et ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis isdem esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus isdem de rebus disputantis? The subject is well treated by Ogereau, Essai, p. 70.

παραίτητέον: Tatian's objection to the Stoic theory is based on the ground that there is no progress towards perfection, the bad will be again more numerous than the just: Socrates and Heracles belong to a very small minority.

ἀνωμαλίας, θαλάττης ἀναχωρήσεως, ἐκάστου τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν διαλύσεως, χερσαίων φθορᾶς κατὰ γέννη ζῷων. κατα-5 ἱσκευάζειν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὖτως· 'εἰ μὴ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔλαβεν ἡ γῆ, μέρος ὑπανεστος οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι ἀντὶς ἑωρᾶτο, χθαμαλὰ δ’ ᾑδη τὰ ὅρη παῦτ' ἐγεγένητο, καὶ οἱ γεωλοφοι πάντες ἱσόπεδοι τῇ πεδιάδι· τοσοῦτων γὰρ καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ὁμβρὼν εἰς αἰδίου φερομένων εἰκὸς ἦν τῶν διηρμένων 10 πρὸς ύψος τὰ μὲν χειμάρροις ἀπερρῆχθαι, τὰ δὲ ὑπονοστή-σαντα κεχαλάσθαι, πάντα δὲ διὰ πάντων ἡ γῆ λελειάνθαι· νυνὶ δὲ συνεχῶς ἀνωμαλίαι καὶ παμπόλλων ὅρων αἱ πρὸς αἰθέριον ύψος ὑπερβολαὶ μηνύματ' ἐστὶ τοῦ τὴν γῆν μὴ αἰδίου εἶναι· πάλαι γὰρ, ὡς ἐφην, ἐν ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ ταῖς 15 ἐπομβρίαις ἀπὸ περάτων ἐπὶ πέρατα πᾶσ' ἄν λεωφόρος ἐγεγένητο. πέφυκε γὰρ ἡ ὑδατος φύσις καὶ μάλιστα ἄφ' υψηλοτάτων καταράττουσα τὰ μὲν ἐξωθεὶ τῇ βίᾳ, τὰ δὲ τῷ συνεχεῖ τῶν ψεκάδων κολάττουσα κολαίνειν ὑπερ-γάζεσθαι τῇ τῆς σκληρογέων καὶ λιθωδεστάτην ὀρυκτήρων 20 οὐκ ἐλαττον. 'καὶ μὴν ἡ γε θάλασσα,' φασὶν, ']!='ηδη μεμείωται· μάρτυρες δ' αἴ νήσου εὐδοκιμώταται Ῥώδος τε καὶ Δήλος· αὕται γὰρ τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἡφαιστεῖνα κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης ἐδεδύκεσαν ἐπικλυζόμεναι, χρόνῳ δ' ὑστερον ἐλαττομενής ἥρεμα κατ' ὁλίγον ἀνίσχουσαι, ὡς 25 αἰ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀναγραφεῖσα μηνύουσιν ἱστορίαι· [τῇ δὲ Δήλου καὶ Ἀναφήν ωνόμασαν δι' ἀμφοτέρων ὀνομάτων πιστοῦμενο τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδὴ γὰρ δήλῃ ἀναφανείσα ἐγένετο αἰδηλουμενή καὶ ἀφαινης οὖσα τὸ πᾶλαι] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις μεγάλων πελαγῶν μεγάλους κόλπους καὶ βαθέως 30 ἀναξιρισθέντας ἵππερωσθαι καὶ γεγεννῆθαι τῇ παρακε-μένης χώρας μοίραν οὐ λυπρῶν σπειρομένους καὶ φυτευο-μένους, οἷς σημεῖ αὕτα τῆς παλαιᾶς ἔναπολελεῖθαι θαλαττώσεως ψηφιδίας τε καὶ κόγχας καὶ ὦσα ὀμοιότροπα πρὸς αἰγαλοὺς εἰώθεν ἀποβράττεσθαι. [διὸ καὶ Πίνδαρος 35 ἐπὶ τῆς Δήλου φησί·

"Χαίρ', ὡ θεοδότα, λιπαροπλοκάμου"
παίδεσσι Λατούς ἵμεροέστατον ἐρνός
Πόντου θύγατερ, χθονὸς εὐρείας ἀκίνητον τέρας· ἃν τε βροτοί
40 Δάλων κικλήσκουσιν, μάκαρες δ' ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ τηλέ-
φαντὸν κυανέας χθονὸς ἀστρον.
θύγατέρα γὰρ Πόντου τὴν Δήλου εἴρηκε τὸ λεχθὲν ἀινίτ-
τόμενος]. εἰ δὴ μειοῦται ἡ θάλαττα, μειωθῆσεται μὲν ἡ
γῆ, μακρὰς δ' ἐνιαυτῶν περιόδους καὶ εἰς ἀπαν ἐκάτερον
στοιχεῖον ἀναλωθῆσεται, δαπανωθῆσεται <δὲ> καὶ ὁ
45 σύμπας ἀὴρ ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ὀλίγον ἐλαττούμενος, ἀποκρι-
θῆσεται δὲ πάντ' εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν τὴν πυρός.'
πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ τρίτου κεφαλαίου κατασκευήν χρώνται
λόγῳ τοιῷδε: 'φθείρεται πάντως ἐκεῖνο, οὐ πάντα τὰ μέρη
φθαρτὰ ἐστὶ, τοῦ δὲ κόσμου πάντα τὰ μέρη φθαρτά ἐστι,
50 φθαρτὸς ἡρὰ ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶν.' δ' ὑπερθέμεθα νῦν ἐπι-
σκεπτέον. ποίον μέρος τῆς γῆς, ὡς ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀρξώμεθα,
μείζον ἢ ἐλαττον, οὐ χρόνῳ διαλυθῆσεται; λίθων οἱ
κραταίοτατοι ἄρ οὔ μυδώσι καὶ σήπονται κατὰ τὴν ἔξως
ἀσθένειαν—[ἡ δ' ἐστὶ πνευματικὸς τόνος, δεσμὸς οὐκ]
55 ἄρρηκτος, ἀλλὰ μὸνον δυσδιάλυτος]—θρυπτόμενοι καὶ
ῥέοντες εἰς λεπτὴν τὸ πρῶτον ἀναλύονται κόνιν; [εἴθ' ὑπερ-
τερον δαπανηθέντες ἐξαναλύονται] τί δὲ; εἰ μὴ πρὸς
ἀνέμων ῥιπίζοιτο τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀκίνητον ἐαθὲν οὐχ ὑφ' ῥηχίας
νεκροῦται; μεταβάλλει γοὺς καὶ δυσωδέστατον γίγνεται
60 οἷα ψυχῆν ἀφηρημένον ζῷον. αἴ γε μὴν ἀέρος φθοράη
παντὶ τῷ δῆλαι νοσεῖν γὰρ καὶ φθίνει καὶ τρόπων τιν' ἀποθνήσκειν πέρικεν. ἐπεὶ τί ἄν τις, μὴ στοχαζόμενος
ὀνομάτων εὐπρεπείας ἀλλὰ τάληθος, εἰποὶ λοιμὸν εἶναι
πλὴν ἀέρος θάνατον τὸ οὐκείον πάθος ἀναχέοντος ἐτὶ
65 φθορᾶ πάντων ὁσα ψυχής μεμοιράται; τὶ χρῆ μακρη-
γορεῖν περὶ πυρός; ἀτροφήσαν γὰρ αὐτίκα σβέννυται
χωλόν, ἣ φασιν οἱ ποιηταί, γεγονὼς εἰς ἑαυτοῦ. διὸ σκηριπ-
τόμενον ὁρθοῦτα κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἀναφθείσης ὕλης νομην,
ἐξαναλωθείσης δ' ἀφανίζεται. [τὸ παραπλήσιον μέντοι
καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰνδικὴν δράκοντας φασὶ πάσχειν. 70 ἀνέρποντας γὰρ ἔπὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ξώων ἐλέφαντας περὶ νῦτα καὶ νηδύν ἅπασαν εἰλείσθαι, φλέβα δ᾽ ἢν ἢν τοὺς διελόντας ἐμπίνειν τοῦ αἴματος, ἀπλῆστως ἐπισπομένους βιαίων πνεύματι καὶ συντόνῳ ροίξι. μέχρι μὲν οὖν τινος ἐξαναλομμένους ἐκείνους ἀντέχειν ὑπ᾽ ἀμηχανίας 75 ἀνασκιρτώντας καὶ τῇ προνομαίᾳ τὴν πλευρὰν τύπτοντας ὡς καθισμένους τῶν δράκοντων, ἐὰν οἴει κενομένου τοῦ ἄστικοῖν πηδάν μὲν μηκέτι δύνασθαι, κραδανομένους δ᾽ ἐστάναι, μικρὸν δ᾽ ύστερον καὶ τῶν σκελῶν ἐξασθενησάντων κατασεισθέντας ὑπὸ λιφαμίας ἀποψύχειν πεσόντας 80 δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους τοῦ θανάτου συναπολλύναι τρόπῳ τοιῶδε, μηκέτι ἔχοντες τροφῆν ὦν δράκοντες, ἐὰν περιέθεσαν δεσμῶν ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐκλύειν ἀπαλλαγὴν ἡδὶ ποθοῦντες, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ βάρους τῶν ἐλεφάντων θλιβόμενοι πιεζόνται καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπεδιὰν τὸ ἁρμόσιμον ἢν εἰς ἀναλυσιν ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πίεσαντος βίας πεδηθέντες ἐαυτοὺς πολυτρόπως ἐν ἀμηχάνοις καὶ ἀπόροις γυμνάσαντες ἐξασθενοῦσιν. καὶ καθάπερ οἱ κατακελευσθέντες ἢ τεῖχους αἰφνίδιον ἐπενεχθέντες προκαταληφθέντες, οὐδ᾽ ὅσον ἀνα- 90 κύψαι δυνάμενοι πυγῆ τελευτῶσιν.] εἰ δὴ τῶν μερῶν ἐκαστὸν τοῦ κόσμον φθορὰν ὑπομένει, δηλούστω καὶ ὦ ἔξι αὐτῶν παγεῖς κόσμοι ἀφθαρτοὶ οὐκ ἔσται. τὸν δὲ τέταρτον καὶ λοιπὸν λόγον ἀκριβωτέον ὁδὸν φασίν. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ κόσμος ἁίδιος ἦν, ἢν ἢν καὶ τὰ ξώα ἁίδια καὶ πολὺ γε μᾶλλον τὸ ἵν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὁσοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄμεινον. ἄλλα καὶ ὁ ψυγόνον φανήσῃ τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐρευνάν τὰ φύσεως. εἰκὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνθρώπους συνυπάρξαι τὰς τέχνιας ὦς ἢν ἰσηλίκας οὐ μόνον ὅτι λογικῇ τὸ ἐμμε- θόδουν οἰκεῖον ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι ξῆν ἀνευ τοῦτων οὐκ ἔστιν. 100 ἰδωμεν τούς ἐκάστων χρόνους ἀλογήσαντες τῶν ἐπιτραγῳ- δουμένων θεοῖς μύθων * * * εἰ μὴ ἁίδιος ἀνθρωπος, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τι ξῆν, ὡστ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αἱ δεδεγμέναι ταῦτα χωρᾷ γῇ
καὶ ὑδωρ καὶ ἄηρ. ἐξ ὤν τὸ φθαρτὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον δὴλόν ἐστιν.

It will be seen that the writer attributes to Theophrastus the statement and criticism of certain views as to the creation and destruction of the world, which were opposed to the Peripatetic doctrine of its eternity. After the above extract this hostile view is refuted by arguments obviously derived, in part at least, from Peripatetic sources, although the name of Theophrastus is not again introduced. The question arises, assuming the good faith of the extract, to whom do these criticised views belong? This point was first raised by Zeller in Hermes xi. 422—429 and by an ingenious process of reasoning he concluded that Zeno is the philosopher who is here attacked. First, the four arguments, by which the proposition that the world is mortal is supported, belong to the Stoic school. They cannot belong to a pre-Aristotelian philosopher, for the doctrine of the eternity of the world and of mankind, against which they are directed, had not been broached before Aristotle (see de Caelo i. 10. 279b12); of the post-Aristotelians they obviously alone suit the Stoics, who were alone in holding the periodical destruction of the world. The second argument, built on the retrocession of the sea, finds a parallel in the views of a world-flood attributed to the Stoa by Alexander Aphrod. Meteor. 90a m.; and the dialectical form in which the third and fourth arguments are couched suggests the same origin. Again, the authority of Diog. L. vii. 141 is conclusive as to the third argument, and the terminology of ἐξις, τόνος, πνεύμα, and πνευματικὴ δύναμις, to which may be added οὐσία, ἀναφθείσης ὑλῆς, and φύσει οἴκεῖον, is undoubtedly Stoic. Next, it being proved that these arguments belong to the Stoic school, Zeno is the only Stoic whom Theo-

1 This point is proved in detail by Zeller, l. c. p. 424, 5.
Phrastus could have criticised, for the latter died in Ol. 123, that is between 288 and 284 B.C., at a time when Zeno's school had been founded for about 15 years. For the avoidance of a direct mention of Zeno, if such was really the case in the Theophrastean original, Zeller quotes the parallel cases in which Aristotle combats the views of Xenocrates and Speusippus without referring to them by name. As an additional circumstance pointing to Zeno's authorship, we may refer to the form in which the syllogism introducing the third argument is cast. This is undoubtedly one of those breves et acutulae conclusiones, so often mentioned by Cicero as characteristic of the style of the founder of Stoicism and of which examples (in addition to those in Cicero) have been preserved by Sextus Empiricus and Seneca: see the collection in Introd. p. 33. This is perhaps the right place to observe that a supposed frag. of Zeno, extracted by Wachsmuth (Comm. I. p. 8) from Philo de Provid. I. 12, and to the same effect as the third argument here, can no longer be regarded as belonging to Zeno on the authority of that passage after the explanation of Diels, Doxogr. Gr. proleg. p. 3.

These views of Zeller have however been vigorously criticised by Diels (Doxogr. Gr. pp. 106—108). His main contention is that the authority of the compiler of the pseudo-Philonian treatise is too weak to support so important a discovery as the alleged controversy between Theophrastus and Zeno, of which no trace has come down to us from other sources. He does not believe that this "nebulo" had ever read Theophrastus, and suggests that, finding the name of Theophrastus attached to the first two arguments in some work of Critolaus, he left his readers to assume that the elder Peripatetic was really responsible for those passages in which Critolaus himself
attacks what is undoubtedly Stoic doctrine. The result is that Diels, though he prints cc. 23—27 in the body of his work, does not believe that they contain (even after allowing for later accretions) a genuine excerpt from the φυσικά δόξαι of the Eresian philosopher. Now it is obvious that we are only concerned with the question of the fontes of the Philonian treatise and its general credibility, in so far as its solution enables us to authenticate these fragments as belonging to Zeno. Thus, altogether apart from its appearance in this passage, the Zenonian authorship of the syllogism in ll. 48—50 is extremely probable not only from internal indications, but also because of the evidence of Diogenes Laertius vii. 141, 142 (observe especially the words περὶ δὴ οὖν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς τοῦ κόσμου φησὶ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου). But, as to the general body of the fragment, the case is different: if we cannot trust the good faith of the writer, as giving us a genuine statement of the refutation by Theophrastus of his opponents' doctrine, it may well be that the two earlier arguments represent early Ionian, possibly Heraclitean, views (with Stoic additions), and that in the later portions we have the work of one of Zeno's successors as set out by a later Peripatetic. On the other hand, if Theophrastus is responsible for the exposition of all four arguments, they certainly belong to a single teacher or a single school, and that teacher, as has been shown above, must be Zeno. It is therefore necessary for us to consider the tenor of Zeller's rejoinder in Hermes xv. 137—146, which, briefly stated, resolves itself into a theory as to the origin of the pseudo-Philonian treatise. He fully admits the many absurdities with which the text is strewn, but argues that they can all be eliminated without interfering with the nexus of the arguments; nay more, that the original writing, though
not of great value, was at least a clear and trustworthy exposition of the views of the Peripatetic school, to which the writer belonged, but that the sequence of its thought has been distorted and its whole character changed by the blundering additions of a later hand. We are able to recognise in this treatise the work of two distinct authors, the first probably an Alexandrian philosopher of the latter half of the first century before Christ, and a contemporary of Arius Didymus and Boethus, and the second an Alexandrian Jew of the first or second century of the Christian era. The references of the original writer to Greek philosophy are found to be correct in all cases where his statements can be scrutinised by the light of other evidence: why then should we mistrust his citation of Theophrastus? To test this theory in detail would require a thorough examination of the treatise in question with reference to the suggested additions, an examination which would be out of place here. But we can gauge the character of the proposed explanation by the three passages which Zeller expels from our extract, and which may be fairly said to be typical of the accretions in the general body of the work. All three are certainly futile and purposeless, but that which is especially remarkable is the manner in which the course of the argument is improved by their removal. In particular, the long digression about the serpents and the Indian elephants prevents the conclusion founded on the destructibility of the several elements from following in natural sequence the last of the arguments by which this destructibility is proved of each element in detail. The latest treatment of this question is to be found in von Arnim's Quellen Studien zu Philo von Alexandria (Berlin 1888) p. 41 foll. He believes that the compilator of the treatise only had later Peripatetic writings—especially those of Critolaus—before

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him, and that the main portion of our passage was derived from one of them. All that belongs really to Theophrastus is the statement of the headings of the four arguments (ll. 1—5) and these headings, if taken alone, might refer to pre-Aristotelians. Yet, holding in agreement with Zeller and against Diels that the arguments by which the headings are supported are undeniably Stoic, he concludes that a younger Peripatetic adopted the Theophrastean scheme, originally a doxographical statement of pre-Aristotelian doctrines, as a groundwork for his polemic against the Stoics, who on their side had adopted these four arguments, perhaps from Heraclitus and Empedocles. Finally he suggests, on very inadequate grounds (p. 47), that Antipater of Tarsus was the particular Stoic whose views are summarised. If this theory is correct, it is certainly an extraordinary coincidence that Theophrastus should have selected from the older philosophy four particular statements, which go to prove the destructibility of the world, and that the Stoics should have unconsciously taken up identically the same ground in support of their own theory. Zeller's opinion still appears to me more reasonable: see also Stein, Psych. n. 86, who has anticipated the argument used above from the syllogism in ll. 33—35.


ἐγεγένητο(ἐγένετο) indicates that the process would have been already complete at the time specified i.e. long ago. In the case of verbs denoting an action the distinction between plup. and aor. with ἄνω is less apparent, though always present: cf. e.g. Dem. Timocr. p. 746 § 146, if imprisonment were contrary to the Ath. constitution
"There would not have been found a clause enacted in the laws" etc.


28. γάρ: the sentence would run more smoothly if this word were omitted.

33. οἷς σημεῖ' ἀπτα κ.τ.λ. The observation of similar facts induced in Xenophanes the belief that the earth was originally in a fluid state: cf. Hippolyt. i. 14 (quoted by Zeller, pre-Socrat. i. p. 570), ὁ δὲ Ξενοφάνης μὲν ξυς τὴν γῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν γενέσθαι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ χρόνω ἀπὸ τοῦ ύγροῦ λύσθαι φάσκων τοιαύτας ἔχειν ἄποδείξεις, ὅτι ἐν μέσῃ γῆ καὶ ὀρεσίν εὑρίσκοντο κόγχαι καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις δὲ ἐν ταῖς λατομίαις λέγει εὑρήθαι τύπον ἵθνος καὶ φωκῶν, ἐν δὲ Πάρῳ τύπον ἄφυς ἐν τῷ βαθεῖ τοῦ λίθου, ἐν δὲ Μελίτῃ πλάκας συμπάντων θαλασσιῶν.

35. διὸ—αἰνιττόμενος expelled by Zeller l. c. and also by Bücheler.

37. Pindar, frag. 64[87] Bergk.

43. periodoi: see on frag. 52.

45. ἀποκριθῆσεται "will be merged," cf. Thuc. i. 3, Ἐλληνας...εἰς ἐν ὄνομα ἀποκριθῆσαι, Diog. L. vii. 148, φύσις...τοιαύτα δρώσα ἄφ' οἴων ἀπεκρίθη.


54. πνευματικός τόνος: the favourite doctrine of Cleanthes: if this passage belongs to Zeno, we have an indication here that the master prepared the way for the pupil, cf. Cleanth. frag. 24. The words however may in any case be a later addition, and under the circumstances they have been bracketed.

56. ρέοντες "passing away" in the Heraclitean sense; yet even Plato has εἰ γὰρ ρέοι τὸ σῶμα...(Phaed. 87 D).

58. ἀνέμων: the illustration is suggestive in connection with the doctrine of πνεῦμα. For ῥυπτίζοιτο cf. frag. 106 κινοῦμενον καὶ ἀναριπτίζομενον ύπ’ ἐκείνου.

60. ψυχήν appears to be attributed to animals in general and not exclusively to man, see on frag. 43.

63. εὑπρεπείας. Cf. Plat. Euthyd. 305 E, καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὀντως ὡς Κρίτων εὑπρέπειαιν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλῆθειαν. It is possible that there is a reference to some contemporary school here, which had explained λοιμος after the manner of Prodicus. For the definition cf. M. Aurel. ix. 2.

69—91 ejected by Zeller, l. c.


99. ὡς ἄν not merely equivalent to ὡσπερ but elliptical. The full phrase would be ὡς εἰκός ἦν ἀν εἰ ἱσήλικος ἤσαν. Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 38, ἀν εἰ σοι πείσαιμι κοινῇ τὴν πόλιν ψευδόμενος ὡς ἀν στρατηγικῷ καὶ πολιτικῷ ἐαυτῇ ἐπιτρέψαι, where see Kühner. In this way is to be explained Thuc. i. 33. 1.

57. Philargyrius ad Verg. Georg. II. 336, Zenon ex hoc mundo quamvis aliqua intereant tamen ipsum perpetuo manere quia inhaerent ei elementa e quibus generantur materiae: ut dixit crescre quidem, sed ad interitum non pervenire manentibus elementis a quibus revalescat.

If taken literally, the doctrine here referred to would be inconsistent with the destructibility of the κόσμος, which, as we have seen, was held by Zeno: again, elementa can hardly be a translation of στοιχεία, which undoubtedly perished. We must suppose therefore that Zeno is speaking not of the visible world, but of the universe, and that elementa = ἄρχαι. According to Diog. L. vii. 137 κόσμος is used by the Stoics in three senses: the first of these is αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης οὐσίας ἔδιωκ τοιὸν ὅσ ὁ δή ἄφθαρτός ἕστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, and this is the sense which mundus must bear here. If this explanation be thought impossible, we can only suppose that there is a confusion with Zeno of Tarsus who is said to have withheld assent to the doctrine of the ἐκπύρωσις, Zeller, p. 168 n. 1. Stein, Psych. p. 64 and n. 92, thinks that Zeno held that at the ἐκπύρωσις the various manifestations of God—world-soul, λόγος σπερματικὸς etc.—lose themselves in the divine unity, but that the indeterminate matter (ἄποιος ὑλή) remains, cf. ib. p. 34, n. 42.

58. Diog. Laert. vii. 143, ὅτι τε εἰς ἑστὶν (ὁ κόσμος) Ζήμων φησι· ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου. Stob. Ecl. i. 22. 3b p. 199, 10, Ζήμων ἕνα εἶναι τὸν κόσμον.

This was one of the points which distinguished the Stoics from the Epicureans, who held that there are an infinite number of worlds. See further Zeller, p. 183 and the notes: the characteristic and important view of συμπάθεια μερῶν or συντονία is one of the developments introduced by Cleanthes.

We need not infer from this passage that Zeno expressed himself to be adopting Socrates' argument, for in the preceding paragraphs in Sext. i. c. 92 f. the passage referred to (Xen. Mem. i. 4 §§ 2—5. 8) is set out and discussed. The parallel passage is § 8 καὶ ταῦτα εἰδὼς ὁ ζῆν εἰς μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὐκής ἔχεις κ.τ.λ. ...νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἁρα οὐδαμοῦ ὅντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλῆθος ἀπειρα δι’ ἀφροσύνην τινά, ὡς οἶει, εὐτάκτως ἔχειν; cf. Sext. Math. ix. 77, M. Aurel. iv. 4 and see Stein, Psych. n. 53.

τούτου. Bekker with some plausibility suggests τοῦ θεοῦ. The Stoics argued from the existence of God that the world must be reasonable and vice versa. For the relation of God to the world see infra, frag. 66.

60. Cic. N. D. ii. 22, Idemque (Zeno) hoc modo: "Nullius sensu carentis pars aliquaque potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt: non igitur caret sensu mundus."


Alexinus the Megarian attacked Zeno’s position with the remark that in the same way the world might be proved to be poetical and possessed of grammatical knowledge. The Stoics retorted that it is not true that in the abstract τὸ ποιητικὸν is better than τὸ μὴ ποιητικὸν or τὸ γραμματικὸν than τὸ μὴ γραμματικὸν: otherwise Archilochus would be better than Socrates, Aristarchus than Plato (Sext. l. c. 108—110). For the fact cf. Diog. vii. 139, οὔτω δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ξώον οὖντα καὶ ἐμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν κ.τ.λ. Stein adds Philo, de incorr. m. p. 506 Μ, ὁ κόσμος καὶ φύσις λογική, οὐ μόνον ἐμψυχος ὁ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοερὸς πρὸς δὲ καὶ φρόνιμος. Siebeck refers to Arist. de Gen. An. ii. 1. 731b 25, τὸ ἐμψυχον τοῦ ἡψύχου βέλτιον.


Hirzel’s theory, p. p. 217, 218, that Zeno called the world ἐμψυχον and λογικῶν only but not ξώον is controverted by Stein, Psych. n. 82 from this passage. The passage in Plato, part of which is quoted by Sextus, is
Timaeus, p. 29 foll.; and see esp. 30 A, B which illustrates this and the last frag., cf. M. Aurel. iv. 40.

63. Cic. N. D. II. 22, Idemque similitudine, ut saepe solet, rationem conclusit hoc modo: ‘si ex oliva modulate canentes tibiae nascerentur, num dubitares quin inesset in oliva tibicinii quaedam scientia? quid? si platani fidiculas ferrent numerose sonantes, idem scilicet censeres in platanis inesse musicam. Cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque judicetur, quum ex se procreet animantes atque sapientes?’

This recalls the anecdote about Amoebeus: apoph. 19.

64. Stob. Ecl. i. 23. 1, p. 200, 21, Ζήνων πῦρινον εἶναι τὸν οὐρανόν.

Stobaeus couples Zeno with Parmenides, Heraclitus and Strato. For the Stoic authorities see Zeller, p. 201.


The genitive is partitive: “the extreme part of the aether.” This becomes clear when we remember that Zeno is closely following Aristotle here, cf. Phys. iv. 5 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μὲν γῆ ἐν τῷ ὑδάτι, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, οὕτως δ' ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι, ὁ δ' αἰθηρὸς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὁ δ' οὐρανὸς οὐκέτι ἐν ἀλλο. Just before he had said: ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ πάντα· ὁ γὰρ οὐρανὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔσως.

περιέχει. A direct parallel to this may be found in the teaching of the Pythagoreans (Zeller, pre-Socratics, i. p. 465), but there is possibly also a reminiscence of Plato, Timaeus 31 A, where οὐρανὸς is spoken of as τὸ περιέχον
πάντα ὁπόσα νοητὰ ξῶα: cf. also the περιέχου φρενῆρες of Heraclitus (Sext. Math. vii. 127 foll.). M. Aurel. viii. 54.


Cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 1. 29, p. 38, 1. The Stoics held θεοῦς... τὸν κόσμον καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν γῆν. In so far as God is manifested in the world, the world is God. Many more references are given in Zeller, p. 157. The words καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν are added because in it the material essence of divinity exists in its purest form. Diog. L. vii. 138, οὐρανός δὲ ἐστιν ἢ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ἢ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον. Hence Chrysippus and Posidonius spoke of the οὐρανός as τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου (ib. 139). Certainly, if these words are pressed, pantheism, involving the identification of God and matter, is distinctly attributed to Zeno. Wellmann, p. 469, suggests that Zeno may really only have said that the world is formed out of the divine essence (ὁ κόσμος οὐσία θεοῦ) and that Diog. through a confusion of subject and predicate interpreted this as a definition of the essence of God. Another possibility is that κόσμος is used in the same sense as in frag. 71. See also Stein, Psychologie n. 88.

67. Stob. Ecl. i. 19. 4, p. 166, 4, Ζήνωνος. τῶν δ' ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πάντων τῶν κατ' ἱδίαν ἐξίν συνεστῶτων τὰ μέρη τὴν φορὰν ἔχειν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ὅλου μέσον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόσμου· διὸπερ ορθῶς λέγεσθαι πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ κόσμου τὴν φορὰν ἔχειν, ἢ μάλιστα δὲ τὰ βάρος ἔχοντα. ταῦταν δ' αὐτίων εἶναι καὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου μονῆς ἐν ἀπείρῳ κενῷ, καὶ τῆς γῆς παραπλησίως ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ περὶ τὸ τούτου κέντρου καθιδρυμένης ἱσοκρατῶσ. οὐ πάντως δὲ σώμα βάρος ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἀβαρῆ εἶναι ἄερα καὶ πῦρ τείνεσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα πῶς...
éπι το της ὅλης σφαίρας τοῦ κόσμου μέσου, την δὲ σύστασιν πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν αυτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι. φύσει γὰρ ἀνώφοιτα ταῦτ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ δενὸς μετέχειν βάρους. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις οὐδ' αὐτῶν φασι τὸν κόσμον 15 βάρος ἔχειν διὰ τὸ την ὅλην αυτοῦ σύστασιν ἐκ τε τῶν βάρων ἔχοντων στοιχείων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄβαρων. τὴν δ' ὅλην γην καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν ἕχειν ἀρέσκει βάρος παρὰ δὲ τὴν θέσιν διὰ τὸ τὴν μέσην ἔχειν χώραν (πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον εἶναι τὴν φορὰν τοῖς τοιούτοις σώμασιν) ἐπὶ τοῦ τόπου 20 τούτου μένειν.

2. συνεστώτων. This is the most general term, else-where opposed to συνάπτεσθαι, συνέχεσθαι etc.

4. πάντα τὰ μέρη κ.τ.λ. This centralising tendency is called by Diogenes (vii. 140) τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν καὶ συντονίαν. In the Stoic doctrine of the microcosm and the macrocosm there is one discrepancy, in that while the ἡγεμονικὸν of the world is at its extreme periphery the ἡγεμονικὸν of man is in the breast. Stein, Psych. p. 211, finds in this passage an attempt to remove this inconsistency by making the earth the central point from which all motion originates and to which it returns.

9. οὐ πάντως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 14. 1 f. p. 142, 9, οἱ Στωικοὶ δῦο μὲν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κοῦφα πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα· δῦο δὲ βαρέα ύδωρ καὶ γῆν. κοῦφον γὰρ ὑπάρχει φύσει, ὃ νεῦει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱδίου μέσου, βαρὺ δὲ τὸ εἰς μέσον, i.e. light is opposed to heavy not relatively, as in our use of the words, but absolutely, implying motion in an outward or upward direction. Cic. Tusc. i. 40, persuasant mathematici...eam naturam esse quattuor omnia gignentium corporum, ut, quasi partita habeant inter se ac divisa momenta, terrena et umida suopte nutu et suo pondere ad paris angulos in terram et in mare ferantur, reliquae duae partes, una ignea, una animalis,...rectis
lineis in caelestem locum subvolent, sive ipsa natura superiora adpetente, sive quod a gravioribus leviora natura repellantur. N. D. II. 116, 117. The Stoics were following Aristotle (ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 19. 1, p. 163, 9, τῆς δὲ κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου γίνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὸ μέσον. πυρὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, γῆς καὶ ύδατος ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, τοῦ πέμπτου περὶ τὸ μέσον).

10. τείνεσθαι δὲ: So Diels for MSS. γίνεσθαι, a correction more probable for palaeographical reasons and in itself more attractive than Meineke's κινεῖσθαι. Cf. Nemes. 2. p. 29, τονικὴν εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἀμα καὶ τὸ ἔξω κινουμένην. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 44. 7. 1054 E, οὖτω δὲ τοῦ ὀλου τεινομένου εἰς ταυτὸ καὶ κινουμένου κ.τ.λ. The explanation is as follows:—the natural motion of the elements is restrained and modified by the continual process of change (μεταβολή) by whose action the world is formed and exists. Fire and Air are perpetually being transformed into Water and Earth and thus, before their upward tendency has time to assert itself, they themselves becoming possessed of βάρος start again in the opposite direction. Thus each of the four elements is apparently stationary and remains constant: in reality its component parts are in continual motion. Cf. Chrysippus ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 44. 6, a passage too long to quote. This explanation is supported by the statement which is attributed to the Stoics by Stobæus, that at the ἐκπύρωσις the world is resolved into the void (Ecl. i. 18. 4 b. p. 160, 11 and Euseb. P. E. xv. 40): cf. ib. i. 21. 3 b, μήτε αὔξεσθαι δὲ μήτε μειοῦσθαι τῶν κόσμων τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ὅτε μὲν παρεκτείνεσθαι πρὸς πλεῖονα τόπον ὅτε δὲ συστέλλεσθαι. This is not necessarily inconsistent with Prof. Mayor's explanation (on N. D. II. 116) that "the all-pervading aether, while it has a naturally ex-
pansive and interpenetrative force, has also a strong cohesive force and thus holds all things together round the centre.” See also M. Aurel. xi. 20.

11. σφαῖρας: for the Stoic doctrine of the rotundity of the world, cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 15. 6b οἱ Στωικοὶ σφαῖροειδῆ τὸν κόσμον ἀπεφήμαντο, Diog. vii. 140, Cic. N. D. i. 24, hence ἀντίπόδες Cic. Acad. ii. 123.

17. παρὰ δὲ τὴν θέσιν: in itself earth βάρος ἔχει and so tends to move πρὸς τὸ μέσον, but owing to the accident of its position in the centre of the κόσμος its natural motion has no opportunity of becoming apparent.

18. μέσην. For the position of the earth cf. Diog. L. vii. 137, 155, Cic. N. D. i. 103.

68. Stob. Ecl. i. 15. 6a p. 146, 21, Ζήνων ἐφασκε τὸ πῦρ κατ’ εὐθείαν κυνεῖσθαι.

Cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 14. 1. f. p. 142, 12, τὸ μὲν περίγειον φῶς κατ’ εὐθείαν...κυνεῖται. This is only true of πῦρ ἀτεχνὸν, for the aether or πῦρ τεχνικὸν has a circular motion in the same manner as the πέμπτων σῶμα of Aristotle. So Ar. de Caelo, i. 2. 9, τὸ τε γὰρ πῦρ ἐπ’ εὐθείας ἀνω φέρεται.

69. Stob. Ecl. i. 18. 1d p. 156, 27, Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου μηδὲν εἰναι κενὸν, ἔξω δ’ αὐτοῦ ἀπειροῦ. διαφέρειν δὲ κενὸν, τόπον, χώραν καὶ τὸ μὲν κενὸν εἰναι ἐρημίαν σώματος, τὸν δὲ τόπον τὸ ἐπεχώμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τὴν δὲ χώραν τὸ ἐκ μέρους ἐπεχώμενον.

Cf. Diog. vii. 140, ἔξωθεν δὲ αὐτοῦ περικεχυμένον εἰναι τὸ κενὸν ἀπειροῦν ὡφερ ἀσώματον εἰναι ἀσώματον δὲ τὸ οὐν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σωμάτων οὐ κατεχόμενον’ ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μηδὲν εἰναι κενὸν. Plut. plac. i. 18, οἱ Στωικοὶ ἐντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου οὐδὲν εἰναι κενὸν, ἔξωθεν δ’ αὐτοῦ ἀπειροῦ. M. Aurel. x. 1. Diels adds Theodoret iv. 14, ἐντὸς
μὲν τοῦ παντὸς μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν, ἐκτὸς δὲ αὐτοῦ πᾶμπολύ τε καὶ ἀπειρον. The Epicureans held that without the existence of void within the world motion was impossible (Lucr. i. 329 foll., Reid on Acad. i. 27, π. 125). The Stoics were unaffected by this argument in consequence of their doctrine of κρᾶσις δι’ ὀλων, see further on frag. 50, supra. Aristotle denied the existence of void altogether either within or without the universe.

κενόν, τόπον, χώραν. The Stoics and the Epicureans were in virtual agreement in their definitions of these terms: see Sext. Emp. adv. Math. x. 2, 3. For a fuller exposition cf. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 18. 4th p. 161, 8, who compares κενόν to an empty, τόπος to a full, and χώρα to a partially filled vessel, cf. the similar views of Aristotle quoted by R. and P. § 327.

70. Themist. Phys. 40b Speng. π. 284, 10, (τὸ κενόν) κεχωρισμένον καὶ ἀθρόον εἶναι καθ’ αὐτὸ περιέχον τὸν οὐρανὸν, ὡς πρότερον μὲν ὑοντο τῶν ἀρχαίων τινὲς, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ περὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Κιτίεα. Philopon. on Ar. Phys. iv. 6. p. 213 a 31, φασὶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Κιτίεα οὖν (scil. ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εἶναι κενόν τι καθ’ αὐτὸ) δοξάζειν.

τῶν ἀρχαίων τινὲς are probably the Pythagoreans who believed in an ἀπειρον πνεῦμα outside the universe, called κενόν by some of the authorities (Zeller, pre-Socratics i. pp. 467, 8).

71. Stob. Ecl. i. 25. 5, p. 213, 15, Ζήνων τὸν ἦλιον φησι καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρων ἕκαστον εἶναι νοερὸν καὶ φρόνιμον πῦριν πυρὸς τεχνικὸν. δύο γὰρ γένη πυρὸς, τὸ μὲν ἀτεχνὸν καὶ μετάβαλλον εἰς ἑαυτὸ τὴν τροφήν, τὸ δὲ τεχνικὸν, αὐξητικὸν τε καὶ τηρητικὸν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐστὶ καὶ ζῷοις, ὁ δὲ φύσις ἐστὶ καὶ
ψυχη: toioi'tou di epuroia einai tin toy astrophon ouasia tou. 

7tvpOevdil TTJV rWV (UTTpfOV rov 8

V7TO rov Kocr/jov d.Tr d.varojv, 
et<

tovrciiv 

Stob. Ecl. i. 26. 1, p. 219, 12, Zlmuov tin selin'nu ephi'sev

vicrov 

To e/c-

tovroKocr/jov.

tacp,

ravcre

yi<yvea-6ai 8 

dp<j>oTep(i)v ro? e/cXei 
et?

i/ai eXarroi;.

Stob. Eel. I. 2(5. 1, p. 219, 12, Zqvw TIV cre
tv e<f>ria-ev 

dcnpov voepov 
tcai fypovijjiov Trvpivov Se 

mjpivov: 

ye

are situated in the external periphery of aether, and are themselves composed of the same substance. The later Stoics, at any rate, held that the heavenly bodies are fed by exhalations of grosser matter, and hence their differentiation from their environment. Cf. Cleanth. frags. 29 and 30.


phiw oc refers to phiwocis and psiw' to zyoiocis: cf. frag. 43.

fophas. The first movement is the diurnal revolution from east to west (from one rising to another): the second is the orbit described kata' toyo zydiakov kumlo, occupying either a year or a month, as the case may be. For the Zodiac cf. Diog. L. viii. 155, 156.

ups toy kospov, i.e. they move with the aether which revolves round the three lower strata of the world. These latter are themselves stationary, so that kospov is used as in Cleanth. frag. 48, l. 7, where see note. The whole structure of the cosmos is very clearly expounded by Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 21. f. p. 184, 185; and cf. especially toy...kospov to mev ei'nav peri'reromenov peri' toy me'sov to d' upsomenov' peri'reromenov men toy ai'tera upsom

mevov de tin yin kai ta ep' auitis ygrai kai toy aera...to 
dele peri'reromenov auitw egenvklis aitetera ei'nav, ev d' 
ta astera kahidroutai ta' aplanve kai ta planowego, theia
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τὴν φύσιν ὄντα καὶ ἐμψυχα καὶ διοικούμενα κατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν.

ζωδίων: according to Diels, the acc. is "insolenter dictum" and requires the addition of εἰς, but it has been pointed out to me that the true explanation of the acc. is to be found in the fact that ζωδίων is a measure of space = 30 μοῖραι, Hippol. Haer. v. 13: we should not therefore compare μεταβας βίοτον Eur. Hipp. 1292, which is in any case different. For the fact cf. Diog. vii. 144.

τὰς δ' ἐκλείψεις: sec infra frag. 73.

μεῖζον καὶ ἐλάττους: "entire and partial."

72. Cic. N. D. 1. 36, idem (Zeno) astris hoc idem (i.e. vim divinam) tribuit tum annis, mensibus, annorum-que mutationibus.

astris. On the other hand the Epicureans taught that the stars could not possess happiness or move in consequence of design. Diog. L. x. 77, μήτε αὖ πυρώδη τινὰ συνεστραμμένα τὴν μακαριότητα κεκτημένα κατὰ βούλησιν τὰς κινήσεις ταῦτας λαμβάνειν.

annis: probably Zeno did not stop to enquire whether the seasons etc. were corporeal or not; he regarded them as divine "als regelmässig erfolgende Umläufe der Sonne und des Mondes" (Krische, p. 389). Chrysippus must have been hard pressed when he delivered the extraordinary opinion quoted by Plut. Comm. Not. 45, 5 (see Zeller, Stoics p. 131). Krische appositely quotes Plat. Leg. x. p. 899 B, ἀστρον δὲ δὴ περὶ πάντων καὶ σελήνης ἑνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ πασῶν ὃρῶν πέρι, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον ἐρόμεν ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ πάντων τούτων αὐτίαι ἐφανήσαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἱρέτην, θεοὺς αὐτάς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἰτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοόσαι, ξοδα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσι πάντα οὐρανόν, εἰτε ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως: In Sext. Math. ix. 184 an argument of Carneades is
quoted of the Sorites type, disproving the existence of God. If the sun is a god, so are days, months and years. This the Stoics might have admitted, but he concludes thus:—σὺν τῷ ἀτοπον εἶναι τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν θεον εἶναι λέγειν, τὴν δὲ ἐω καὶ τὴν μεσημβρίαν καὶ τὴν δείλην μηκέτι.

73. Diog. L. vii. 145, 6, ἐκλείπειν δὲ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον ἐπιπροσθούσης αὐτῷ σελήνης κατὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μέρος, ὥς Ζῆνων ἀναγράφει ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου. φαίνεται γὰρ ύπερχομένη ταῖς συνόδοις καὶ ἀποκρύπτουσα αὐτὸν καὶ πάλιν παραλλάττουσα. γνωρίζεται δὲ τούτο διὰ λεκάνης ὑδρὸς ἑχοῦσης. τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐμπίπτουσαν εἰς τὸ τῆς γῆς σκίασμα. οἶθεν καὶ ταῖς πανσελήνους ἐκλείπειν μόναις, καὶ περι κατὰ διάμετρον ἰσταμένην κατὰ μήνα τῷ ἥλιῳ ὅτι κατὰ λοξοῦ ὡς πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον κινομένην παραλλάττει τῷ πλάτει ἢ βορειοτέρα ἢ νοτιοτέρα γνωμένη. όταν μέντοι τὸ πλάτος αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸν ἥλιακὸν καὶ τὸν διὰ μέσων γένηται εἶτα διαμετρήσῃ τὸν ἥλιον τότε ἐκλείπει.

ἐκλείπειν. The eclipse of the sun owing to the interposition of the moon between it and the earth is a doctrine attributed by Stobaeus to Thales, the Pythagoreans, and Empedocles (Ecl. i. 25. 1³ 2³ 3³): the same explanation was also given by Anaxagoras (Zeller, pre-Socratics π. p. 361). The same account is given by the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 103, luna...subiecta atque opposita soli radios eius et lumen obscurat, tum ipsa incidens in umbram terrae, cum est e regione solis, interpositu interiectuque terrae repente deficit.

taῖς συνόδοις “at the period of conjunction.” Cf. Cic. Rep. i. 25, Pericles...docuisset cives suos dicitur, id quod ipse ab Anaxagora, cuius auditor fuerat, exceperat, certo illud (eclipse of sun) tempore et necessario,
cum tota se luna sub orben solis subiecisset: itaque, etsi non omni intermenstruo, tamen id fieri non posse nisi certo intermenstruo tempore. Thuc. ii. 28.


πανσελήνους: the fact was a matter of common observation: cf. Thuc. vii. 50, ἡ μῆνη ἐκλείπειν ἐτύγχανε γὰρ πανσελήνος οὐσα.

κατὰ λοξοῦ: hence ἐλικοεἰδῆ in Diog. L. vii. 144, see Krische p. 389.

diὰ μέσων scil. ἔφεδρων. There is nothing distinctively Stoic in these explanations. Zeno was simply repeating the ordinary scientific theories of his age. Epicurus gave alternative explanations, of which this is one (Diog. L. x. 96).

74. Diog. L. vii. 153, 154, ἀστρατήν δὲ ἔξαψιν νεφῶν παρατριβομένων ἡ ῥηγυμένων ὑπὸ πνεῦματος, ὡς Ζηνών ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου βροντήν δὲ τὸν τούτων ψόφον ἐκ παρατριψεως ἡ ρήξεως κεραυνοῦ δὲ ἔξαψιν σφοδρὰν μετὰ πολλῆς βίας πίπτουσαν ἐπὶ γῆς νεφῶν παρατριβομένων ἡ ρηγυμένων.

Cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 29, 1, p. 233, 9, ἀστρατήν ἔξαψιν νεφῶν ἐκτριβομένων ἡ ρηγυμένων ὑπὸ πνεῦματος, βροντήν δὲ εἶναι τὸν τούτων ψόφον...όταν δὲ ἡ τοῦ πνεῦματος φορὰ σφοδροτέρα γένηται καὶ πυρώδης, κεραυνοῦ ἀποτελεῖσθαι. ib. p. 234, 1 where the same views are attributed to οἱ Στωικοὶ. Here again there is nothing specially characteristic of the Stoa: Epicurus, as was his wont, gave a number of possible explanations and amongst them these: see Diog. L. x. 100—103, cf. Lucr. vi. 96 f. (thunder), 162 f. (lightning), 246 f. (thunderbolts). Lucan i. 151, qualiter expressum ventis per nubila fulmen aetheris impulsi sonitu etc. Aristoph. Nub. 404 foll.

H. P.

On this point the majority of the Stoic school seem to have deviated from the teaching of Zeno, considering his view unsatisfactory: thus Diog. vii. 152, κομῆτας δὲ καὶ πωγονίας καὶ λαμπαδίας πυρὰ εἶναι ύφεστῶτα, πάχους ἀέρος εἰς τὸν αἰθερώδῃ τὸπον ἀνενεχθέντος, cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 28. 1. p. 228, 6, Βοηθὸς ἀέρος ἀνημμένον φαντασιάν. Sen. N. Q. vii. 21, placet ergo nostris cometas...denso aere creari.

76. Stob. Ecl. i. 8. 40. p. 104, 7, Ζηνών ἔφησε χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα, τῶτο δὲ καὶ μέτρον καὶ κριτήριον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος ὁποῖς ἔχει ἔκαστα. κατὰ τούτον δὲ γίγνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ περαινόμενα ἀπαντα καὶ τὰ ὑπότα εἶναι. Simplic. ad Cat. 80 a 4, τῶν δὲ Στωικῶν Ζηνών μὲν πάσης ἀπλῶς κινήσεως διάστημα τὸν χρόνον εἶναι, who goes on to say that Chrysippus limited the definition by adding the words τοῦ κόσμου. Cf. Diog. vii. 141, ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἀσώματον, διάστημα ὑπό τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. Varro L. L. vi. 3 (quoted by Prof. Mayor on Cic. N. D. i. 21.), tempus esse dicunt intervallum mundi motus. See also Zeller p. 198 and add Plotin. Ennead. iii. 7. 6, Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 136 f. Math. x. 170 f. Zeno held as against Chrysippus that time existed from eternity, and that it is not merely coeval with the phenomenal world. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 223—225.

ἔκαστα is added by Wachsm. and some word is clearly wanted: Posidonius however in reproducing the clause has ὁποῖς ἔχει τὸ ἐπινοούμενον (Stob. Ecl. i. 8. 42, p. 105, 21). It seems better to remove the comma usually placed
after βραδύτητος, as the genitives depend at least as much on ὃπως ἔχει as on μέτρον καὶ κριτήριον, cf. e.g. Thuc. ii. 90. 4, ὡς εἶχε τάχους ἔκαστος.

ἀπαντᾶ must be corrupt, as some verb is required to balance γίνεσθαι and εἶναι. Usener suggests ἀπαρτίζεσθαι, which gives the required sense, cf. ἀπαρτισμόν. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 8. 42, p. 106, 17. Diels' correction ἀπαντᾶ is less satisfactory in meaning.

77. Censorinus de die Nat. xvii. 2, quare qui annos triginta saeculum putarunt multum videntur errasse. hoc enim tempus genean vocari Heraclitus auctor est, quia orbis aetatis in eo sit spatio, orbem autem vocat actatis dum natura ab sementi humana ad sementim revertitur. hoc quidem geneas tempus alii aliter definierunt. Herodicus annos quinque et viginti scribit, Zenon triginta.

genean: this substantially accords with the popular reckoning as recorded by Herod. ii. 142, γενεὰὶ γὰρ τρεῖς ἀνδρῶν ἐκατὸν ἐτεὶ ἐστὶ.

Heraclitus: for the other authorities which attribute this statement to Heraclitus see Zeller pre-Socratics ii. p. 87, n. 4 and frags. 87 and 88 ed. Bywater.

sementi: saeculum is properly used with the meaning "generation" and this supports the derivation from sero, satus (Curtius G. E. i. p. 474 Eng. Tr.). For examples see the Lexx.

Herodicus: either (1) the Alexandrian grammarian, or (2) the physician of Selymbria: see D. Biog.

Zenon: according to Wachsmuth Jahn proposes to substitute Xenon, but the agreement with Heraclitus rather points to the founder of the Stoa.

78. Stob. Ecl. i. 16. 1, p. 149, 8, Ζήμων ο Ἡττοῖκος τὰ χρώματα πρῶτους εἶναι σχηματισμοὺς τῆς ὀλης. The
same words occur also in Plut. plac. i. 15. 5 and in Galen Hist. Phil. c. 10. xix. 258 Kühn.

The above extracts appear to represent all that is known of the Stoic theories about colour: for the Epicurean view cf. Lucri. ii. 795 foll. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 310, rightly observes that the definition, implying that colour is an actual attribute of matter, indicates Zeno’s reliance on sense-impressions.


We have already seen that Zeno held καθ’ εἰμαρμένην τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, frag. 45. How then are we to reconcile with this doctrine of necessity the fact that free will is here allowed to mankind even in a limited degree? The Stoic answer is most clearly given by the simile with which they supported their position, cf. Hippolyt. adv. Haeres. i. 18, καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ καθ’ εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πᾶντα διεβεβαιώσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ ὡσπερ ὀχύματος ἢ ἢ ἐξηρτημένος κύων, ἢ ἢ μὲν βούληται ἐπεσθαί καὶ ἐλκεται καὶ ἐπεταί ἐκών, ποιών καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης οἶον τῆς εἰμαρμένης’ ἢ ἢ δὲ μὴ βούληται ἐπεσθαί πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται· τὸ αὐτὸ δὴ ποικιλὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων’ καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθῆσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον ἐσελθεῖν. The simile itself very possibly belongs to Cleanthes as it accords exactly with his lines in frag. 91. Chrysippus struggled vigorously with the difficulties in which he was involved in maintaining this theory: see the authorities collected by Zeller p. 177 foll. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie pp. 328—332, who ascribes to Cleanthes the introduction of the Stoic answer to the dilemma, has omitted to notice
the present frag. and does an injustice to Zeno in asserting that the conflict between free will and necessity never presented itself to his mind.

80. Censorinus de die Nat. iv. 10, Zenon Citieus, Stoicae sectae conditor, principium humano generi ex novo mundo constitutum putavit, primosque homines ex solo adminiculio divini ignis, id est dei providentia, genitos.

This doctrine is connected with that of the destructibility of the world: cf. frag. 56, where however there is unfortunately a lacuna at the point where the origin of man is being discussed. ὄψιγνον in that passage must not be supposed to be at variance with this: the argument there is simply to show that the world cannot be without beginning, because facts show that mankind has not existed from eternity. Zeno is, therefore, distinctly opposed to a theory of progression; mankind was produced in the first instance, when the primary fire was in full sway, and was entirely formed out of the divine essence; the inference must be that men have degenerated through the assimilation of coarser substances, and in this connection we may perhaps point to Posidonius' belief in the popular view of a golden age, when there was a complete supremacy of wise men. Senec. Ep. 90, 5. There is a parallel to this passage in Sext. Math. ix. 28 where the arguments given by various schools for the existence of gods are being recited, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων στωικῶν φασὶ τινὲς τούς πρώτους καὶ γγγενεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ πολὺ τῶν νῦν συνέσει διαφέροντας γεγονέναι, ὅς πάρεστι μαθεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἠμῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαιοτέρους καὶ ἱρως ἐκείνους, ὃσπερ τι περιττὸν αἰσθητήριου σχόντας τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς διανοίας ἐπιβεβληκέναι τῇ θείᾳ φύσει καὶ νοῆσαι τινὰς δυνάμεις θεῶν. Cf. Cic. Leg. i. 24. Tusc. iii. 2, nunc parvulos nobis dedit (natura) igniculos quos celeriter
malis moribus opinionibusque depravati sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat. For the anthropological aspect of this passage see Stein, Psych. p. 115.

81. Varro de Re Rust. II. 1, 3, sive enim aliquod fuit principium generandi animalium, ut putavit Thales Milesius et Zeno Citieus, sive contra principium horum exstitit nullum, ut ereditit Pythagoras Samius et Aristoteles Stagirites.

It is obvious that only on the hypothesis of the world in its present form being without beginning is the doctrine of the eternity of the human race or of animals possible. Aristotle, however, expressly says (de Caelo i. 10 279 b 12) that none of his predecessors had held the world to be without beginning in this sense. Unless therefore Aristotle is mistaken, the reference to Pythagoras in the present passage must be erroneous: see the discussion in Zeller pre-Socrates i. pp. 439—442 and especially p. 439 n. 2 and for the similar case of Xenophanes ib. p. 570: see also Newman on Ar. Pol. II. 8 1269 a 5. At any rate Zeno is in agreement with the great majority of those who went before him: the early philosophers held for the most part that animal life was produced by the action of the sun’s rays on the primitive slime, as Anaximander, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Archelaus (Zeller i. c. i. pp. 255, 577, 601, II. p. 392), or on the earth, as Diogenes of Apollonia (ib. i. p. 296). Somewhat similar were the views of Empedocles and Anaxagoras (ib. II. pp. 160, 365).

82. Schol. ad Plat. Alcib. i. p. 121 ε δις ἐπτὰ ἐτῶν] τότε γὰρ ὁ τέλειος ἐν ἦμιν ἀποφαίνεται λόγος, ὥσ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Ἀλκμαῖων ὁ Πυθαγόρειος φασίν.

Cf. Stob. Eel. i. 48. 8, p. 317, 21, πάλιν τοίνυν περὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ πασῶν τῶν κρειττῶν δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς
οἱ μὲν Στωικοὶ λέγουσιν μὴ εὐθὺς ἐμφύεσθαι τὸν λόγον, ὑστερον δὲ συναθροίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντασίων περὶ δεκατέσσαρα ἑττή. Plut. plac. IV. 11, ὁ δὲ λόγος καθ' ὑν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοί ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληρωθῆναι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐβδομάδα. (This points to some slight divergence in the school itself as to the exact period of life at which ὁ λόγος τελειοῦται: secus Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 116, but how can συμπληρωθῆναι = “begin”?) Diog. vii. 55, φωνή...ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, ὃς ὁ Διογένης φησίν· ἦτις ἀπὸ δεκατεσσάρων ἑτῶν τελειοῦται. The mind at birth is a tabula rasa: reason lies in the application of προλήψεις and ἐννοιαι, which are themselves ultimately founded on external impressions, cf. Cleanth. fr. 37 θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεσθαι τὸν νοῦν. The present fragment has been generally overlooked.


aiσθητικήν: the MSS. have αἰσθησιν Ἦ but the correction (made by Wellmann p. 475 and Zeller p. 212) is rendered certain by the parallel passage in ps-Plut. vit. hom. c. 127, την ψυχήν οἱ Στοικοί ὀρίζονται πνεύμα συμφυεῖς καὶ ἀναθυμίασιν αἰσθητικὴν ἀναπτομένην ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν σώματι ύγρῶν.

ἀναθυμίασιν: cf. Ar. de Anim. i. 2. 16. 405 a 25, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι φησὶ ψυχήν, εἰπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, εἴς ἃς τάλλα συνίστησιν, i.e. Aristotle identifies the ἀναθυμίασις (“fiery process” Wallace) with τῦρ. Zeno adopts the word as an apt description of the warm breath of which the soul is composed.

νοερά. The soul’s rational power is constantly renewed by the fiery process, because it is fed by the emanations from the περιέχον according to Heraclitus or from the moist parts of the body, i.e. the blood, according to Zeno. In this way Heraclitus explained his famous saying αὕτη ψυχῇ σοφωτάτη (frag. 74 ed. Bywater), while the Stoics from their point of view regarded the excellence of the soul as consisting in a suitable admixture of heat. Stein, Psych. p. 105. Hence, as Diels observes, there is no necessity to read ἐτεραῖ αἰεί.

εἰκασεν αὐτάς: the principle of πάντα ρεῖ applies no less to the soul than to the world in general: thus Arist. l.c. continues καὶ ἀσωματώτατον τε καὶ ρέον αἰεί· τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινούμενοι γνωστικός ἐν κινήσει δ’ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κάκεινος ὑετο καὶ οἱ πολλοί. The soul is νοερά because it is in flux. For ποταμοῖοι cf. Plat. Crat. 402 λ, Ἡράκλειτος...ποταμὸν ροῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίνῃς. R and P § 26.

καὶ...ἀναθυμίαντα. Bywater Heracl. fr. 42 ascribes these words to Zeno and not to Heraclitus: the importance of this will appear presently.
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όμοιος: i.e. in the same sense as Heraclitus: the latter however would not have called the soul αἰσθητική, distinguishing as he did between sensation and knowledge: κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώπων ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ δῶτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἔχοντων frag. 11 Sch. and Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 12: hence Sextus infers that Heraclitus held τὴν αἰσθησίν ἀπιστοῦν ἐναὶ (Math. vii. 126).

tυπούσθαι: cf. frag. 7, and for ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων κ.τ.λ. frag. 11.


This passage has been discovered by Stein, Psych. n. 81 to whose remarks the reader is referred.

85. Diog. L. vii. 157, Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεύς...πνεῦμα ἐνθερμοὶ ἐναὶ τὴν ψυχῆν. τούτῳ γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐναὶ ἐμπνεύσως, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κινεῖσθαι.

Cf. Alex. Aphr. de an. p. 26, 16 ed. Bruns, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοιχεῖας πνεῦμα αὐτὴν λέγοντες ἐναὶ συγκείμενων πως ἐκ τε πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 70, ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ ἀγεμονικὸν ἢ λεπτομερέστερον τι πνεύματος κ.τ.λ. If any of the authorities seem to assert that Heraclitus defined the soul as πνεῦμα, this is doubtless either due to Stoic influence or is a mere gloss on ἀναθυμίασις: see the reff. in Zeller pre-Socrates II. p. 80 where however the reference to Sext. Math. ix. 363 (leg. 361) is a mistake, as the passage is dealing with τὰ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα. Not dissimilar is the Epicurean definition of the soul: Diog. L. x. 63, ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμα ἐστὶ λεπτομερές παρ᾽ ὀλον τὸ ἀθροισμα παρεσπαρμένου προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κράσιν ἔχοντι. Sext. Emp. Math. ix. 71, λεπτομερεῖς γὰρ όνται (αι ψυχαι) καὶ οὐχ ἢττον πυρώδεις ἢ πνευματώδεις εἰς τοὺς ἀνω μᾶλλον τόπους κουφοφοροῦσιν.
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υπὸ τούτου κινεῖσθαι: frag. 91.

86. Cic. Acad. i. 39, (Zeno) statutebat ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret et mentem atque sensus. Fin. iv. 12, cum autem quaereretur res admodum difficilis, num quinta quaedam natura videretur esse ex qua ratio et intellegentia oriretur, in quo etiam de animis eius generis essent quaereretur, Zeno id dixit esse ignem. Tusc. i. 19, Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur.

See also Stein, Psychologie p. 101.

87. Galen plac. Hippocr. et Plat. ii. 8 (v. 283 Kühn), εἰ δὲ γε ἐποιτο (Διογένης ὁ Βασιλιώτης) Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ζήνωι τρέφεσθαι μὲν εξ αἵματος φύσασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕσιν δ' αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν τὸ πνεῦμα.

It is doubtful whether the doctrine of the nourishment of the soul by the blood was held by Heraclitus and from him derived by Zeno. The only authority, besides the doubtful passage of Arius Didymus (frag. 83), from which it can be argued that such a view belonged to him is Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2 p. 28 (quoted by Zeller, pre-Socratics ii. p. 80) Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν τού παντὸς ψυχῆς ἀναθυμιάσιν ἐκ τῶν υγρῶν, who however goes on expressly to distinguish the individual soul from the world-soul and states that the former is composed ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς (ἀναθυμιάσεως). It is best therefore to regard this as a Stoic innovation: just as the stars in the fiery aether are fed by the moist particles rising from the watery zone which they enclose, so is the fiery soul fed by the moist blood: thus man is in himself an organic whole, and the microcosm of the individual is an exact parallel to the macrocosm of the universe. Further references ap. Zeller p. 212 n. 2. With regard to this passage, Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 10) suggests that there is here a confusion between Zeno of Citium and Zeno of Tarsus, but there is no necessity
to adopt this supposition: that Zeno held the soul to be fed from the internal moisture of the body, which must be the blood, is clear from frag. 83 even if we leave out of account the frag. next following.


In both cases the MSS. have σώματος for αἵματος, but the words are often confused and σώματος yields no satisfactory sense. The emendation is made by Stein, Psychol. p. 107, and is confirmed by the passages which he cites from Marcus Aurelius (v. 33, vi. 15). στερεοῦ αἵματος is rather an odd expression, but was probably introduced by way of contrast to ψυχῆ as λεπτομερέστατον πνεῦμα. For ἀμφω Viger suggested ἀμφοῖν, but the word is sometimes indeclinable.


p. 211, where further illustrations to this and the following frag. will be found in the notes. concretum or consitum corpori spiritum = Chrys. ap. Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 1 (v. 287 Kühn), ἡ ψυχή πνεύμα ἐστί σύμφυτον ἡμῶν συνεχές παντὶ τῷ σῶματι διήκου (quoted by Zeller). For quo digresso etc. cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 18, sunt qui diseessum anima a corpore putent esse mortem. Plat. Phaed. 64 c, ἁρα μὴ ἄλλο τι (ήγούμεθα τὸν θάνατον εἶναι) ἡ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγῆν;

90. Chalcid. in Tim. c. 220, Spiritum quippe animam esse Zenon quaerit hactenus: quo recedente a corpore moritur animal, hoc certe anima est. naturali porro spiritu recedente moritur animal: naturalis igitur spiritus anima est.

It is possible that this passage and the extract from Tertullian (fr. 89) are derived from a common original, but, as in their present form the syllogisms are directed to distinct points, it has been thought better to keep them separate.

91. Galen, Hist. Phil. 24, Diels, p. 613, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτῆς (ψυχῆς) οἱ μὲν σῶματον ἐφασαν ὡς Πλάτων, οἱ δὲ σώματα κινεῖν ὡς Ζήνων καὶ οἱ εἰς αὐτοῦ. πνεύμα γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτην ὑπενόησαν καὶ αὐτοῖ.

σῶματα κινεῖν. So MS. A, but B has σῶματα συγκινοῦν and the Latin version of Nicolaus has “corpus simul secum movens.” Wachsm. conj. σῶμα σῶματα ἀμα κινοῦν. Usener: σῶμα τὰ σῶματα κινοῦν. Diels: σῶμα αὐτὸ κινοῦν sive εἰς ἔαντον κινοῦμενον. Coll. Gal. def. Med. 30 κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Στοικοὺς σῶμα λεπτομερές εἰς ἔαντον κινοῦμενον. Whatever may be the right reading, σῶμα certainly seems wanted as well as σῶματα to point the contrast with Plato. For the doctrine of the soul re-
garded as the principle of movement, see the summary of the views of previous philosophers given by Arist. de An. i. 2. §§ 2—6, 403 b 27—404 b 7. That the soul was self-moving as being the principle of motion, was a distinctively Platonie dogma. Phaedr. 245 c, μὴ ἀλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχήν. Legg. 895 A, ψυχήν ...τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν, where the argument is made use of to prove the immortality of the soul.

For the Stoics cf. Sext. Math. ix. 102, πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ Ἡγεμονικοῦ, and the references collected by Stein, Psych. nn. 217 and 221 to which add M. Aurel. v. 19. The theory of τόνος throws an entirely new light on this, as on many other Stoic doctrines, which were originally adopted on independent grounds.

92. Stob. Ecl. i. 49. 33, p. 367, 18, ἀλλὰ μὲν οἱ γε ἀπὸ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήνωνος φιλόσοφου καὶ πάντες ὅσοι σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν νουσί. τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητας συμβιβάζουσι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὡς οὐσίαν προϋποκειμένην ταῖς δυνάμεσι τιθέασιν, ἐκ δὲ ἁμφοτέρων τούτων σύνθετον φύσιν ἐξ ἀνομοίων συνάγουσιν.

ποιότητας...οὐσίαν. This distinction we have already met with in frag. 53. It properly belongs to the department of logic but, in consequence of the Stoic materialism, it has also a quasi-physical application: see Zeller, Stoics, pp. 105, 127, Reid on Cic. Ac. i. 24 foll. The different activities of the soul bear the same relation to the soul as a whole, as the qualities of any particular object bear to its substance: hence Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 234, φασὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν λέγεσθαι διχῶς τὸ τε συνέχον τὴν ὅλην σύγκρισιν καὶ κατ’ ἑδιαν τὸ Ἡγεμονικὸν.

προϋποκειμένην: for the significance of this expression, see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 310.

We must distinguish the μέρη ψυχῆς from the δυνάμεις, for they are not identical, as the passage in Stobæus shows. Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 237, καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὀρμὴ καὶ ἡ συγκατάθεσις καὶ ἡ κατάληψις ἑτεροιῶσεις εἰσὶ τοῦ ἠγεμονικοῦ. In spite of this eightfold division of local extension (see Zeller, p. 214 n. 2) the Stoics held the unity of the soul as an essence: see especially Stein, Psych. pp. 119, 122, who suggests "soul-functions" as a more suitable expression for the Stoics than "parts of the soul".

tὸ ἠγεμονικὸν. We have clear evidence here that the term ἠγεμονικὸν is Zenonian. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie nn. 219 and 693, is inconsistent on this point, in the former passage attributing its introduction to Cleanthes and in the latter to Zeno. It is very possible that Cleanthes first spoke of τὸ ἠγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου, which with him was the sun, in furtherance of his view of man as a microcosm.

94. Tertullian de Anima, c. 14, dividitur autem in partes nunc in duas a Platone, nunc in tres a Zenone.

This passage is at variance with the account given by Nemesius. Wellmann, l. c. p. 476, prefers the authority of Tertullian, thinking that the three divisions in question are the ἠγεμονικόν, the φωνητικόν, and the σπερματικόν, and that the five organs of sense were regarded by Zeno as parts of the body, though the centre of sense resides
in the ἡγεμονικὸν. On the other hand Weygoldt, l. c. p. 36, and Heinze in Bursian's Jahresb. i. p. 191, think Nemesius more trustworthy than Tertullian, and certainly the better opinion is that Zeno taught the eightfold division (see Stein’s full discussion, Psych. pp. 158—160). It is just possible that the triple division mentioned by Tertullian is (1) τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, (2) the five senses, and (3) the voice and the reproductive organism, and that, if we were in possession of the full text of Zeno, the discrepancy would explain itself. If all that we knew of Plato’s psychological divisions had been contained in this passage and a statement that he divided the soul into λόγον ἔχον, θυμοειδές, and ἐπιθυμητικόν, we should have had some difficulty in reconciling the two. Hirzel, ii. p. 154, 155 appears to be unaware of the passage in Nemesius: he accepts the evidence of Tertullian, but explains it as an ethical rather than a physical distinction.

95. Epiphan. adv. Haeres. iii. 2. 9 (iii. 36), Ζήνων ὁ Κίτιεις ὁ Στωικὸς ἔφη...δεῖν...ἔχειν τὸ θεῖον ἐν μόνῳ τῷ νῷ μᾶλλον δὲ θεόν ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ νοῦν. ἐστὶ γὰρ αὐθάνατος...ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ μετὰ χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκάλει τὴν ψυχήν πολυχρόνιν πνεῦμα, ὅπι μην δὲ ἀφθαρτον δι' ἓλον ἔλεγεν αὐτήν εἶναι. ἐκδιπανωθαί γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εἰς τὸ ἀφανές, ὡς φησί. Cf. August. contra Acad. iii. 17, 38, quamobrem cum Zeno sua quadam de mundo et maxime de anima, propter quam vera philosophia vigilat, sententia deflectaretur, dicens cam esse mortalem, nec quidquam esse praeclarum sensibilem mundum, nihilque in eo agi nisi corpore; nam et deum ipsum ignem putabat.


πολυχρόνιον: the language of this extract recalls the objection of Cebes in the Phaedo to Socrates' proof of
the immortality of the soul p. 87 a—88 B, recapitulated by Socrates p. 95 b—e, cf. especially τὸ ἀπομακρύνειν ὅτι ἵσχυρὸν τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή καὶ θεοειδῆς καὶ ἂν ἐτι πρότερον πρὺν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι οὐδὲν καλύειν φής πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἄθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι ἐτι πολυχρόνιον τὲ ἐστιν ψυχή, καὶ ἂν πον πρότερον ἁμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ἅδει τε καὶ ἐπραττεν πολλὰ ἀττα κ.τ.λ. For the limited future existence which the Stoics allowed to the soul see Zeller, p. 218 foll. and add Schol. ad Lucan. ix. 1, alii (animas) solidas quidem, postquam exierint de corpore, permanere, sed deinde tractu temporis dissipari: hæc opinio Stoicorum. There was considerable variation in points of detail among the various members of the soul: see on Cleanth. frag. 41.

tοῦ σώματος: some such words as χρόνον τινά διαμένειν have fallen out here.

οὐ...ἀφθαρτον: this is not inconsistent with ἄθανατος above. The soul never perishes entirely, although eventually it passes into a higher power, Diog. vii. 156. ψυχήν μετά θάνατον ἐπιμένειν, φθαρτὴν δὲ εἶναι. Stein Psychol. p. 145.

96. Themist, de An. 68 a Speng. ii. p. 30, 24, ἀλλ' ὀμως Ζήνωνι μὲν ὑπολείπεται τις ἀπολογία κεκράσθαι ὀλὴν δὲ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος φάσκοντι τῇν ψυχήν καὶ τῇν ἐξοδον αὐτῆς ἀνευ φθορᾶς τοῦ συγκρίματος μὴ ποιοῦντι.

The passage of Aristotle is de An. i. 3 §6, p. 406 a 30—65, where he says that one of the objections to the view that the soul κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα is that in that case the soul’s movements will correspond to those of the body, so that if the body moves locally, the soul may do the same and change its position with regard to the body by leaving it. εἴ δὲ τοῦτ' εὑδέχεται, ἐποιεῖ ἀν τὸ ἀνίστασθαι τὰ τεθνεώτα τῶν ζώων. We might therefore
infer from this passage that Zeno taught that the soul moved the body (frag. 91).

Themistius says that Zeno is rescued from this dilemma by the doctrine of κράσις δι' ὀλαν, for which see on frag. 52. He seems to refer to the Stoic view of the soul as the bond of union for the body, so that body cannot exist qua body without the presence of soul, cf. Iambl. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 49. 33, p. 368, 6, καθ' οὖς δὲ μία ξοῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστιν ἢ τοῦ συνθέτου, συνγεκραμένης τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ σώματι. Sext. Math. ix. 72, οὔδε γὰρ πρότερον τὸ σῶμα διακρατητικοῦ ἢν αὐτῶν (τῶν ψυχῶν) ἄλλ' αὐταὶ τῷ σώματι συμμονῆς ήσαυ αὐταί κ.τ.λ. The best illustration however is Sext. Math. vii. 234, ἐσεὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν λέγεσθαι διχῶς, τὸ τε συνέχον τῆς ὀλήν σύγκρισιν καὶ κατ' ἱδιαὶ τὸ ἑγεμονικόν. ὅταν γὰρ εἴπωμεν συνεστᾶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ἢ τὸν θάνατον εἶναι χωρίσμον ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἵδιως καλοῦμεν τὸ ἑγεμονικόν, the meaning of which passage seems to be that only the ἑγεμονικόν and not the whole soul is said to depart, inasmuch as the corpse must possess συνεκτικὴ δύναμις in the form of ἔξις, for otherwise it will be altogether non-existent. (See Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 105 foll.) But there is no inconsistency with the present passage, since the change of τὸ συνέχον from ψυχῆ to ἔξις is φθορὰ τοῦ συγκριματος (for φθορὰ θάνατος see on frag. 95).

97. Lactant. Inst. vii. 7. 20, Esse inferos Zenon Stoicus docuit et sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas: et illos quidem quietas et delectabiles incolere regiones, hos vero luere poenas in tenebrosis locis atque in caeni voraginibus horrendis.

Cf. Tertull. de anima c. 54, quos quidem miror quod imprudentes animas circa terram prosternant cum illas
a sapientibus multo superioribus erudiri adfirmant. ubi erit scholae regio in tanta distantia diversiororum? qua ratione discipulae ad magistros convenitabunt, tanto discrimine invicem absentes? quid autem illis postremae eruditionis usus ac fructus iam iam conflagratione perituris? reliquas animas ad inferos deiciunt. Hirzel thinks that Virgil's description of the souls of the lost in Aen. vi. is derived from Stoic sources, and therefore ultimately from Zeno, and refers to Ecl. vi. 31, Georg. iv. 220, Aen. vi. 724, for the influence of Stoicism on Virgil. The same writer correctly points out the distinction between the treatment of popular religion in this doctrine of Zeno and that which appears in those passages (to be presently considered) where the attributes of the popular deities are explained away by rationalistic allegory. He compares the spirit of the present passage with the Platonic myths, called by Grote "fanciful illustrations invented to expand and enliven general views," and suggests that it may have occurred in the πολυτεία, which Zeno, as we are told by Plutarch, directed against the Platonic school (see Hirzel, Untersuchungen ii. pp. 25—31). It is certainly hardly credible that Zeno can have attached any philosophical importance to a theory stated in these terms, and it is better to regard it as a concession to popular belief in a matter which could not be formulated with scientific precision. See also Stein, Psych. p. 149 and 162, who infers that Zeno agreed with Chrysippus rather than with Cleanthes in the controversy appearing in Cleanth. frag. 41. The general view of the school was that the soul after death ascends to the upper aether and is preserved there among the stars to which it is akin: Sext. Math. ix. 73, 74, Cic. Tusc. i. 42, 43.
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eιρημένον, ὁ καὶ φωνὴν καλοῦσιν, ἔστιν πνεύμα διατείνουν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι φάρυγγος καὶ γλώττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων.

Cf. on Cleenath. frag. 43.

99. Eustath. in Π. Σ 506, p. 1158, 37, ἡ ηροφόνους κήρυκας "Ομηρος κάνταυθα εἰπὼν τὸν κατὰ Ζήνωνα τῆς φωνῆς ὅρου προὔπεβαλεν εἰπόντα: "φωνὴ ἐστίν ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος."

Cf. Diog. L. vii. 55, ἔστι δὲ φωνὴ ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος. This frag. is taken from Wachsmuth, Comm. Π. p. 12. Sound is produced by the breath coming in contact with the external air; in the case of an animal the air is said to be struck ὑπὸ ὀρμηῆς, while the voice of man is ἔναρβηρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοιας ἐκπεμπομένη, Diog. l. c. See also the passages quoted by Stein, Psychol. n. 248.

Cf. Plato's definition, Tim. p. 67 b., ὄλως μὲν ὀνὺν φωνῆν θώμεν τὴν δὲ ὅτων ὑπ᾽ ἀερὸς ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἴματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγῆν διαδιδομένην. Ar. de An. Π. 8 discusses ψόφος, ἀκοή, and φωνή. Sound is formed ὅταν ὑπομένῃ πληγεῖς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ μὴ διαχυθῆ (§ 3, p. 419 b 21): voice is then defined as ψόφος τις ἐμψύχου (§ 9, p. 420 b. 5) and is minutely described.

100. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. plac. Π. 5, v. p. 241, Κ, ὁ θαυμαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν στωικῶν λόγος ὁ Ζήνωνος... ἐχει γὰρ ὅθε. "φωνὴ διὰ φάρυγγος χωρεῖ. εἰ δὲ ἦν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου χωροῦσα, οὐκ ἂν διὰ φάρυγγος ἔχωρε. ὅθεν δὲ λόγος, καὶ φωνὴ ἐκείθεν χωρεῖ. λόγος δὲ ἀπὸ διανοιας χωρεῖ, ὅστ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐστίν ἡ διάνοια." It is tempting to suggest that λόγος and φωνὴ have changed places: the argument would certainly be more transparent if the transposition were made: cf. the following passage in Galen, speaking of Diogenes Babylonius: ὅθεν ἐκπέμπονται ἡ φωνὴ, καὶ ἡ ἔναρβηρος· οὐκοῦν
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kaɪ ή σημαίνουσα ἐναρθρος φωνῆ ἐκείθεν· τοῦτο δὲ λόγος. καὶ λόγος ἥρα ἐκείθεν ἐκπέμπτεται ὁθεν καὶ ή φωνῆ. Galen’s comment is that Zeno has omitted some of the necessary ὅξιώματα, while Diogenes has too many. He also points out the fallacy underlying the preposition ἀπό, which is ambiguous; either ἐξ or ὑπὸ ought to have been used, in which case the argument could never have stood the test of daylight. The gist however of his argument against Zeno, which is given at some length, is that Zeno has been deceived by the following fallacy: ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἐκπέμπτεται, ἐκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸν διαλογισμὸν γίγνεσθαι, ποτέ πρέπει ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ μορίῳ. τοῦτο δὲ φήσομεν ἀντικρὺς εἶναι ψεύδος, οὐ γὰρ εἶ τι κατὰ προαιρέσειν ἐκ τινος ἐκπέμπτεται κατ’ ἐκεῖνο τό μόριον δείκυσαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὑπάρχειν, καθὰπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑφὸν οὐδὲ τὸ πτύελον οὐδὲ ἡ κόρυξα οὐδὲ τὸ ἀποπάτημα. Wachsmuth quotes further passages from Galen’s argument in which Zeno’s name is mentioned, but they add nothing to the words cited above. Chrysippus, and after him Diogenes of Babylon (Cic. N. D. 1. 41), laboured to prove that the birth of Athene from the head of Zeus in no way conflicted with their view that the breast was the seat of reason (Zeller, p. 364). See generally Stein, Psychol. p. 137.


This passage occurs in the course of the discussion as to φωνῆ and διάνοια as a parenthetical argument, and Galen objects that there is no perceptible interval of time between the impression and the sensation. Cf. Plut. plac. IV. 23. 1, impressions are made on the organ of sense but
the seat of feeling is in the ἒγεμονικόν. Philo de mund. Opif. p. 114 Pfeiff. (quoted on Cleanthes, frag. 3). See also Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 306.


φέρει, so I. Müller for MSS. φέρειν. This obscure passage was formerly punctuated as though Zeno's words extended from ἄλλα οὐ πάντα to φέρεται, but, if the context is read, it is at once plain that I. Müller is right in putting the inverted commas after καταπίνεται. Chrysippus, who is being quoted, is aiming to prove the location of the ἒγεμονικόν in the breast by the usage of ordinary speech: e.g. ἀναβαίνειν τὸν θυμόν—καταπίνειν τὴν χολήν—σπαράγματα καταπίνεσθαι—καταπιον τὸ ῥηθέν ἀπήλθεν: then comes this reference to Zeno, and the conclusion οὔτε—φέρεται is the inference drawn by Chrysippus from the facts stated. Still, it is by no means clear what was the force of the objection made to Zeno or of his rejoinder. Müller translates:—Et Zeno reprehendentibus, quod omnia, quae in quaestionem vocarentur, in ore gestaret, 'at,' inquit, 'non omnia a me devorantur,' apparently making Zeno the subject of φέρει, but the Latin is in other respects hardly less obscure than the Greek. Wachsmuth, who has the old punctuation, interprets πάντα τὰ ξητούμενα as "affectus" and suggests φέρεται for φέρειν, but what meaning he deduces from the passage I do not understand. In this perplexity, the following explanation is suggested. πάντα τὰ ξητούμενα is the
subject of θέρει and the objectors say:—all objects of investigation are ultimately concerned with the mouth. For θέρει see L. and S. οἱ ἐπιλαμβανόμενοι are the Epicureans, who denied the existence of any intermediate σημαινόμενον (λεκτόν) between σημαίνον (φωνή) and τυγχάνον (τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον), cf. Sext. Math. viii. 11 foll. and esp. 13, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον... φαίνονται... περὶ τὴν φωνή τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεύδος ἀπολείπειν. Diog. L. x. 33, πάν οὖν πρᾶγμα ὄνοματι τὸ πρῶτος ἐπιτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἔστι. But this nominalism went hand in hand with the most absolute credence in every sense-perception. To the Stoic, however, not every φαντασία is ἐναργής, but only that which is καταληπτική. Hence Zeno’s reply:—however this may be, we can’t swallow everything. καταπίνεται is substituted for καταλαμβάνεται, just as στόμα takes the place of φωνή. Some confirmation of this guess may be found in the recurrence of τὸ ζητούμενον, ζητεῖν, etc. in Epicurean texts (Diog. x. 33, 37, 38, Sext. Math. xii. 21). If Müller’s punctuation is adopted, this fragment ought rather to be numbered with the ἀποφθέγματα, but, in a matter of so much uncertainty, I have not ventured to remove it from the physical fragments, among which it is placed by Wachsmuth.

οὗτος κ.τ.λ. It would not be correct to speak of “swallowing” or “imbibing” another’s words, in any other case unless (ἀλλας εἰ μὴ) the dominant part of the soul were in the breast. For καταπόσεως cf. Ar. Ach. 484 (of Dicaearchus encouraging his θυμός to persevere in taking the part of the Lacedaemonians) ἔστηκας; οὖκ εἰ καταπιῶν Εὐριπίδην;

103. Cic. de Divin. ii. 119, contrahi autem animum Zeno et quasi labi putat atque concidere et ipsum esse dormire.
Elsewhere sleep is said to be caused by a slackening of the tension in the πνεῦμα. Diog. L. vii. 158, τόν δὲ ύπνον γίνεσθαι ἐκλυομένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τόνου περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν. Plut. plac. v. 23. 4, Πλάτων οἱ Στωικοὶ τὸν μὲν ύπνον γίνεσθαι ἀνέσει τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος, οὐ κατ’ ἄναχαλασμὸν, καθάπερ ἔπι τῆς γῆς, φερομένου δὲ ὦς ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μεσόφρυνον. For Plato's theory of sleep cf. Tim. p. 45 D, E, and for the Stoics, Stein, Psychol. p. 141.


For the Stoic theory of vision see Zeller, p. 221, n. 4. Stein, Psych. n. 241. In Plut. plac. iv. 21, ὀρασίς is defined as πνεῦμα διατείνου ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι ὀφθαλμῶν. The views of the ancient philosophers before Aristotle will be found concisely stated in Grote's Plato, iii. 265 n., and for Aristotle see Grote's Aristotle, p. 465.

105. Varro de L. L. v. 59, sive, ut Zenon Citieus, animalium semen ignis is, qui anima ac mens.

Mueller's punctuation of the passage has been followed: in Spengel's edition, Zeno's statement is made to extend farther. ignis = πνεῦμα in the next fragment. Zeller remarks: "Plutarch (Plac. v. 16, 2. 17, 1. 24, 1) draws attention to the inconsistency of saying that the animal soul, which is warmer and rarer than the vegetable soul, has been developed thereout by cooling and condensation," p. 213, n. 1. Stein's explanation of this paradox (Psych. p. 115—117) is ingenious, but he is driven to assume that φύσις is warmer than ψυχή, which seems questionable.

106. Euseb. P. E. xv. 20. 1, Ar. Did. fr. phys. 39,

See also Zeller, p. 212, 213. Stein, Psych. n. 252, collects the various points of resemblance between the Stoics and the Hippocratesan school of medicine.


φύει: is productive (not intrans.). So perhaps in the well known line: Hom. Il. vi. 149, ὃς ἀνδρῶν γενεὴ, ἥ μὲν φύει ἡ δ' ἀπολήγει. Otherwise, as τε is not required
by the sense, we might suggest that τεφνει arose from φυτεία, cf. Diog. L. vii. 159, τῶν εἰς τὴν γῆν καταβαλλομένων σπερμάτων ἀ παλαίωθεντα οὐκ ἐτι φυτεία. Cleanth. fr. 24, ὁσπερ γὰρ ἐνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύτεια κ.τ.λ. Diels suggests κερασθέν τε φύει and Usener κρύφα ἐπισχύει. 

εἰς after ᾠδεί is perhaps due to dittography.


σπερματικῶν. Diels, p. 418 reads σπέρμα πεπτικῶν.


Sextus proceeds to describe the forced interpretation which Diogenes of Babylon and others put upon Zeno’s words in order to get rid of the transparent sophistry (ib. 133—136). Theon, Progymn. 12, p. 251 (Spengel, Rhet. gr. p. 126, 16) gives proofs of the existence of the gods, among which is: ἡξῆς δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς δοκεῖ, οἴον Πλάτωνι, Ἀριστοτέλει, Ζήνωνι.

109. Lactant. de ira Dei c. 11, Antisthenes...unum esse naturalem Deum dixit, quamvis gentes et urbes suos habeant populares. Eadem fere Zeno cum suis Stoicis. Cf. Philod. περὶ εὑσεβ. p. 84 Comp., πάντες ὁν ὦι ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος, εἰ καὶ ἀπελειπτον τὸ δαιμόνιον...ἐνα θεον λέγουσιν εἶναι.
At first sight these passages are inconsistent with frag. 108, but in reality there is no such difficulty: cf. Athenag. Suppl. c. 6, p. 73, quoted supra on frag. 45. The Stoics strongly opposed the follies of the popular belief, while at the same time they called attention to the germ of truth which it contained, being no doubt anxious to preserve it as a basis for morality. Zeller well observes, p. 347, "Holding that the name of God belongs in its full and original sense only to the one primary being, they did not hesitate to apply it in a limited and derivative sense to all those objects by means of which the divine power is especially manifested." In testing how far this admission goes, it should be observed that the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 45 distinctly denies that the derivative gods are human in shape, cf. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. p. 85 G., ἀνθρωποειδεῖς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐ νομίζουσιν ἄλλα ὀέρας καὶ πνεύματα καὶ αἰθέρας. For Antisthenes cf. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. p. 73 G., παρ’ Ἀντισθένει δ’ ἐν μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λέγεται τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι πολλοὺς θεοὺς, κατὰ δὲ φύσιν εὖα.

110. Cic. N. D. i. 36, Cum vero Hesiodi θεόγονίαν interpretatur, tollit omnino usitatatas perceptasque cognitiones deorum; neque enim Iovem neque Iunonem neque Vestam neque quemquam qui ita appelletur in deorum habet numero sed rebus inanimis atque mutis per quandam significationem haece docet tributa nomina.

Hesiodi θεόγονίαν: Introd. p. 31.

Iovem: see on frag. 111 and cf. Flach, Glossen u. Scholien zur Hesiodischen Theogonie, p. 66.

Iunonem = air: see infra and cf. Cic. N. D. ii. 66; she is identified with air as being the wife of Iuppiter (= aether), and air is regarded as feminine, quod nihil est eo mollius. Similarly "Ηρὴ = air in Empedocles (R. and P. § 131). ἄηρ is also one of Plato’s derivations, who says the order of
the letters has been reversed, γνώής δ' ἄν εἰ πολλάκις λέγοις τὸ τῆς Ηρας ὄνομα, Crat. p. 404 c.


This is perhaps the best place to refer to a supposed fragment of Zeno contained in Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Hercul. vol. vi. Tab. i. 1, <αν> δα <δ> Ζήνων ἐκαστὸν <τὸν θεῶν ἀπειρα κατέχειν> δὴ τὰ εῦ <τήρια>...<οῦκ ἄ>ν συνακο<λούθει εἰ μὴ τι> τῶν αἰῶν<ων> καὶ ἃ<ξ> οὖτα δια<φ>θυσάμε<νος> ὡς με<τὰ τὰ>ς θεὰς. It will be seen that so little of the papyrus is legible here that the sense for which it is quoted by Zeller, p. 165 n. 5, is entirely due to the imagination of the Naples editor. Prof. Scott (Fragm. Hercul. p. 181) rightly characterises this as "gibberish," and wonders that Zeller should have seriously quoted it: see also Wachsm. Comm. i. p. 9 n. If we are to follow the conjectures of the Naples editor of this work of Philodemus, there are at least three other fragments of Zeno preserved in it. In no place but this, however, does the name of Zeno occur, and, though the doctrines appear to belong to some Stoic, there is no reason whatever for supposing that they originated with Zeno. They will be found at Tab. iv. 7. c. iv. col. i. c. xi. and col. ii. c. xii.


Iovem: it is clear that Zeus was identified with the
aether or pure fiery essence, of which caelum is here an equivalent, as in Pacuvius ap. Cic. N. D. ii. 91, hoc quod memoro nostri caelum Grai perhibent aethera. Cf. Chrysipp. ap. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβὶ. p. 79 Gomp.,"Ἡφαιστον δὲ πῦρ εἶναι...Δία δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα. Diog. L. vii. 147 God is the creator of the universe, and, as it were, the father of all; his various manifestations are described by different names. 

Δία μὲν γὰρ φαιν δι’ ὄν τὰ πάντα. Ζῆνα δὲ καλοῦσι παρ’ ὅσον τού ζῆν αἴτιὸς ἐστιν, ἥ διὰ τοῦ ζῆν κεχώρηκεν...... "Ἡραν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἀέρα. καὶ "Ἡφαίστον κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ. καὶ Ποσειδῶνα κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ ύγρόν. The extract from Minuc. lends some slight weight to Krische's theory (p. 398) that the whole of Diogenes' description is ultimately derived from Zeno. The same writer thinks that the explanation of the myths of the mutilation of Uranus and the binding of Cronos (Cic. N. D. ii. 63, 64) belongs to Zeno.

ignem. Diogenes' πῦρ τεχνικὸν is, according to Krische, a blunder: Hephaestus is elsewhere identified with earthly fire (τὴν φλόγα in Plut. de Iside c. 66, for which however see on Cleanth. frag. 23). But see Zeller, p. 359, 1. These explanations were not novelties introduced by the Stoa, except in so far as they were specially adapted to Stoic dogmas. Cf. Sext. Math. ix. 18 (after citing Euhemerus and Prodicus), καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτον Δημήτραν νομισθῆναι τὸν δὲ οἶνον Δίονυσον τὸ δὲ ύδωρ Ποσειδῶνα τὸ δὲ πῦρ"Ἡφαίστον καὶ ἡδὴ τῶν εὐχρηστοῦντων ἐκαστον.

pellatum ἀπὸ τοῦ χέρσθαι, quamquam tandem opinionem ab Homero possumus intelligere quod ait Ὄκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηβόν. This frag. is cited by Wachsmuth Comm. i. p. 11, who adds "eadem originatio est apud Achill. Tat., Isag. in Arat. phaen. 3. 125 e. Petav."

The lines of Hesiod, Theog. 116 foll. are often quoted, e.g. by Plato, Symp. 178 β, to prove the antiquity of love, and by Ar. Met. i. 4. 1 as an indication that Hesiod recognised both the efficient and the final cause. Aristotle also refers to the passage in Phys. iv. 1 and de Caelo iii. 1. 298 b. 25, and Krische suggests (p. 395) that the application which is put upon it by him in the latter place prevented Zeno from identifying χάος with his own πρώτη ὡλη as might have been expected. Cf. also the anecdote related of Epicurus in Sext. Math. x. 18, 19.

ἀπὸ τοῦ χέρσθαι. Krische l. c. remarks that this derivation is probably referred to in Plat. Cratyl. 402 β where Socrates, after saying that Heraclitus likened all things to a flowing river, and that Homer's line showed that he was of the same opinion, proceeds: οἴμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσίόδος.

113. Schol. on Apoll. Rhod. i. 498, καὶ Ζήνων δὲ τὸ παρ' Ἡσίόδῳ χάος ὑδωρ εἶναι φησιν, οὔ συνιξάνοντος ἰλυν γίνεσθαί, ὅς πηγιμυμένης ἢ γῆ στερεμινοῦται. τρίτον δὲ Ἕρωτα γεγονέναι καθ' Ἡσίοδον, ἵνα τὸ πῦρ παραστήσῃ, πυρωδέστερον γὰρ πῦθος Ἕρως.

This passage shows clearly that Zeno must have rejected or been ignorant of ll. 118 and 119 of the Theog. see Krische, p. 396.

χάος. See on frag. 112 and add Cornut. c. 17, p. 85 Osann, ἔστι δὲ χάος μὲν τὸ πρὸ τῆς διακοσμήσεως γενόμενον υγρόν, ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως οὕτως ὁνομασμένον.

ιλύν: similar views with regard to the formation of the
earth are attributed to Xenophanes. Hippolyt. i. 14, ταύτα 
δὲ φῆσι γενέσθαι ὅτε πάντα ἐπηλώθησαν πάλαι τὸν δὲ 
tόπον ἐν τῷ πῆλῳ ξηρανθῆναι κ.τ.λ., and to Anaxagoras 
(Zeller, pre-Socrates ii. p. 356). Hence Zeno himself 
spoke of earth as ὑποστάθμη πάντων, frag. 114.

πυρώδεστερον: a familiar comparison. Pind. P. iv. 219 
Medea ἐν φρασὶ καιομέναν. Virg. Aen. iv. 68, uritur in-
felix Dido. Georg. iii. 244, in furias ignemque ruunt: 
amor omnibus idem. Cf. Schol. ad Hes. Theog. 120, ἥδ' 
ἔρωθα...ἐναὶ δὲ πῦρ· τὸ πυρῶδες γὰρ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.

The authorities give two further Stoic explanations of 
Hesiod's Eros; (1) with a reference to λόγος σπερματικὸς. 
Cornut. c. 17, p. 86 Osann, ὁ δὲ Ἐρως σὺν αὐτοῖς γεγονέναι 
ἐρρήθη, ἡ ὀρμη ἐπὶ τὸ γεγενν. (2) Fire regarded as 
συνεκτικὴ δύναμις: Schol. ad Hes. Theog. 120, τὰ τρία 
στοιχεία εἰπὼν τὸ δ' λέγει τὸ πῦρ ὄπερ δαιμονίως ἔρωτα 
φησι, συναρμόζειν γὰρ καὶ συνάγειν καὶ ἐνοῦν πέφυκεν.
On the passage generally cf. Flach, Glossen u. Scholien, 
p. 37, who attributes to Zeno the words in the Schol. on 
l. 115, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὑδατός ἐγένοντο τὰ στοιχεῖα, γη κατὰ 
συνίζησιν, ἄρη κατὰ ἀνάδοσιν· τὸ δὲ λεπτομέρες τοῦ 
ἀέρος γέγονε πῦρ, τὰ δὲ ὄρη κατὰ ἐξοστρακισμὸν τῆς γῆς, 
which appear also in Cornut. c. 17, p. 84 Osann. This is 
likely enough, but there is no direct evidence. The same 
remark applies to the derivation of Κρόνος from χρόνος 
id. p. 44 (cf. Cic. N. D. ii. 64). Flach refers many other 
definitions to Zeno: a list of some of them will be found 
at p. 48 of his work, but those of his inferences which are 
not supported by direct evidence cannot be dealt with 
here.

114. Schol. on Hes. Theog. 117, Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Στωικὸς 
ἐκ τοῦ ύγροῦ τὴν ὑποστάθμην γῆν γεγεννηθεὶσα φησιν, 
τρίτον δὲ Ἐρωτα γεγονέναι, ὅθεν ὁ ἐπαγόμενος ἀθετεῖται

Wachsmuth connects this with frag. 113. For the general sense cf. frag. 52. The word ύποστάθμη is Platonic (Phaed. 109 c).


ποιότητα, frag. 53. πάντα τὰ βάρη, frag. 67. βάρη...ἀνωθεν... εἶδος: so Flach, p. 223 after Schoemann. The old reading was κούφα...ἀνω...μέρος. Osann suggested ὑπετειν for πίπτειν. Cf. Cornut. c. 17, p. 91 Osann, οὔτως ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν Ἰάπετος μὲν ωνομάσθη ὁ λόγος καθ’ ὑν φωνητικὰ τὰ ξῆνα ἑγένετο καὶ ὁλος ὁ ψόφος ἀπετελέσθη, ἵαφτες τις ὄν’ ἵν γὰρ ἡ φωνή. Κοίοι δὲ καθ’ ὑν ποιὰ τινα τὰ ὄντα ἑστὶ, τὸ γὰρ κ πολλαχοῦ οί Ἰωνες ἀντὶ τοῦ π χρόνται...

Κρίος δὲ καθ’ ὑν τὰ μὲν ἁρχεί καὶ δυναστεύει τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ ὑποτέτακτα καὶ δυναστεύεται: ἐντεῦθεν τάχα καὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ποιμνίοις κριοῦ προσαγορευομένου. Ἡπερίων δὲ καθ’ ὑν ὑπεράνω τινα ἐτέρων περιπορεύεται. See Flach, Glossen u. Scholien zur Hes. Th. p. 42 foll.

116. Schol. on Hes. Theog. 139, Gaisf. Gr. Poet. Min. π. 484. Κύκλωπας. Ζήνων δὲ πάλιν φυσικωτέρος τὰς ἐγκυκλίους φορᾶς εἰρήσθαι φησι’ διὸ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα τούτων ἐξέθετο Βρόντην τε καὶ Στερόπην’ Ἀργην δὲ ἐπειδὴ φασὶ τὸν ἀργῆτα κεραυνὸν: παῖδας δὲ φησιν αὐτοὺς τοῦ Οὐρανοῦ ἐπειδὴ πάντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη περὶ
τὸν οὐρανὸν εἰς...[ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ τινὶ ἐγένοντο ἐγκυκλιον περιφοραὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος].

Flach’s arrangement of the text is quite different: he inserts the words ἐν χρόνῳ—ἀέρος after εἰρήσθαι φησιν, altering φορᾶς into περιφοράς. See his interpretation, p. 50.

ἐγκυκλίους φορᾶς. The band of aether which formed the external stratum of the world revolved in a circle round it. Stob. Ecl. i. 14. 1’, p. 142, 13, τὸ αἰθέριον (φῶς) περιφερῶς κυνείται. In the matter of the revolving aether Zeno followed Aristotle, whose quinta essentia is described by Sextus as τὸ κυκλοφορητικὸν σῶμα (Pyrrh. ii. 31). Aristotle himself approves of the Platonic derivation from ἄει θείῳ and censures Anaxagoras for referring it to αἴθῳ (de Caelo i. 2); see also Krische, p. 306 foll.

Βρῶντην τε καὶ Στερόπην. Wachsmuth says:—“immo βρῶντην τε καὶ στερόπην,” but surely Hesiod is the subject to ἐξέθετο as to φησι below. τίθεσθαι ὄνομα is used regularly of the father: e.g. Isae. ii. § 36, τῶ ἐμῶ παιδίῳ ἑθέμην τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἐκείνου.

ἐν χρόνῳ κ.τ.λ. These words cannot belong to Zeno, unless Flach’s view of the passage is adopted, as they are inconsistent with the rest of the explanation.

117. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. col. 8, τ<ου>ς δὲ ὀρθοὺς <λόγο>ους καὶ συνοδαίας διαθέσεις Διοσκούρους.

From the position of these words in the fragments of Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας it appears probable that they belong to Zeno: see on frag. 40. Gomperz however p. 74 puts a full stop after διαθέσεις.

ὀρθοὺς λόγους: see Introd. p. 8, and for the ethical importance of the expression Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 259 foll. Cic. Tusc. iv. 34, ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest.
diadéseis are opposed to ἓξεις as “permanent forms admitting neither of increase nor diminution,” Zeller, p. 103. Thus intellectual goods are divided into (1) virtues = διαδέσεις, (2) σπουδαίας ἓξεις such as μαντική, and (3) ἐπαινετῶς ἐνεργείας = οὕτε ἓξεις οὕτε διαδέσεις, such as φρονίμενα, Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5, e and f, Diog. VII. 98, Cleanth. frag. 51, cf. Sext. Pyrrh. III. 243; αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ φρονίμη διάθεσις ἄκατάληπτος ἐστί μήτε ἓξ αὐτῆς ἀπλῶς καὶ αὐτόθεν φαινομένη μήτε έκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς: κοινὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ ταύτα καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. For the distinction between ἓξεις and διάθεσις in Aristotle see Wallace on de An. II. 5. 417 b. 15.

Διεσκούρονς: explained physically by Xenophanes as clouds made to shine by their movement (Stob. Ecl. I. 24. 1a p. 204, 18). See also the explanations cited by Sext. Math. IX. 37. 86: the latter passage appears to be Stoic, as recognising the belief in demons.


μαντική. The Stoic definition was as follows: Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5b 12, p. 67, 16, εἶναι δὲ τὴν μαντικὴν φασιν ἐπιστήμην θεωρητικὴν σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἂν δαιμόνων προς δὲ ἀνθρώπινον βίον συντεινόντων. Substantially the same in Sext. Math. IX. 132.

εἰ καὶ. Others read ἠ καὶ, reversing the argument: in fact, the Stoics seem to have appealed to the truth of μαντικὴ as a proof of the existence of God, no less than vice versa. See the references in Zeller, pp. 175, 3; 372, 2 and 3.

tέχνην. They prove that it is an art by the truth of certain results, cf. Cic. de Divin. I. 23, Quid? quaeris, Carneades, cur habe ita fiunt aut qua arte perspici possint?
Nescire me fateor, evenire autem te ipsum dico videre. That its professors are sometimes deceived does not invalidate the title of divination as an art (ib. § 24), cf. N. D. II. 12.

ETHICA.

119. Diog. L. vii. 84, τὸ δὲ ήθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἰς τὸν περὶ ὀρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ ἁρετῆς καὶ περὶ τέλους περὶ τῆς πρώτης ὑζίας καὶ τῶν πρᾶξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν· καὶ οὕτω δ᾿ ὑποδιαιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ Χρυσισππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα κ.τ.λ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κίτιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεανθῆς ώς ἄν ἄρχαιότεροι ἀφελέστερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον.

There is a full discussion of this passage in Zeller, p. 223, 1: its difficulties, however, do not affect Zeno or Cleanthes.

120. Diog. L. vii. 87, διόπερ πρῶτος ὁ Ζήνων εἰν τῷ περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τέλος εἰπτε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὀπέρ ἐστὶ κατ᾿ ἁρετὴν ζῆν· ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις. Lactant. Inst. iii. 7, Zenonis (summum bonum) cum natura congruenter vivere. id. iii. 8, audiamus igitur Zenonem; nam is interdum virtutem somniat. Summum, inquit, est bonum cum natura consentanee vivere. Stob. Εcl. ii. 7. 6a, p. 75, 11, τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἀπέδωκε ὅτῳ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν· τούτῳ δ᾿ ἐστὶ καθ᾿ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως ζώντων κακοδαιμονόντων. Plut. Comm. Not. 23, 1, οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων τούτους (scil. Peripatetics) ἱκολουθησεν ὕποτιθεμένους στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τῆς φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. (Cf. Cic. Fin. iv. 72, videsne igitur Zenonem tuum cum Aristone verbis consistere,
re dissidere; cum Aristotele et illis re consentire, verbis discrepare? ib. v. 88.) Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 21. 129, p. 496 P., 179 S., πάλιν δ' αὐτ Ζήνων μὲν ὁ Στοικὸς τέλος ἤγενται τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν, cf. Cic. Fin. iv. 14, hunc ipsum Zenonis aitut esse finem, declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere (where see Mady.): ib. iii. 21, summum...bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod ὀμολογύαν Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, etc.

There is a conflict of testimony here between Diog. and Stob. as to whether Cleanthes added the words τῇ φύσει to Zeno's definition or found them there already. On the whole the fact that Diogenes quotes from a named book of Zeno's makes his authority the more trustworthy. So Wellmann, l. c. pp. 446—448, cf. Krische, p. 372, 3. Ueberweg, p. 199, adds that Diog.'s statement is all the more credible, because Speusippus, Polemo, and Heraclitus had enounced similar principles. Zeller, p. 228, 2, does not decide the point. Hirzel, ii. p. 105—112, argues the question at some length and decides in favour of Stobaeus, but his arguments are always biassed by the desire to vindicate the originality of Cleanthes. See also Introd. p. 14.


This frag. has been taken from Stein, Erkenntnis-theorie, p. 271. Although we cannot with certainty attribute to Zeno a statement, which is only expressed to belong to οἱ ἄπο Ζήνωνος, yet there is no reason why he should not have taught this. The soul at birth is only open to the impressions of sensation, and its first impulse is towards self-preservation. Cf. Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 5, p. 1038 c, ἀλλ' οὕτ' αἰσθησίς ἐστιν οἷς μηδὲν αἰσθητὸν, 11—2
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THE FRAGMENTS OF ZENO.

οὐτ' οἰκείωσις οἷς μηδὲν οἰκείον· ἢ γὰρ οἰκείωσις αἰσθησις ἐοίκε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀντίληψις εἶναι.

122. Porphyry. de Abstin. iii. 19, τὴν δὲ οἰκείωσιν ἀρχὴν τίθενται δικαιοσύνης οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος.

δικαιοσύνη is one of the four cardinal virtues (see infra. frag. 134) and is founded on οἰκείωσις in the same sense as ἀρετή generally. The natural impulse of every animal is towards self-preservation, so that it seeks after those things which are κατὰ φύσιν and shuns those which are παρὰ φύσιν. Diog. L. vii. 85; Cic. Fin. iii. 16; Alex. Aphr. de an. p. 150, 28 ed. Bruns. οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωικοὶ οὐ πάντες δὲ λέγουσιν πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι τὸ ξύον αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν γὰρ ξύον εὐθὺς γενόμενον πρὸς το ἀυτὸ οἰκείωσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν οἱ δὲ χαριέστερον δοκοῦντες λέγειν αὐτῶν καὶ μᾶλλον διαρθροῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρωποῦ φασιν πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν καὶ τήρησιν οἰκείωσθαι εὐθὺς γενόμενος ἡμᾶς τὴν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 13, p. 118, 11 (where the doctrine is attributed to the Peripatetics). For τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, see Madv. de Fin. Exc. iv. and especially p. 8183, "Stoici...ita disputabant, ut, quae postea demum, orto subito rationis lumine, quod in infante nondum esset accensum, et animadversa constantia convenientiaque naturae, nascetur voluntas cum natura consentiendi, in qua et virtus et perfectio rationis esset, eam omnino a prima conciliacione dirimerent, bonumque constituerent, quod expeteretur, a primis, quae appetenterunt, genere seiuunctum."

123. Epict. diss. i. 20. 14, καίτοι αὐτὸς μὲν ὁ προηγούμενος λόγος τῶν φιλοσοφῶν λίαν ἐστὶν ὅλιγος. εἰ θέλεις γνῶναι, ἀναγνώθι τὰ Ζήνωνος, καὶ ὡς εἰ ἐγείρεις καιρῶν ἐπιπεῖν ὅτι τέλος ἐστι τὸ ἐπεσθαι θεοῖς, οὐσία δ' ἀγαθοῦ χρῆσις οὐα δεῖ φαντασιῶν;
"leading doctrine": not in the technical sense to be noticed on frag. 169.

This passage furnishes an argument in support of the view taken in the Introd. p. 14 as to the character of Zeno's φύσις.

Zeno went back to the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge, so that it is not surprising to find that his epistemology is brought into connection with practical morality. That particular class of impressions which is directed towards the performance of some moral action gives rise to corresponding ὀρμαί in the soul, cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 9, p. 86. 17, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν τὴν ὀρμῆν οὐδὲν ἔτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ' ἡ φαντασίαν ὀρμητικὴν τοῦ καθῆκοντος αὐτόθεν. Virtue consists in the proper direction of these ὀρμαί in accordance with the dictates of ὀρθὸς λόγος: hence Diog. L. vii. 86 says of reason:—τεχνίτης γὰρ οὐτός ἐπιγίγνεται τῆς ὀρμῆς, cf. Cleanth. frag. 66. The doctrine depends on the freedom of the assent: supra, frag. 19, cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 9b, p. 88, 1, πίσας δὲ τὰς ὀρμὰς συγκαταθέσεις εἶναι, τὰς δὲ πρακτικὰς καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν περιέχειν, and see Windelband in Müller's Handbuch, v. 295. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 166, 167, points out that the ethical application of φαντασίαι is very often mentioned by the younger Stoics, although not unknown in the earlier period, cf. Diog. vii. 48, ὥστε εἰς ἀκοσμίαν καὶ εἰκαίοτητα τρέπεσθαι τοὺς ἀγυμνάστους ἔχοντας τὰς φαντασίας.

M. Aurel. II. 5, v. 9, x. 6. *εὐδαιμονία* is not identical with *τέλος*, which rather consists in *τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*.

125. Diog. vii. 127, αὐτάρκη εἶναι ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, καθαὶ φησι Ζήνων. August. contra Acad. III. 7. 16, clamat Zennon et tota illa porticus tumultuatur hominem natum ad nihil esse alium quam honestatem; ipsam suo splendore in se animos ducere, nullo prorsus commodo extrinsecus posito et quasi lenocinante mercede; voluptatemque illam Epicuri solis inter se pecoribus esse communem; in quorum societatem et hominem et sapientem tendere nescias esse. August. de trin. xiii. 5. 8, diximus ibi quosque posuisse beatam vitam quod eos maxime delectavit...ut virtus Zenonem. Cic. Fin. v. 79, a Zeno hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur: “virtus ad bene vivendum seipsa contenta est.” Cf. Acad. i. 7, 35; II. 134, 135; Paradox. II. This position was borrowed from the Cynics, Introd. p. 19.

126. Cic. Fin. iv. 47, errare Zennonem, qui nulla in re nisi in virtute aut vitio propensionem ne minimi quidem momenti ad summum bonum adipiscendum esse diceret, et, cum ad beatam vitam nullum momentum cetera habe- rent, ad appetitionem tamen rerum esse in iis momenta diceret. ib. iv. 60, Zeno autem quod suam quod propriam speciem habeat cum appetendum sit, id solum bonum appellat, beatam autem vitam eam solam, quae cum virtute degatur.

This point constitutes the main gist of Cicero’s argument against the Stoic virtue in de Fin. iv., viz. that while the *πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν* are an object of desire, they have no weight in the explanation of virtue itself. Madvig points out (1) that Cicero has throughout confused the Stoic prima constitutio, which excludes virtue, with that
of Antiochus which includes it, (2) that throughout the Fourth Book he attributes far more importance to the doctrine of οἰκείωσις than the Stoics themselves did (pp. 820, 821), and (3) that he fails to notice the Stoic distinction between τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν and τὸ πάντα ποιεῖν ἐνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν (Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5b, p. 58, 14; Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 26; Cic. Fin. II. 22). On the subject in general see Zeller, p. 278 foll. For the nature of the πρωτὰ κατὰ φύσιν cf. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 3c, p. 47, 12 f.; ib. 7a, p. 80, 9; 7d, p. 82, 12. The position of Zeno will have to be considered with reference to the προηγμένα, where the same inconsistency appears.

aut vitio: these words were bracketed by some of the edd. and are, of course, logically indefensible, but see Madv.

127. Cic. Tusc. II. 29, Nihil est, inquit (Zeno), malum, nisi quod turpe atque vitiosum est...Numquam quidquam, inquit (seil. doleas necne interest), ad beate quidem vivendum, quod est in una virtute positum, sed est tamen reiciendum. Cur? Asperum est, contra naturam, difficile perpessu, triste, durum. ib. v. 27, si Stoicus Zeno diceret qui, nisi quod turpe esset, nihil malum duceret. Cf. ib. II. 15.

In Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5b, p. 58, 14, we read ἀνάλογον δὲ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι κακίας, τὰ δ' οὐ, and the examples given of the latter class are λύπη and φόβος. This occurs in the course of a passage which Wachsmuth attributes to Zeno, but see on frag. 128. Just before this, in what is clearly Zeno's classification of ἀγαθὰ and κακία, we find ἡδονή classed among the ἄδιάφορα, cf. Diog. L. vii. 103, and this agrees with the statement in the present passage that dolor is an ἀποπροηγμένον. So dolor is classed in Cic. Fin. III. 51, where Zeno's name appears in the
immediate context, and it is to be observed that the corresponding προηγμένου in that passage is not ἥδουν but "doloris vacuitas." The entire subject of the relation which the emotions bear to the classification of ἀγαθὰ and κακὰ is extremely obscure, and the ancient authorities are not only defective but, as we have seen, contradictory. See Introd. p. 46, where this passage should have been referred to. Zeller's account is not clear on this point: at p. 253 he apparently asserts that the emotions are to be classed as κακὰ.

128. Stob. Eel. II. 7. 5a, p. 57, 18, ταῦτ’ εἶναι φησιν ὁ Ζήνων ὁσα οὐσίας μετέχει, τῶν δ’ ὅντων τὰ μὲν ἄγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ κακὰ, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα. ἄγαθὰ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν καὶ πάν ὁ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἢ μετέχον ἀρετῆς· κακὰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀφροσύνην, ἀκολασίαν, ἀδικίαν, δειλίαν, καὶ πάν ὁ ἐστι κακία ἢ μετέχον κακίας· ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ζωὴν θάνατον, δόξαν ἀδοξίαν, πόνον ἥδουν, πλοῦτον πενίαν, νόσου ύγίειαν, καὶ τὰ τούτων ὄμοια.

Substantially the same account appears in Diog. L. vii. 101, 102, where Hecaton, Apollodorus, and Chrysippus are referred to as authorities.

τῶν δ’ ὅντων κ.τ.λ. This classification is attributed by Sext. Math. xi. 3, 4, to the Old Academy, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics in common: he quotes from Xenocrates, πάν τὸ ὁν ἢ ἄγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἐστὶν ἢ οὐτε ἄγαθὸν ἐστὶν οὔτε κακὸν ἐστὶν. In the same passage he states that the name ἀδιάφορον was applied to the third class by all three schools, but probably this is a mistake, as all the other evidence points to Zeno as having been the first to use the word in this special ethical sense. On the other hand, there is not much likelihood in Hirzel's opinion (II. p. 45 n.) that Aristotle was the first to in-
introduce the term ἀδιάφορον, and that Zeno spoke of μέσα.

ϕρόνησιν κ.τ.λ. cf. frag. 134.

πάν ὁ ἐστιν ἀρετή: cf. Sext. Math. xi. 77, ἄλλον μὲν Ζήνων, δι’ οὐ τὴν ἀρετήν ἀγαθόν εἶναι δεδοξακεν. ib. 184, καθ’ καὶ ὁρίζομενοι τινες ἕξ αὐτῶν φασιν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἀρετή ἢ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς. The meaning of μετέχον ἀρετῆς is made clear by Diog. L. vii. 94, 95, where it is explained as including actions in accordance with virtue, and good men: the converse is true of μετέχον κακίας.

ηδονήν: cf. Aul. Gell. ix. 5, 5. Zeno censuit voluptatem esse indifferentem, id est neutralum neque bonum neque malum, quod ipse Graeco vocabulo ἀδιάφορον appellavit. For the attitude of the Stoics towards the Epicurean summum bonum see Wellmann i.e. pp. 449, 450. Heinze, de Stoicorum affectibus p. 37, doubts, without sufficient ground, whether Gellius’ statement is accurate, thinking that Zeno would rather have classed ηδονη among the κακά. It will be observed that, omitting πόνον ηδονήν, every pair of ἀδιάφορα here mentioned contains a προηγμένον and an ἀποπροηγμένον, and that, except in the case of νόσον ὑγείαν (which Wachsm. transposes), the προηγμένον is mentioned first. We should naturally suppose the same to be the case with ηδονη and πόνος, but which then is the προηγμένον? Wachsmuth evidently thinks ηδονή, since he transposes the words, and at first sight Diog. L. vii. 102 is conclusive. But it should be observed that Hecaton is the main authority there cited, and there is reason to believe that this was one of the points on which the view of the School altered as time went on. With Zeno and Cleanthes, at least, it seems better to suppose that πόνος is the προηγμένον, and ηδονή the ἀποπροηγμένον, and that ηδονή is contrasted with πόνος rather than with λύπη, because the latter certainly belonged

Wachsmuth would continue to Zeno the passage following this in Stobaeus down to p. 59. 3, but the evidence is against this. The prominence given to ἰσχύς ψυχῆς rather points to an origin subsequent in date to Cleanthes, and λύπη and φόβος are here classed as κακά, which is inconsistent with frag. 127, not to speak of ἣδον ἤ in the present fragment.

129. Senec. Epist. 82, 7, Zeno noster hac collectione utitur: "Nullum malum gloriosum esse; mors autem gloriosa est; mors ergo non est malum."

In the subdivision of the ἀδιάφορα death belongs to the ἀποπροηγμένα Diog. L. vii. 106; cf. Cic. Fin. iii. 29, ut enim, qui mortem in malis ponit, non potest eam non timere, sic nemo uilla in re potest id, quod malum esse deereverit, non curare idque contemnere.

130. Cic. Acad. 1. 36, Cetera autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat (Zeno), alia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat. Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione dignanda dicebat, contraque contraria; neutra autem in mediis relinquebat, in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti.

In this and the following §§ of Cicero it is unsafe to attribute entirely to Zeno the summary of Stoic doctrines there set forth, in the absence of other testimony pointing in the same direction. At the same time there is no
reason a priori why Zeno should not have sub-divided αδιάφορα into (1) τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, (2) τὰ παρὰ φύσιν, and (3) τὰ καθάπαξ αδιάφορα = media, or have identified τὰ κατὰ φύσιν with ληπτὰ or τὰ αξίαν ἔχοντα, and τὰ παρὰ φύσιν with ἀληπτὰ or τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα. Cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 7d, p. 82, 11 : 7f, p. 84, 3.

131. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 7e, p. 84, 21, τῶν δ' ἀξίαν ἔχοντων τὰ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀξίαν τὰ δὲ βραχεῖαν. ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντων ἢ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν, ἢ δὲ βραχεῖαν. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν προηγμένα λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν ἀποπροηγμένα, Ζηνώνων 5 ταύτας τὰς ὀνομασίας θεμένου πρῶτον τοὺς πράγματι προηγμένου δ' εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὁ αδιάφορον (ὅν> ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον. τὸν δὲ ὀμοίον λόγον ἐπὶ τῷ ἀποπροηγμένῳ εἶναι καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ταύτα. οὔδεν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένου 10 διὰ τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. τὸ δὲ προηγμένου, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει. οὔδε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν προηγμένοις εἶναι τὸν βασιλεὰ ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτὸν τεταγμένους. προηγμένα δὲ λέγεσθαι οὐ τῷ πρὸς ἐνδαμονίαν τινα συμ-15 βάλλεσθαι συνεργεῖν τε πρὸς αὐτὴν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τούτων τὴν ἐκλογὴν ποιεῖσθαι παρὰ τὰ ἀποπροηγμένα. Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 1. Some of the πρεσβῦτεροι said that Zeno's προηγμένου was in as bad a way as the sour wine, which its owner could not dispose of as wine or vinegar: so the προηγμένου is neither an ἀγαθὸν nor an αδιάφορον.

phrase, Acad. i. 37 (sed quae essent sumenda ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris), is of doubtful import: see Reid in loc. In Fin. iii. 51 we have:—quae autem aestimanda essent, corum in aliis satis esse causae, quamobrem quibusdam anteponerentur, where Madvig remarks that none of the authorities give examples of those things which are ληπτὰ without being προηγμένα.

5. Ζηνώνος: apart from the evidence of Stob. and Plut. it is clear that the προηγμένα must have formed part of Zeno's system from the fact that Aristo expressly dissented from him on this point (Cic. Acad. ii. 130), cf. Cic. Fin. iii. 51. According to Hirzel p. 418 the word was discarded by the later Stoics, and εὑρηστα substituted by Posidonius.

8. προηγούμενον λόγον: see on frag. 169.

τῶν ἀποπροηγμένων: so Wachsmuth for τὸ ἀποπροηγμένον MSS. Heeren reads τῶν—ον.

13. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐλῇ: cf. Cic. Fin. iii. 52, ut enim, inquit (Zeno), nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem—id est enim προηγμένον—sed eos qui in aliquo honore sunt, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primario loco sunt, sed ea, quae secundum locum obtinent, προηγμένα, id est, producta nominentur.

τῶν προηγμένων: so Madv. ad de Fin. l.e. for MSS. τὸν προαγόμενον: he is followed by Wachsmuth. Hirzel ii. p. 823 prefers προηγούμενον.

15. τινά: so MSS. τινί Davies. <μοïραν> τινα Hense.

16. τε: Mein. τι MSS.

ἄλλα τῷ κ.τ.λ. On the subject of the προηγμένα in general consult Zeller, pp. 278—287. This sentence contains the gist of the Stoic position in the matter. Although sickness e.g. does not impede the happiness of the wise man, since he is secure in the possession of virtue, it
is at the same time impossible ceteris paribus not to prefer health to sickness, cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 7, p. 79, 12—17.


Cf. Cic. Paradox. iii. Hor. Sat. i. 3. 120 foll. Both Sextus and Diog. give as the ground for this doctrine an argument from the relation of truth to falsehood. As one true thing cannot be more true or one false thing more false than another in respect of its truth or falsity, so one sin cannot be more sinful than another. ἀμάρτημα is the correlative of κατόρθωμα and is defined as τὸ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πραττόμενον, ἢ ἐν ὧ παραλέλειπται τι καθήκον ὑπὸ λογικοῦ ζωῆν, Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11a, p. 93, 16. See further Zeller, p. 267.

133. Cic. Mur. § 61, omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum, qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum, qui patrem suffocaverit.

This is quoted among the sententiae et praecepta Zenonis, but it is extremely unlikely that the illustration used is that of Zeno. Cicero attempts (Paradox. iii. 25) to answer this objection by the remark, doubtless borrowed from some Stoic source, that whereas the wrongful killing of a slave involves a single ἀμάρτημα, many ἀμαρτήματα are committed in the act of parricide.

134. Plut. Sto. Rep. vii. 1, 2, ἀρετᾶς ὁ Ζήνων ἀπο-
Zeno taught that virtue is one and indivisible, but that in different spheres it is manifested in different forms. He resumed the Socratic position (for which see Zeller, Socrates E. T. p. 140 foll., and especially Xen. Mem. III. 9, Plat. Men. 88 c), that virtue is knowledge, but adopted the terminology of Aristotle by making use of the word φρόνησις instead of ἐπιστήμη, and thus indicated that moral insight is to be distinguished from intellectual research (cf. Ar. Eth. vi. 13). There is therefore high probability in Zeller’s suggestion (p. 258 n.) that “perhaps Zeno had already defined φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν.
"At the same time he must have been influenced by the Platonic doctrine of the four cardinal virtues (Rep. p. 441 foll.), but he traced the differences in virtue to the diversity of the objects with which it is concerned, while Plato treated them as arising from the distinct parts of the soul, which produce different mental states.

\( \text{ἀπονεμητέοις} = \) the rendering every man his due (\( \text{ἀπονεμητικὴ} \) \( \tauῆς \) \( \text{ἀξίας} \) \( \text{ἐκάστῳ} \) Stob. l.c.), cf. the definition attributed to Simonides in Plat. Rep. i. p. 331 E, \( \dot{o} \tau \tau \text{ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδοναι δίκαιον ἔστι.} \) It is more general in meaning than Aristotle’s \( \tauο \) \( \text{ἐν} \) \( \tauα\)ς \( \text{διανομαῖς} \) \( \text{δίκαιον} \) (Eth. N. v. 2. 12).

\( \text{διαρετέοις} \): distinguishing between things with a view to choice: it deals with \( \tauας \) \( \text{αἵρεσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις} \) (Cleanth. frag. 76).

\( \text{ἄπομενετεοῖς...ἔνεργητεοῖς.} \) Hirzel suggests that there is a lacuna in Plut. Sto. Rep. l.c. and that we ought to read there \( \text{φρόνησιν} \) \( \text{ἐἶναι} \) \( \epsilonν \) \( <\text{ἀπομενετεοῖς} \) \( \text{τήν} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) \( \text{σωφροσύνην} \) \( \text{φρόνησιν} \) \( \text{ἐν} > \) \( \text{αἱρετεοῖς} \) (in place of \( \text{ἔνεργητεοῖς} \)). For \( \text{ὑπομ.} \) cf. Ar. Eth. III. 6, 6, \( \dot{o} \) \( \text{ἄνδρείος...οὐδεὶς} \) \( \gammaάρ} \) \( \text{ὑπομενετικώτερος} \) \( \tauῶν \) \( \text{δειμόν} \): for the general sense cf. Thuc. II. 40. 3, \( \text{κρίτιστοι} \) \( \dot{o} \) \( \text{ἀν} \) \( \text{τήν} \) \( \text{ψυχήν} \) \( \text{δικαίως} \) \( \text{κρίθειν} \) \( \text{oι} \) \( \tauα \) \( \text{τε} \) \( \text{δειμά} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{ἡδέα} \) \( \text{σαφέστατα} \) \( \text{ηγυνώσκοντες καὶ} \) \( \text{διὰ} \) \( \text{ταύτα} \) \( \muι} \) \( \text{ἀποτρεπόμενοι} \) \( \epsilonκ} \) \( \tauῶν} \) \( \text{κινδύνων.} \)

\( \text{σχέσεις.} \) This word has a technical meaning with the Stoics, being opposed to \( \text{κίνησις} \) on the one hand (cf. Cic. Tusc. iv. 30), and to \( \text{ἐξίς} \) (non-essential)(essential) on the other (Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5\(^k\), p. 73, 1). The virtues themselves are \( \text{διαθέσεις} \), for which see on frag. 117.

135. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 3, \( \text{κοινώς} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) \( \text{ἀπαντες} \) \( \text{οὕτω} \) (scil. Menedemus, Aristo, Zeno, Chrysippus) \( \text{τήν} \) \( \text{ἀρετήν} \) \( \text{τοῦ} \) \( \text{ἡγεμονικοῦ} \) \( \text{τῆς} \) \( \text{ψυχῆς} \) \( \text{διώθεσίν} \) \( \text{τινα} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{δύναμιν} \) \( \text{γεγενη-} \)
THE FRAGMENTS OF ZENO.

μένην ὑπὸ λόγου, μᾶλλον δὲ λόγου οὐδὲν αὐτὴν ὀμολογοῦμεν καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑποτίθενται: καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἀλογον διαφορά τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος (ὁ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν), διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μετάβαλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἐξιν ἡ διάθεσις μεταβολαῖς, κακίαι τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν ἐχεῖν ἀλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ λέγεσθαι δὲ ἀλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὀρμῆς ἵσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι πρὸς τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἰροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτουμένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ρόμην προσλαβόντα.

τὴν ἀρετήν κ.τ.λ. cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 56, p. 64, 18, ἀρετῶς δὲ εἶναι πλείους φασὶ καὶ ἀχωρίστους ἀπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ὑπόστασιν.

ὀμολογούμενον: frag. 120.

ἀμετάπτωτον: cf. the definition of knowledge in frag. 17. Virtue is knowledge as applied to conduct.

καὶ νομίζουσι κ.τ.λ. This is principally aimed at Plato (see e.g. Rep. 436 A), but partly also at Aristotle, although the latter denies that the soul is μεριστὴ in the Platonic sense (de An. i. 5, 24, but cf. Eth. i. 13, 10). With Zeno the local extension of the soul as a πνεῦμα throughout the body does not detract from its unity either on the physical or the moral side: πάθος and ἀρετή are alike affections of the ἡγεμονικὸν: see on frag. 93. "The battle between virtue and vice did not resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war carried on in one and the same country." Reid on Acad. i. 38.

διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν. For the distinction between these two terms see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 132, 306.

ἐξιν ἡ διάθεσιν: see on frag. 117. The πάθη are dis-
tinkished, being neither εξεις nor διαθέσεις but κινήσεις, Cic. Tusc. iv. 30.

τῷ πλεονάζοντι. Zeno's view of the πάθη will be considered in the next following fragments. Cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7, 10, p. 88, 10, εἰναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἕγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς.


Cf. Cic. Off. i. § 136, perturbationes, id est, motus animi nimos rationi non obtemperantes. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7: 2, p. 44, 4, πᾶν πάθος ὀρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. ib. 7. 10, p. 88, 8, πάθος δὲ εἰναι φασιν ὀρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθη τῷ αἰροῦντι λόγῳ ἢ κίνησιν ψυχῆς <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν. Plut. in fragm. utr. anim. an corp. libid. et aegrit. c. vii. Andron. περὶ παθῶν c. 1. The comments in Stob. Ic. 10a, p. 89, 3—90, 5, are important. They appear to belong to Chrysippus and show that, while defining the πάθη as κρίσεις, he did not give to that word the restricted interpretation which Galen (see infra, frag. 139) places upon it, and that he recognised the influence of the will in determining the nature of emotion. We may also infer that the words ἀπειθῆς τῷ αἴροῦντι λόγῳ are a gloss of Chrysippus upon Zeno's term ἄλογος. This is also clear from Galen, Hipp. et Plat. p. 368 κ, 338 μ, where the reason is given, namely, the desire to enforce the doctrine of the

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unity of the soul (frag. 135). In maintaining that every πάθος is essentially ἄλογον and παρὰ φύσιν, Zeno goes far beyond Plato and Aristotle, although he has much in common with the Platonic point of view. Thus in the Phaedo 83 b, we read ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἥδων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καθ’ ὅσον δύναται, although elsewhere Plato admits that certain pleasures and pains are allowable (see Zeller’s Plato, p. 444). Similarly Aristotle, while classing certain πάθη as ἄλογα, declares that under certain circumstances wrath and desire are legitimate (Eth. N. III. 1. 24—26).


Cf. ib. ii. 7. 10, p. 88, 11, διὸ καὶ πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι <καὶ> πάλιν <πάν> πάθος πτοίαν. Wachsmuth refers to Chrysipp. ap. Galen. de Hipp. et Plat. plac. iv. 5, p. 364, 23, Müll. οἰκεῖως δὲ τῶν παθῶν γένει ἀποδίδοται καὶ ἡ πτοία κατὰ τὸ ἐνσεσοβημένον τούτῳ καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῇ, where the use of the word ἀποδίδοται points to Zeno’s authorship. ἀπὸ τῆς—παρεικάσας seems to be merely the comment of Didymus, although it is possible that Zeno derived πτοία from πέτεσθαι, as Wachsmuth thinks.

138. Cic. Acad. i. 38, Zeno omnibus his (perturbationibus) quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem...nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quandam intemperantiam.
quasi morbis: see on frag. 144. ἀπαθὴ εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν, Diog. vii. 117.

opinionisque iudicio: in view of what follows this is important, and the expression aptly illustrates Galen's statement that Zeno regarded the πάθη as τὰ ἐπιμυγνόμενα κρίσεων.

intemperantiam. The particular virtue which is concerned with regulating the ὀρμαὶ is σωφροσύνη: see on Cleanth. frag. 76, so that excess of impulse or πάθος is said to be produced by its opposite, ἀκολασία (ἀγνοία αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 513, p. 60, 2), cf. Tusc. iv. 22, Quemadmodum igitur temperantia sedat appetitiones et efficit, ut eae rectae ratione parent, conservatque considerata iudicia mentis: sic huic inimica intemperantia omnem animi statum inflammant conturbat incitat: itaque et aegritudines et metus et reliquae perturbationes omnes gignuntur ex ea.

139. Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. plac. v. 1, v. 429 K., Ζήνων οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιμυγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ λύσεις ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ [τὰς] πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιςεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη, ib. iv. 3, v. 377 K. Chrysippus contradicts himself, Zeno, and even other Stoics as to this οὐ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ [καὶ] τὰς ἐπὶ ταύτας ἀλόγους συστολάς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ δίξεις ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. Wachsmuth, Comm. t. p. 7, adds ibid. iv. 2, v. p. 367 K., τοιαύτην τινὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν παθῶν (i.e. ὅτι αἱ μειώσεις καὶ αἱ ἐπάρσεις καὶ αἱ συστολαὶ καὶ αἱ διαχύσεις...τῆς ἀλόγου δυνάμεως ἐστὶ παθήματα τὰς δόξας ἐπιμυγνομένα) Ἐπίκουρος...καὶ Ζήνων ὑπολαμβάνει. Galen distinguishes between three different views of the nature of πάθη, (1) that they have no connection at all with λογισμὸς or κρίσεις, which is the view of Plato and
Posidonius, and in which Galen himself concurs. He infers that Cleanthes was of the same opinion (but see on Cleanth. frag. 84); (2) that they are κρίσεις, cf. Diog. L. vii. 111. This is the view of Chrysippus and is in Galen's opinion the worst of the three; (3) between these two extreme views that of Zeno in identifying them with ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρίσεις occupies a middle position. It would seem however that in this respect Galen has done Chrysippus an injustice: for it is clear from other evidence (see e.g. on frag. 136) that Chrysippus did not confine himself to the view that πάθη are solely an intellectual affection (Zeller, p. 245, 246). At the same it is probably true that he made a distinct advance upon Zeno by identifying πάθη with κρίσεις and connecting them with συγκαταθέσεις: cf. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 198, 199.

συστολάς. This refers to λύπη, which is defined as συστολὴ ἄλογος (Diog. L. vii. 111, cf. M. Aurel. ii. 10) or ἀπειθής λόγος (Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 70b, p. 90, 14): in the same way ἐπαρσίς refers to ἡδονή (Diog. L. vii. 114, Stob. l. c., l. 16).

λύσεις. For this word Müller substitutes διαχύσεις, but this is perhaps questionable, cf. Cic. Tusc. iii. 61, ex quo ipsam aegritudinem λύπην Chrysippus [quasi λύσιν id est] solutionem totius hominis appellatam putat.

τὰς, delet Müller.

καὶ is expunged by Zeller, p. 246, and Müller, but this corr. is by no means certain: see on frag. 143, and cf. Heinze, Stoicorum de Affectibus doctrina, p. 37.

δήξεις. Zeller's correction, accepted by Müller, for δεῖξεις, is made almost certian by Cic. Tusc. iv. 15, ut aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat, cf. Tusc. iii. 83, cited on frag. 158.

διαχύσεις. In Diog. L. vii. 114 this word appears 'as a subdivision of ἡδονή and is defined as ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς.
In Suidas, col. 818, however ἂνοιγή itself is defined as ἀλογος διάχυσις, cf. deliquesceat in Cic. Tusc. iv. 37. It is worthy of observation that all these words (excepting perhaps ταπεινώσεις) refer to λύπη and ἂνοιγή, and that επιθυμία and φόβος are not so prominent. For ταπεινώσεις, cf. examination humili atque fracta connected with metus in Cic. Tusc. iv. 13, and for πτώσεις demitti (of aegritudo) ib. 14, 37. In the face of the evidence already cited, Wellmann, p. 454, seems to be wrong in supposing λύσεις and πτώσεις to be equivalent to ὀρέξις and ἐκκλίσις in Diog. and Stob. ll. ce.


140. Themist. de An. 90 b, Spengel, ii. 197, 24, καὶ οὐ κακῶς οἱ ἦπὶ Ζήνωνος τὰ πάθη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζυγίσας τοῦ λόγου διαστροφᾶς εἶναι τιθέμενοι καὶ λόγου κρίσεις ἡμαρτημένας.

In the face of Galen's testimony this statement is of no importance so far as Zeno is concerned and may be discarded.

141. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. plac. III. c. 5, v. p. 322 K., οὐ μόνον Χρύσιππος ἄλλα καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Ζήνων ἐτοίμως αὐτὰ τιθέασιν (τοὺς φόβους καὶ τὰς λύπας καὶ πάνθρος ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάθη κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν συνιστάσθαι). This passage is taken from Wachsmuth, Comm. i. p. 7. The emotions are placed in the heart because it is the seat of the ἔγγεμονικον (frag. 100), of which the πάθη are affections (frag. 135), Zeller, p. 213, Stein, Psych. n. 258.

142. Diog. vii. 140, τῶν παθῶν τὰ ἀνωτάτω (καθαρφησιν...Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν) εἶναι γένη τέτταρα, λύπην, φόβουν, ἐπιθυμίαν, ἂνοιγήν.

Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 10, p. 88, 14, πρώτα δ' εἶναι τῷ γένει
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ταῦτα τὰ τέσσαρα, ἐπιθυμίαν, φόβον, λύπην, ἡδονήν, cf. Cic. Off. i. 69, Tusc. iii. 24, iv. 11, Jerome Epist. cxxxiii. illi enim quae Graeci appellant πάθη nos perturbationes possumus dicere, aegritudinem videlicet et gaudium, spem et metum, quorum duo præsentia, duo futura sunt, asserunt extirpari posse de mentibus et nullam fibram radicemque vitiorum in homine omnino residere, meditatione et assidua exercitacione virtutum. Plato had already recognised λύπη, φόβος, ἐπιθυμία and ἡδονή as the four chief πάθη, cf. Phaed. 83 B, cited on frag. 136. From τὰ ἀνωτάτω...γένη it is obvious that Zeno classed certain εἶδη under each of the principal πάθη, but how much of the exposition in Diog. L. vii. 111—116, Stob. Ecl. ii. 7, 10βε is derived from him the evidence does not enable us to determine, nor can we tell whether the doctrine of the εὐπάθεια belongs to him.

143. Cic. Tusc. iii. 74, 75, Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali præsentis, in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. Additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte ut illa opinio præsentis mali sit recens. Galen de Hipp. et Plat. plac. iv. 7, p. 416, ‘ὁ γοῦν ὅρος οὕτως, φησιν [Posidonius], ὁ τῆς λύπης, ὡσπερ οὗν καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν παθῶν ὑπὸ τε Ζήνωνος εἰρημένοι καὶ πρὸς τὸν Χρυσέππου γεγραμμένοι σαφῶς ἐξελέγχουσι τὴν γνώμην αὐτοῦ. δόξαν γὰρ εἶναι πρόσφατον τοῦ κακῶν αὐτῷ παρείναι φησι (? φασί) τὴν λύπην. ἐν φα καὶ συντομότερον ἐνίοτε λέγοντες ὥδε πῶς προσφέρονται λύπη ἐστὶ δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας.’ λύπης is the necessary correction of Cornarius, Bake and I. Müller for the MSS. άτης. The unfortunate currency, which Kühn's ἀσης has obtained, has given rise to much perplexity.

These passages, and especially that of Cicero, have been
strangely neglected by the authorities. A difficulty arises here, because it is generally inferred from frag. 139 that the treatment of the πάθη by Zeno and Chrysippus was radically different, and it is strange that, if Zeno defined λύπη, for example, as ἄλογος συστολή, he should also have defined it as δόξα πρόσφατοι κακοῦ παρουσίας. (For the connection of Chrysippus with the latter definition cf. Galen, op. cit. iv. p. 336 K., 336, 9 M., ἐν τοῖς ὀρισμοῖς τῶν γενικῶν παθῶν τελέως ἀποχωρεῖ τῆς γνώμης αὐτῶν [scil. his own writings] τὴν λύπην ὀριζόμενος δόξαν πρόσφατον κακοῦ παρουσίας τὸν δὲ φόβον προσδοκίαν κακοῦ τὴν δὲ ἴδιον δόξαν πρόσφατον ἀγαθοῦ παρουσίας, but at the same time defines ἐπιθυμία as ἄλογος ὀρέξεις.) For, in that case, how could Galen or Posidonius have treated Chrysippus as diverging from Zeno by explaining the πάθη as κρίσεις, especially as Posidonius is the ultimate authority on whom the attribution of the δόξα definition to Zeno rests?

Now the evidence of Galen establishes almost beyond a doubt that the definitions of λύπη as ἄλογος συστολή and of ἴδιον as ἄλογος ἐπαρσίς (Diog. L. vii. 111, 114) were propounded by Zeno. From this it would seem to follow as a natural corollary that he also defined ἐπιθυμία as ἄλογος ὀρέξεις (Diog. vii. 113), and φόβος as ἄλογος ἐκκλίσισις (Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 10b, p. 90, 11, ἐκκλίσις ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ), cf. Andron. περὶ παθῶν, c. i., λύπη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἄλογος συστολή, φόβος δὲ ἄλογος ἐκκλίσις, ἐπιθυμία δὲ ἄλογος ὀρέξεις, ἴδιον δὲ ἄλογος ἐπαρσίς; and see Kreuttner, p. 31. On other grounds it seems probable (see on frag. 136) that Chrysippus is responsible for the substitution of ἀπειθῆς λόγῳ for ἄλογος in Stob. i. c., but we cannot tell who added the words ἐπὶ φευκτῷ δοκοῦντι and ἐφ’ αἵρετῳ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν (Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iv. 2, p. 367), which appear also in Diog. 114. It remains therefore to
decide whether the definitions of which δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας is a type were introduced by Zeno or Chrysippus. The latter alternative would be the most satisfactory solution and is generally adopted (e.g. by Wellmann, p. 454, 455, Zeller, pp. 249, 250, Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie, ii. 232, 233 and 504), but if Posidonius’ evidence is to be accepted in the one case, why is it to be discarded in the other, especially where it tells most strongly against himself? cf. Galen, p. 390 K., (Ποσειδώνιος) πειράται μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Κυττέα Ζήνωνα προσάγειν. We must remember that Posidonius was anxious to pick holes in Chrysippus, in order to excuse his own heresy. Hence he charges Chrysippus not merely with divergence from his predecessors but with inconsistency (τὴν αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑναντιολογίαν τοῦ Χρυσίππου, Galen, p. 390). It would seem therefore that he is less worthy of credence as a witness, when he affirms a discrepancy between Zeno and Chrysippus than when he testifies to the identity of their doctrine. Nor ought we to neglect the fact that in Diog. L. vii. 112 φόβος is defined as κακοῦ προσδοκία, being thus differentiated from the other πάθη, and that this definition is ultimately traceable to Plato (Protag. 358 d, Lach. 198 b). If however we suppose that Zeno made use of a double set of definitions, what was the nature of the contribution made by Chrysippus? Only two answers seem possible. If Zeno in his oral lectures (εἰρημένοι), and subsequently to the publication of the work περὶ παθῶν, put forward the δόξα definitions, it would devolve on Chrysippus to reconcile as against opponents the written and the oral tradition of the school. Or again it is quite conceivable that Posidonius may have been misled by the desire of Chrysippus to represent his own developments as the natural out-growth
of Zeno’s system. In any case the difference was comparatively unimportant: ‘hanc differentiam levissimam esse quis est quin videat, cum uterque id semper docuerit, πάθη esse voluntaria?’ (Heinze, Stoicorum de Affectibus doctrina, p. 10, and see also pp. 23, 24, 36, 37).

144. Lactant. Inst. iii. 23, inter vitia et morbos misericordiam poniit (Zeno). id. Epist. ad Pentad. 38, Zeno Stoicorum magister, qui virtutem laudat, misericordiam...tamquam morbum animi diiudicavit.

It is probable that Zeno spoke of the πάθη in general terms as νόσοι and that Chrysippus is responsible for the distinction between νοσήματα and ἀφρωστήματα, as the passage in Cic. Tusc. iv. 23 suggests. Cf. Zeller, p. 251, 252, and Stein, Psych. n. 267. At the same time morbus may here be simply the translation of πάθος, which Cicero rejected (Tusc. iii. 7, iv. 10). For ἔλεος, a subdivision of λύπη, cf. Diog. vii. 111, Stob. Eel. ii. 7. 10c, p. 92, 12, Cic. Tusc. iv. 18.


Stob. Eel. ii. 7. 8, p. 85, 13, ὀρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθήκον· τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὁ πραχθέν εὐλογὸν ἀπολογισμῶν ἔχει παρὰ τὸ καθήκον δὲ τὸ ἑναυτίως. τούτῳ διατείνει καὶ εἰς τὰ ἀλογα τῶν ζόων, ἐνεργεὶ γὰρ τι κάκεινα ἀκόλουθος τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν λογικῶν ζῶν ὀὕτως ἀπο-
δίδοται τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. Cic. de Fin. III. 58, est autem officium quod ita factum est ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit (where see Madv.).

καθήκον is, according to Zeno, any action for the performance of which a sufficient reason can be given and it is entirely distinct from virtuous action, which is described as κατόρθωμα. That Zeno must have treated of κατόρθωμα is a supposition which is rendered necessary by the circumstances of the case, but the evidence to connect him with it is wanting. The doctrine of καθήκον is closely connected with that of προηγμένον (ἀκόλουθος ὥς ἐστι τῷ περὶ τῶν προηγμένων ὥς περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος τόπος, Stob. I. c.) inasmuch as in the ordinary course of life we are forced to regulate our conduct with regard to external circumstances, which are strictly speaking ἀδιάφορα. Hence we must explain κατά τινας where κατά means "over against" (diejenige Pflicht, die von aussen an uns herantritt, von der unterschieden werden soll, die in unserem eigensten Wesen, in der Vernunft selber ihren Ursprung hat), as Hirzel has shown by a comparison of Epict. Enchir. 15, μέμνησο ὅτι ὅσ ἐν συμποσίῳ δεῖ σε ἀναστρέφεσθαι. περιφερόμενον γέγονε τι κατά σε; ἐκτείνας τὴν χείρα κοσμίως μετάλαβε· παρέρχεται; μὴ κάτεχε. οὔτω ἥκει; μὴ ἐπίβαλλε πόρρῳ τὴν ὀρεξιν· ἀλλὰ περίμενε, μέχρις ἄν γένηται κατά σε. οὔτω πρὸς τέκνα, οὔτω πρὸς γυναῖκα, οὔτω πρὸς ἄρχας, οὔτω πρὸς πλοῦτον, καὶ ἐσθὶ ποτὲ ἄξιος τῶν θεῶν συμπότης. καθήκον, therefore, in Zeno’s system is not a general term of which κατορθώματα and μέσα καθήκοντα are subdivisions, but rather καθήκοντα and κατορθώματα are mutually exclusive, so that the distinctions between ἄει καθήκοντα and οὐκ ἄει καθήκοντα, and μέσα καθήκοντα and τέλεια καθήκοντα belong to later Stoics: see Hirzel, Untersuchungen, II. pp. 403—410. εὐλογον does not imply
action in accordance with right reason, i.e. virtue, as Zeller and Ueberweg suppose, for reason in this sense cannot be attributed to φυτὰ and ἄλογα ζώα, which are nevertheless capable of καθήκοντα according to the authorities. (The use of εὐλογος in this narrower sense is justified by Hirzel, p. 341, 1, from a comparison of Diog. vii. 76. Seneca, de Benef. iv. 33, sequimur qua ratio non qua virtus trahit; Diog. vii. 130, εὐλόγως ἐξιδεῖν ἐαυτόν τοῦ βίου τοῦ σοφοῦ.) If Hirzel's explanation is correct, it follows that in Sext. Math. vii. 158, where κατόρθωμα is defined as ὅπερ πραξθεῖν εὐλογον ἐχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν, Arcesilas adopts the Stoic definition of καθήκον as the true basis of κατόρθωμα. Wellmann, p. 461, believes that κατόρθωμα belongs solely to the later Stoics, but surely Zeno must have given some name to virtuous action, and it is most reasonable to assume that this was κατόρθωμα. It is unnecessary to observe that Zeno was not the first to use καθήκον in the sense of "duty": all that is meant is that he gave the word its special technical sense, cf. κατάληψις. As to the divergence of Stobaeus from Diogenes we should note (1) that τὸ ἀκόλουθων ἐν ζωῇ is made the main point in the definition, which is probably a mistake, cf. Cic., (2) the distinction between βίος and ζωή, for which cf. Arist. ap Ammon, in Steph. Thes. βίος ἔστι λογικὴ ζωή (quoted by Hirzel).

146. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7, 1, p. 38, 15, οἱ δὲ κατὰ Ζήνωνα τοῦ Στωικὸν τροπικῶς ἥθος ἐστὶ πηγῇ βίου, ἀφ’ ἕς αἰ κατὰ μέρος πράξεις ρέουσι.

The Stoics regarded not so much the act itself as the character of the agent (cf. σπουδαία διάθεσις). For πηγῆ cf. Plat. Leg. 808 c, who says that a young boy ἔχει πηγῆν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην.

Cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 50. 34, οἱ Στωικοὶ τὸν σοφὸν αἰσθῆσει καταληπτῶν αὐτὸ τοῦ ἐιδοὺς τεκμηριωδῶς. Euripides regrets that it is impossible to distinguish men in this manner. Med. 516—520,

ο Ζεὺς, τί δὴ χρυσοῦ μὲν ὡς κίβδηλος ἔτεκμηρι' αὐθρώποισιν ὀπασας σαφῆ, ἀνδρῶν δὲ ὡς τῷ χρῆ τὸν κακὸν διειδέναι, οὐδεὶς χαρακτῆρ εἵμπεφυκε σώματι;


148. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11z, p. 99, 3, ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Στωικοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου 5 χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις· ὀδεν τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ κατορθοῦν ἐν ἀπασίαν ὅσ προστίθεται, τὸ δὲ ἀμαρτάνειν. καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαίον ταῖς περὶ τοῦ βίου ἐμπειρίαις χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς πραττομένοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πάντ' εὖ ποιεῖν, καθάπερ φρονίμως καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ 10 κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς· τὸν δὲ φαύλον κατὰ τούναντίου κακῶς, καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαίου μέγαν καὶ ἀδρόν καὶ ύψηλόν καὶ ἵσχυρόν. μέγαν μὲν ὅτι δύναται ἐφικεῖσθαι τῶν κατὰ προαίρεσιν ὅντων αὐτῷ καὶ προκειμένων· ἀδρόν δὲ, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡμιεμένους πινώθεν· ύψηλόν δ', ὅτι μετεί- 15 λὴφε τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος υψίου ἀνδρὶ γενναίῳ καὶ σοφῇ, καὶ ἵσχυρόν δ', ὅτι τὴν ἐπιβάλλουσαν ἵσχυν περιπε- ποίηται, ἀητήτως ὁν καὶ ἀκαταγώνιστος. παρ' ὃ καὶ οὔτε ἀναγκᾶζεται ὑπὸ τινος οὔτε ἀναγκάζει τινα, οὔτε κωλύεται οὔτε κωλύει, οὔτε βιάζεται ὑπὸ τινος οὔτ' αὐτὸς 20 βιάζει τινα, οὔτε δεσπόζει οὔτε δεσπόζεται, οὔτε κακοποιεῖ τινα οὔτ' αὐτὸς κακοποιεῖται, οὔτε κακοῖς περιπτέτει <οὔτ'
It is a matter of doubt how much of this extract can be reasonably regarded as derived from Zeno, but if the whole of it is to be traced to a single source, that source may be Zeno, as there is some evidence for connecting him with the statements appearing at the end of the passage. On the doctrine of the wise man in general see Zeller, p. 268 foll., Cic. Fin. iii. 75, 76.


12. μέγαν. Physical excellence can only be predicated of the wise man, even if in the popular sense of the term he does not possess it, for no kind of excellence can be attributed to the φαύλος. Further, inasmuch as the only good is ἀρετὴ or τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς, physical advantages only have value when found in conjunction with virtue.

17. ἄρττητος. Cf. frag. 157, the parallelism of which is perhaps a circumstance of some weight in favour of Zeno's authorship here.

19. βιάζεται: for this verb, see Shilleto on Thuc. i. 2. 1.

20. δεσπόζει: cf. Diog. L. vii. 122, ἦ (δουλεία) ἀντι-
τίθεται ή δεσποτεία φαύλη οὐσα καὶ αὐτή. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 11\textsuperscript{k}, p. 104, 5.

23. διαφεύγεται: because falsehood consists not merely in stating something contrary to fact but in doing so advisedly in order to deceive others (Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 11\textsuperscript{m}, p. 111, 10; Sext. Math. vii. 44, 45). So, on the other hand the φαύλος may speak ἀληθές τι but is devoid of ἀλήθεια.


ἀξιωματικός: this appears to mean "high in rank," see Plut. Mor. 617 ν, and cf. the use of ἀξίωμα in Thuc. as applied to Pericles. It can hardly mean "speaking axioms" as when used of Arcesilas in Diog. iv. 31.

βασιλικός. Among the sententiae et praecepta Zenonis cited by Cie. Mur. § 61 occurs solos sapientes esse si servitutem servant reges. It is extremely probable that this paradox was asserted by Zeno from Diog. L. vii. 122, ἄλλα καὶ βασιλείας (εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς) τῆς βασιλείας οὐσῆς ἀρχῆς ἀνυπενθύνου, ἢτις περὶ μόνου ἄν τοὺς σοφοὺς σταίη, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ κυρίως κεχρησθαι Ζήνωνα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. Cf. Hor. Sat. i. 3. 125, Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 11\textsuperscript{m}, p. 108, 26.


πολιτείᾳ. Introd. p. 29.
\[ \text{\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\alpha\varsigma} : \text{the question naturally arises, how is this statement to be connected with the cosmopolitanism which Zeno in the same treatise advocated (see frag. 162, \text{\iota\nu\alpha... \pi\epsilon\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon \eta\gamma\omicron\omicron\omega\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha \delta\eta\mu\omicron\omicron\tau\alpha\varsigma \kappa\iota \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\alpha\varsigma)? Zeno's ideal state is not a community of the wise alone, but of all mankind. He seems to be arguing here against the ordinary civic distinctions, which are utterly valueless as compared with the broad line drawn between \sigma\omicron\omicron\phi\omicron\omega and \phi\alpha\upsilon\lambda\omicron\iota. Presumably in the ideal state everyone would be so trained in Stoic precepts as to become thereby \sigma\pi\omicron\omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\omicron.} \]

\[ \text{\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\upsilon\omicron\varsigma : cf. Diog. L. vii. 124, Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11\textsuperscript{m}, p. 138, 15, where friendship is based upon \delta\omicron\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon which can only be found among the wise. Cic. Off. i. 56, N. D. i. 121. A full discussion of the subject is given by Zeller, p. 317 foll. This is one of the doctrines borrowed by Zeno from the Cynics, see Introd. p. 19; it had already been taught by Socrates (Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 14 foll.). The view is rejected as inadequate by Plato in the Lysis (p. 214), but no doubt Clement is thinking rather of the Phaedrus and Symposium: he adds his usual comment that Plato's views are borrowed from the Jews.} \]

\[ \text{\epsilon\lambda\nu\omicron\theta\epsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\omicron\varsigma. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11\textsuperscript{i}, p. 101, 18, Diog. L. vii. 121, Cic. Parad. v. This again is derived from the Cynics: see Zeller, Socrates, p. 322.} \]

150. Cic. Mur. \S\ 61, solos sapientes esse, si distortissimi, formosos. This occurs among the "Sententiae et praecepta Zenonis" cited by Cicero in his banter against Cato, so that the evidence is not very trustworthy, a remark which also applies to frags. 152, 153 and 155. The wise man is beautiful because virtue alone is beautiful and attractive: Zeller, p. 270 and n. 4, to whose references add Cic. Fin. iii. 75, recte etiam pulcher ap-
pellabitur: animi enim lineamenta sunt pulciora quam corporis.


152. Cic. Mur. § 61, sapientiam gratia nunquam moveri, numquam cuiusquam delicto ignoscere; neminem misericordem esse nisi stultum et levem; viri non esse neque exorari neque placari.

The reasons for this opinion are given by Diog. vii. 123, ἐλεήμονάς τε μὴ εἶναι, συγγνώμην τε ἔχειν μηδενί· μὴ γὰρ παρεῖναι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιβαλλοῦσας κολάσεις· ἐπεὶ τὸ γε ἔτειν καὶ ὁ ἔλεος αὐτῆ τε ἡ ἐπιείκεια οὐδὲνειά ἐστι ψυχῆς πρὸς κολάσεις προσποιομένης χρηστότητα μηδὲ οἰσθαί σκληροτέρας αὐτὰς εἶναι. The same at greater length in Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 114, p. 95, 25—96, 9; see also Zeller, p. 254. It should be remembered that ἔλεος is a subdivision of λύπη (ἐπὶ τῶ δοκοῦντι ἀναξίως κακο-παθεῖν Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 106, p. 92, 12) and therefore one of the πάθη: possibly this is all that is meant by Lactant. Inst. iii. 23 (frag. 144).

ab eodem Zeno accepissent nihil esse turpior quam opinari.

The Greek authorities for this fall partly under frag. 148, l. 22, ὀὕτε ἐξαπατᾶται ὀὕτε ἐξαπατᾶ ἄλλον, ὀὕτε διαψεύδεται ὀὕτε ἀγνοεῖ ὀὕτε λανθάνει ἕαυτὸν ὀὕτε καθ-όλου ψεύδος ύπολαμβάνει, and the rest may be supplied from Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11m, p. 112, 1, μηδὲν δ’ ύπολαμβάνειν ἀσθενῶς ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἀσφαλῶς καὶ βεβαιῶς διὸ καὶ μηδὲ δοξάσειν τὸν σοφὸν... p. 113, 5, οὐδὲ μετανοεῖν δ’ ύπολαμβάνονσι τὸν νοῦν ἐχοντα...οὐδὲ μεταβάλλεσθαι δὲ κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον οὐδὲ μετατίθεσθαι οὐδὲ σφάλλεσθαι. Diog. vii. 121, ἦτι τε μὴ δοξάσειν τὸν σοφὸν. For Zeno’s definition of δόξα see on frag. 15.


This is the natural antithesis of frag. 149. Even parents are enemies to their children, if φαῦλοι, because natural relationship and parental love are absolutely ἀδιάφορα as compared with ἀρετή. On the subject of these paradoxes in general consult Ritter and Preller § 420 with the notes.

155. Cic. Mur. § 61, nos autem, qui sapientes non sumus, fugitivos, exules, hostes, insanos denique esse.

But for the sake of uniformity this might have been omitted, as we can feel very little confidence that we have here the actual words of Zeno. For exules cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11, p. 103, 9, λέγουσι δὲ καὶ φυγάδα πάντα φαῦλον εἶναι, καθ’ ὅσον στέρεται νόμον καὶ πολιτείας κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιβαλλοῦσης.

156. Athen. iv. 158 B, Στωικὸν δὲ δόγμα ἐστίν ὦτι
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τε πάντα εὖ ποιήσει ὁ σοφὸς καὶ φακὴν φρονίμως ἁρτύσει διὸ καὶ Τίμων ὁ Φλιάσιος ἔφη
καὶ [Ζηνώνειόν] γε φακὴν ἐφεῖν ὃς μὴ φρονίμως μεμάθηκεν
ὡς οὖν ἄλλως δυναμένης ἐψηθήναι φακῆς εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὴν Ζηνώνειον υφήγησιν ὃς ἐφη
εἰς δὲ φακῆν ἐμβαλλε δυνωδέκατον κοριάννου.

ὁτὶ τε κτ.λ. This follows from the doctrine that all virtue is wisdom (φρονησις): since φρονησις is required in the preparation of a φακή, the wise man can alone prepare it properly. This applies even if the wise man has no experience in the particular practical task under consideration, because he alone possesses the necessary capacity, cf. frag. 148, l. 9. Diog. L. vii. 125, πάντα τε εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν, ὡς καὶ πάντα φαμὲν τὰ αὐλήματα εὖ αὐλεῖν τὸν 'Ισμηνίαν, which furnishes a close parallel to Hor. Sat. 1. 3. 126 foll., 'non nosti quid pater,' inquit, 'Chrysippus dicat:' 'sapiens crepidas sibi numquam nee soleas fecit, sutor tamen est sapiens.' qui? 'ut quamvis tacet Hermogenes, cantor tamen atque optimus est modulator etc.' Cf. also Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5b10, p. 66, 14 foll.

157. Philo, liber quis virtuti studet, p. 880, ἄξιον τὸ Ζηνώνειον ἐπιφωνῆσαι ὅτι θάττων ἀν ἁσκὸν βαπτίσαις πλήρῃ πνεύματος ἢ βιάσαι τὸν σπουδαίον ὄντων ἄκουστα δρᾶσαι τι τῶν ἄβουλήτων· ἀνένδοτος γὰρ καὶ ἀγάσητος ψυχῆ ἣν ὀρθὸς λόγος δόγμασι παγίως ἐνεφρώσε.

βαπτίσαις...βιάσαι. So Mangey, followed by Wachsmuth, for the MSS. βαπτίσαι...βιάσαιτο. The same editor suggests the alternative of inserting τις, which is less probable.

βιάσαιο: for the freedom of the wise man's will cf. Cic. Tusc. iv. 12, eiusmodi appositionem Stoici βούλησιν
appellant, nos appellamus voluntatem. Eam illi putant in
solo esse sapiente; quam sic defniunt: voluntas est, quae
quid cum ratione desiderat, and see Stein, Erkenntnis-
theorie, p. 196.

ἀνένδοτος: cf. supra frag. 148, ἵσχυρον δ' (τὸν σοφόν) ὅτι
τὴν ἐπιβάλλουσαν ἵσχυν περιπετεοῖται ἀήττητος ὁν καὶ
ἀκαταγώνιστος. M. Aurel. i. 16 fin.

ὁρθὸς λόγος: see Introd. pp. 8, 9.

158. Seneca, de Ira, i. 16, 7, Nam, ut dixit Zeno, in
sapientis quoque animo etiam quam vulner sanatum sit
cicatrix manet. Sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et
umbras affectuum, ipsis quidem carebit.

This is a concession to popular feeling, although at
the same time the absolute ἀπάθεια (Diog. L. vii. 117,
Cic. Acad. i. 38) of the wise man is maintained. It would
be a mistake to infer from this passage that Zeno is
responsible for the doctrine of εὐπάθεια. Further re-
ferences are given by Zeller, p. 291. Cf. Diog. vii. 118,
προσπεσεῖσθαι μέντοι ποτὲ αὐτῷ φαντασίας ἀλλοκότους,
διὰ μελαγχολίαν ἢ λήρησιν κ.τ.λ., where however the
point is rather different. Remembering that Zeno de-
scribed the effect of grief as δῆξεις, we may compare
Socrates' description of the result of violent love in Xen.
Symp. iv. 28, ὅσπερ ὑπὸ θηρίου τινὸς δεδηγμένος τὸν
tε ὑμον πλεῖον ἢ πέντε ἡμέρας ὡδαξὸν καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ
ὁσπερ κυήσμα τι ἐδόκοιν ἔχειν. Cic. Tusc. iii. 83, hoc
detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit
sublata illa maerens, morsus tamen et contractiuncula
quaedam animi relinquentur. The best account of the
sensibility of the wise man to pain is given by Heinze,
Stoicorum de aff. doctr. pp. 14, 15. The wise man can-
not resist the impact of the φαντασία, but will refuse
συγκατάθεσις. See further on Cleanth. frag. 94.
159. Seneca, Epist. 83. 8, Ebrio secretum sermonem nemo committit: viro autem bono committit: ergo vir bonus ebrius non erit.

Seneca finds no difficulty in refuting this fallacy, in spite of the defence which he quotes from Posidonius. For the syllogistic form of the argument see Introd. p. 33. Von Arnim, Quellen Studien p. 104, has pointed out the original in Philo de Plantatione Noë p. 350, eι τῷ μεθύοντι οὐκ ἄν της εὐλόγως λόγον ἀπόρρητον παρακατάθοιτο <τῷ δὲ σοφῷ παρακατατίθενται> οὐκ ἁρα μεθύει ὁ ἀστεῖος.


160. Plut. de prof. in virt. 12, ὁρὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑποτέν ἐστιν ἥξιον γαρ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑνείρων ἐκαστοῦ έαυτοῦ συναίσθανεσθαι προκόπτοντος, εἰ μήτε ἥδομενον αἰσχρῷ τινι έαυτὸν μήτε τι προσίέμενον ἡ πράττοντα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ ἁδίκων ὀρᾷ κατὰ τοὺς ὑπεροῦς ἀλλὰ οἶον ἐν βυθῷ γαλήνης ἀκλύστῳ καταφανεί διαλάμπει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φανταστικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διακεχυμένον.

ἀπὸ τῶν ὑνείρων: it was a popular Greek notion that the vision of the mind's eye is clearer in sleep. Aesch. Eum. 104. Pind. frag. 108 [96], Fennell.

προκόπτοντος: Wellmann p. 462 argues that Zeno, while
maintaining to the full the possibility of acquiring virtue, did not admit the practical non-existence of wise men or the consequent distinction between οἱ προκόπτοντες and οἱ σπουδαῖοι: these latter views, he thinks, may have originated with Chrysippus. On προκόπτῃ in general see Zeller, p. 293 foll.

προστέμευνον, "approving" (cf. Dem. Timoer. § 156). The words αἰσχρῶν δεινῶν ἀδίκων point to the acquisition of the three leading virtues σωφροσύνη ἀνδρεία and δικαιοσύνη.

ἀλλ' οἶον κ.τ.λ. The emotions are dispersed by reason in the mind of the προκόπτων, which remains clear and unsullied, like the transparent ocean on a calm day when shingle and sand settle down to the bottom: cf. Cleanth. frag. 66.

φανταστικόν, has no objective reality but is merely διάκενος ἐλκυσμός, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ' οὔδενὸς φανταστοῦ γνώμενον (Plut. plac. iv. 12). Observe that it is described as a πάθος. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 156, n. 309.

161. Seneca, Epist. 104. 21, quod si convivere etiam Graecis juvat: cum Socrate, cum Zenone versare: alter te docebit mori, si necesse erit: alter, antequam necesse erit.

antequam necesse erit. Suicide (ἐξαγωγή) is justifiable under certain circumstances. It is important to remember that life and death belong to the class of the ἀδιάφορα, and suicide therefore has no connection with ἀρετή, but is merely to be regarded as a matter of καθήκον (τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθήκον <παρὰ> μετρεῖσθαι τὴν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11" p. 110, 13 and see on frag. 145). This point is emphasised by Zeller p. 338.
162. Plut. Alex. virt. 6, καὶ μὴν ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ τῆν Στωικῶν αἴρεσιν καταβαλομένου Ζήνωνος εἰς ἐν τούτῳ συντείνει κεφάλαιον ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ κατὰ δήμους οἰκώμεν, ιδίοις ἐκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἄνθρωπος ἡγόμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἰς δὲ βίος ἢ καὶ κόσμος, ὡσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νομὸ κοινῷ συντρεφομένης. τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν ἔγραψεν ὡσπερ ὅναρ ἢ εἴδουλον εὐνομίας φιλοσόφον καὶ πολιτείας ἀνατυπωσάμενος: id. de Sto. Rep. π. 1, ἑπεὶ τοίνυν πολλὰ μὲν, ὡς ἐν λόγοις αὐτῷ Ζήνωνι...γεγραμμένα τυγχάνει περὶ πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικαζεῖν καὶ ῥητορεύειν. Chrysost. Hom. i. in Matth. 4, οὐ γὰρ καθάπερ Πλάτων ὁ τῷ καταγέλαστον ἑκείνην πολιτείαν συνθεῖς καὶ Ζήνων καὶ εἰ τις ἔτερος πολιτείαν ἔγραψεν ἢ νόμοις συνέθηκεν.

πάντας ἄνθρωπος: see on frag. 149. The idea of cosmopolitanism was largely developed by the later Stoics, especially Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. Zeno's disregard of the fundamental distinction between Greeks and barbarians may partly be due to the influence of his birthplace, as Zeller remarks, but at the same time he only carries out Cynic teaching (Diog. L. vi. 72, μόνην τε ὅρθν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ). As to Socrates, see Zeller's Socrates p. 167 n. 8, R. and P. § 219°.

ὡσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου. As Zeno is generally admitted to have written the πολιτεία when he was still under the influence of the Cynic school, Zeller (Socrates p. 325) treats this passage as being typical of Cynicism, and suggests that Plato, in the Politicus (267 D, οὐκοῦν τῶν νομεντικῶν ἡμῖν πολλῶν φανεισῶν ἁρτὶ τεχνῶν μία τίς ἢν ἢ πολιτικὴ καὶ μιᾶς τινὸς ἀγέλης ἐπιμέλεια; κ. τ. λ.) and in his description of the ὅν τόλις in Rep. 372 A. foll. is referring to Antisthenes. The reference is however extremely doubtful (see Ueberweg p. 93), and it is worth noticing
that the comparison of the ruler of a state to a herdsman was a favourite one with Socrates. Xen. Mem. i. 2, 32, εἰπὲ πον ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι θαυμαστῶν οἱ δοκοῖ εἶναι, εὕτις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεύς καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἔλαττους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν μὴ ὀμολογοῖν κακῶς βουκόλος εἶναι ἐτί δὲ θαυμαστότερον εἶ τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως κ.τ.λ., with which cf. Plat. Gorg. 516 A. See also Newman, Politics of Aristotle, vol. i. p. 30.

163. Athen. xiii. 561 c, Ποντιανὸς δὲ Ζήνωνα ἡφι τὸν Κιτίεα ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν ὡροτα θεῶν εἶναι φιλίας καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ ὀμονοίας παρασκευαστικόν, ἀλλου δ᾽ οὐδενὸς. διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ἡφι "τὸν Ἡρωτα θεῶν εἶναι, συνεργοῦν ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν." Plut. vit. Lycurg. 31. Lycurgus' object was not to leave Sparta with a large empire, ἀλλά ὁσπέρ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός βίῳ καὶ πόλεως ὀλής νομίζων εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἐγγύνεσθαι καὶ ὀμονοίας τῆς πρὸς αὐτήν, πρὸς τὸντο συνέταξε καὶ συνηρμοσεν, ὁπως ἐλευθερίου καὶ αὐτάρκεις γενόμενοι καὶ σωφρονοῦντες ἐπὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον διατελῶσι. ταύτην καὶ Πλάτων ἔλαισε τῆς Πολιτείας ὑπόθεσιν καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ζήνων κ.τ.λ.

tὸν Ἡρωτα. Love is in Hesiod to be regarded as an allegorical presentment of fire, frag. 113. In the ideal state Love is taken as a presiding deity, because all discord and party strife are to be banished from it, and the wise men, who are its citizens, are to be united by friendship and concord. Cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11ṁ, p. 108, 15, ἐν μονοῖς τε τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀπολείπομεν ἕλιαν, ἐπεὶ ἐν μονοῖς τούτοις ὀμονοία γίνεται περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, τὴν δ' ὀμονοίαν εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμην. Chrysipp. ap. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. col. 12, p. 79, Gomp., καὶ τὴν αὐτήν εἶναι καὶ Εὐνομίαν καὶ Δίκην καὶ Ὀμονοίαν καὶ Εἰρήνην καὶ Ἀφροδίτην καὶ τὸ παραπλῆσιον πάν. It is probable that
Zeno took the same objection, that of want of unity, to Plato's Republic as is taken by Aristotle Pol. II. 5, p. 1264 a 24, εν μιᾷ γὰρ πόλει δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ύπεναντίας ἀλλήλαις. Cf. also ib. II. 4 1262 b 7, Xen. Mem. IV. 4. 16, and contrast Ar. Pol. II. 2. 1261 b 10. Hirzel, II. p. 36, finds here a divergence from Antisthenes, comparing Clem. Alex. Strom. II. 485 P., but he apparently forgets Diog. L. vi. 12, which shows that the inconsistency, if it exists, is with Antisthenes himself.


The Cynics also deny the sanctity of temples: Diog. L. vi. 73, μηδέν τε ἀτοπον εἶναι ἐξ ἱεροῦ τι λαβεῖν. Zeno's language in some particulars recalls St Paul's address to the Athenians, Acts xvii. 24, ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὸν κόσμον καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὕτως οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς Κυρίος ὑπάρχων οὐκ ἐν χειροποιητοῖς ναοῖς κατοικεῖ.
165. Stob. Floril. 43, 88, Ζήνων ἐφη δεῖν τὰς πόλεις κοσμεῖν οὐκ ἀναθήμασιν ἄλλα ταῖς τῶν οἰκούντων ἄρεταις. In a similar spirit Crates promised to honour Hermes and the Muses ὁ δαπάναις τρυφερᾶς ἄλλ' ἄρεταις ὀνείας (Julian Or. vi. 200 λ, quoted by Zeller, Socrates p. 329 n. 1).

166. Diog. L. vii. 33, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς διακοσίους στίχους μηθ᾽ ἵρα μητὲ δικαστήρια μητε γυμνάσια ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οἰκοδομεῖσθαι.

κατά...στίχους. Prose writings were cited according to the number of lines, cf. Diog. L. vii. 187, (Chrysippus) ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων φυσιολόγων συγγράμματι λέγων κατὰ τοὺς ἐξακοσίους στίχους. Dion. Hal. de Thuc. hist. jud. e. 19, προοίμιον τής ἱστορίας μέχρι πεντακοσίων ἐκμηκύνει στίχων.


167. Diog. vii. 32, ἐνοῦ μέντοι...ἐν πολλοῖς κατηγοροῦντες τοῦ Ζήνωνος τὴν ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν ἀχρηστον ἀποφαίνειν λέγουσιν ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς πολιτείας.

ἐγκύκλιον παιδεία. The ordinary course of Greek education comprised the three branches of γράμματα, μουσική, and γυμναστική (Becker's Charicles E. T. p. 231 foll.). Zeno intended to imply, probably again in opposition to Plato, that, as compared with the acquisition of virtue or true wisdom, the wisdom which education proposes to supply is worthless (cf. Wellmann p. 437, 8). Such at least seems to be the ground on which the Cynics put forward a similar opinion, Diog. L. vi. 11, τήν τε ἄρετὴν
τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλειόνων δεσμένην, μήτε μαθημάτων. 73, μουσικής τε καὶ γεωμετρικῆς καὶ ἀστρολογίας καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀμελεῖν ὡς ἀχρήστων καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖων. 103, παραιτοῦντα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα. γράμματα γούν μὴ μανθάνειν ἐφασκεν ὁ Ἀντίσθένης τοὺς σώφρονας γενομένους, ἵνα μὴ διαστρέφουντο τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις. Epicurus agreed with Zeno on this point (see Prof. Mayor on Cic. N. D. i. 72), while Aristotle considered that τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα are useful for the acquisition of virtue (Diog. L. v. 31). It is important to observe that Chrysippus held ἐνχρηστείων τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα (Diog. L. vii. 129, cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7, 511, p. 67, 5), and it is possible that Zeno may at a later period of his life have modified his conclusion on this point, just as he diverged from the Cynics in recommending Dialectic and Physics as well as Ethics, Zeller p. 63, 3, Hirzel ii. p. 523, 4, cf. Cleanth frag. 106.

168. Diog. vii. 33, περὶ τε νομίσματος οὕτως γράφειν (Ζήνωνα), νόμισμα δ’ οὔτ’ ἄλλαγῆς ἐνεκεν οἴεσθαι δεῖν κατασκευάζειν οὔτ’ ἀποδημίας ἐνεκεν.

νόμισμα. “Diogenes in the πολιτεία proposed a coinage of bones or stones (ἀστράγαλοι) instead of gold and silver, Athen. iv. 159 E.” Zeller, Socrates, p. 325 n.

ἄλλαγῆς ἐνεκεν. This again is pointed at Plato Rep. ii. 371 B, ἄγορὰ δὴ ἡμῶν καὶ νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἄλλαγῆς ἐνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου. Aristotle’s statement is more exact, explaining that money is a security with a view to future exchange: ὑπὲρ τῆς μελλούσης ἄλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἐσται εἰν δεσθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἶον ἐγγυητῆς ἐσθ’ ἡμῶν. Eth. v. 5. 14. Cf. especially Ar. Pol. i. 9. 1257 a 32 foll. and Newman on ib. 1257 b 11.

169. Athen. vi. 233 B, c, Ζήνων δὲ ὀ ἀπὸ τῆς
The opinions professed with regard to money bear the same relation to the last frag. as frag. 171 bears to frag. 176. This passage affords another good illustration of the doctrine of the καθήκοντα as applied to those things which are morally indifferent. The σπουδαιος, who is unaffected either by fear or desire (ἀπαθής), and whose ὀρμαὶ are properly directed by right reason, will know how to discriminate between τὰ κατὰ φύσιν and τὰ παρὰ φύσιν, so as to cling to the former and avoid the latter. Thus πλοῦτος is a προηγμένον (Diog. L. vii. 106), and possesses value as being of advantage for life in accordance with nature (ib. 105), while ἥ ὀρθὴ χρῆσις πλοῦτον which is characteristic of the σπουδαιος is sharply distinguished from the φιλοπλούτια (Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 104, p. 91, 18) of the φαῦλος.

αἵρεσιν: suggested by Schweighäuser and adopted by Kaibel for the MSS. ἀρχὴν. After τὴν χρῆσιν δὲ Schweig. thought some words had fallen out such as τὴν μὲν ὀρθὴν εἰα.

λιτῶν. Cf. M. Aurel. i. 3, τὸ λειτὸν κατὰ τὴν διάιταν.

ἀπερίττων. So Casaubon in place of MSS περιττῶν. Contrast M. Aurel. v. 5 with id. ix. 32.

προηγουμένως. This word is difficult. In Sext. Emp., with whom it occurs at least eight times, it always means "principally" or "in the first place," being often opposed
to ἀκολούθως. cf. προηγούμενος λόγος frag. 123 = leading doctrine. Here however it seems to have the special Stoic sense = in the absence of overriding circumstances ἀ(καθήκοντα into τὰ ἀνευ περιστάσεως, such as ὑμείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (or καλῶς χρῆσθαι πλούτῳ as here), and τὰ κατὰ περίστασιν, such as τὴν κτήσιν διαρρήπτειν (vII. 109). Hirzel, p. 825, denies that προηγούμενος belongs to the elder Stoics, thinking that it was taken over subsequently from the Academics and Peripatetics. He would substitute here ὡς προηγούμενων.

ἀθαύμαστον. Cf. Hor. Epist. i. 6. 1, 2, nil admirari prope res est una Numici solaque quae possit facere et servare beatum; where see Orelli, who properly observes that τὸ θαύμαζειν, which Plato and Aristotle speak of as the starting point of philosophy, is something quite different. Cf. Marc. Aurel. i. 15, Cic. Tusc. III. 30. Hence Arr. Epict. Diss. i. 18, 11, μὴ θαύμαζῇ τὸ κάλλος τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ τῷ μοιχῷ οὐ χαλεπανεῖς. For διάθεσιν see on frag. 117.

170. Seneca de Otio 30, 2, Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam (sapiens), nisi si quid impedierit. id. Tranq. An. i. 7, Promptus compositusque sequor Zenonem, Cleanthem, Chrysippum; quorum tamen nemo ad rempublicam accessit, nemo non misit.

The same doctrine is attributed to Chrysippus in Diog. L. VII. 121, πολιτεύεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφῶν, ἢν μὴ τι κωλύῃ, ὡς φησὶ Χρύσιππος εν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων: cf. Cic. Fin. III. 68, Schol. on Lucan. ii. 380, Stoicorum sapiens erit civilis, hoc est, in administratione rei publicae.
τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι is another instance of καθήκων which is to be undertaken κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον (Stob. Ecl. ἐπὶ 7. 11<sup>m</sup>, p. 111, 5) = προηγουμένως (see on last frag.). We may say then that, while τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι is καθήκων προηγούμενως οὐ ἀνευ περιστάσεως, τὸ μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι is καθήκων κατὰ περίστασιν, just as a careful use of wealth is contrasted with the condition of the spendthrift.

171. Diog. ὑπὲρ 121, καὶ γαμήσειν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν πολιτείᾳ, (τὸν σοφὸν) καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι.

Cf. Stob. Ecl. ἐπὶ 7. 11<sup>m</sup>, p. 109, 16, Cic. Fin. ἕπειτα 68. The statement refers to the duty of a wise man under existing circumstances, and while living in an ordinary civil community. It has no reference to the ideal state in which wives are to be held in common (frag. 176): γάμος clearly belongs to the ἀδιάφορα and γαμεῖν is a καθήκων. This seems better that Wellmann’s view p. 439, who strains the meaning of γάμος to bring this passage into conformity with frag. 176, and is strongly supported by the analogous case of the duty of the wise man to enter public life. The latter clearly refers to existing political institutions, cf. Stob. Ecl. ἐπὶ 7. 11<sup>b</sup>, p. 94, 9, πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαίνουσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας. The same explanation will account for the two passages in Diog. ἑπὶ 11 and 72, where similar views are attributed to the Cynics, without supposing (with Zeller, Socrates ἐπὶ 320) a divergence of opinion between Antisthenes and Diogenes.

172. Diog. ἑπὶ 7. 129, καὶ ἐρασθῆσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων τῶν ἐμφαίνοντων διὰ τοῦ εἴδους τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυίαν, ὡς φησὶ Ζήνων ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.

For the Cynics see Introd. p. 20. This passage is no
doubt inspired by the influence of the Phaedrus and Symposium. Speaking of the ἔρως of Socrates Dr Thompson remarks (Phaedrus App. i. p. 152):—"It was not the beauty of Alcibiades, but his splendid mental endowments, his great capacity for good or for evil, which excited the admiration and the solicitude of Socrates." Cf. Symp. 208 B foll. and for εὐφυίαν ib. 209 B, ψυχὴ καλὴ καὶ γενναίᾳ καὶ εὐφυεῖ, cf. frag. 147, καταληπτῶν εἶναι τὸ ήθος ἕξ εἶδος. We must distinguish between the ἔρως of the σπουδαῖος and the φαύλος. τὸ ἐρᾶν itself belongs to the class of ἀδιάφορα, and implies, therefore, a corresponding καθήκον, the duty, that is, τοῦ καλῶς ἐρᾶν, Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5b9, p. 66, 3—10. If then the objection is raised that the σπουδαῖος should avoid ἔρως, if he is to retain his ἀπάθεια, since ἔρως is a subdivision of ἐπιθυμία and a πάθος, the answer is that this is untrue of that particular form of ἔρως which is defined as ἐπιθεόλη φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον (Stob. l. c. l. 12, ib. 10o p. 91, 15, 11e p. 115, 1, Diog. L. vii. 113, 120, Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 239), and which is not an ἐπιθυμία. Under ἐπιθυμία are to be classed ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ only, and in Diog. vii. 113 the distinction between the two classes of ἔρως is clearly indicated. Cic., Fin. iii. 68, speaks of amores sanctos.

173. Athen. xiii. 563 E, καὶ τούτῳ μεν ἐξηλωκότες τὸν ἀρχηγὸν ὑμῶν τῆς σοφίας Ζήνωνα τὸν Φοίνικα, ὦς οὐδεπώποτε γυναικὶ ἐχρῆσατο παιδικὸς δ' ἀεί. ὦς Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος ἰστορεῖ ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ βίου αὐτοῦ βραβίλειτε γὰρ ὅτι "δεὶ μὴ τῶν σωμάτων ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρᾶν."

dεὶ μὴ κ.τ.λ. It is most natural to suppose that these are Zeno's words from the position of his name in the context. For the sense see on frag. 172.
174. Clem. Alex. Paedag. iii. 11. 74, p. 296 P. 109 S., ὑπογράφειν ὁ Κιτεινὸς ἔοικε Ζήνων εἰκόνα νεανίου καὶ οὔτως αὐτῶν ἀνδριαντουργεῖ· ἔστω, φησί, καθαρῶν τὸ πρόσωπον, ὡφρύς μὴ καθειμένη, μηδὲ ὁμμα ἀναπεπταμένον, μηδὲ διακεκλασμένον, μὴ ὑππιος ὁ τράχηλος, μηδὲ ἀνίεμενα τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέλη, ἂλλα [τὰ] μετέωρα ἐντόνοις ὁμοια· ὁρθὸς νοῦς πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὡξύτης καὶ κατοκωχῆ τῶν ὁρθῶς εἰρημένων, καὶ σχηματισμοὶ καὶ κινήσεις μηδὲν ἐνδιδοῦσαι τοῖς ἀκολάστοις ἐλπίδος. αἴδως μὲν ἐπανθείτω καὶ ἀρρενωπία· ἀπέστω δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν μυροπωλίων καὶ χρυσοχοείων καὶ ἐριοπωλίων ἁλὺς καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐργαστηρίων, ἐνθα καὶ ἑταιρίκως κεκοσμημένοι, ὀσπερ ἐπὶ τέγους καθεξόμενοι, διημερεύοσιν.

This remarkable fragment was first restored by Cobet in Mnemos. O. S. vi. p. 339, who saw that the writer was necessarily speaking of young men and not of young women, as the word ἀρρενωπία of itself shows. It seems probable, as Wachsmuth suggests, that this frag. comes from the ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη (Introd. p. 30).

νεανίον. So Cobet l.c. for νεανίδα. Dind. with two MSS. reads νεανία.

καθαρόν. Cf. Plut. de Audiendo 13, p. 45 c, προσώπῳ κατάστασις καθαρὰ καὶ ἀνέμφατος.

ἀναπεπταμένον: barefaced, impudent, cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 22, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, of the woman representing Vice in Prodicus' fable. See Aesch. Suppl. 198, 9 and the comm. μηδὲ διακεκλασμένον is an emendation of Cobet's (Mnemos. xi. 387) for the MSS. μηδ' ἀνακεκλασμένον, the meaning of which is not clear. With the alteration ἀναπ. est hominis protervi et petulantis, διακ. mollis et impudici.

τὰ is rejected by Wachsm. with great improvement to the sense.

ὁρθὸς νοῦς, so Wachsm. for vulg. ὀρθόνοῦν· πρὸς κ.τ.λ.
Perhaps it would be better to place a comma after νοῦς, and connect πρὸς τὸν λόγον with ὀξύτης. Dind. brackets ὀξύτης.

κύνησις...ἐνθιδούσα Dind. with some MSS.

μυρωπλίων: these shops are mentioned as the lounges frequented by young men. Ar. Eq. 1375, τὰ μειράκια ταυτὶ λέγω, τὰν τῷ μῦρῳ. Lys. Or. 24 § 20, ἕκαστος γὰρ ύμῶν εἴθισται προσφοιτὰν ὅ μὲν πρὸς μυρωπλίων, ὁ δὲ πρὸς κουρεῖν, ὁ δὲ πρὸς σκυτοτομεῖον, ὁ δ’ ὅποι ἄν τύχῃ: id. Or. 23. § 3, Isoc. Or. 7. § 48, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς σκηραφείοις οἱ νεώτεροι διέτριβον οὖδ’ ἐν ταῖς αὐλητρίσιν οὖδ’ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις συλλόγοις ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηθεύμασιν ἐμενον ἐν οἷς ἐτάχθησαν. In Homer’s time the smith’s shop was used for this purpose: Od. xviii. 38, Hes. Op. 491: later the barber’s shop is most frequently mentioned: see the comm. on Hor. Sat. i. 7. 3. Other authorities are collected by Becker, Charicles E. T. p. 272.

κεκοσμημένοι...καθεξομενοι. So Cobet for κεκοσμημέναι...καθεξομεναι. For the former word cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 11. 4 where Theodota is spoken of as πολυτελῶς κεκοσμημένη, and Lucian, Ver. Hist. ii. 46, γυναίκας πάνυ ἐταιρικῶς κεκοσμημέναι (quoted by Becker, Charicles E. T. p. 249); and for the latter Aeschin. Timarch. § 74 τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν οἰκημάτων καθεξομένους (referred to by Wachsm.), and Catull. xxxvii. 8, 14.


Possibly this is only a reference to the preceding frag. For πορείᾳ see on frag. 31. περιβολῇ = clothing.

176. Diog. L. vii. 131, ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναίκας δεῖν παρὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς ὡστε τὸν ἐντυχόντα τῇ ἐντυχούσῃ χρῆσθαι, καθά φησὶ Ζήνων ἐν τῇ
THE FRAGMENTS OF ZENO.

\[\text{politeia}. \] ib. 33, κοινάς τε τὰς γυναίκας δογματίζειν ὁμοίως Πλάτωνε ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.

For the Cynics see Introd. p. 20. Observe, however, that Chrysippus concurred in this opinion, which must not therefore be treated as merely Cynical.

177. Diog. L. vii. 33, καὶ ἔσθητι δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κελεύει (Ζήνων) χρῆσθαι ἄνδρας καὶ γυναίκας καὶ μηδὲν μόριον ἀποκεκρύφθαι.

The same view seems to have been advocated by the Cynics. Hence the point of Menander’s lines quoted by Diog. L. vi. 93, συμπεριπατήσεις γὰρ τρίβων' ἔχουσα' ἐμοί, ὦσπερ Κράτητι τῷ Κυνικῷ ποθῇ γυνῇ. Socrates in Xen. Symp. ii. 3 says:—ἔσθης ἄλλη μὲν γυναικὶ ἄλλη δὲ ἄνδρι καλῇ. With regard to the words μηδὲν μόριον ἀποκ. Zeller, p. 308 n. 2, remarks:—“The latter act is only conditional and allowed in certain cases, such as for purposes of gymnastics.” But the limitation is Plato’s (Rep. v. 452 Α, 457 Α) and we have already seen that Zeno proposed to abolish γυμνάσια: it may well be that Zeno, like the Cynics, disclaimed the theoretical propriety of the ordinary rules of modesty in dress. There is no question here of the καθήκοντα of ordinary life, and Zeno’s departure from the Cynical point of view is largely to be found in this direction.

178. Origen e. Celsum, vii. 63, p. 739, ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ μοιχεύειν οἱ τὰ τοῦ Κιτιέως Ζήνωνος φιλοσοφοῦντες... διὰ τὸ κοινωνικὸν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τῷ λογικῷ ζῷῳ νοθεύειν τὴν ύπὸ τῶν νόμων ἑτέρῳ προκαταληφθείσαν γυναικά καὶ φθείρειν τὸν ἄλλου ἀνδρῶπον ὀίκον.

Since strictly speaking marriage is an ἀδιάφορον, τὸ μοιχεύειν cannot be contrary to virtue, and such an offence would be impossible in the ideal state. Still, with
society constituted as it is, μὴ μοιχεύειν is καθήκον ἁνευ περιστάσεως and therefore κατὰ φύσιν. The wise man will recognise the laws of the state in which he lives in the same spirit in which he takes part in its public affairs (Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11b 94, 8 foll.). In Sext. Pyrrh. III. 209 we find τούς γε μὴν μοιχοὺς κολάζει παρ’ ήμίν νόμος, παρὰ δὲ τισιν ἀδιάφορον ἐστὶ ταῖς τῶν ἐτέρων γυναιξι μίγνυσθαι καὶ φιλοσοφοῦν δὲ τινες φασιν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ ἄλλοτρία γυναίκι μίγνυσθαι. The Stoics are probably indicated, and the passage is in no way inconsistent with the present, cf. Theoph. ad Autol. III. 3 p. 118 D, οὐχὶ καὶ περὶ σεμνότητος πειρώμενοι γράφειν ἁσελγείας καὶ πορνείας καὶ μοιχείας ἐδίδαξαν ἐπιτελείσθαι, ἔτι μὴν καὶ τάς στυγνήτας ἠρήτοροποίης εἰσγηνήσαντο;

179. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. III. 245, οἷον γοῦν ὁ ἀἱρεσιάρχης αὐτῶν Ζήνων ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς φησι περὶ παῖδων ἁγωνῆς ἄλλα τε ὅμοια καὶ τάδε: “Διαμηρίζειν μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἴσσου παιδικά ἢ μὴ παιδικά μηδὲ θηλέα ἢ ἄρρενα: οὐ γὰρ [ἐστὶ] παιδικοῖς ἄλλα ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄρρεσιν, ἄλλα ταύτα πρέπει τε καὶ πρέποντα ἐστίν.” The same fragment is preserved by Sext. Emp. adv. Math. xi. 190, introduced by the words καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν παῖδων ἁγωνῆς ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς ὁ ἀἱρεσιάρχης Ζήνων τοιαύτα τίνα διέξεισιν, and with the variant ἄλλα παιδικοῖς for ἐστὶ παιδικοῖς ἄλλα.

ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς. For this book see Introd. p. 30. The true aspect from which to regard this and the four next following fragments is very clearly set forth in a passage of Origen, c. Cels. iv. 45 (quoted by Zeller, p. 310, n. 1). “The Stoics made good and evil depend alone on the intention, and declared external actions, independent of intentions, to be indifferent: εἰπον οὖν ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀδιαφόρων τόπῳ ὅτι τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ (the action
taken by itself) ὑγατράσαι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορον ἑστίν, εἰ καὶ μὴ χρῆ ἐν ταῖς καθεστώσας πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν, καὶ υποθέσεως χάριν...παρειλήφασι τὸν σοφὸν μετὰ τῆς υγατρός μόνης καταλεκέημένου παντὸς τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους διεθθαρμένου, καὶ ἦποιούσιν εἰ καθηκόντως ὁ πατήρ συνελεύσεται τῇ υγατρῷ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι...τὸ πάν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος.” This also illustrates frag. 178.


It should be observed that Sextus does not state that this extract as well as the last comes from the διατριβαί, so that we may perhaps refer Plutarch’s words to this passage: Wellmann however, p. 440, thinks that both the
Sextus passages come from the διατριβαί, in which case Plutarch’s statement should form a separate fragment. Cf. Chrysipp. ap. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 246, id. ap. Epiphanius adv. Haeres. iii. 2. 9 (iii. 39), Diels, p. 593, ἐλεγε γὰρ δεῖν μέγινοθαί ταῖς μητράσι τους παῖδας τοῖς δὲ πατράσι τὰς θυγατέρας. Diog. L. vii. 188, Theophr. ad Autol. iii. 6, 120 d.

181. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. xi. 190, καὶ πάλιν (ὁ Ζήνων) “διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἐρώμενον; οὐκ ἐγώγε. πότερον οὐκ ἐπεθύμησας αὐτὸν διαμηρίσαι; καὶ μάλα. ἀλλ’ ἐπεθύμησας παρασχεῖν σοι αὐτὸν ἢ ἐφοβθῆθης κελεύσαι; μά Δ’. ἀλλ’ ἐκέλευσας; καὶ μάλα. εἰτ’ οὐκ ὑπηρέτησέ σοι; οὐ γὰρ.”

The line taken here is that the intention is all important, and not the act in itself: hence virtue belongs only to ὑπονοοῖα διάθεσις, cf. Cleanth. frag. 95,

ὁστις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχετ’ αἰσχροῦ πράγματος οὕτος ποιῆσε τοῦτ’ ἐὰν καιρὸν λάβῃ.

Bekker suggests ἀλλ’ ἐπιθυμήσας...εἰτ’ ἐφοβθῆθης.

182. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. iii. 200, καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, ὅπου γε καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς κυνικῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Κυτίεα Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον ἀδιάφορον τούτο (i.e. ἀρρενομιξίαν) εἶναι φασίν;


184. Theophr. ad Autol. iii. 5, p. 119 c, τί σοι ἔδοξε τὰ Ζήνωνος ἢ τὰ Διογένους καὶ Κλεάνθους, ὅπόσα περιέχουσιν αἱ βιβλικαί αὐτῶν διδάσκουσαι ἀνθρωποβορίας, πατέρας μὲν ὑπὸ ἰδίων τέκνων ἐψεσθαί καὶ βιβρώσκεσθαι
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καὶ, εἰ τις οὖ βουλοίτο ἣ μέρος τι τῆς μυσέρας τροφῆς ἀπορρίψει εἰν, αὐτὸν κατεσθίεσθαι τὸν μὴ φαγόντα;

Cf. Diog. L. vii. 121, γεύσεσθαί τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίων σαρκῶν κατὰ περίστασιν, ib. 188 (Chrysippus) ἐν δὲ τῷ γ᾽ περὶ δικαίου κατὰ τοὺς χιλίους στίχους, καὶ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας κατεσθίειν κελεύων. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 207, 247 foll., Math. xi. 192—194, Mayor on Juv. xv. 107. Cannibalism was also recommended by the Cynics, Diog. vi. 73, μηδ' ἀνόσιον εἶναι τὸ καὶ ἀνθρωπείων κρεῶν ἄφαισθαι, ὡς δὴλον ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἔθνων, with which cf. an amusing summary of the various modes of disposing of the dead prevalent in different countries, ap. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 226—229. It should be observed however that the Stoics only enjoined this practice κατὰ περίστασιν.


Chrysippus, ap. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. iii. 248, Math. xi. 194, recommends that the flesh of deceased relations should be eaten if suitable for food, but, if useless for that purpose, ἢ κατορύζαντες τὸ μνήμα ἐποίουσιν ἢ κατακαύσαντες τὴν τέφραν ἄφησον. The meaning of these obscure words of Epiphanius appears to be similar, and παραβάλλειν is certainly commonly used in this sense (see L. and S.). Others however have explained the words very differently. Thus Stein, Psychol. p. 161, n. 314, finds some allusion in them to the doctrine of metempsychosis. In the same spirit Diogenes ordered his body to be cast forth unburied (Diog. L. vi. 79, Cic. Tusc. i. 104). Chrysippus proved the absolute unimportance of any particular form of burial from a comparison of the varying practice of different nations (Cic. Tusc. i. 108, Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 226—9).
186. Cic. Ep. Fam. ix. 22. 1, Atqui hoc (libertas loquendi) Zenoni placuit...sed ut dico placet Stoicis suo quamque rem nomine appellare.

Cf. Cic. Off. i. 128, nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut ei qui fuerunt Stoici poene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et invident, quod ea quae re turpia non sunt nominibus ac verbis flagitiosa ducamus: and see Zeller, Socrates, p. 326.


The allusion to the Indians is explained by the words the Indian philosophers are said to have used to Alexander: σώματα μὲν μετάξεις ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, ψυχάς δ' ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἀναγκάσεις ποιεῖν ἀ μὴ βουλόμεθα. πῦρ ἀνθρώπων μέγιστον κολαστήριον, τούτοις ἠμεῖς καταφρονοῦμεν. Clem. Alex. Strom. iv. 7. 50. Similarly Philo, in telling the same story: quod omnis probus sit liber, p. 879, πῦρ μεγίστου τοῦ ζῶσι σώμασι πόνους καὶ φθοράν ἐργάζεται, τούτοις ὑπεράνω ἡμεῖς γινόμεθα, ζῶντες καἰόμεθα. The historians attest the custom of burning themselves alive said to have been practised by the Brahmans. Strabo, xv. 1. 65, αἰσχίστον δ' αὐτοῖς νομίζεσθαι νόσου σωματικῶς τὸν δ' ὑπονοησαντα καθ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἐξάγειν ἑαυτὸν διὰ πυρὸς νήσαντα πυρᾶν, ὑπαλειψάμενον δὲ καὶ καθίσαντα ἐπὶ τὴν πυρὰν ὑφάσαι κελεύειν, ἀκίνητον δὲ καὶ σέσβαι. Curt. viii. 9. 32, apud hos occupare fati diem pulcrum, et vivos se cremari iubent, quibus aut segnis aetas aut incommoda valitudo est:...inquinari putant ignem nisi qui spirantes recipit. Cic. Tusc. II. 40, (Mueller) uri se patiuntur Indi. The case of Calanus is particularly recorded, Cic. Tusc. II. 52 etc.
āv, added by Cobet, Ἑρμῆς λόγιος, i. p. 487.

tās...ἀποδεξεῖς. There is no doubt some particular reference in this, the point of which it is difficult now to ascertain. May it refer to Antisthenes? In Diog. L. vi. 2, we read of him: ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου Ἡρακλέους καὶ τοῦ Κύρου, and in the list of his works preserved by the same writer (vi. 15—18) we find three with the title Ἡρακλῆς, two of which bear the alternative title ἦ περὶ ἱσχύος.


189. Stob. Flor. 14, 4 = Anton. Meliss. i. 52,

ἐλεγχε σαυτόν, ὅστις εἰ, μὴ πρὸς χάριν ἄκου', ἀφαιροῦ δὲ κολάκων παρρησίαν.

ἐλεγχε σαυτόν recalls γνωθί σεαυτόν, for which see the authorities ap. Mayor on Juv. xi. 27.

πρὸς χάριν ἄκου' = do not listen to flatterers, is the passive form of πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν (Thuc. ii. 65), πρὸς ἡδονήν δημιουργεῖν (Dem. Phil. i. § 38), πρὸς χάριν ἐρείς (Soph. O. T. 1152). The best illustration however is Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11e, p. 114, 23, the wise man οὗτε προσφέρει τινί οὗτε προσέται τὸν πρὸς χάριν λόγον, Diog. L. vii. 117.

Meineke would also ascribe to Zeno the couplet quoted by Stob. Flor. ii. 12, where the lemma in the MSS. is Ζηνοδότου.
190. Maxim. Floril. c. 6, ed. Mai, ὃ μὲν γεωργὸς ἀφ’ ὄν ἀν πολὺν καὶ καλὸν θέλοι καρπὸν λαβεῖν ὡφέλιμον ἑαυτὸν ἐκείνοις παρέχεται καὶ πάντα τρόπων ἐπιμελεῖται καὶ θεραπεῦειν. πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἀνθρωποὶ τοῖς ὡφελίμοις πεφύκασι χαρίζεσθαι καὶ περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους μάλιστα σπουδάζειν' καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν μερῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνων ἐπιμελοῦμεθα μᾶλλον ἀπερ ὡφελιμώτερα ἑαυτοῖς πρὸς τὴν ὑπηρεσίαν νομίζομεν εἶναι, ὅθεν ὁμοίως ὑφ’ ὄν εὖ πάσχειν ἥξιοῦμεν, ὡφελίμους αὐτοῖς ἔργοις, ἄλλα μὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἶναι δει. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἐλαία τοῦ θεραπεύοντι αὐτὴν ἐπαγάλλεται, ἄλλ’ ἐκφέρονσα πολλοὺς τε καὶ καλοὺς καρποὺς ἐπεισεν ἑαυτῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον.

This fragment is taken from Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 6): see Introd. p. 31.

θέλοι: unless θέλῃ be read, ἀν belongs to the verb.
Cf. Dem. de Cor. § 246, ἄλλα μὴν ὄν γ’ ἀν ὁ ῥήτωρ ὑπεύθυνος εἰη, πᾶσαν ἔξετασιν λάμβανε. But it is often difficult to determine whether the optative is really potential. See Fennell on Pind. Nem. iv. 8, Goodwin § 557, Madvig § 137.

ὡφέλιμον, cf. Cleanth. frags. 75 and 77.

ἀνθρωποὶ, “οἱ addendum?” Wachsm.

iatrois: Jelf § 654 b.

191. Athen. XIII. 565 D, ὃ δὲ σοφὸς ἐκείνος Ζήνων, ὡς φησιν Ἁρτίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος, προμαντευόμενος ὑμῶν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς περὶ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς προσποιήτου ἐπιτηδεύσεως, ἐφ’ ὡς οἱ παρακούσαντες αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων καὶ μὴ συνέντευς ἔσονται ῥυταροὶ καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι καθάπερ οἱ τῆς Ἁριστίππου παρενεχθέντες αἴρέσεως ἅσωτοι καὶ θρασεῖς.

Cic., N. D. iii. 77, attributes this remark to Aristo: si verum est quod Aristo Chius dicere solebat, nocere audientibus philosophos iis, qui bene dicta male interpre-
tarentur: posse enim asotos ex Aristippi, acerbos e Zenonis schola exire. It should be observed, however, that Athenaeus specifies Antigonus of Carystus as the source of his information, so that he is at least as much entitled to credit as Cicero.


tοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. Conformity to nature, i.e. external environment, is taken as the basis of all those actions, which, although unconnected with virtue, yet constitute the objects of καθήκοντα, Diog. L. vii. 108, ἐνέργημα δὲ αὐτῷ (καθήκον) εἶναι, ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον, Stob. Ecl. p. 7. 8, p. 86, 13; Diog. L. vii. 105.

193. Diog. L. viii. 48, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν πρωτον (i.e. Pythagoras) ὄνομάσαι κόσμον καὶ τὴν γῆν στρογγυλὴν · ὥς δὲ Θεόφραστος Παρμενίδην · ὥς δὲ Ζήυνων Ἡσίοδον.

The lines of Hesiod supposed to be referred to are Theog. 126—128, Γαῖα δὲ τοι πρωτον μὲν ἐγείνατο ἱσον ἐαυτῇ οὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ᾽ ἵνα μιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτοι ὁφρ᾽ εἰη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ, which are a very poor basis for the two assertions. For the limited sense in which κόσμος is used, cf. Diog. vii. 138, καὶ αὐτῆν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμου εἶναι λέγουσιν, Krische, p. 396, 397.

194. Diog. L. vi. 91, Ζήυνων δ᾽ αὐθ᾽ ὦ Κῖτιεὺς ἐν ταῖς χρείαις καὶ κώδιον αὐτὸν (Crates) φησὶ ποτε προσρᾶψαι τῷ τρίβωνι ἀνεπιτρεπτοῦντα.

ἐν ταῖς χρείαις. Introd. p. 31.

ἀνεπιτρεπτούντα i.e. "neec curavisse deformitatem." The word is omitted in L. and S. and also in Steph. Th.


For the object of Zeno's Homeric studies cf. Krische p. 393, 394, who points out that, although Zeno may have incidentally controverted some of the Chorizontes of his time, yet his main object was to fortify Stoic precepts by appealing to Homer's authority. For Antisthenes see Zeller, Socrates p. 330.

Μαργίτου. This work seems to have resisted the disintegrating process, which from early times was applied to Homer's works, better than any other of the poems ascribed to him, except the Iliad and Odyssey. Aristotle (Poet. iv. 10) does not question Homer's authorship.

196. Plut. comm. Hesiod. ix., Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς ἐνικάττε τοὺς στίχους λέγων

κεῖνος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς εὐ εἰπόντι πίθηται,
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὐ κάκεινος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοησή,
The fragments of Zeno.


The lines of Hesiod (Op. 291) are often quoted or imitated: cf. Ar. Eth. i. 4, 7, Liv. xxi. 29, 8, Soph. Ant. 720 φὴμ' ἐγὼνε πρεσβεύειν πολὺ φῦναι τὸν ἄνδρα πάντ' ἐπιστήμης πλέον· εἰ δ' οὖν...καὶ τῶν λεγόμενων εὖ καλὸν τὸ μανθάνειν.

197. Plut. de aud. poet. p. 33 E, καὶ ὁ Ζήνων ἔπανορθούμενος τῷ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους,

ὁστὶς δὲ πρὸς τύραννον ἐμπορεύεται
κείνου ἵπτι δοῦλος καὶ ἔλευθερος μόλυ,
μετέγραφεν

οὐκ ἔστι δοῦλος ἀν (?) ἔλευθερος μόλυ,
τῷ ἔλευθέρῳ νῦν συνεκφαίνων τὸν ἑδῆ καὶ μεγαλόφρονα
καὶ ἀταπείνωτων.

The fragm. is no. 711 (Dind.). This was also given to Aristippus or Plato by other authorities: see Diog. L. ii. 82. For ἔλευθερος cf. frag. 149.

198. Strabo vii. 3, 6, Homer never mentions Arabia εἰ μὴ Ζήνων τῷ φιλοσοφῷ προσέκτεον γράφοντι:

Ἄιθίοπας δ' ἰκόμην καὶ Σιδονίους "Αραβᾶς τε.
Hom. Od. iv. 83 where the edd. now adopt καὶ Ἐρεμ-βοῦς the reading of Posidonius: Crates of Mallus preferred Ἐρεμνους (Krische p. 393).

199. Stob. Floril. 95. 21, Ζήνων ἔφη Κράτητα ἀναγιγνώσκειν ἐν σκυτείῳ καθήμενον τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους προτρητικῶν ὅν ἔγραψε πρὸς Θεμίσωνα τῶν Κυπρίων βασιλέα λέγων ὅτι οὐδεὶς πλεῖω ἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχει πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφῆσαι, πλούτον τε γὰρ πλεῖστον αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὡστε δαπανᾶν εἰς ταύτα ἔτι δὲ δόξαν ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ. ἀναγιγνώ- σκοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν σκυτέα ἔφη προσέχειν ἕμα ράπτοντα, καὶ τὸν Κράτητα εἰπεῖν ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ, ὁ Φιλίσκε, γράψεων πρὸς σὲ προτρητικῶν πλεῖον γὰρ ὄρῳ σοι ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφῆσαι ὅν ἔγραψεν Ἀριστοτέλης.

This passage belongs to the work entitled Κράτητος ἀπομνημονεύματα: Introd. p. 31.


The meaning is made clear by Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 11 κ p. 105, 4, where it is said of the φαύλος:—μηδὲ εἶναι φιλό- λογον, λογοφίλον δὲ μάλλον, μέχρι λαλίας ἐπιπολαίον προβαίνοντα, μηκέτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκβεβαιούμενον τὸν τῆς ἁρετῆς λόγον.

201. Stob. Floril. 6. 34, ὁ Ζήνων ἦταν τοὺς πλείσ- τους λέγων, ἐξὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πόνων τὰς ἥδονας φέρειν, ἄπο τῶν μαγειρεῖων λαμβάνοντας.

πόνων. This passage should have been quoted in the note on frag. 128.

202. Stob. Floril. 4. 107, Ζήνων δὲ ἔφη γελοίοις ἐκάστους μὲν τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς δεῖ ζῆν μὴ προσέχειν ὡς ὅντι εἰδότων, τὸν δὲ παρὰ πάντων ἐπαινοῦν θαυμάζειν ὡς
ἐχόμενον κρίσεως. πράγμασιν is clearly corrupt and Wachsmuth reads παραγγείλασιν, but Mr R. D. Hicks suggests τοῖς παρὰ τῶν σοφῶν παραγγελμασίν which restores the balance of the sentence.

For the sense cf. Cleanth. frag. 100.
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3. Plut. de Inimic. Util. 2, Ζήνων δὲ, τῆς ναυκληρίας αὐτῶ συντριβείσης, πυθόμενος εἶπεν, εὖ γε, ὦ τύχη, ποιεῖς εἰς τὸν τρίβωνα συνελαύνουσα ἡμᾶς. Plut. de Tranq. An. 6, Ζήνων τῷ Κιτιεί μία ναΐς περιήν φορτηγός· πυθόμενος δὲ ταύτην αὐτόφορτον ἀπολολέναι συγκλυσθεῖσαν, εὖ γε, εἶπεν κ.τ.λ. with καὶ τὴν στοὰν added after τρίβωνα. Substantially the same account in Plut. de Exilio 11, with
καὶ βίου φιλόσοφον in place of καὶ τῆς στοάν. Suidas col. 1023 s. v. νῦν εὐπλόηκα ὅτε νεανάγηκα. ἐπὶ τῶν παρ’ ἐλπίδα εὐτυχισάντων. Ζήνων γὰρ ὁ Κιτιεὺς καταλεῖπον τοὺς πρῶτοι διδασκάλους καὶ Κράτητος τοῦ φιλοσόφου φοιτητῆς γενόμενος τούτο εὗρικε, ναυαγίῳ περιπεσών καὶ εἰπόν, εὐ γε ποεῖ ἡ τὺχῃ προσελαύνουσα ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφία

* * * οὕτω τραπῆναι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν. That the story was given in various forms appears from the account in Diog. L. vii. 4, 5. Senec. de Tranq. An. 14, 2, Nuntiato naufragio Zeno noster, quum omnia sua audiret submersa, “Iubet” inquit “me fortuna expeditius philosophar.”

4. Diog. L. vii. 19, πρὸς δὲ τῶν φάσκοντα ὡς τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῷ Ἀντισθένης οὐκ ἀρέσκει, χρείαν Σοφικλέους προενεγκάμενος, ἡρώτησεν εἰ τινα καὶ καλὰ ἔχειν αὐτῷ δοκεῖ. τοῦ δ’ οὐκ εἰδέναι φήσαντος, εἰτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνη, ἔφη, εἰ μὲν τι κακὸν ἢν εἰρημένον ὑπ’ Ἀντισθένους τοῦτ’ ἐκλεγόμενος καὶ μυημονεύων, εἰ δὲ τι καλόν, οὐδ’ ἐπιβαλλόμενος κατέχειν;

5. Diog. L. vii. 20, λέγοντος δὲ τινὸς αὐτῷ περὶ Πολέμωνος, ὡς ἄλλα προθέμενος ἄλλα λέγει σκυθρωπάσας, ἔφη, πόσου γὰρ ἡγίστας τὰ διδόμενα;

The explanation is thus given by Aldobrand: videbatur ergo cupiditatis Polemonem accusare, ac si illa ita docere consuevisset, quomodo a discipulis tractaretur.

6. Plut. de prof. in virt. c. 6, ὃ δὲ Ζήνων ὄρῳ τὸν Θεοφραστὸν ἐπὶ τῷ πολλοὺς ἔχειν μαθητὰς θαυμαζόμενον, ὃ ἐκείνου μὲν χορὸς, ἔφη, μεῖζων, οὐμός δὲ συμφωνότερος. Plut. de seips. citra inv. laud. c. 17, οὕτω γὰρ ὃ Ζήνων πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Θεοφράστου μαθητῶν, ὃ ἐκείνου χορὸς, ἔφη, μεῖζων, ὃ ἐμὸς δὲ συμφωνότερος.
7. Diog. L. vii. 24, φησὶ δὲ Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Τύριος ἐλκοντος αὐτὸν Κράτητος τοῦ ἵματίου ἀπὸ Στίλπωνος εἰπεῖν, ὃν Κράτης, λαβῇ φιλοσόφων ἐστὶν ἐπιδείξιον ἢ διὰ τῶν ὡτών πείσας οὖν ἔλκε τούτων. εἰ δὲ με βιάζῃ, τὸ μὲν σῶμα παρὰ σοι ἔσται, ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ παρὰ Στίλπωνι.


8. Diog. L. vii. 21, ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς πλείστους, τά μὲν πολλὰ ἀσόφους εἶναι, τά δὲ μικρὰ καὶ τυχηρὰ ἀμαθεῖς.

Wilamowitz(Antigonos p. 117) says:—"die Philosophen sind in den meisten Dingen ungeschickt, von den gewöhnlichen begreifen sie nichts: sie wissen nur das eine was Not tut," but probably we should read εὕμαθεῖς, with Meric Casaubon.


The fallacy known as θερίζων was concerned with the nature of the possible. "According to Ammon. de Inter. 106 a [§ 3 p. 160 ed. Or.], Lucian, Vit. Auct. 22 the θερίζων was as follows:—Either you will reap or you will not reap:
it is therefore incorrect to say, perhaps you will reap."
Zeller, p. 182.


15. Diog. L. vii. 20, τοὺς εὐ λεγομένους οὐκ ἔφη δεῖν καταλείπεσθαι τόπον, ὡσπερ τοὺς ἀγαθοῖς τεχνίτασ εἰς τὸ θεώσασθαι· τούναυτίον δὲ τὸν ἀκούοντα οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς λεγομένους γίνεσθαι, ὡστε μὴ λαμβάνειν χρόνον εἰς τὴν ἐπισημείωσιν.

tόπον: perhaps we should read χρόνον, ὡσπερ τόπον.


For the distinction between φωνῇ and λέξεις cf. Diog. L. vii. 56, λέξεις δ’ ἐστὶ φωνῇ ἐγγράμματος. The meaning is:—we ought not to commit to memory the words and expressions of a maxim (χρείας as in apoph. 4), but to exercise our mind as to its arrangement, without learning it by heart like a cookery recipe. For αναλαμβάνειν cf. Plut. Agesil. 20, 3. Cobet, however, translates otherwise.


So Cobet, followed by Wilamowitz, for MSS. φωνῇ... φωνῇ, cf. Diog. L. vii. 130, ὥρα ἄνθος ἀρετῆς. Zeno, frag. 147, καταλήπτον εἶναι τὸ ἥθος ἐξ εἰδοὺς.


19. Plut. de Virt. Mor. 4, καίτοι καὶ Ζήνωνα φασιν εἰς θεάτρον ἀνιόντα κιθαρῳδούντος Ἀμοιβέως πρὸς τοὺς μαθητάς, ἔωμεν, εἰπεῖν, ὅπως καταμάθωμεν οίαν ἐντερα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὀστὰ λόγου καὶ ἄριθμοῦ μετασχόντα καὶ ταξέως ἐμμέλειαι καὶ φωνὴν ἀφίησιν.

Cf. Plut. Arat. c. 17, 2, ἄδυντος Ἀμοιβέως ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ, a passage which also fixes Amoebecus as a contemporary of Antigonus.


This is found several times in the collections of γνώμαι, and is sometimes attributed to Socrates (cf. Stein, Psych. p. 7, n. 5): the references are given by Wachsmuth in Sauppe's Satura Philologa, p. 29.


Köhler in Rhein. Mus. xxxix. 297 proposes βάθρου for βωμοῦ.

The point of this bon mot appears to have been lost in the tradition; it must originally have stood:—"The man who abuses me I send away like an ambassador without an answer (καθάπερ εἰ πρεσβευτὴν ἀναπόκριτον ἀποστέλλωμι)"; so Wilamowitz.


The anecdote in the form related in Diog. Laert. rests on the authority of Antigonus of Carystus, and hence Wilamowitz (Antig. p. 114) concludes that the king who sent the embassy was Ptolemaeus and not Antigonus Gonatas. It was natural that in later times, when the friendly relations subsisting between Antigonus and Zeno were remembered, the country of the ambassadors should
have been transferred from Egypt to Macedonia. Diogenes, however, has misconceived the object of the embassy, which appears in a less corrupted form in Plutarch. The ambassadors were sent to Athens, not to Zeno, and the assembly was not one of philosophers but of Macedonian partisans. These the ambassadors were instructed to sound, but they seem to have missed the mark in Zeno’s case.


28. Athen. viii. 345 c, Ζήνων δ’ ὁ Κιτιεύς ὁ τῆς Στοάς κτίστης, πρὸς τοῦ ὄψοφάγου ὃς συνέζη ἐπὶ πλείονα
χρόνου, καθά φησιν 'Αντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος ἐν τῷ Ζήνωνος βίῳ (p. 119 Wil.), μεγάλου τινὸς κατὰ τύχην ἰχθύος παρατεθέντος, ἄλλου δ’ οὐδενὸς παρεσκευασμένου, λαβὼν ὁ Ζήνων ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνακος οἶς ἦν κατεσθίειν. τοῦ δ’ ἐμβλέψαντος αὐτῷ· τί οὖν, ἐφη, τοὺς συζώντας σοι οὐεὶ πάσχειν, εἰ σὺ μίαν ἥμεραν μὴ δεδύνησαι ἐνεγκείν ὦσο-φαγίαν; The same in Diog. L. vii. 19.

29. Athen. v. 186 D, ὁ δὲ Ζήνων, ἔπει τις τῶν παρόντων ὄψων ἀπέσυρεν ἀμα τῷ παρατεθήναι τὸ ἐπάνω τοῦ ἰχθύος, στρέψας καὶ αὐτὸς τὸν ἰχθύν ἀπέσυρεν ἐπιλέγων· (Eur. Bacch. 1129)

'Ἰνω δὲ τάπι θάτερ' ἐξειργάζετο.

The same story is told of Bion Borysthenites, id. viii. 344 A. Schweighäuser (Ind.) thinks it is rightly attributed to Zeno.

30. Diog. L. vii. 17, δυοῦν δ’ ὑπανακειμένων ἐν πότῳ, καὶ τοῦ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ υφ’ ἑαυτοῦ σκιμαλίζοντος τῷ ποδὶ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνον τῷ γόνατι. ἐπιστραφέντος δέ, τί οὖν οἰεὶ τὸν ὑποκάτω σου πάσχειν υπὸ σοῦ; see also Suidas, col. 792, s. v. σκιμαλίσω. Vulgo ὑπέρανκα. and ὑπέρ αὐτόν: corrected by Menage.

31. Stob. Floril. 57, 12, Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς φιλόσοφος ὀρῶν τινα τῶν γνωρίμων υπὸ τοῦ ἀγροῦ περισπώμενον εἶπεν· εάν μὴ σὺ τούτου ἀπολέσης, οὕτος σὲ ἀπολέσει.

32. Boissonade, Aneed. Gr. vol. i. p. 450, Ζήθι, ὁ ἀνθρωπε, μὴ μόνον ἵνα φάγης καὶ πίης ἄλλῃ ἵνα τὸ ξῆν πρὸς τὸ εὐ ξῆν καταχρῆσθη, attributed to Zeno in Cod. Reg. Paris, 1168, seems to be another form of the well-known saying of Socrates, ap. Stob. Floril. 17, 22, ξῶμεν οὐκ ἵνα ἐσθίωμεν ἄλλῃ ἐσθίωμεν ἵνα ξῶμεν. This forms frag. eth. 10 in Wachsmuth’s collection (Comm. i. p. 8), who refers to other passages giving the saying to Zeno.
33. Diog. L. vii. 21, καὶ προεφέρετο τὰ τοῦ Καφησίουν ὡς, ἐπιβαλομένου τινὸς τῶν μαθητῶν μεγάλα φυσάν, πατάξας εἶπεν, ὡς οὐκ ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ τὸ εὖ κείμενον εἶη, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ εὖ τὸ μέγα.

The saying of Caphesias is recorded also by Athen. xiv. 629, A.

34. Diog. L. vii. 26, τὸ εὖ γίνεσθαι παρὰ μικρόν, οὐ μὴν μικρὸν εἶναι.

35. Plut. de vit. pud. 13, τὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ὡς ἀπανтаσας τινὶ νεανίσκῳ τῶν συνηθῶν παρὰ τὸ τείχος ἡσυχὴ βαδίζοντι, καὶ πυθόμενος, ὅτι φεύγει φίλον ἁξιούντα μαρτυρεῖν αὐτῷ τὰ ψευδή: τί λέγεις, φησίν, ἀβέλτερε; σὲ μὲν ἐκείνος ἀγνωμονῶν καὶ ἄδικῶν οὐ δέδειν οὐδ' αἰσχύνεται: σὺ δ' ἐκείνου ύπέρ τῶν δικαίων οὐ παρρεῖς ὑποστήναι;


37. Diog. L. vii. 19, μειρακίων δὲ περιεργότερον παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐρωτῶντος ζήτημα τι, προσήγαγε πρὸς κάτοπτρον, καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἐμβλέψαί. ἐπειτ' ἴρωτησεν εἰ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἁμότοτοντα εἶναι ὁψεὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ζήτηματα.

38. Diog. L. vii. 21, νεανίσκου δὲ τινὸς θρασύτερου διαλεγομένου, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι, ἔφη, μειράκιου, ἄ ἐπέρχεται μοι.


43. Stob. Floril. 15, 12, Ζήνων πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολογουμένους ύπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν ἁσωτίας καὶ λέγοντας ἐκ πολλοὺ τοῦ περιόντος ἀναλίσκειν ἔλεγεν, ἦ ποιον καὶ τοὺς μαγείρους συγγνώσεσθε, εάν ἀλμυρᾶ λέγωσι πεποιηκέναι τὰ ὁψα, ὅτι πλῆθος ἀλῶν αὐτοῖς ύπήρχεν;

44. Diog. L. vii. 17, ἐρωτικῶς δὲ διακέιμενος Χρεμωνίδου, παρακαθιζόντων αὐτοῦ τε καὶ Κλεάνθους, ἀνέστη, θαυμάζοντος δὲ τοῦ Κλεάνθους, ἑφη, καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούω τῶν ἁγαθῶν κράτιστον εἶναι φάρμακον πρὸς τὰ φλεγμαίνοντα ἰσυχίαν.

For Chremonides cf. Introd. p. 6.

45. Diog. L. vii. 18, πρὸς δὲ τῶν φιλόπαιδα, οὕτε τοὺς διδάσκαλους ἑφη φρένας ἔχειν, ἀεὶ διατρίβοντας εἰν παιδαρίοις, οὕτε ἐκείνους.


Manes was a common slave's name, cf. Ar. Av. 522,
47. Diog. L. vii. 17, ὃς δὲ Κυνικὸς τις οὐ φήσας ἐλαιον ἔχειν ἐν τῇ ληκύθῳ προσήτησεν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔφη δύσευν. ἀπελθόντα μέντοι ἐκέλευε σκέψασθαι ὁπότερος εἰς ἀνα-δέστερος.

48. Athen. ix. 370 c, καὶ οὐ παράδοξον εἰ κατὰ τῆς κράμβης τινὲς ὁμοιον, ὅποτε καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ὁ τῆς Στοᾶς κτίστωρ μιμούμενος τὸν κατὰ τῆς κυνὸς ὄρκον Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτοὺς ὁμοιοὶ τὴν καταπαρίν, ὡς Ἐμποδὸς φησιν ἐν Ὀπομυμονεύμασιν, cf. Diog. L. vii. 32.

"Ἐμποδὸς": on this very doubtful name see Müller, Frag. Hist. Gr. iv. 403, after whom Kaibel reads Ἐμπεδὸς.


So Theophrastus ap. Cic. Tusc. iii. 69.


So Arist. Eth. N. ix. 4, 5, ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτὸς, cf. Cic. Lael. § 80 verus amicus...est tamquam alter idem, ib. § 23 and Reid’s note.

52. Diog. L. vii. 23, Διογνύσιον δέ τοῦ Μεταθεμένου εἴπόντος αὐτῷ διὰ τί αὐτὸν μὸνον οὔ διορθοῖ; ἔφη, οὐ γάρ σοι πιστεύω.


53. Seneca de Benef. iv. 39. 1, Quare ergo, inquit, Zeno vester, quum quingentos denarios cuidam promisisset et illum parum idoneum comperisset, amicis suadentibus ne crederet, perseveravit credere quia promiserat? Perhaps the same circumstance is alluded to in Themist. Or. xxi. 252 B, πότε ἀφῆκας τῷ δεδευείσμενῷ, καθάπερ Ζήνων ὁ Κύτιε̄νς.


Seneca however says:—nullum servum fuisset Zenoni satis constat (Cons. Helv. 12. 3). To have no slave was a sign of abject poverty: see the comm. on Catull. xxiii. 1.


56. Diog. L. vii. 28, 29, ἐτελεύτα δὴ οὕτωσι. ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς ἀπιὼν προσέπτασε καὶ τὸν δάκτυλον περιέρρηξε. παίσας δὲ τὴν γῆν τῇ χείρι, φησὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς Νιόβης,

ἐρχομαι, τί μ᾽ αὖσ;

καὶ παραχρῆμα ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀποπνίξας ἑαυτὸν. Stob. Floril. vii. 45, Ζήνων, ός ἡδη γέρων ὁν πταίσας κατέπεσεν, "ἐρχομαι," εἶπε, "τί με αὖσ;" καὶ εἰσελθὼν ἑαυτὸν ἐξηγαγεν. Lucian Macrob. (lxii.) 19, Ζήνων δὲ...οὐν φασίν εἰσερχόμενον εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ προσπαίσαντα ἀνα-
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φθέγξασθαι, τί με βοής; καὶ ύποστρέψαντα οἶκαδε καὶ ἀποσχόμενον τροφῆς τελευτήσαι τὸν βίον.

Νιόβης: the author of the play is uncertain. Both Aeschylus and Sophocles wrote plays with this title, but Nauck thinks the words belong to the Niobe of Timotheus: cf. Soph. frag. 395 (Dind.). The situation must have been similar to the concluding scene of the Oedipus Coloneus, where Oedipus is summoned by a mysterious voice: O. C. 1626 f.

This recalls Marcus Aurelius, e.g. vi. 15.
THE FRAGMENTS OF CLEANTHES.

1. Diog. L. vii. 41, ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἐξ μέρη φησὶ διαλεκτικόν, ῥητορικόν, ηθικόν, πολιτικόν, φυσικόν, θεολογικόν.

ἐξ μέρη. These are only subdivisions of the triple Zenonian division: thus διαλεκτικόν and ῥητορικόν together occupy the same ground as λογικόν (Diog. L. vii. 41 cited in Zeno frag. 6, where Cleanthes is probably meant). For his rhetorical writings see Introd. p. 50. Hirzel II. p. 170—178 tries to establish two points in connection with this statement, (1) that Cleanthes, unlike the other Stoics, believed in the unity and indivisibility of philosophy itself, but adopted six divisions for the purpose of exposition merely, and, (2) that the sixfold division is taken from Heraclitus, cf. Diog. L. ix. 5, εἰς τρεῖς λόγους εἰς τὸν περὶ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν θεολογικὸν. But see Stein, Psych. n. 95, Erkenntnistheorie n. 206.

πολιτικόν. Similar is Aristotle’s distinction between φρόνησις (practical thought) and πολιτική (Eth. vi. 8), in which chapter φρόνησις appears both as the general term and as a special subdivision dealing with the individual. The same may be said of ηθικόν here.

θεολογικόν. Aristotle divides Speculative (θεωρητική) Philosophy into φυσική, μαθηματική, θεολογική (Metaph. v. 1, 10). The last-named branch is identical with πρώτη φιλοσοφία and is the best of the three, because its subject-
matter is the most honourable, (id. x. 7. 9). In the Stoic system it would have been impossible to follow out this distinction in practice, since their materialism was destructive of metaphysics, and it may be doubted whether theolουκόν does not simply refer to the treatment of popular religion appearing in the book περὶ θεῶν. The hymn to Zeus belongs to θεολουκόν rather than to φυσικόν.

LOGICA.

2. Epict. Diss. i. 17. 11, τὰ λογικά ἄλλων ἐστὶ διακριτικά καὶ ἐπισκεπτικά καὶ, ὃς ἂν τὶς εἴποι, μετρητικά καὶ στατικά. τὶς λέγει ταύτα; μόνος Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης; See Zeno frag. 4.


Zeno's definition of φαντασία (frag. 7) became a battle ground for his successors: Cleanthes explained τύπωσις as referring to a material impression like that made upon wax by a seal, cf. Philo de mund. opif. p. 114, Pfeiff., φ (scil. νῦ) τὰ φανέντα ἐκτὸς εἰσῳ κομίζουσαι, διαγγέλλουσι
THE FRAGMENTS OF CLEANTHES.

καὶ ἐπιδείκνυνται τοὺς τύπους ἐκάστων, ἐνσφραγιζόμεναι τὸ ὁμοίον πάθος. κηρῷ γὰρ ἐοικώς, δέχεται τὰς διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων φαντασίας, αῖς τὰ σώματα καταλαμβάνει. Chrysippus however objected that, on this view, if the soul received at the same time the impression of a triangle and a square, the same body would at the same time have different shapes attached to it, and would become at the same time square and triangular (Sext. l.c., Diog. L. vii. 45—50); and he accordingly interpreted τύπωσις by ἐπεροϊσσις and ἀλλοϊσσις, cf. Cie. Tusc. i. 61 an imprimi, quasi ceram, animum putamus, et esse memoriam signatarum rerum in mente vestigia? Hirzel n. pp. 160—168 finds here also the influence of Heraclitus, who, he believes, is pointed at in Plat. Theaet. p. 191 foll., θές δὴ μοι λόγου ἐνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγείον κ.τ.λ. He relies however entirely on the disputed frag. κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποις ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὡτα βαρβαροὶς ψυχαῖς ἐχόντων, which Zeller interprets in exactly the opposite sense to that of Schuster and Hirzel. The point cannot therefore be regarded as established: see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 734.

εἰςοχὴν...ἐξοχὴν = concavity...convexity. Cf. Sext. Pyrrh. 1. 92, αἱ γοῦν γραφαὶ τῇ μὲν ὄψει δοκοῦσιν εἰςοχᾶς καὶ ἐξοχᾶς ἐχεῖν, οὐ μὴν καὶ τῇ ἀφῇ, ib. 1. 120. Plat. Rep. 602 D, καὶ ταῦτα καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα ἐν ὑδασί τε θεωμένοις καὶ ἐξῳ, καὶ κοιλά τε δὴ καὶ ἔξεχοντα διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ χρώματα αὐτοὶ πλάνην τῆς ὄψεως.

δακτυλών. For ancient Greek rings see Guhl and Koner, E. T. p. 182, with the illustrations, and for κηρῶν see on Zeno frag. 50. Hirzel l.c. shows that the metaphor was common, even apart from philosophic teaching: cf. Aesch. P. V. 789, δέλτοι φρενῶν, etc.

4. Plut. Plac. iv. 11, οἱ Στωικοὶ φασίν ὦταν γεννηθῇ
The grounds upon which this is referred to Cleanthes have been stated in the Introduction, p. 38, 39. For the further illustration and exposition of the passage the reader is referred to the exhaustive and interesting note of Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 112, n. 230; but it may be as well here to set out two quotations from Philo, which make strongly in favour of the hypothesis that Cleanthes was the originator of the "tabula rasa" theory: cf. Philo, quod Deus sit immut., 1. 9, p. 279 Mang., fantasia δ' ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, ἢ γὰρ εἰσήγαγεν ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὡσπερ δακτυλίος τις ἢ σφαγίς, ἐναπεμάξατο τὸν οίκείον χαρακτήρα· κηρῷ δὲ ἑοικός ὁ νοῦς. quis rer. div. haer. c. 37, p. 498 Mang., ἢ γὰρ ψυχῇ τὸ κίρμων, ὡς εἰτέ τις τῶν ἀρχαίων.

5. Olympiodorus l.c. on Zeno frag. 12, Κλεάνθης τοίνυν λέγει ὅτι τέχνη ἐστίν ἐξίς ὅδὲ πάντα ἀνύουσα. Quintil. Inst. Or. ii. 17. 41, nam sive, ut Cleanthes voluit, ars est potestas, via, id est, ordine efficiens.

Cf. also Cic. Fin. iii. 18, quoted on Zeno frag. 12. Olympiodorus objects that the definition is too wide, and that it would include φύσις which is not a τέχνη (cf. Cic. N.D. ii. 81), but Cleanthes might have replied that neither is φύσις an ἐξίς. For ἐξίς cf. on διάθεσις Zeno frag. 117, and Stob. Ecl. ii. 7, 5κ p. 73, 7, ἐν ἐξίς δὲ ὅν μόνος εἶναι τὰς ἀρέτας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀνδρὶ ἀλλοωθείσας ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ γενομένας ἀμεταπτώτους, οίονει γὰρ ἀρετὰς γίνεσθαι.

6. Syrian, ad Ar. Metaph. 892 b 14—23, ώς ἀρα τὰ εἰδη παρὰ τοῖς θείοις τούτοις ἀνδράσιν (i.e. Socrates Plato
Parmenides and the Pythagoreans) οὐτε πρὸς τὴν ρήσιν τῆς τῶν ὅνομάτων συνεθείας παρήγγετο, ὡς Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ οἱ πλείους τῶν Στοικῶν ὕστερον φήσθησαν... οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐννοήματά εἰσι παρ’ αὐτοῖς αἱ ἱδεῖαι, ὡς Κλεάνθης ὕστερον εἰρηκεν.

This difficult fragment has been variously interpreted. Wellmann, p. 480, and Krische, p. 421, think that Cleanthes described the ideas as "subjective Gedanken," in which case the fragment is a restatement of Zeno's view: cf. Zeno frag. 23. Stein discusses the passage at length (Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 293—295): reading νοήματα, he supposes that Cleanthes' words were οὐκ εἰσίν αἱ ἱδεῖαι νοήματα. Zeller also p. 85 has νοήματα. However ἐννοήματα appears in the Berlin Aristotle edited by Usener, and so Wachsmuth (Comm. II. p. 3) reads. Stein explains as follows:—νοήματα represent abstract rationalized knowledge resulting from our experience by the agency of ὀρθὸς λόγος. By such νοήματα are we made aware of the existence of the gods (frag. 52), and from these we must distinguish the class conceptions (Gattungsbegriffe) which have no scientific value. Class conceptions (ἐννοήματα) can never be the criterion of knowledge, since they have no real existence. Cf. Simpl. in Cat. f. 26 c: οὕτω πάντα κοινὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς λέγεται. But, even assuming that the distinction between νοήμα and ἐννοήμα is well founded, which is by no means clear, and that νοήματα is to be read here, the context in Syrian is conclusive against Stein. The meaning simply is, “nor again are the ideas in Plato etc. to be treated as ἐννοήματα”: in other words, the negative οὐδὲ is no part of Cleanthes' statement, but belongs to the commentator. This is abundantly clear from the following words:—οὐδ’ ὡς Ἀντωνίνος, μηνοῦς τὴν Δογμάνον καὶ Κλεάνθους δόξαν, τῷ νῷ παρερφίσταντο κατὰ τὰς ἐννοητικᾶς ἱδεὰς.

λεκτά: the abstractions contained in thoughts as expressed in speech, as opposed to thoughts on the one hand and the things thought of on the other (μέσον τοῦ τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος). Neither again are they identical with the spoken words, which are corporeal (Sext. Math. viii. 75). Being incorporeal they can have no real existence, and yet the Stoics seem to have hesitated to deny their existence altogether. In the ordinary terminology of the school κατηγόρημα is a subdivision of λεκτόν, and is described as λεκτὸν ἐλλιπτές (Diog. vii. 64). From this passage, then, we must infer that Cleanthes was the first to restrict κατηγόρημα to its narrower sense by the introduction of the new term λεκτόν. An example of κατηγόρημα given by Sextus is ἀψίνθιον πιεῖν (Pyrrh. ii. 230), but a new term was required to denote the abstraction of a complete assertion (e.g. Cato ambulat), for which κατηγόρημα was obviously insufficient. For λεκτόν generally see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 219—222.

Ἀρχέδημος: Zeller p. 50. The most important fact recorded about him is that he placed the ἡγεμονικόν τοῦ κόσμου in the centre of the earth (Zeller p. 147).

8. Epict. Diss. ii. 19. 1—4, ὁ κυριεύων λόγος ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν ἡρωτησθαί φαίνεται· κοινῆς γὰρ οὔσης μάχης τοῖς τρισὶ τούτοις πρὸς ἁλληλα, τῷ πᾶν παρελθειθοῦσι ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαίων εἶναι, καὶ τῷ δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ τῷ δυνατῶν εἶναι ὃ ὀυτ' ἔστιν ἀληθὲς ὃ ὀυτ' ἔσται· συνυπότων τῆς μάχης ταύτην ὁ Διώδωρος τῇ τῶν πρῶτων δυνῶν πιθανότητι συνεχρησάτο πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι δυνατὸν ὃ ὀυτ' ἔστιν ἀληθὲς ὃ ὀυτ' ἔσται. λοιπὸν ὃ μὲν τις ταύτα τηρήσει τῶν δυνῶν, ὅτι ἔστι τε τῷ δυνατῶν, ὃ ὀυτ' ἔστιν ἀληθὲς ὃ ὀυτ' ἔσται.

II. P.
kaὶ δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ· οὐ πῶν δὲ παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖων ἐστὶ· καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Κλεάνθην φέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, οἷς ἐπὶ πολὺ συνηγόρησεν Ἀντίπατρος. οἱ δὲ τῦλλα δῦν, ὅτι δυνατόν τ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ οὐτ᾽ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς οὐτ᾽ ἐσται· καὶ πῶν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖων ἐστιν· δυνατῷ δ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἀκολουθεῖ. τὰ τρία δ᾽ ἐκείνα τηρήσαι ἀμήχανον, διὰ τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι αὐτῶν μάχην. Cic. de Fato 7. 14, omnia enim vera in praeteritis necessaria sunt, ut Chrysippo placet, dissentienti a magistro Cleanthe, quia sunt immutabilia nec in falsum e vero praeterita possunt convertere.

Three propositions are here mentioned, which are inconsistent with each other in such a way that the acceptance of any two involves the rejection of the third:—

(1) Every past truth is necessary. (2) That which is possible can never become impossible. (3) A thing may be possible which does not exist and never will exist.

Diodorus asserted the truth of (1) and (2) and denied (3): thus Simplicius ad Cat. 65. 6—8 describes his followers as αὐτῇ τῇ ἐκβάσει κρίνοντες τὸ δυνατὸν. Cic. Fam. ix. 4 (writing to Varro) περὶ δυνατῶν me seito κατὰ Διόδωρον κρίνειν. Quapropter, si venturus es, seito necesse esse te venire: sin autem non es, τῶν ἀδυνάτων est te venire. Cleanthes asserted the truth of (2) and (3) and denied (1). Chrysippus asserted the truth of (1) and (3) and denied (2), cf. Alexander ad An. Pr. i. 15 p. 34 a 10 Χρύσιππος δὲ λέγων μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον ἐπεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cleanthes maintained therefore that it is and was possible for past events to have happened differently. See further on this controversy Grote’s Plato vol. iii. p. 495 foll. On p. 499 Hobbes is quoted, who is in agreement with Diodorus. The dilemma itself was originally propounded by Diodorus the Megarian, on whom see Zeller Socratics p. 252. It went by the name of ὁ κυριεύων λόγος =
argument getting the better of others: cf. Themist. Or. ii. 30 b who mentions it together with ὁ κερατίνης as the discovery of Philo or Diodorus. In Lucian Vit. Auct. c. 22 Chrysippus professes his ability to teach it as well as the θεριζων Ἡλέκτρα and ἐγκεκαλυμμένος. Aul. Gell. i. 2. 4, κυριεύοντας ἡσυχάζοντας καὶ σωφρείτας. Cleanthes wrote a special treatise on the subject (Introd. p. 50).

9. Quintil. Inst. Or. ii. 15. 33—35. huic eius substantiae maxime conveniet finitio, rhetorice esse bene dicendi scientiam. nam et orationis omnes virtutes semel compлектitur, et protinus etiam mores oratoris, cum bene dicere non possit nisi bonus. idem valet Chrysippi finis ille ductus a Cleanthe, scientia recte dicendi (scil. rhetorice).

Kiderlin (Jahrb. f. Class. Phil. 131, p. 123) conjectures that the word Cleanthis has fallen out after substantiae, so that, while Cleanthes defined rhetoric as ἔπιστῆμη τοῦ εὖ λέγειν, the words τοῦ ὁρθῶς λέγειν would be an alteration of Chrysippus. See however Striller Rhet. Sto. pp. 7, 8. For the usual Stoic definition cf. Diog. L. vii. 42, τὴν τε ῥητορικὴν, ἔπιστῆμην οὐσαν τοῦ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων where rhetoric is contrasted with dialectic, since dialectic was also defined as ἔπιστῆμη τοῦ εὖ λέγειν by the Stoics (Alex. Aphr. Top. 3. 6, quoted by Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 210). Sext. Emp. Math. ii. 6.

10. Varro de L. L. v. 9, quod si summum gradum non attigero, tamen secundum praeteribo, quod non solum ad Aristophanis sed etiam ad Cleanthis lucubravi [secundum explained in § 7 quo grammatica esceindit antiqua, quae ostendit quemadmodum quodque poeta finxerit verbum confinxerit declinarit].
11. Athen. xi. 467 d, Κλεάνθης δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐν τῷ περὶ μεταλήψεως ἀπὸ τῶν κατασκευασάντων φησίν ὀνομασθήναι τὴν τε θηρίκλειον κύλικα καὶ τὴν δεινίδα. ib. 471 b, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ μεταλήψεως συγγράμματι φησί, τὰ τούνυν εὐρήματα, καὶ ὁσα τοιαῦτα ἐτι καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἐστι, ὅιον θηρίκλειος, δεινίδας, Ἰφικρατίς, ταῦτα [γὰρ] πρότερον συνιστορεῖ τοὺς εὐρόντας, φαίνεται δ' ἐτι καὶ νῦν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ τοῦτο, μεταβεβληκός ἃν εἴη μικρὸν τούνομα. ἀλλὰ, καθάπερ εἰρητι, οὐκ ἐστι πιστεύ- σαι τῷ τυχόντι.

μεταλήψεως: the meaning of this word seems to be that explained by Quintil. viii. 6. 37, superest ex his, quae aliter significant, μετάληψις, id est, transsumtio, quae ex alio in aliud velut viam praestat: tropus et varissimus et maxime improprius, Graccis tamen frequentior, qui Centaurum Chirona, et νῆσος (? ναῦς) θοὺς ἄξειας dicunt. Nos quis ferat, si Verrem suem aut Laelium doctum nominemus? cf. Arist. Top. vi. 11, p. 149 a 6.

θηρίκλειον: a kind of drinking cup, said to be named after Thericles, a Corinthian potter of some celebrity, and, according to Bentley on Phalaris § 3, a contemporary of Aristophanes. Welecker, however (Rhein. Mus. vi. 404 foll.), maintains that these cups were so called because they were decorated with the figures of animals.

δεινίδας and Ἰφικρατίς are the names given to particular kinds of slippers, the latter of which was so called after the celebrated Athenian general. Cf. Poll. vii. 89, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν χρησαμένων Ἰφικρατίδες, Δεινίδες, Ἀλκιβιάδια, Σμινδρίδια, Μυνάκια ἀπὸ Μυνάκου. Diod. Sic. xv. 44, τὰς τὲ υποδέσεις τῶν στρατιώτων εὐλύτους καὶ κούφας ἐποίησε, τὰς μέχρι τοῦ νῦν Ἰφικρατίδας ἀπ' ἑκείνου καλου-μένας. Alciphr. Ep. iii. 57, ὕναγχος Κρονίων ἐνστάντων Ἰφικρατίδας μοι νεουρυχις ἑπεμψε. Becker's Charicles E. T. p. 450, Müller Handbuch iv. 428.
γὰρ is expunged by Meineke, whom Wachsm. follows. 
συνιστόρει is read by Casaubon for συνιστορεῖν. It seems to mean "connoted."

ei δὲ μὴ τρ. "if it does not do this, the word must have changed somewhat." For the tense cf. Dem. xxx. 10. Timocrates and Onetor were both men of substance ὁστ' οὐκ ἂν διὰ τοῦτο γ' εἰεν οὐκ εὐθὺς δεδωκότες.

PHYSICA.

12. Diog. L. vii. 134, δοκεῖ δ' αὐτούς ἄρχας εἶναι τῶν ὀλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχουν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ ἀδίδουν ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἔκαστα. τίθησι δὲ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο... Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀτόμων. See Zeno frag. 35.


spiritum = πνεῦμα. So far as the evidence serves, Cleanthes was the first to explain the Heraclitean πῦρ as πνεῦμα. While not refusing to admit that Zeno's aether is an emanation from the Godhead (see on frag. 15), he differs from Zeno in identifying God with the sun, as the ruling part of the universe, and the ultimate source of the "Urpneuma." Stein Psych. p. 68. Hirzel's account is inconsistent: at p. 211 he attributes πνεῦμα to Chrysippus and restricts Cleanthes to πῦρ, while at p. 216 he allows that Cleanthes introduced the conception of πνεῦμα.

permeatorem. Gk. διήκειν Zeno frag. 37, probably indicates that Cl. accepted κράσις δι' ὀλων, cf. Alex. Aphrod. de Mixt. 142 a, ἡνωσθαί τὴν σύμπασαν οὐσίαν,
THE FRAGMENTS OF CLEANTHES.

πνεύματος τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὑφ’ οὗ συνάγεται καὶ συμμένει.


Cleanthes teaches the exact correspondence between the microcosm of the individual and the macrocosm of the world: there is therefore in the world a ruling principle analogous to the soul of man. Sext. Math. ix. 120, ὥστε ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικεῖται πολυμερῆς καθεστῶς, εἰς ἃν τι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ κυριεύον καὶ τὸ προκαταρχόμενον τῶν κυνήσεων. οὐδὲν δὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἣ τήν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν, ἢτις θεὸς ἐστιν. ἐστιν ἂρα θεὸς.

15. Cic. N. D. i. 37, tum ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfundatum et extremum omnia cingentem atque complexum ardorem, qui aether nominetur, certissimum deum judicat. Lactant. Inst. i. 5, Cleanthes et Anaximenes aethera dicunt esse summum Deum (quoting in support Verg. Georg. ii. 325).

According to Krische, p. 428—430, Cicero has here made a blunder by importing an explanation of his own into the Greek original θεῶν εἶναι τῶν αἰθέρα, and by a confusion of the two senses in which αἴθήρ is used in the Stoic School (1) = πῦρ τεχνικόν, (2) = the fiery zone surrounding the world. Cleanthes, as will be presently seen, disagreeing with the rest of the school, regarded the
sun and not the belt of aether as the ἠγεμονικόν, or, in popular language, as the abode of God (Cic. Acad. ii. 126). Cleanthes therefore only meant to affirm the identity of θεὸς and the πύρ τεχνικόν. This may be true, but the reasoning is not conclusive. Apart from the word certissimum, which is not important, there is no reason why Cleanthes should not have attributed divinity to the ultimus omnia eingens aether, just in the same manner as he does to the stars, where Krische feels no difficulty. Similarly Stein, Psychol. n. 99: the aether emanates from the "Urpneuma" and is a divine power, but not God himself.

ultimum i.e. farthest removed from the earth which is in the centre of the universe. Zeno, frag. 67. Cic. N. D. ii. 41. 117. Diog. vii. 37.

16. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. c. 9, λόγον ἠγούμενον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. Cic. N. D. i. 37, tum nihil ratione censet esse divinius.

This, it should be remembered, is in direct opposition to the teaching of Epicurus, who speaks of the world as φύσει ἀλόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστῶτα (Stob. Ecl. i. 21. 3ο p. 183, 10).

17. Cic. N. D. i. 37, Cleanthes...tum ipsum mundum deum dicit esse. Cf. N. D. ii. 34. 45.

See Krische p. 424—426, according to whom we are to interpret mundum here in the first of the three senses specified by Diog. L. vii. 137, 138, ἑστι κόσμος ὁ ἰδίως ποιός τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας. Cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 21. 5, p. 184, 11, λέγεται δ' ἐτέρως κόσμος ὁ θεός, καθ' ὃν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται καὶ τελειωται. In any case, we have here a distinct statement that Cleanthes was a pantheist, and identified God with matter. The different meanings given to κόσμος in effect amount to this that it
may be regarded either as the sum total of all existence, or as the transitory and derivative part of existence: the distinction, however, as Zeller observes, is only a relative one (see his remarks p. 159). For pantheism as advocated by Cleanthes see Hirzel ii. p. 206. Stein, Psychol. p. 67 and n. 98.

18. Chalcid. in Tim. c. 144, ex quo fieri ut quae secundum fatum sunt etiam ex providentia sint. eodemque modo quae secundum providentiam ex fato, ut Chrysippus putat. alii vero quae quidem ex providentiae auctoritate, fataliter quoque provenire, nec tamen quae fataliter ex providentia, ut Cleanthes.

Zeno had affirmed the identity of εἶμαρμένη and πρόνοια (frag. 45), but omitted to discuss the difficulties involved in so broad an explanation of fatalistic doctrine. Cleanthes felt the difficulty that κακὸν could not be said to exist κατὰ πρόνοιαν, even if it existed καθ' εἶμαρμένην. This point will recur in the Hymn to Zeus frag. 46, l. 17, ο_fixed_νὲ ἐγὼν ἐπὶ ἄθοι σοῦ δίξα δαίμον...πλῆν ὁπόσα ῥέξουσι κακοὶ σφέτηρσιν ἄνοιας, where we shall have to discuss the nature of the solution which he offered. In support of the position here taken up by Chrysippus cf. id. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 34, 3, κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἱμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων...οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ τοῦλαχιστὸν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον. id. Comm. Not. 34, 5, εἰ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦλαχιστὸν ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἄλλα ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἁρκτίν θεόλησιν. Chrysippus also defined εἰμαρμένη as λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένων. The Sceptic objections on this head are put very clearly in Sext. Pyrrh. III. 9—12.
19. Philo de provid. ii. 74 p. 94 Aucher: (astra erratica) nota sunt non solum ratione verum etiam sensu ita movente providentia, quae, ut dicit Chrysippus et Cleanthes, nihil praetermisit pertinentium ad certiorem utilioremque dispensationem. quod si aliter melius esset dispensari res mundi, eo modo sumpsisset compositionem, qua tenus nihil occurreret ad impediendum deum.

I have taken this fragment from Gercke (Chrysippea p. 708).

quae nihil praetermisit...Much of the Stoic exposition in the 2nd book of Cicero's de Natura Deorum is a commentary on this. Thus for astra erratica cf. § 103 foll. and esp. § 104, ergo, ut oculis adsidue videmus, sine ulla mutatione et varietate cetera labuntur...caelestia...quorum contemplatione nullius expleri potest animus naturae constantiam videre cupientis. Generally cf. M. Anton. ii. 3, τά τῆς τύχης οὐκ ἀνεν ἐφύσεως ἢ συγκλώσεως καὶ ἐπιπλοκῆς τῶν προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων τούτα ἐκείθεν ἰην ἐπόσεστι δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ τὸ τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ συμφέρον, οὐ μέρος εἰ.

quia tenus...At the same time we find elsewhere a chain argument of Chrysippus in Alex. de fato c. 37 p. 118 οὐ πάντα μὲν ἐστὶ καθ' εἰμαρμένην, οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ ἀκώλυτος καὶ ἀπαρημπόδιστος ἢ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις κ.τ.λ. But inconsistency was inevitable in this matter, when Chrysippus could account for the existence of evil by saying (Plut. Sto. Rep. 36. 1) κακίαν δὲ καθόλου ἰραι οὔτε δυνατῶν ἐστιν οὔτ' ἐχει καλῶς ἱρθήναι. See Zeller's lucid exposition pp. 176—193.

20. Probus ad Verg. Ecl. 6. 31, p. 10, 33, Omnem igitur hanc rerum naturae formam tenui primum et inani mole dispersam refert in quattuor elementa concretam et ex his omnia esse postea effigiata Stoici tradunt


φρέατος. This is explained by the anecdote related by Diog. vii. 168, διεβοήθη δὲ ἐπὶ φιλοπονία, ὥς γε πένης ὅν ἄγαν ὀρμησε μισθοφορεῖν καὶ νῦκτωρ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κήποις ἡμτλεί, μεθ' ἡμέραν δ' ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγυμναζετο' ὅθεν καὶ Φρεάντλης ἐκλήθη. The same idea is kept up by ἀνυμᾶ i.e. "hauls up."

καὶ τὴν μὲν γῆν κ.τ.λ. This constant interchange of the various elements is not so strongly brought out in the Stoic system as it was by Heraclitus with his formula πάντα ἐνεῖ. Cf. Krische p. 387. It is however always implied, cf. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 10. 16¢ p. 129, 18, πρώτης μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἐκ πυρὸς κατὰ σύστασιν εἰς ἀέρα μεταβολῆς, δευτέρας δ' ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς ὕδωρ, τρίτης δὲ ἐτι μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνισταμένου τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς γῆν. πάλιν δ' ἀπὸ ταύτης διαλυμένης καὶ διαχεομένης πρώτη μὲν γίγνεται χύσις εἰς ὕδωρ, δευτέρα δ' ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἑσχάτη εἰς πῦρ. Cie. N. D. 11. 84, et cum quattuor genera sint corporum, vicissitudine eorum mundi continuata natura est. Nam ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aër, ex aëre aether, deinde retrorsum vicissim ex aether eër, inde aqua, ex aqua terra insima. Sic naturis his, ex quibus omnīa constant, sursus deorsus, ultro citro commenentibus mundi partium coniunctio continetur. For Heraclitus see R. and P. § 29.
eis πῦρ. Some words must be supplied here: Diels inserts ἄνω.

tὸ δὲ πῦρ: the reverse process is concisely stated.

ἡς μέρος μετέχοντας: for the divine origin of the human soul see Stein Psych. p. 96, n. 169.

22. Stob. Ecl. i. 20, 1º p. 171, 2, Ζηνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἴον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν, οία πρότερον ἦν. See Zeno frag. 54.


Philo is arguing that when everything becomes fire, it must burn itself out and cannot be created anew, but there is no importance in his objection, as he is confounding the πῦρ τεχνικὸν with πῦρ άτεχνων. φλόξ and αὐγή therefore alike express what Numenius, speaking of the school in general, calls πῦρ αἴθερωδες i.e. πῦρ τεχνικὸν (Euseb. P. E. xv. 18. 1). What then is the meaning of the divergence? Stein believes that we have here a piece of evidence showing a substantial disagreement in the views taken by Cleanthes and Chrysippus of the ἐκπύρωσις and that φλόξ is used with reference to the Sun (see on frag. 24), and αὐγή as a representation of the finest aether. For the connection of φλόξ with ἡλιος he quotes Diog. L. vii. 27, Aesch. Pers. 497, Soph. Trach. 693, O. T. 1425 (Stein, Psychologie pp. 70, 71 and the notes). Hirzel's explanation is similar (p. 211), except that he does not see any reference to the sun: according to him, Cleanthes spoke of a permeating πῦρ for which πνεῦμα was substituted by Chrysippus; but see on frag. 13. For φλόγα cf. ἐκφλογισθέντος in frag. 24.
24. Stob. Ecl. i. 17. 3, Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πῶς φησιν: ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ παντὸς συνίζειν τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβέννυσθαι δι’ ὅλου. τοῦ δὲ παντὸς ἐξυγραθέντος τὸ ἐσχατὸν τοῦ πυρὸς, ἀντιτυπήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ μέσου, τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τούναυ-τίον, εἶθ’ οὕτω τρεπόμενον ἄνω φησίν αὐξεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεσθαι διακόσμησιν τὸ ὀλον καὶ τοιαύτην περίοδον αἴει καὶ διακόσμησιν ποιομένου τὸν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀλῶν οὐσία τόνον μὴ παύεσθαι. ὦςπερ γὰρ ἐνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύεται ἐκ σπερμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρώνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ὄλου τὰ μέρη, ὥν καὶ τὰ ξώα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις φύεται. καὶ ὦςπερ τινές λόγοι τῶν μερῶν εἰς σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται καὶ ἀΰθις διακρίνονται γινομένων τῶν μερῶν, οὕτως ἔξ ἐνός τε πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἐν συγκρίνεσθαι, ὁδῷ καὶ συμφόνως διεξεισθης τῆς περιόδου.

The explanation of the first part of this difficult fragment appears to be as follows:—When everything has been set on fire and the tendency of all things to become absorbed in the πῦρ ἄειξῶν has been satisfied, the reaction commences in the centre, and spreads towards the extremities until everything except the outer rim is in a watery mass. Seneca, N. Q. iii. 13. 1, nihil relinqui... aliud, igne restincto, quam humorem. In hoc futuri mundi spem latere. Then the remaining portions of the original fire, concentrated in the sun (Stein p. 71), in spite of resistance from the centre, begin to exert their creative influence, and by their ever-increasing activity, the elements and the world are formed. Phenomenal existence, then, is possible only when the tightening and slackening influences are in equilibrium or nearly so; the exclusive predominance of either destroys the balance of the universe. The centre of the σφαῖρας is always readier to admit the loosening of tension, while the bracing in-
vigorating vivifying power, which knits together the frame of the universe as of the individual, is in fullest sway in the parts at the circumference (hence ἄνω αὐξεσθαι). This is the theory of tension as applied to the ἐνεκόσμησις, and its statement constitutes the most important contribution made by Cleanthes to Stoicism. A difficulty in the above exposition remains to be stated:—Why is there no created world in the period between ἐκπύρωσις and ἐξυγρωσις, as there must then be a time when the two influences are of equal strength? The answer, perhaps, is that during the whole of this period there is an ever-increasing slackening of tension, as the fire of the ἐκπύρωσις is gradually extinguished, and slackening of tension produces not life but death (Plut. plac. v. 24 etc.); the creation of the world only starts when τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρὸς τρέπεται εἰς τούναντίον. There is also a divergent view, namely, that the destruction of the world may be compassed by κατακλυσμὸς as well as by ἐκπύρωσις. This implies that our world can exist during the transition towards ἐξυγρωσις. Cf. Sen. N. Q. iii. 29. 1 and Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 25, p. 53, quoted by Zeller p. 169, 1. Schol. on Lucan vii. 813 ἐκπύρωσις, quam secuturam κατακλυσμοῦς adserunt Stoici, seems to have been overlooked, but is of doubtful import. Stein's account of the διακόσμησις (Psych. p. 32 foll.) is radically different, but I do not see how it can be reconciled with this passage: (1) the creation of the world is due to a slackening of tension in the original fiery substance, and (2) τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρὸς is what remains of the original "Urpneuma" after the four elements have been formed, whereas according to Cleanthes the creation of the world only begins when this remnant of fire begins to exert its influence. Hirzel discusses the present passage at some length (Untersuchungen ii. p. 124—134). He strongly insists
that τὸ ἑσχατον meansextremum (das Feuer des Umkreises) and not reliquum, and that Philo περὶ ἁφθ. κόσμου 18, (μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ἐπειδὰν ὁ νέος κόσμος μέλλῃ ἡμιουργεῖσθαι σύμπαν μὲν τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται ποσῆ δὲ τις αὐτοῦ μοῖρα ύπολείπεται) follows Chrysippus and not Cleanthes. It would seem, however, that the distinction is not important, as ἑσχατον must in this case be both extremum and reliquum. Further on he suggests that Cleanthes did not maintain the doctrine of the four elements, but cf. frag. 21. Two possible anticipations of the tension theory have been noticed in Zeno’s fragments, but the passage in frag. 56 is probably spurious, while in frag. 67, even if τείνεσθαι is sound, Zeno is confessedly dealing with another point, viz. the explanation of how the separate parts of the κόσμος are kept in one solid mass and why they are not scattered into the void. Ogereau p. 10 attributes the introduction of τὸνος to Zeno, and depreciates the performances of Cleanthes (p. 19); but he insists throughout too strongly on the unity of the school, without considering its historical development.

tὸ μέσον, cf. Stob. Eel. i. 21, 3b p. 183, 3, ἀπὸ γῆς δὲ ἀρξασθαί τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ κόσμου, καθάπερ ἀπὸ κέντρου, ἄρχῃ δὲ σφαίρας τὸ κέντρον.


τρεπομένου. MSS. corr. Canter.

τὸν...τὸνον. The MSS. have τοῦ...τὸνον. The reading in the text is due to Mein., whom Wachsm. now follows, although he formerly (Comm. ii. p. 11) kept the MSS. reading, removing the colon after ὁλον and inserting commas after καὶ and τὸνον. There is some mistake in Stein’s note on this point, Psychol. n. 41.

ἐκ σπερμάτων. Cf. Zeno frag. 54 = Cleanth. frag. 22, and see Ritter and Preller § 402.
λόγοι was unnecessarily suspected by the older edd. of Stoaeus. The conj. τῶν is tempting, but Wachsm. quotes Marc. Aurel. ix. 1, ὦρμησεν (ἡ φύσις) ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν διακόσμησιν συλλαβοῦσα τινας λόγους τῶν ἐσομένων κ.τ.λ. The best parallel is Zeno frag. 106, which puts the text beyond dispute. τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν = certain proportions of the constituent parts of the soul.

γενομένων P. γενομένων F, whence γενομένων Mein. Wachsm. Diels: but the present, accepted by Hirzel ii. p. 126, seems preferable.

eis is bracketed by Diels and Wachsm.


As the sun is, according to Cleanthes, the ἤγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου, the πῦρ ἄνεξάνου may be supposed to exist there in its purest form (cf. the authorities cited by Zeller, Stoics p. 204, 3, Krische p. 386), and to this the moon and the other stars will be assimilated at the ἐκπυρώσεις.

ἐξομοίωσειν. MSS. have ἐξομοίωσαν corr. Zeller, p. 165, n. 4.

26. Stob. Ecl. i. 15, 6a p. 146, 19, Κλεάνθης μόνος τῶν Στωικῶν τὸ πῦρ ἀπεφήνατο κανονειδῆς.

Presumably this refers to the fire of the revolving aether, for the doctrine appears to be borrowed from the Pythagoreans cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 15, 6a p. 146, 14, οἱ ἀπὸ Ηνθαγόρου...μόνον τὸ ἀνωτάτου πῦρ κανονειδῆς. This is supposed to refer to the Milky Way (Zeller, pre-Socratics, i. p. 466 n. 2), cf. infra frags. 32, 33.

27. Plut. de facie in orbe lunae c. 6, 3, ὥσπερ
THE FRAGMENTS OF CLEANTHES.

'Aristarchon ὄντος δεῖν Κλεάνθης τὸν Σάμιον ἀσθενείας προσκαλείσθαι τοῖς Ἐλληνας, ὡς κινοῦντα τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ἐστίαν, ὦτι <τὰ> φαινόμενα σώζειν ἀνήρ ἐπειράτο, μένειν τὸν οὐρανὸν ὑποτιθέμενος, ἐξελίπτεσθαι δὲ κατὰ λοξὸν κύκλου τὴν γῆν, ἀμα καὶ περὶ τὸν αὐτῆς ἄξωνα διουμένην.

This comes from the treatise πρὸς 'Aristarchon: Introd. p. 51.

'Aristarchon: the celebrated mathematician. For the theory here attacked cf. Sext. Math. x. 174, οὐ γε μὴν τὴν τοῦ κόσμου κίνησιν ἀνελόντες τὴν δὲ γῆν κινεῖσθαι δοξάσαντες, ὡς οἱ περὶ 'Aristarchon τὸν μαθηματικὸν κ.τ.λ. Stob. Ecl. i. 25, 3* p. 212, 2, 'Aristarchos τὸν ἥλιον ἰστήσει μετὰ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν δὲ γῆν κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν ἥλιον κύκλου. (This also illustrates κατὰ λοξὸν κύκλου.) It appears however to be doubtful whether Aristarchus propounded this view otherwise than hypothetically: cf. Plut. quaest. Plat. viii. 1, 2, 3.

ἀσθενείας προσκαλείσθαι. For the γραφὴ ἀσθενείας see Attischer Process ed. Lipsius, pp. 366—375, and cf. the case of Anaxagoras (ib. p. 370). Every γραφὴ, as well as an ordinary civil action, commenced with the πρόσκλησις or writ of summons (ib. p. 770 f.).

ἐστίαν: alluding to the central position of the earth. Aesch. Ag. 1056 ἐστίας μεσομφάλου, Virg. Aen. ii. 512 aedibus in mediis nudoque sub ætheris axe ingens auit. It is possible that Cleanthes had in his mind the Pythagorean description of the central fire as ἐστία τοῦ παντός: see Dr Thompson on Phaedr. 247 a, μένει γὰρ Ἐστία ἐν θεῶν οἰκῳ μόνῃ.

τὰ φαινόμενα σώζειν: "to save appearances:" for which phrase see Prof. Mayor in Journ. Phil. vi. 171.

There is no warrant whatever for Krische's suggestion (p. 435), that Cleanthes probably ("wahrscheinlich") adopted the Heraclitean theory of the daily renewal of the sun: everything points the other way. At the same time, the important position assigned to the sun was probably due to his Heraclitean studies (see Introd. p. 50), for, though Heraclitus himself did not maintain this doctrine, we read of the Heraclitean school in Plat. Cratyl. 413 B, τὸν ἧλιον...διαίοντα καὶ κάοντα ἑπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. Cf. Pliny, N. H. II. 12 (cited by Hirzel, p. 138).

29. Stob. Ecl. I. 25. 3 i p. 211, 18, Κλεάνθης ἀναμμα νοερόν τὸ ἐκ θαλάττης τὸν ἧλιον. περὶ δὲ τῶν τροπῶν φασὶ κατὰ τὸ διάστημα τῆς ὑποκειμένης τροφῆς ὀκεανὸς δ' ἐστὶ * * * ἵν τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἑπινέμεται. συγκαταφέρεσ- θαι δὲ τὸν ἧλιον κινούμενον ἐλικα ἐν τῇ σφαίρᾳ, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσημερινοῦ ἐπὶ τε ἀρκτον καὶ νότον, ἀπερ ἐστὶ πέρατα τῆς ἐλικος. Cic. N. D. III. 37, Quid enim? non eisdem vobis placet omnem ignem pastus indigere nec permanere ullo modo posse, nisi alitur: ali autem solem, lunam, reliqua astra aquis, alia dulcibus, alia marinis? eamque causam Cleanthes adfert cur se sol referat nec longius progradiatur solstitiali orbi itemque brumali, ne longius discedat a cibo. Macrob. Sat. I. 23, 2, ideo enim sicut et
Posidonius et Cleanthes affirmant, solis meatus a plaga, quae usta dicitur, non recedit, quia sub ipsa currit Oceanus, qui terram ambit et dividit.

Wachsmuth regards Cic. and Stob. ll. cc. as containing two distinct fragments (Comm. II. fr. phys. 7 and 8), but the passage in Cic. is only a verbal expansion of *περὶ τροπῶν...τροφῆς*. Wachsm. does not cite Macrobr. l. c. This is one of the points which attest Cleanthes' study of Heraclitus, cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 25. 1° p. 239, 5. Hirzel concludes (II. p. 122) from the evidence, that Cleanthes, like Heraclitus, spoke only of the feeding of the sun by exhalations, and not also of that of the moon and stars.

ἀναμμα κ.τ.λ. cf. Plut. plac. II. 20. 3, *περὶ οὐσίας ἥλιον, οἱ Στωικοὶ ἀναμμα νοερὸν ἐκ θαλάττης*. Diog. vii. 145, τρέφεσθαι δὲ τὰ ἐμπυρα ταῦτα (i.e. the sun and moon) καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀστρα. τὸν μὲν ἥλιον ἐκ τῆς μεγάλης θαλάττης νοερὸν οὗτα ἀναμμα, whereas the moon is fed with fresh water, and is mixed with air. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 25. 5, τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι τὸ ἀθροισθὲν ἐξαμμα νοερὸν ἐκ τοῦ τῆς θαλάττης ἀναθυμιάματος. Wachsmuth adds Galen, hist. phil. c. LVIII. p. 277 K., ὥκεανον δὲ καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν παρέχειν τῷ ἥλιῳ τροφῆν τὴν αὐτοῦ υγρότητα ἕχουσαν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν γεώδη ἀναθυμίασιν.

τροπῶν: a necessary correction by Bake for the mss. τροφῶν.

φασι MSS. Wachsm. suggests φησι.

ἐστὶ: there is a lacuna after this word. Wachsmuth formerly (Comm. II. p. 10) supplied καὶ γῆ coll. Plut. plac. II. 23. 3, but he now writes: "lacuna fuit in Aetii exemplo, quod cum Ps. Plutarcho legit Stobaeus; Plut. ἥ γῆ add.; Aetius καὶ ἡ μεγάλη θάλασσα vel simile scripsit," quoting the passages cited above.

συγκαταφέρεσθαι i.e. with the aether, which is itself in motion.
The discovery of the inclination of the earth's orbit to that of the sun is attributed by some to Anaximander, and by others to Pythagoras (Zeller, pre-Socratics i. p. 455, 2).

30. Cic. N. D. ii. 40, atque ea (sidera) quidem tota esse ignea duorum sensuum testimonio confirmari Cleanthes putat, tactus et oculorum. nam solis et candor illusior est quam ullius ignis, quippe qui immenso mundo tam longe lateque colluceat, et is eius tactus est, non ut tepfaciat solum, sed etiam saepe comburat. quorum neutrum faceret, nisi esset igneus. "ergo," inquit, "cum sol igneus sit Oceanique alatur humoribus, quia nullus ignis sine pastu aliquo possit permanere, necesse est aut ei similis sit igni quem adhibemus ad usum atque ad victum, aut ei, qui corporibus animantium continetur. atqui hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et consumptor omnium idemque, quocumque invasit, cuncta disturbat ac dissipat. contra ille corporeus vitalis et salutaris omnia conservat, alit, auget, sustinet sensuque adficit." negat ergo esse dubium horum ignium sol utri similis sit, cum is quoque efficiat ut omnia floreant et in suo quaeque genere pubescant. quare cum solis ignis similis et eorum ignium sit, qui sunt in corporibus animantium, solen quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua astra, quae oriantur in ardore caelestis, qui aether vel caelum nominatur.

testimonio: this passage illustrates two characteristics, which are specially prominent in Cleanthes: (1) his activity in the investigation of the problems of natural science, and (2) his confidence in the results of sense observation. Stein, Psychol. p. 69, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 319.
Oceani: cf. frag. 29.
ei...igni: for the two kinds of fire cf. Zeno frag. 71.
corporeus: see on frag. 42.
aether vel caelum: hence in Zeno frag. 111 Zeus is identified with caelum in place of the usual gloss aether.


πλήκτρον: Krische p. 400 connects this with the Stoic identification of Heracles with the sun. Thus Heracles is τὸ πληκτικῶν καὶ διαρεπτικῶν (Plut. de Iside c. 40), and his name is derived from ἄρη and κλάσις by Porphyrius ap. Euseb. P. E. iii. p. 112 c, and Nicomachus ap. Laur. Lyd. de Mens. iv. 46. πλήκτρον is properly “any striking instrument”: hence lightning is described as πλήκτρον διόβσολον πυρὸς κεραυνῶν (Eur. Ale. 128): cf. especially Plut. de Pyth. orae. c. 16 ad fin. ὑστερον μεντοι πλήκτρον ἀνέθηκαν τῷ θεῷ χρυσοῦν ἐπιστήμαται, ὡς έοικε, Σκυθίνω λέγοντι περὶ τῆς λύρας, ἦν ἀρμόζεται Ζηνός εὐειδὴς Αὐτάλ-λων, πᾶσαν ἄρχην καὶ τέλος συλλαβῶν· ἔχει δὲ λαμπρόν πλήκτρον ἥλιου φάος (quoted by Hirzel, p. 181). Eur. Suppl. 650, λαμπρὰ μὲν ἀκτίς, ἥλιου κανῶν σαφής. Sandys on Bacch. 308, and Milton’s “With touch ethereal of Heaven’s fiery rod.”

32. Stob. Ecl. i. 26. 1° p. 219, 14, Κλεάνθης πυροειδή τὴν σελήνην, πυλοειδή δὲ τῷ σχήματι.

πυροειδή: but the fire of the moon is not so pure as that of the sun, being fed with grosser matter. Cf. Diog. L. vii. 144, εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον εἰλικρινές πῦρ...145, γεώδησε-τέραν δὲ τὴν σελήνην.
πιλοειδή: the MSS. have πηλοειδή corrected by Lipsius (Phys. Stoic II. 13), who also suggests πολνειδή, to πιλοειδή, in which correction he is followed by the editors of Stobaeus. But what is the meaning of this word as applied to shape? In this connection "like felt" (L. and S.) is nonsense. Zeller translates "ball-shaped," which is improbable because, apart from other considerations, it is almost certain that Cleanthes did not regard the moon as spherical. There remains Hirzel's suggested rendering:—"shaped like a skull-cap." The only justification for such an absurdity is to be found in the Heraclitean σκαφοειδής (Stob. Ecl. i. 26. 1c p. 218, 8), for no support can be derived from πιλήματα ἄρος (Anaximander) or νέφος πεπιλημένον (Xenophanes), which simply refer to densely packed clouds. Krische, p. 435, boldly reads κωνοειδή which gives the required sense, but is not close enough to the MSS. It is suggested therefore that the true reading is ἡλιοειδή, the Π being due to dittography of the following H. There would be no obscurity in this, assuming Cleanthes or his epitomiser to have previously described the sun as κωνοειδής (cf. frag. 33). The other Stoics consistently describe the moon as σφαιροειδής (Stob. Ecl. i. 26. 1k 1l p. 219, 20, 26).


Cleanthes attributed a conical shape to fire, sun, moon, and stars. There is no direct evidence as to the sun and moon, but it is a fair inference from the authorities that they also were conical. It is probable, moreover, that
Cleanthes was moved by the consideration that Heraclitus described sun, moon and stars as boat-shaped (σκαφοειδῆ), cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 25. 18 26. 1c, Diog. L. ix. 9. Krische is apparently right in inferring that the same is true of the world, cf. Plut. plac. ii. 2. 1, οἱ μὲν Στωικοὶ σφαιροειδῆ τὸν κόσμον, ἄλλοι δὲ κωνοειδῆ, οἱ δὲ φοειδῆ.

34. Plut. plac. ii. 16. 1, Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν ἐτὶ δυσμᾶς φέρεσθαι πάντας τοὺς ἀστέρας. Galen, hist. phil. c. 13, xix. 272 K. Ἀ καὶ Δ. καὶ Κλ. ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν εἰς δυσμᾶς φέρεσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας νομίζουσιν. Πάντας in Plut. apparently includes ἀπλανῆ ἀστρα as well as the πλανώμενα: the former are said συμπεριφέρεσθαι τῷ ὅλῳ οὐρανῷ, τὰ δὲ πλανώμενα κατ' ἱδίας κυνεῖσθαι κυνήσεις (Diog. vii. 144). Full information on the ancient theories as to the rising and setting of the stars will be found in Achill. Tat. Isag. cc. 37, 38.


This fragment is taken from Wachsmuth's collection (fr. phys. 27, Comm. ii. p. 14): cf. frag. 29 and Macrobr. i. 23, 2 there cited. Krische, p. 393, refers this to the influence of Zeno's studies on Homer. "Hiernach möchte ich glauben, dass Zenon dort auch den Homerischen Ocean aufgesucht und dadurch den Kleanthes und Krates aufgefordert habe, dieselbe Betrachtung zu erneuern." Cf. Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 29, p. 89:—There are five zones: Arctic, Antarctic, two temperate (εὐκρατοι), μία δὲ διακεκαυμένη, ἥ δὲ τούτων μέση πασῶν ἔστιν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ τροπικοῦ μέχρι τοῦ χειμερινοῦ τροπικοῦ τοσοῦτον γὰρ πλάτος ἔχει,
οσον καὶ ὁ ἡλιος περιέρχεται. καλεῖται δὲ διακεκαυμένη ὅπος τὸ πυρώδης εἶναι, τοῦ ἡλίου δὲ αὐτὴς τὴν πορείαν ἀεὶ ποιοῦμένου. Posidonius, as we learn from ib. 31, p. 90, made six zones, dividing the torrid zone into two.

36. Tertullian de An. c. 5, vult et Cleanthes non solum corporis lineamentis, sed et animae notis similitudinem parentibus in filios respondere, de speculo silicet morum et ingeniorum et affectuum: corporis autem similitudinem et dissimilitudinem capere: et animam itaque corpus similitudini vel dissimilitudini obnoxiam, item corporalium et incorporalium passiones inter se non communicare. porro et animam compati corpori, cui laeso ictibus, vulneribus, ulceribus condolescit, et corpus animae, cui addictae cura, angore, amore, coaegrescit, per detrimentum silicet vigoris, eius pudorem, et pavorem rubore atque pallore testetur. igitur anima corpus ex corporalium passionum commutatione. Nemesius, Nat. Hom. p. 32, ὁ Κλεάνθης τοιόνδε πλέκει συλλογισμόν οὗ μόνον φησίν ὅμοιον τοῖς γονεύσι γνώμεθα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἄλλα 15 καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἡθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεις, σώματος δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσωμάτου, σῶμα ἁρὰ ἡ ψυχή...ἐτὶ δὲ ὁ Κλεάνθης φησίν οὐδὲν ἀσωμάτων συμπάσχει σώματι, οὐδὲ ἀσωματω σῶμα, ἄλλα σῶμα σώματι: συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχή τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι 20 καὶ τεμνομένῳ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ ἀισχυνομένης ὡρῶν ἐρυθρῶν γίνεται καὶ φοβοῦμένης ὥχρον σῶμα ἁρὰ ἡ ψυχή. Tertullian de An. c. 25, unde oro te similitudine animae quoque parentibus de ingeniis respondemus secum dum Cleanthis testimonium, si non ex animae semine educimur?

The Nemesius passage is regarded as a distinct fragment from the two places in Tertullian by Wachsmuth (Comm. ii. fr. phys. 20, 21), but, as Hirzel has observed, they
obviously refer to the same original. Stein’s observations on this passage should be consulted (Erkenntnistheorie, n. 736). The mind is a tabula rasa at birth, in the sense that it possesses no definite knowledge. But through the seed a capacity for knowledge, and ethical tendencies in particular, are transplanted from father to son: see also Introd. p. 38 f.

5. The ordinary punctuation of this passage puts a full stop at animam, with no stop after capere, but this gives no satisfactory sense. Mr Hicks would strike out the words capere et, remove the stop after animam, and alter obnoxium to obnoxiam. The latter change, which is a decided improvement, I have adopted, and, by putting the stop after capere, the required sense is obtained without further alteration.

15. γονεύοι: cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 79, vult enim (Panaetius)... nasei animos, quod declaret eorum similitudo, qui procreentur, quae etiam in ingeniiis, non solum in corporibus apparet. The child receives through the seed the same grade of tension in the soul as his father, and, as the activity of the soul depends on its inherent tension, the mental resemblance between children and parents is explained. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 130, 131.


διαθέσι: cf. on Zeno, frag. 117.

17. σώματος: agreeably to Stoic tenets, for likeness and unlikeness cannot be predicated of the non-existent, cf. Zeno, frags. 34 and 91.

19. συμπάθεια: the συμπάθεια μερῶν is an indication to the Stoic of the ἐνωσίς of a body: this is true of the cosmos no less than of the individual. Sext. Math. ix. 79, who continues (80), ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἡνωμένων συμπάθειά τις ἔστιν,

This is an obscure statement which cannot be understood in the same manner of the various philosophers mentioned. Thus, as regards Pythagoras, it is simply a deduction from the theory of metempsychosis (Zeller, pre-Socratics i. p. 479); while for Plato and Xenocrates we may understand a reference to the previous existence of the soul before its entrance into the body (Zeller, Plato, p. 596). The terminology however is Aristotle's (de Generat. An. ii. 3, p. 736 b 27, λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θείον εἶναι μόνον' οὐθέν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεὶ σωματικῇ ἐνέργεια), whose doctrine is widely different from Plato's. As regards Cleanthes, the Stoics in general do not distinguish between νοῦς and ψυχή (see on Zeno, frag. 43): the latter is transmitted in the seed, developed in the womb, and brought to maturity by the action of the outer air, so that it is hard to see in what sense ψυχή θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεται. Perhaps the meaning is that the reasoning powers (νοῦς) are founded on external impressions, from which Knowledge is derived: cf. Zeno, frag. 82. Stein, however (Psychol. p. 163 foll.), believes that by θύραθεν is indicated the action of the outer air on the embryo at birth, whereby the ψυχή is
developed out of a mere \( \phi \upsilon \sigma \iota \sigma \). In this case Cleanthes anticipated the Chrysippean doctrine of \( \pi \varepsilon \rho \iota \psi \upsilon \upsilon \iota \sigma \). Hirzel (II. p. 156 foll.) uses this passage in support of his improbable view that Cleanthes maintained a tripartite division of the soul: he sees here also the influence of Heraclitus. Cic. N.D. II. 18 might suggest a more general view, that the point referred to is the material nature of the soul as \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \upsilon \mu \alpha \), but the context in Stobaeus is against this.

38. \( \equiv \) Zeno, frag. 83.

There is a curious contradiction in Stein’s Psychologie on this point. At p. 107 and p. 155 he cites and upholds the evidence which distinctly attributes to Zeno the doctrine of the soul being fed by exhalations from the blood. Yet at p. 165 he suggests that this innovation was made by Cleanthes.

39. \( \equiv \) Zeno, frag. 87.

40. \( \equiv \) Zeno, frag. 88.

41. Diog. L. vii. 157, Kλεάνθης μεν οὖν πάσας ἐπιδιαμένειν (τὰς ψυχὰς) μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως, Χρύσιππος δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνων.

Cf. R. and P. § 409. Cic. Tusc. 1. 77, Stoici diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant, cf. Zeno frag. 95. The teaching of Cleanthes is everywhere more materialistic than that of Chrysippus, who was no doubt anxious to vindicate the purity of the soul essence: see Stein Psychol. n. 279 and pp. 145—147, who compares their divergence as to the nature of τῷ πωσις and the “Urpneuma” (\( \phi \lambda \delta \xi \) and an\( \upsilon \gamma \nu \)). Ar. Did. ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 20. 3 follows the account of Chrysippus, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γεννητὴν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν φθέρεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπιμένειν τως χρόνως καθ’ ἐαυτήν τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων μέχρι τῆς εἰς τὸ ρ ἀναλύ-
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σεως τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς ποσοῖς τινας χρόνους...τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζῷων ψυχῶς συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασιν.

42. Cic. N. D. ii. 24, quod quidem Cleanthes his etiam argumentis docet, quanta vis insit caloris in omni corpore: negat enim ullam esse cibum tam gravem, quin is die et nocte concoquatur, cuin etiam in reliquis inest calor iiis, quas natura respuerit.

This must be regarded as an argument in favour of the warmth of the vital principle: hence Zeno called the soul πνεύμα ἐνθερμον (frag. 85). The excellence of the human soul consists peculiarly in a suitable mixture (ἐύκρασία) of warmth and cold. Cf. Galen quod animi mores etc. iv. 783 K. (quoted at length by Stein, Psychol. p. 105). Cleanthes no doubt was influenced by Heraclitus: cf. frag. 54, Byw. αὐτῇ ἡξηρῇ ψυχῇ σοφωτάτη, but substituted warmth for dryness. It is highly probable that the words immediately preceding this extract, which are of great importance for the τόνος theory, are ultimately derived from Cleanthes: they are as follows: sic enim res se habet, ut omnia, quae alantur et quae crescent, contincant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possent neque crescre. Nam omne, quod est calidum et igneum, cietur et agitur motu suo, quod autem alitur et crescit, motu quodam utitur certo et aequivabili, qui quamdin remanet in nobis, tam diu sensus et vita remanet, refrigerato autem et extincto calore occidimus ipsi et exstinguimus. Compare with this the remarks of Stein Psychol. p. 32, and Philo de incorr. mundi, p. 507, Mang. ἅπαν σῶμα ἀναλυόμενον εἰς πῦρ διαλύεται τε καὶ χείται, σβεννυμένης δὲ τῆς εν αὐτῷ φλογὸς στέλλεται καὶ συνάγεται. This is one of the many points of contact between the Stoics and the medical school of Hippocrates. We are reminded of the τόνος of Cleanthes when we read
that Aristoxenus, the Peripatetic and musician, described the soul as ipsius corporis intentionem quandam (Cic. Tusc. i. 20), but the doctrines were totally dissimilar: see Munro on Lucr. iii. 100.

43. Seneca, Epist. 113, 18, inter Cleanthem et discipulum eius Chrysippum non convenit quid sit ambulatio: Cleanthes ait, spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum; Chrysippus ipsum principale.

_ambulatio_: the Stoics were led to this extreme materialism by their insistence on the dogma that nothing exists but the corporeal. Cf. Plut. Comm. Not. 45, 2, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῶα ποιούσι, τὸν περίπατον ζῴου, τὴν ὄρχησιν, τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, τὴν προσ-ἀγόρευσιν, τὴν λοιδορίαν.

_spiritum_: the Greek original of this would be πνεῦμα διατείνουν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι ποδῶν (cf. Plut. plac. iv. 21). The deviation of Chrysippus from the teaching of his predecessor was probably caused by a desire to insist more strongly on the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Iambl. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 49. 33, p. 368, 12, πῶς οὖν δια-κρίνονται; κατὰ μὲν τοὺς Στωικοὺς ἕναι μὲν διαφορότητι <τῶν> ὑποκειμένων σωμάτων: πνεῦμα γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ φασιν οὐτοί διατείνειν ἄλλα κατ’ ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς, τὰ δὲ εἰς ὤτα, τὰ δὲ εἰς ἄλλα αἰσθη-τήρια: ἕναι δὲ ἰδιότητι ποιότητος περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκει-μένου ὡσπερ γὰρ τὸ μῆλον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι τὴν γλυκύτητα έχει καὶ τὴν εὐώδιαν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐν ταύτῳ φαντασίαν, συγκατάθεσιν, ὀρμῆν, λόγον συν-εἴληφε. Sext. Math. ix. 102, πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὄλον ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν πνημῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται, ὥστε πᾶσαν δύναμιν τὴν περὶ τὸ μέρος οὖσαν καὶ περὶ τὸ ὄλον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγεμονικῷ διαδίδοσθαι. The former passage
is, I find, also cited by Stein for the same purpose (Psychol. p. 168). He points out that Cleanthes explained the different soul functions by means of a πνεύμα διατείνου, and Chrysippus by a πνευμά πως ἔχον. The former regarded only the grade, while the latter also distinguished the kind of tension. It is possible that this passage also points to the different treatment of φαντασία by Cleanthes and Chrysippus (cf. frag. 3), Cleanthes insisting more strongly on the immediate contact of the psychical air-current with the sense organ (Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, n. 728). Hirzel's explanation (II. p. 201) is vitiated by his fundamental error as to Cleanthes' view of the ἡγεμονικόν. See also on Zeno frag. 93. There is a certain affinity between the doctrine here mentioned and that attributed to Strato of Lampsacus by Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 350, οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν (scil. τὴν διάνοιαν) εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διὰ τινῶν ὁπῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσαν, ἢς στάσεως ἤρξε Στράτων ὁ φυσικός. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 46, viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares, a sede animi perforatae.

44. Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. 6. 33. 849 P. 304 S., ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Λίσωπος οὐ κακῶς ἔφη τοὺς ἃς κεκραγέναι μέγιστον ὅταν ἔλκωνται. συνειδέναι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο χρησίμως ἢ πλὴν εἰς τὴν θυσίαν· διὸ καὶ Κλεάνθης φησίν ἃνθ' ἀλῶν αὐτοῖς ἐχειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἵνα μὴ σατῆ τὰ κρέα. The same saying is attributed to Chrysippus by Cic. N.D. ii. 160, sus vero quid habet praeter escam? cui quidem ne putesceret animam ipsam pro sale datam dicit esse Chrysippus: to which add Porphyry de Abstin. iii. 20, ἣ δὲ ὅς, ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν χαρίτων τὸ ἡδίστον (scil. τοῦ Χρυσίππου), οὐ δὲ ἄλλο τι πλὴν θύεσθαι ἐγεγόνει, καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ θεὸς οἶον ἄλας ἐνέμιζεν. Elsewhere the statement is ascribed to no definite author. Cic. Fin.
v. 38, ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. Varro de R. R. p. 4, 10, suillum pecus donatum ab natura dicunt ad epulandum. itaque iis animam datam esse proinde ac salem quae servaret carnem. Plut. Quaest. Conv. v. 10, 3, διό καὶ τῶν Στωικῶν ἐνοι τὴν ὑπηνή σάρκα κρέα γεγοιέναι λέγουσι, τῆς ψυχῆς ὅσπερ ἄλων παρεσπαρμένης ὑπὲρ τοῦ διαμένειν. Lastly, we have two passages of similar import in which a suggested derivation of ὅς from θύειν is referred to: Clem. Alex. p. 20. 105, p. 174 S. p. 484 P., λέγεται γοῦν τινα τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων ἐτυμολογοῦντα τὴν ἐν θύν εἶναι φάναι, ὡς εἰς θύσιν καὶ σφαγῆν μόνον ἐτιτήδειον δεδοσθαί γάρ τῶδε τῷ ζώῳ ψυχήν πρὸς οὖδεν ἔτερον ἡ ἐνεκα τοῦ τὰς σάρκας σφριγάν. Varro R. R. p. 4, 9, sus Graece dicitur ὅς, olim θύειν dictus ab illo verbo, quod dicunt θύειν, quod est inmolar. ab suillo enim [genere] pecore inmolanditi initium primum sumptum videtur; eius vestigia quod initiis Ceres porci inmollantur.

Everything in the world is created for and adapted to a special end; the existence of various animals is used as an argument to prove the government of the world by πρόνοια (cf. the context in Cic. N.D. 1. c.). In a similar spirit Epict. Diss. p. 8. 7 says that asses were intended to bear burdens, and that, as for this purpose they must walk, imagination has been given them to enable them to do so.

The passages here collected, as well as Zeno frag. 43, shew conclusively that Stein's theory (Psych. p. 92 f.) that the vital principle of animals is not ψυχή, but something midway between φύσις and ψυχή, ought not to be accepted. He contends that Marcus Aurelius is the first Stoic who expressly gives ψυχή to animals, but cf. Zeno frag. 50, spiritum...fore non naturam, sed animam et quidem rationabilem, which clearly points to the ἀλογος ψυχή of

45. Plut. de sollertia animalium xi. 2, 3, ὁ μὲν οὖν Κλεάνθης ἔλεγεν, καίπερ οὐ φάσκων μετέχειν λόγου τὰ ζώα, τοιαύτη θεωρία παρατυχεῖν μύρμηκας ἐκθέειν ἐπὶ μυρμηκιών ἔτέραν μύρμηκα νεκρὸν φέροντας· ἀνίοντας οὖν ἐκ τῆς μυρμηκίας ἔτέρουσι οἷον ἐντυγχάνειν αὐτοῖς καὶ πάλιν κατέρχεσθαι· καὶ τούτο διὸ τὴς γενεσθαί τέλος δὲ, τοὺς μὲν κάτωθεν ἀνενεγκεῖν ὡσπερ Λύτρα τοῦ νεκροῦ σκόληκα, τοὺς δὲ ἐκείνουν ἀραμένους, ἀποδόντας δὲ τοῦ νεκροῦ οἴχεσθαί. Aelian Nat. An. vi. 50, Κλεάνθην τὸν Ἀσσιοῦν κατηνάγκασε καὶ ἄκοντα ἐξεὶ καὶ ἀποστήνααί τοὺς ζῴους τοὺς καὶ ἐκείνα λογισμοῦ μὴ διαμαρτάνειν, ἀντιλέγοντα ἵσχυρός καὶ κατὰ κράτος, ἱστορία τοιαύτῃ, φασίν. ἔτυχεν ο Κλεάνθης καθήμενος καὶ μέντοι καὶ σχολήν ἄγων μακροτέραν ἄλλως· οὐκοῦν μύρμηκας παρὰ τοῖς ποσῶν ἦσαν αὐτῷ πολλοῦ· ο δὲ ἄρα ὅρα ἐξ ἀτραποῦ τινος ἔτέρας νεκρὸν μύρμηκα μύρμηκας ἄλλους κομίζοντας εἰς οἴκον ἔτέρων, καὶ ἔαντος οὐ συντρόφων καὶ ἐπὶ γε τῷ χείλει τῆς μυρμηκίας ἐστώτας αὐτῷ νεκρῶ, καὶ ἀνίοντας κάτωθεν ἔτέρους καὶ συνύοντας τοῖς ξένοις ὡς ἐπὶ τινι, εἶτα κατίοντας τοὺς αὐτοὺς, καὶ πλεονάκις τούτοι καὶ τελευτῶντας σκώληκα, οἴονει λύτρα, κομίζει τοὺς δὲ ἐκείνου μὲν λαβεῖν, προέσθαι δὲ ὁνπερ οὖν ἐπήγγοντο νεκρῶν· καὶ ἐκείνους ὑποδέξασθαι ἀσμένως, ὡς ιῶν κομιζομένους ἢ ἀδελφῶν.

μετέχειν λόγου τὰ ζώα: for animals possess indeed ψυχήν, but not ψυχῆν λόγον ἐχουσαν καὶ διάνοιαν: hence the term ἄλογα ζώα: cf. Sext. Math. xi. 99 foll:—the Stoics say that the courage of certain of the nobler (γενναία) animals proves that τὸ καλὸν is φύσει αἰρετῶν, but only
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ἡ φρονίμη διάθεσις can discern τὸ καλὸν: hence ὁ ἀλεκτρύων καὶ ὁ ταῦτας μὴ μετέχοντα τῆς φρονίμης διαθέσεως οὐκ ἀν βλέποι τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν. Hermes ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 41. 6, p. 284, 12, τῶς οὖν ὅρωμεν τινα τῶν ἀλόγων ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη χρώμενα, οἷον τοὺς μύρμηκας τὰς τροφὰς ἀποθησαυρίζομένους τοῦ χειμῶνος. It was easier, however, for the Stoics than for those who separate the soul of man from that of animals by a sharp dividing line, to make the admission which circumstances forced upon Cleanthes. For the soul of man differs from that of animals in degree only and not in kind; it is the same substance, though varying in its degrees of purity, which permeates inorganic matter as ἔξις, plants as φύσις, and men and animals as ψυχή (Diog. L. vii. 139). Chrysippus believed that dogs possessed the power of inference (Sext. Pyrrh. i. 69). Stein, Psychol. n. 165, is mistaken in quoting Ael. N.A. iv. 45 as an authority bearing on this subject. The passage, when cited in full, is seen to have an entirely different application: "Ομηρος μὲν οὖν φησίν "ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ παιδα καταφθιμένοι λιπέσθαι," ἐοικε δὲ ἡ φύσις δεικνύαι, ὦτι καὶ φίλον ἐαυτῷ τιμωρῶν καταλιπτεῖν, ὦ φίλε "Ομηρε, κέρδος ἐστίν, οἶον τι καὶ περὶ Ζήνωνος καὶ Κλεάνθους νοοῦμεν εἰ τι (οὐ ἐιτε) ἀκούομεν, i.e. it was an advantage to Zeno to leave his friend Cleanthes behind him to uphold his doctrines.

μύρμηκας: cf. Cie. N.D. iii. 21, num existimatas formicam anteponendam esse huic pulcherrimae urbi, quod in urbe sensus sit nullus, in formica non modo sensus sed etiam mens ratio memoria? Aristotle allowed that some animals, and especially bees, possessed νοῦς (cf. Grote's Aristotle, p. 483).

ἄλλως: "aimlessly": so Eur. Hipp. 375, ἦδη ποτ' ἄλλως νυκτὸς ἐν μακρῷ χρόνῳ θυητῶν ἐφράντισ' ἦ διέφθαρται βίος.
ἐξ ἀτραποῦ τινος ἐτέρας: alluding to the practice of ants to use one narrow path in passing backwards and forwards between their hole and any other place. Cf. Verg. Aen. iv. 404, praedamque per herbas convectant calle angusto. Georg. i. 379, angustum formica terens iter, where Forbiger refers to Arist. Hist. An. ix. 38, ἀεὶ μίαν ἀτραποῦν πάντες βαδίζουσιν.

46. Cic. N. D. i. 37, idemque (Cleanthes) quasi delirans in iis libris, quos scripsit contra voluptatem, tum tingit formam quandam et speciem deorum, tum divinitatem omnem tribuit astris, tum nihil ratione censet esse divinus.

quasi delirans: for the treatise περὶ ἡδονῆς see Introd. p. 53.

formam quandam: either (1) an allusion to the allegorical explanations of the popular deities, whereby they are identified with the powers of nature, or (2) referring to ἀνικὴτοις ἐν χερσίν in the hymn to Zeus, as Prof. Mayor suggests.

astris: this position is proved at length in N. D. ii. 40—44, cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 21. 5. p. 185, 5, ἐν ὧν (αἴθερὶ) τὰ ἀστρα καθίδρυται...θεῖα τὴν φύσιν ὄντα καὶ ἐμψυχα καὶ διοικούμενα κατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν.

47. Plut. Comm. Not. 31, 5, ἀλλὰ Χρυσιστόσ καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐμπεπληκότες, ὃς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν τὴν γῆν τὸν ἁέρα τὴν θάλατταν οὐδένα τῶν τοσοῦτων ἀφθαρτον οὐδ’ ἀδιόν ἀπολελοίπασι, πλὴν μόνον τοῦ Διός, εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκονσι τοὺς ἄλλους... ταῦτα δὲ οὐ...τοῖς δόγμασι ἐπεται, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ μέγα βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν καὶ προνοίας εἰμαρμένης τε καὶ φύσεως γράμμασι διαρρήθην λέγουσι τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς ἀπαντας εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησαμένους ὑπὸ πυρὸς, τηκτοὺς κατ’ αὐτοὺς ὀσπέρ κηρίνους ἢ καττιτερίνους ὄντας.

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ἐμπεπληκότες: the Stoics would readily admit this: Cicero makes his Stoic say:—quidquid enim magnam utilitatem generi adferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur (N.D. II. 60).

Διὸς: Zeus is here identified, as often, with the supreme Stoic God: see Zeller, p. 358.

ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν κ.τ.λ. Chrysippus wrote περὶ θεῶν (Diog. vii. 148), περὶ προνοίας (ib. 139), περὶ εἰμαρρένης (ib. 149), and φυσικά (ib. 39). For Cleanthes περὶ θεῶν see Introd. p. 51.


48. Stob. Ecl. i. 1. 12. p. 25, 3. Κλεάνθους. κύδιστ’ ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε, παγκρατεῖς αἰεῖ, Ζεῦ, φύσεως ἀρχηγόν, νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν, χαίρε σε γὰρ πάντεσσι θέμις θυντοῖσι προσανδάν. ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, ἄγχον μιμήμα λαχόντες μόνον, ὥσα ξωεὶ τε καὶ ἔρπει θυτή’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν’ τῷ σε καθυμνήσω καὶ σοῦ κράτος αἰεὶν ἀείσω. σοὶ δι’ πᾶς ὄδε κόσμος, ἐλισσόμενος περὶ γαῖαν, πειθείσαι, ὡς κεν ᾠγς, καὶ ἑκὼν ὑπὸ σεῖο κρατεῖσαι τοῖον ἔχεις ὑπορεγὼν ἀνικήτως ἐνὶ χερσὶν ἀμφίηκῃ, πυρόεντ’, αἰείζωντα κεραυνὸν τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πληγῆς φύσεως πάντ’ ἐρρίγα <σιν>· ὅ συ κατευθύνεις κοινῶν λόγον, ὡς διὰ πάντων φοιτᾶ, μιγνύμενος μεγάλοις μικροῖς τε φάεσον’ [ὡς τόσος γεγαως ὑπᾶτος βασιλεύς διὰ παντός,] οὐδὲ τι γίγνεται ἐργὸν ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαίμον, 15 οὐτε κατ’ αἰθέριον θείον πόλον οὐτ’ ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
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1. πολυόνυνμε : not merely in the popular religion, but more particularly from the Stoic standpoint, cf. Diog. L. vii. 147 δημιουργὸν τῶν ὦλων, καὶ ὄσπερ πατέρα πάντων· καὶ καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ δήκον διὰ πάντων, ἡ πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσονομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. See also Krische, p. 401; Stein, Psych. n. 74.


4. ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν. Cf. Act. Apost. xvii. 28, where the words τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμὲν are quoted by St Paul. The divergence in reading points to the fact
that these words were taken from the Phaenomena of Aratus, l. 5, rather than from the present passage.

ηχου: so MS. F, an unmetrical and senseless reading, not yet satisfactorily corrected. The vulg. ιδης is a conjecture of Bruck, and is destitute of authority. Meineke read γενόμεσθα λόγου; Wachsm. (Comm. ii. p. 18) suggested νοῦ σοῦ (or ά δη σοῦ) τμῆμα, and now proposes τίμημα for μίμημα; Usener ‘cum appareat ηχου ex glossemate natum esse’ ιδης (a word coined from ιδείν). None of these are convincing, and all are inferior to Bergk’s ολου, which might have been adopted, had it satisfactorily accounted for the MS. reading. Wachsmuth indeed says that it introduces “sententiam a Stoicis alienam,” but he must have failed to remember frag. 24, which shows that it is a favourite thought with Cleanthes to represent the individual as a counterpart of the divine cosmos. It appears to me that an allusion to “speech” is not here appropriate, in spite of Zeller (p. 215). Meineke’s λόγου, if adopted, would mean “reason” (not “speech”), cf. Euseb. P. E. xv. 15, p. 817 d (quoted by Wachsm.) κοινονιαν δ’ υπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους (seil. θεού καὶ ἀνθρώπων) διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν. If γενόμεσθα is accepted for γένος ἐσμέν, perhaps μόνου or ἐκ σοῦ.

5. όσα: for the omission of the antecedent cf. Soph. Ai. 1050, Trach. 350, and for the sense Hom. Il. 17. 447, Od. 18. 131. Hirzel argues (ii. 201—210), mainly relying on this passage, that Cleanthes was not a pantheist in the full sense of the term, and that he allowed only a limited extension to the divine πνεύμα: but see Introd. p. 41.

6. αἰσω: αἴδω F, whence αἴδω Wachsm.; but the present is very awkward after καθυμνήσω, and it is by no means clear that Cleanthes would have preferred αἰσομαι (see the evidence collected by Veitch s. v.).

7. κόσμος is here used, as Krische, p. 425, has observed,
in the less extended sense mentioned in Diog. vii. 138, καὶ ἀντὶν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον εἶναι: hence ἐλισσόμενος = κυκλοφορητικός.


κεραυνόν: for the physical explanation cf. Zeno frag. 74. But to Cleanthes κεραυνός is only another name for πληγὴ πυρὸς, which he identifies with τόνος, cf. Heraclit. frag. 28. Byw. τὰ δὲ πάντα οὐκαίζει κεραυνός.

11. ἐφρύασιν: so Ursinus and most edd. for ἑρηγα F "in quo postea spatium 10 litt.," which might suggest ἑργα <δαμάσθη>: but there are similar spaces after vv. 12 and 13, and the text at this point is generally suspicious. Wachsm. formerly marked a lacuna after this line, but now agrees with Hirzel, II. p. 118, n. 1, in referring οὗ in v. 12 to κεραυνόν.

13. μεγάλων μικροῖσι F, which Petersen tries to defend, was corrected by Brunck. The reference is to the sun, moon, and stars. For the general sense cf. Zeno frag. 45. A lacuna was marked after this line by Mein., who is followed by Wachsm. But it is equally possible that v. 14 is a spurious or corrupt addition, for (1) the sense is complete without it, (2) διὰ πάντος is suspicious after διὰ πάντων in v. 12, (3) it is difficult to imagine any context which would prevent ὦς τόσσος γεγαως from being frigid, if not obscure, (4) the excessive sigmatism is pointless.

17—20. πλην ὑπόσα κ.τ.λ. The explanations given by the Stoics of this weak point in their system are hopelessly confused and contradictory, as may be seen from an examination of the passages cited in the notes to Zeller, p. 189—193. We have had occasion to refer to
this subject before (frag. 18), and, putting together that passage and the present, we may perhaps suppose that Cleanthes accounted for the existence of moral evil somewhat as follows:—evil is not directly due to God, but is a necessary accompaniment of the process, whereby he created the world out of himself. At the same time, the omnipotence of God is vindicated by the consideration that evil is ultimately swallowed up in good, and that the apparent irregularity of nature is in reality only a phase in the working of a higher law. Chrysippus is inconsistent here, as elsewhere (cf. Diog. L. vii. 180), but to some extent, at least, he agreed with Cleanthes: ὡς τῶν αἰσχρῶν τὸ θεῖον παραίτιον γίνεσθαι οὐκ εὐλογοῦν ἐστιν (Plut. Sto. Rep. 33, 2). We may compare Plato’s words Rep. ii. 379 c, οὐδ’ ἄρα ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἁγαθός, πάντων ἀν εἰη αἰτίος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτίος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιοις' πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῶν μὲν ἁγαθῶν οὐδένα ἀλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀλλ’ ἄττα δεὶ ζητεῖν τὰ αἰτια, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῶν θεῶν. See further Gereke Chrysippea, p. 699.

24. κοινὸν νόμον. Cf. infra frag. 73. No doubt Cleanthes remembered Heracl. frag. 91. Byw. ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονεῖν.

25. κεν belongs to the verb, Madv. § 137.

26. ἂνευ κακοῦ...ἀλλὰ F, ἄνοι Wachsm., κακὸν...ἀλλο Sauppe.

28. οὐδὲν κόσμω: this phrase is used by Herod. and Thuc. as an equivalent for ἀτάκτως. Here it means "inordinately, recklessly." Cleanthes was probably influenced by Homer’s fondness for μᾶς ἀτάρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον (Il. 2. 214 etc.) and the like. al. οὐδ’ ἐνι κόσμῳ.

30, 31. ἄλλοτεν Usener, φέρονται Mcineke, while in 31 Wachsm. suggests πένεσθαι for γενέσθαι. The sense is
unsatisfactory, but as the text is so mutilated conjecture seems hazardous. Mohrnik (pp. 34—44) has a long discussion on these lines, which he calls the hardest in the Hymn. As the text stands, l. 31 must mean that the effect of the actions of the φαῦλοι is just the opposite to that which they intend.

32. ἀργικέραυνε. Cf. Ζεῦς ἄργης, an expression used by Empedocles to denote fire (R. and P. § 131), Zeno frag. 116, Ἁργην δὲ ἐπειδὴ φασὶ τὸν ἄργητα κεραυνὸν.

33. μὲν: add. Scaliger, but perhaps we should read ἐκρόου. ἀπειροσύνης i.e. ἀγνοια, the condition of the φαῦλοι.


49. Philodem. de Mus. col. 28, 1, εἰ μὴ γε π>ἀρὰ Κλεάνθ<θ>ει λέγειν <αὑτὰ> θελήσουσ<ι>ν, ὡς φησιν ἀμείνο<νά>γε εἰναι τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ <μουσ>ικὰ παρα-δεῖ<γμ>ατα, καὶ, τοῦ <λόγ>ον τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἵκαιον<ς> μὲν ἐξαγ<γ>έλλει<ν>δυναμένου τὰ θε<θ>ε<ι>α καὶ ἀ<ν>θρωπο<ν>οῦς ἕξουν<τ>ος δὲ πυλοῦ τῶν θείων μεγεθῶν λέξεις οἰκείας, τὰ μέτρ<ρα> καὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ὡς μᾶλ<ι>στα προσικνεὶσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς τῶν θείων θ<εω>ρίας.

For the general sense, cf. Plat. Rep. x. 607 α, εἰδέναι ὡς <ο>ν μόνον ὑμνοῦς θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκάμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν. The underlying thought is that it is impossible to define the nature of God: cf. Hermes, ap. Stob. Ecl. II. 1. 26, θεον νοῆσαι μὲν χαλέπον, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον. Plat. Tim. 28 c, 29 c, d. The construction is not quite clear. Zeller, in citing this passage (p. 342, 1), puts a full stop after οἰκείας, but this makes τὰ μέτρα κ.τ.λ. very abrupt, and it is better to regard καὶ before τοῦ λόγου as connecting εἰναι and
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προσικνείσθαι, although this leaves ύμείνονα without an object.

ψιλοῦ: bare prose, i.e. stripped of the advantages of metre. The history of the word is well explained in Jebb’s Appendix to Oed. Col. 866. Cf. Plat. Menex. p. 239 B, C, ποιηταὶ...ἐν μουσικῇ ύμνήσαντες...ἐὰν οἷς ἥμεις ἐπιχειρῶμεν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ψιλῷ κοσμεῖν. ψιλὸς λόγος also means “abstract reasoning” (Dr Thompson on Phaedr. 262 c), and a “bare statement” unsupported by evidence, Dem. Androt. § 22, Aphob. i. § 54.

τῶν...ολκείας, “expressions suitable to the divine majesty.”

50. Senec. Epist. 108, 10, Nam, ut dicebat Cleanthes, quemadmodum spiritus noster clariorem somum reddit, quem illum tuba, per longi canalis angustias tractum, potentioram novissimo exitu effudit: sic sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit.

tuba. Greek trumpets were long and straight, ending in a bell-shaped aperture (κώδων), cf. Aesch. Eum. 567, διάτορος Τυρσηνική σάλπιγξ βροτείου πνεύματος πληρουμένη ύπέρτονου γῆρυμα φαινέτω, and Soph. Ai. 17, where Odysseus compares the voice of Athene to the sound of a trumpet.


51. Sext. Math. ix. 88, ὃ δὲ Κλεάνθης οὕτως συνη-ρώτα: εἰ φύσις φύσεώς ἐστι κρείττων, εἰν ὡν τις ἄριστη
This argument for the existence of God is stated in different language and a somewhat amplified form by Cic. N. D. ii. 33—36 : cf. especially § 35.

2. φύσις: the vital principle of plants. Zeno frag. 43.

ei...ēst...ēn an: in this form of the conditional sentence the inference is stated less bluntly than if the indicative were used: see Madv. § 135 r, 1 a. This is especially frequent with ἐθέλω or βούλομαι in the pro-tasis: cf. Stallb. ad Plat. Symp. 208 c. Eur. Alc. 1079.
A close parallel to the use here is Dem. xxxvi. 44, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι πίστις ἀφορμὴ πασῶν ἐστὶ μεγίστη πρὸς χρηματισμόν, πάν ἂν ἀγνοήσειας.

12. καί: Bekker proposed to read ἀλλὰ or καί μὴν, but Wachsmuth's καίτοι is preferable.
15. περιγένοιτο: for the optative in protasis, see Jebb on Soph. Ai. 521, Ant. 666.
16. δυσμαῖς: cf. Ar. Poet. c. 21, § 13, 1457 b 22, ἡ ὡ γῆρας πρὸς βίου καὶ ἔσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν' ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν ἐσπέραν γῆρας ἡμέρας, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἔσπέραν βίου ἥ, ὡσπερ Εμπέδοκλῆς, δυσμαῖς βίου. Cf. Aesch. Ag. 1123, βίου δύντος αὐγαῖς. The difficulty of attaining ἀρετή, in the Stoic sense, is illustrated by the fact that even Soerates and Antisthenes were only regarded as προκόπτοντες (Diog. vii. 91); and Alexander says that they admit the existence of a good man here and there, ὡσπερ τι παράδοξον ζῷον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, σπανιότερον τοῦ Φοίνικος (de Fato, c. 28). In Diog. l. c. the fact that φαῦλοι can become ἀγαθοὶ is given as a proof that virtue is teachable. Hirzel has traced the development of the doctrine of the wise man within the Stoa, and shews that by the earlier Stoics (Zeno and his immediate pupils) the ideal was regarded as attainable and as actually realised by themselves (pp. 274—277).

20. ἀπαίτούντος. The preposition conveys the idea of demanding as of right: cf. ἀποδοῦναι as used in the Halonnesus dispute (Aeschin. Ctes. § 83).

52. Cic. N. D. ii. 13—15. Cleanthes quidem noster quattuor de causis dixit in animis hominum informatas deorum esse notiones. primam posuit eam, de qua modo dixi, quae orta esset ex praesensione rerum futurarum:
alteram quam ceperimus ex magnitudine commodorum, quae percipiuntur caeli temperatione, fecunditate terrarum, aliarumque commoditatum complurium copia: tertiam quae terreret animos fulminibus, tempestatibus, nimbis, nivibus, grandinibus, vastitate, pestilentia, terrae motibus et saepe fremitibus, lapideisque imbribus et guttis imbrium quasi cruentis, tum labibus aut repentinis terrarum hiatibus, tum praeter naturam hominum pecudumque portentis, tum facibus visis cælestibus, tum stellis iis, quae Graeci cometas nostri cincinnatas vocant... tum sole geminato... quibus extrerriti homines vim quandam esse cælestem et divinam suspicati sunt. quartam caussam esse camque vel maximam aequabilitatem motus, conversionem caeli, solis, lunae, siderumque omnium distinctionem, varietatem, puleritudinem, ordinem, quarum rerum aspectus ipse satis indicaret non esse ea fortuita. 

20 Cic. N. D. III. 16, nam Cleanthes, ut dicebas, quattuor modis formatas in animis hominum putat deorum esse notiones. unus is modus est... qui est susceptus ex praesensione rerum futurarum. alter ex perturbationibus tempestatibus et reliquis motibus. tertius ex commoditate rerum quas perspicimus et copia. quartus ex astrorum ordine caeliique constantia.

1. *Cleanthes.* Mr Bywater concludes (Journ. Phil. vii. 75 foll.) that Cleanthes was largely indebted to Aristotle’s dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας for his statement of the four reasons given for the origin of a belief in gods, and proves that the first and fourth in the series were derived from that work.

2. *informatas.* It is to be observed that Cleanthes regards the idea of God’s existence as derived entirely from our experience of external objects, and not as an innate conception. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, n. 737.

4. *praesensione:* this argument depends on the exis-
tence of ἀντική, ἥ δὲ ὀνείρων πρόρρησις etc. (Sext. Math. ix. 132), which are described as πλήθος πραγμάτων πεπιστευμένων ἤδη παρὰ πᾶσιν ἄνθρωποις. Krische, p. 419, attributes some further arguments to Cleanthes, which the evidence does not warrant.

7. tertium: there does not appear to be any extant parallel to this in the Greek texts. Although there is no reason to suppose that we have not here a reproduction of the general argument of Cleanthes, at the same time it is probable that Cicero has enlarged the list of portents from Roman sources. The prodigies mentioned are those which constantly meet us in Livy, as requiring expiation by lustrationes, supplicationes, lectisternia etc. Lists of prodigies illustrating those mentioned here by Cicero will be found in Liv. xx. 62, xxii. 1, xxiv. 44, xxvi. 23, etc. Tac. H. i. 86, Juv. xiii. 65—70, and above all in the exhaustive account of Lucan, i. 525—583.


14. cometas: for the physical explanation, cf. on Zeno, frag. 75.

16. quartum: for a fuller statement of the fourth argument, cf. Sext. Math. ix. 111—118, ib. ix. 26—27: in the last passage it is simply introduced by the term ἐνιού, but from its position between an argument of Epicurus and one belonging to some "younger Stoics," Mr Bywater (Journ. Phil. vii. 76) infers that its immediate source was one of the earlier Stoics, possibly Cleanthes.

17. aequabilitatem. "Cicero is probably translating some such phrase as ὀμαλότητα κινήσεως, φορὰν οὐρανοῦ," Prof. Mayor.

53. Epiphan. adv. Haeres iii. 2. 9 (iii. 37), Κλεάνθης τὸ ἄγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν λέγει εἶναι τὰς ἡδονὰς, καὶ ἄνθρωπον
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έκαλει μόνην τήν ψυχήν, καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς μυστικὰ σχήματα ἐλεγεν ἐναὶ καὶ κλήσεις ἱεράς, καὶ δαδοὺχον ἔφασκεν ἐναι τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὸν κόσμου μύστας καὶ τοὺς κατόχους τῶν θείων τελετὰς ἐλεγεν.

tὸ ἀγαθὸν...ήδονάς. An obvious blunder. Krische, p. 431 n. 1, suggests that the writer of the epitome has confounded the statement by Cleanthes of his opponents' position with his own teaching.

ἄνθρωπον κ.τ.λ. Not much can be made of this mutilated statement; possibly it points to the doctrine of the soul regarded as the bond of union for the body. Stein, Psych. p. 209, finds here a trace of the correspondence between the macrocosm and the microcosm, and quotes frag. 106 τοὺς ἀπαίδευτους μόνη τῇ μορφῇ τῶν θηρίων διαφέρειν.

τοὺς θεοὺς κ.τ.λ. These obscure words appear to represent an explanation of the Eleusinian mysteries from the Stoic point of view, in which the sun as the ἡγεμονικὸν is symbolised by the torchbearer who marches at the head of the procession of mystae, and (adopting Diels' corrections, v. infra) the world itself corresponds to the mystery play, while those who are inspired with divine truth are the priests. Cf. Porphyr. ap. Euseb. P. E. III. 12. p. 116, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατ᾽ Ἑλευσίνα μυστηρίους ὁ μὲν ἱεροφάντης εἰς εἰκόνα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐνσκευάζεται, δαδούχος δὲ εἰς τὴν ἥλιον. For the subject in general see Prof. Mayor on Cic. N. D. I. 119. Mr Bywater however (Journ. Phil. VII. 78) believes that we have here a mutilated argument, ultimately derived from Aristotle's dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας, and explaining the belief in the gods as due to a feeling of awe and admiration consequent on the contemplation of the heavenly bodies. The allusion to the mysteries is brought in by way of comparison: "we seem introduced into a temple like that at Eleusis, only more august and solemn, because the figures [= the hea-
venly bodies] we see circling around us are not lifeless or made with hands, and the celebrants are not men, but the immortal gods." This explanation is fortified by a reference to Dio. Chrys. xii. p. 387 B, Plut. de tranq. 20, p. 477 c, d (also quoted by Diels). For μυστικά σχήματα see Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 130, and for κλήσεις ιεράς ib. p. 62.

μύστασ...τελετάς. Diels, p. 592, who records other suggestions, has μυστήριον...τελεστάς. Perhaps, from a comparison of Chrysipp. ap. Etym. M. 751, 16 id. Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, we ought to restore τοὺς κατόχους τῶν θείων <φόνησ> τελετάς.


Cicero's paraphrase, which omits all mention of Cleanthes, is as follows (N. D. i. 41):—in secundo autem vult Orphaei, Musaei, Hesiodi Homerique fabellas accomodare ad ea, quæ ipse primo libro de dis immortalibus dixerat, ut etiam veterrimi poetæ, qui haec ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici suisse videantur. As far as Cleanthes is concerned the direct evidence only applies to Homer: see Introd. p. 51, but cf. frag. 111. This passage is included by Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 16) under the fragments of the book peri θεῶν.

55. Plut. de audiendis poëtis c. 11, δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀμελῶς ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν Κλεάνθους παραιτεῖσθαι κατειρωνεύεται γὰρ ἐστιν ὅτε προσποιούμενος ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὸ
Zev πάτερ Ἰδηθεν μεδέων,
καὶ τὸ

Zev ἀνα Δωδώναϊε,
κελεύον ἀναγιγνώσκειν ύφ’ ἐν, ὡς τὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμιώμενον ἀέρα διὰ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν Ἀναθυμιώμενον ὄντα. Wachsmuth cites Schol. B L Homer II 233 Zev ἀνα Δωδώναϊε] τινὲς δὲ ἀναθυμιώμενε ὕφ’ ἐν παρὰ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν (?)

This comes from the book περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ according to Krische, p. 433, and Wachsm., Comm. i. p. 17. Zev πάτερ Ἰδηθεν μεδέων, II. III. 276, 320: Zev ἀνα Δωδώναϊε, II. xvi. 233.

παιδιάν. It is worthy of observation that Plut. distinctly suggests that Cleanthes was not serious in his etymologies: see Introd. p. 43, 44, and cf. Plat. Cratyl. 406 B, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ σπουδαίως εἰρημένος ὁ τρόπος τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ παιδικῶς.

ἀναθυμιώμενον: a reference to the feeding of the celestial bodies by exhalations of coarser material, cf. frag. 29 ὥκεανὸς δ’ ἐστὶ...ής τὴν ἀναθυμιώμενον ἐπινέμεται. Cornut. c. 17, p. 84 Osann. ἡρ κατὰ ἀνάδοσιν. It may be observed that the attribution of this doctrine to Thales by Stob. Ecl. i. 10, 12, p. 122, 18 cannot be relied upon.

56. Plut. de Is. et Osir. 66, Φερσεφόνην δὲ φησὶ ποὺ Κλεάνθης τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον καὶ φονεύμενον πνεῦμα.

Dübner translates: spiritus qui per fruges dum fertur interimitur. Probably this, as well as the seven following fragments, comes from the treatise περὶ θεῶν (Wachsm. Comm. i. p. 15). Cf. Plut. de Is. c. 40, where Demeter and Persephone are explained as τὸ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν καρπῶν διήκον πνεῦμα. Chrysipp. ap. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. col. 12, p. 79 Comp. καὶ τὴν Δήμητρα γῆν ἢ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ
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πνεῦμα. Cic. N. D. II. 66, ca (Proserpina) enim est quae Φερσεφόνη Graece nominatur, quam frugum semen esse volunt absconditamque quae est matre fingunt. Plato's derivations of the name will be found at Cratyl. 404 c, d. For modern views see Jebb on Soph. Ant. 894.

57. Macrobi. Sat. i. 18, 14, unde Cleanthes ita cognominatum scribit (Dionysum) ἀπὸ τοῦ διανύσαυ, quae cotidiano impetu ab oriente ad occasum diem noctemque faciendo caeli conflcit cursum.

In the Orphic hymn, quoted just before the present passage, Dionysus is derived from διῃσθαυ. He is elsewhere explained by the Stoics (1) as wine, Cic. N. D. ii. 60, cf. Plato's derivation from δίδωμι and οἶνος, the latter being resolved into οἴεσθαι and νοῦς, (2) as τὸ γόνιμον πνεῦμα καὶ τρόφιμον, Plut. de Is. c. 40. For the identification of Dionysus with the sun see the commentators on Verg. Georg. i. 5, vos, o clarissima mundi lumina, labentem caelo quae ducitis annum, Liber et alma Ceres.

58. Macrobi. Sat. i. 17, 8, Cleanthes (Apollinem) ὡς ἀπ' ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων τόπων τὰς ἀνατολὰς ποιοῦμεν, quod ab aliis atque aliis locorum declinationibus faciat ortus.

Chrysippus (Macrobi. l. c.) derived the word Ἀπόλλων from ἄ and πολύς, while Plato explains the various functions of the God by different etymologies of his name (Crat. p. 405 A—E), so that he is at once ἀπλοῦ, ἀεὶ βάλλοντος, ἀπολοῦντος, and ὁμοπολοῦντος (ib. p. 406 A).

59. Macrobi. Sat. i. 17. 36, Cleanthes Lycium Apollinem appellatum notat quod, veluti lupi pecora rapiunt, ita ipse quoque humorem eripit radiis.

Antipater in the same passage derives the name ἀπὸ τοῦ λευκαίνεσθαι πάντα φωτίζοντος ἥλιου, a guess, which,
so far as the etymology of Λύκειος is concerned, has found some favour in modern times (Müller Dor. p. 6 § 8). Probably Cleanthes did not recognise a distinction between the two titles Λύκειος and Λύκειος (Soph. El. 7), and the best modern opinion seems to agree with him to this extent: see Leaf on II. iv. 101. The connection of Apollo with wolves is indicated by the legends in Pausan. II. 9. 7, II. 19. 3. In Cornut. c. 32 the name is explained in connection with the pestilences brought by Apollo on flocks, which were therefore entrusted to him as Apollo Lycius. humorem eripit: cf. frags. 29 and 55.

60. Macrobr. Sat. 1. 17. 31, Λοξίας cognominatur, ut ait Oenopides, ὅτι ἐκπορεύεται τὸν λοξόν κύκλον ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπὶ ἀνατολᾶς κινούμενος, id est quod obliquum circulum ab occasu ad orientem pergit: aut, ut Cleanthes scribit, ἐπειδή καθ’ ἐλικας κινεῖται, λοξίαι γὰρ εἰσὶ καὶ αὐταί, quod flectensum iter pergit.


ἐλικας: for the obliquity of the sun’s course cf. frag. 29 and Diog. L. vili. 144 there quoted.

61. Photius s. v. λέσχαι, p. 158 ed. Herm., Κλεάνθης δὲ φησιν ἀπονενεμῆσθαι τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῶς λέσχας, ἐξε-δραὶς δὲ ὄμοιας γίνεσθαι, καὶ αὐτῶν δὲ τὸν Ἀπόλλων παρ’ ἐνίοις Λεσχηνόριον ἐπικαλείσθαι. So Suidas I. 541 s. v. Π. P.
λέσχαι. In Harpocrat. s.v. we get the additional information that these remarks were contained in the treatise περὶ θεῶν.

Cf. Plut. de ei ap. Delphos c. 2: Apollo is called Λεσχηνόριος, ὅταν ἐνεργῶσι καὶ ἀπολαύσι χρώμενοι τῷ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλους. The inference drawn by Wachsmuth seems correct, viz., that Cornutus took from Cleanthes the words found in c. 32, καὶ λεσχηνόριον δ’ αὐτόν (Ἀπόλλωνα) προσηγόρευσαν διὰ τὸ τὰς ἡμέρας ταῖς λέσχαις καὶ τῷ ὀμιλεῖν ἄλληλοις συνέχεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὰς δὲ νύκτας καθ’ έαυτούς ἀναπαύεσθαι. He remarks that Cornutus appears to have devoted much attention to the study of Cleanthes. Cf. Pers. Sat. v. 63, cultor enim iuvenum purgatas inseris aures fruge Cleanthea.

ἐξέδραις. These were recesses or alcoves sometimes branching out from an open air court, and fitted with stone seats; they were especially adapted for the conversation of philosophers and rhetoricians. Cf. Cic. Fin. v. 4, ego illa moveor exedra; modo enim fuit Carneadis; quem videre videor (est enim nota imago), a sedeque ipsa, tanta ingeni magnitudine orbata, desiderari illam vocem puto. "Vitruvius in his description of the palaestra, or gymnasium, such as were attached to Roman villas of the higher class, recommends that in three of the cloisters surrounding the court there should be exedrae spatiosae in quibus philosophi, rhetores, reliquique qui studiis delectantur sedentes disputare possint v. 11." Prof. Mayor on Cic. N.D. 1. 15. See also Becker, Charicles, p. 303. Guhl and Koner, p. 403.

όμοιας: the distinction between λέσχαι and ἐξέδραι seems to be that the former were separate buildings used entirely as lounges, whereas the latter were attached either to a private house or a public gymnasium.
62. *Cornut. c. 31 ad fin., τοὺς δὲ δωδέκα ἀθλοὺς ἐνδέχεται μὲν ἄναγαγεῖν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν, ὥς καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐποίησεν· οὖ δὲιν δὲ δοκεῖ πανταχοῦ εὑρεσι-λογον πρεσβεύειν.

It seems clear from the account of Cornutus that there were two current modes of allegorical interpretation of the myths which centre round Heracles. By one set of interpreters Heracles was regarded as an ordinary mortal and by others as a god. Cleanthes apparently explained the twelve labours from the latter point of view. An illustration of this line of interpretation may be seen in the explanation given by Cornutus of Heracles as an archer:

καὶ τοξότης δ' ἀν ὁ θεὸς παρεισάγωντο, κατὰ τε τὸ πανταχοῦ διϊκνεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ. But in the account of the twelve labours in Heraclitus, *All. Hom. c. 33*, Heracles is represented simply as a wise man who brought to light the hidden truths of philosophy: Ἡρακλέα δὲ νομιστέον οὐκ ἦπο σωματικῆς δυνάμεως ἀναχθέντα τοσοῦτον ἰσχύσαι τοῖς τότε χρόνοις. ἀλλ' ἀνήρ ἔμφρων καὶ σοφίας οὐρανίων μύστης γεγονός, ὡσπερεὶ κατὰ βαθείας ἀγλύνος ὑποδε-δυκυίαν ἐφώτισε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, καθάπερ ὡμολογοῦσι καὶ Στοικῶν οἱ δοκιμώτατοι. Zeller, pp. 368, 369, relying on the concluding words of the passage cited, thinks that the account is derived from Cleanthes, but, if so, there is a discrepancy with Cornutus. Krische (p. 400) on the other hand says:—"irre ich nicht, so führte Kleanthes, gleichwie später Porphyrius (bei Euseb. P.E. III. 112 c), die zwölf Arbeiten des Herakles auf die Bahn der Sonne durch die zwölf Zeichen des Zodiakus zurück (Cornut. de X. D. p. 91 G)."

εὑρεσιλογον: "expectes τόν," Lang. Osann interprets this to mean that Cornutus apologises for referring to the authority of Cleanthes by saying that such a trifler ought not to be respected in all cases. This derives a certain amount of support from Plutarch de aud. poēt. p. 31 where
Chrysippus is spoken of as εὑρεσιλογῶν ἀπιθάνως. But it seems strange that Cornutus should have alluded to Cleanthes in this manner. Why cannot the word be used in a good sense as in Diog. L. iv. 37? Mr Hicks suggests εὑρεσιλογίαν.

63. Schol. in Hom. II. III. 64, ap. Bekker, p. 99 b. 23, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἐν Λέσβῳ οὖτω τιμᾶσθαι χρυσῆν Ἀφροδίτην.

Wachsmuth (Comm. I. p. 15) classes this among the fragments of the work περὶ θεῶν, but there is more likelihood in Krische’s view (p. 433) that it belongs to the περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, for there is no reason to separate it from frags. 55 and 65. Perhaps Cleanthes tried to explain the currency of the epithet χρυσῆ by the existence of a gilded statue of Aphrodite at Lesbos. For the figurative meaning of χρυσοῦς = precious, which is perhaps all that is implied in the epithet, see Jebb on Soph. Ant. 699.

64. Athen. xiii. 572 f., πόρνης δὲ Ἀφροδίτης ἑρῶν ἐστι παρὰ Ἀβυδηνοῖς, ὡς φησὶ Πάμφιλος κατεχομένης γὰρ τις πόλεως δουλεία τοὺς φρουροὺς τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ ποτὲ θύσαντας, ὡς ἰστορεῖ Κλεάνθης ἐν τοῖς Μυθικοῖς, καὶ μεθυσθέντας ἑταῖρας πλείονας προσλαβεῖν ὅν μίαν, κατακοιμηθέντας αὐτοὺς ἰδοῦσαν, ἀνελομένην τὰς κλεῖς καὶ τὸ τεῖχος ὑπερβᾶσαν, ἀπαγγειλαῖ τοῖς Ἀβυδηνοῖς. τοὺς δ’ αὐτικὰ μεθ’ ὁπλῶν ἀφικομένους, ἀνελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φύλακας, κρατήσαντας δὲ τῶν τεῖχῶν καὶ γενομένους ἐγκρατεῖς τῆς ἐλευθερίας χαριστηρία τῇ πόρνῃ ἀποδίδοντας Ἀφροδίτης Πόρνης ναὸν ἱδρύσασθαι.

Πόρνης: cf. Aphrodite Pandemos, and the worship of Aphrodite Ourania at Corinth (Becker’s Charicles, p. 246). The object of Cleanthes was doubtless to explain away the discreditable legends attaching themselves to the gods, and thus in the present instance the debased worship at
Abydos is shown to be due to the accident of a historical circumstance, and not to the essential characteristics of the goddess. There is however considerable doubt as to the genuineness of this fragment, see Introd. p. 51.


Wachsmuth also quotes Eustath. in Hom. p. 1389, 55, τὸν "Ἀτλαντα...οἱ μὲν ἀλληγοροῦσιν εἰς τὴν ἀκάματον καὶ ἀκοπίστον πρόνοιαν τὴν πάντων αἰτίαν καὶ ὀλοφρόνων τὸν τουτοῦτον "Ἀτλαντα νοοῦσιν, ὡς τὸν ὑπὲρ ὀλων φρονοῦντα ἡγοῦν τῶν ὀλων φρονιστικῶν. διὸ καὶ Μ. Κλεάνθης, ὡς φασιν, ἐδίσυνε τὸ ὅ τῆς ἀρχούσης. Cf. Cornut. de nat. d. c. 26, ὀλοφρόνων δέ αὐτὸν ("Ἀτλαντα) εἰρήσθαι διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀλων φρονιστικῶν καὶ προνοείσθαι τῆς πάντων αὐτοῦ τῶν μερῶν σωτηρίας. See also Flach Glossen u. Scholien zur Hes. Th. p. 76. Cleanthes identified Atlas with πρόνοια, as holding together the framework of the world (cf. Εἰς).


This frag. is taken from Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 18): cf. Zeno, frag. 160, διαλέμπει τῆς ψυχῆς το φανταστικῶν καὶ παθητικῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διακεχυμένων. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 10a p. 89, 16, πάντες δὲ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγου. In this connection we may observe that Odysseus was taken by the Stoic school as one of the few typical wise men (Sen. de Const. 2. 1, de Benef. 13. 3). This is the earliest known instance of the word ἀλληγορία.

67. Certamen Homer. et Hesiod., p. 4, 18, ed. Nietzsch (in act. societ. philol. Lips. tom. i. fasc. 1), Εἰκάνικος μὲν


68. Porphyr. vit. Pythag. 1, 2, Κλεάνθης εὖ τῶν μυθικῶν Σύρου, ἐκ Τύρου τῆς Συρίας (sicl. Mnesarchus, the father of Pythagoras). σιτοδείας δὲ κατα- λαβοῦσις τοὺς Σαμίους προσπλεύσαντα τὸν Μυῆσαρ- χον κατ’ ἐμπορίαν μετὰ σῖτον τῇ νησίῳ καὶ ἀποδόμενον 5 τιμηθῆναι πολιτεία. Πυθαγόρου δὲ ἐκ παίδων εἰς πᾶσαν μάθησιν οὖντος εὐφυοὺς, τὸν Μυῆσαρχον ἀπαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν εἰς Τύρου, ἐκεῖ δὲ τοῖς Χαλδαίοις συστάντα μετασχεῖν τούτων ἐπὶ πλείον ποιήσαι, ἐπανελθόντα δ’ εἰς τὴν Ἰωνίαν ἐντεύθεν τὸν Πυθαγόραν πρῶτον μὲν Φερεκύδη τῷ Σύρῳ 10 ὀμιλήσαι δεύτερον δ’ Ἐρμοδάμαντι τῷ Κρεσφυλίῳ εὖ Σάμω ἤδη γηράσκοντε. λέγει δ’ ὁ Κλεάνθης ἄλλους εἶναι οὐ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ Τυρηνοῦ ἀποφαίνονται τῶν τὴν Λήμνου ἀποικησάντων ἐντεύθεν δὲ κατὰ πρᾶξιν εἰς Σάμου ἔλθοντα καταμείναι καὶ ἀστὸν γενέσθαι. πλέοντος δὲ τοῦ 15 Μυῆσάρχου εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν συμπλεύσαντα τὸν Πυθα- γόραν νέον οὖν κομιδῇ σφόδρα οὔσαν εὐδαιμόνα καὶ τὸν ὕστερον εἰς αὐτὴν ἀποπλεύσαι. καταλέγει δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄδελφος δύο Εὐνουστον καὶ Τυρηνῶν πρεσβυτέρους. Wachsmuth also quotes Clem. Alex. Strom. i. p. 129 S. ως δὲ Κλεάνθης (MSS. Neǎνθης) Σύριος ἢ Τύριος (fuit Pythagoras). Theodoret, Graec. aff. cur. p. 8, 43, ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης (MSS. Neǎνθης) Τύριον (Πυθαγόραν) ὀνομάζει.

This frag. must stand or fall with frag. 64. The facts
in the life of Pythagoras with which these statements are concerned will be found fully discussed by Zeller, pre-Socratics, i. p. 324 foll. After εὐδαιμονα in l. 16 some such word as αἰσθέσθαι seems wanted.

69. Pseudo-Plut. de Fluviorum nominibus, v. 3, παράκειται δ' [αὐτῷ] τὸ Καυκάσιον ὄρος· ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ τὸ πρότερον Βορέου κοίτη δι' αὐτίαν τουαύτην. Βορέας δὲ ἐρωτικῆν ἐπιθυμίαν Χιώνην ἀρπάσας, τὴν Ἀρκτοῦρον θυγατέρα, κατήνευκεν εἰς τινα λόφον Νιφάντην καλοῦμενον, καὶ ἐγέννησεν ἐκ τῆς προειρημένης υἱὸν Ἰτρηκα, 5 τὸν διαδεξάμενον Ἰνιόχον τὴν βασίλειαν. μετανομάσθη δὲ τὸ ὄρος κοίτη Βορέου. προσηγορεύθη δὲ Καύκασος διὰ περίστασιν τουαύτην. μετὰ τὴν γνιαντομαχίαν Κρόνος ἐκκλίνων τὰς Διός ἀπειλᾶς, ἐφυγεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν Βορέου κοίτης, καὶ εἰς κροκόδειλον μεταμορφωθεῖς <ἐλάθεν.> 10 ὁ δὲ Προμηθεὺς ἐνα τῶν ἐγχορίων ποιμένα, Καύκασον, ἀναταμών, καὶ κατανοήσας αὐτοῦ τὴν διάθεσιν τῶν ἐν πτωγίων, εἶπεν οὐ μακράν εἶναι τοὺς πολεμίους. ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς ἐπιφανεῖς τῶν μὲν πατέρα δήσας πλεκτῷ ἐρίῳ, κατεταράσωσε· τὸ δ' ὄρος εἰς τιμὴν τοῦ ποιμένος Καύ- 15 κασον μετανομάσας, προσέδησεν αὐτῷ τὸν Προμηθεὰ καὶ ἤναγκασεν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ σπλαγχνοφάγον ἀετοῦ βασανίζεσθαι, ὅτι παρηνόμησεν εἰς τὰ σπλάγχνα, ὥς ἰστορεῖ Κλεάνθης ἐν η' θεομαχίας.

The treatise de Fluviis was composed perhaps in the reign of Hadrian or Trajan, but all or nearly all the authorities which the author cites are impudent fictions. For further information see the Preface to Hercher's edition of the tract (Lips. 1851) and especially § 3.


10. μεταμορφωθεῖς. Wyttenbach saw that some words
had fallen out here, since a reference to Prometheus is required. He supplied therefore the words within brackets and substituted ἀναταμών for ἀναπαύον. For ἀναπαύον ἀναρπάζων (Reinesius) and ἀνασπῶν (Dodwell) have also been suggested.


ἡ δὲ τέως γλαφυρῆς ἐξεῖλετο φωριαμοῦ φάρμακον, ὁ ρρὰ τε φασὶ Προμήθειον καλέσθαι,

where a lengthy description of the plant and its virtues is given. Prop. i. 12. 9, num me deus obtuit, an quae lecta Prometheus dividit herba iugis.

71. Pseudo-Plut. de Fluv. xvii. 4, γεννᾶται δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ (Taygetus) βοτάνη καλουμένη Χαρισία ἥν <αι> γυναικὲς ἐαρὸς ἀρχομένου τοῖς τραχύλοις περιάπτουσι καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν συμπαθέστερον ἀγαπῶνται· καθὼς ἱστορεῖ Κλεάνθης ἐν α’ περι ὅρῶν.

Χαρισία: Hercher thinks this word is invented from the name of a city in Arcadia.

ETHICA.

In the extract from Clement, Krische, p. 423 n., proposes to insert the words \( \textit{Διογένης} \) δὲ between \( \xi \nu \) and \( \eta \nu \) \( \textit{εὐλογιστεῖν} \) on the evidence afforded by Diog. L. vii. 88, Stob. Eel. ii. 7. 6\textsuperscript{a}, p. 76, 9, who both expressively attribute the definition \( \textit{εὐλογιστεῖν} \) ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ to Diogenes Babylonius. His suggestion is approved by Wachsmuth (Comm. ii. p. 4) and Heinze, Stoic. Eth. p. 11 n. For the question as to whether Cleanthes first introduced the words τῇ φύσει into the definition, see on Zeno, frag. 120.

73. Diog. L. vii. 89, φύσιν δὲ \( \textit{Χρύσιππος} \) μὲν ἔξακοκεῖ, ἡ ἀκολουθώς δὲ \( \xi \nu \), τὴν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἑδίως ἀνθρωπίνην· ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὴν κοινὴν μόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν, ἢ ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους· τὴν τε ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογομενεῖν καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἀρετήν, οὐ διὰ τινα φόβον ἢ ἑπτίδα ἢ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν· ἐν αὐτῇ τε εἶναι τὴν εἰδαμονίαν, ἀτε οὐσῇ ψυχῇ πεποιημένη πρὸς τὴν ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου· διαστρέφεσθαι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν χρόνον ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς τῶν ἔξωθεν πραγματείων πιθανότητας, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν κατηχησιν τῶν συνόντων, ἔπει ἢ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους.

Diogenes leads us to suppose that Cleanthes and Chrysippus dissented as to the interpretation of \( \textit{φύσις} \), and that Cleanthes refused to allow that human nature is included. This however is scarcely credible (cf. the next frag.), although it is quite possible that Cleanthes laid special stress on κοινῇ φύσις and κοινὸς ρόμος, cf. frag. 48, l. 24, Cic. Fin. iii. 73, utrum conveniat neene natura hominis cum universa. So Zeller, p. 229, who is followed by Wellmann, p. 448. To attain this conformity an acquaintance with physics is necessary (Cic. l. c., Chrysipp. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 9). Hirzel ii. pp. 112—118, thinks that Diogenes' account is substantially right. He
regards Zeno as the upholder of Cynicism in preference to which Cleanthes devoted himself to the study of Heraclitus, cf. Heracl. fr. 7, Sch., διό δεὶ ἐπέστατι τῷ ξυνῷ, τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ξόουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδιὰν ἐχοντες φρόνησιν. To the objection that Zeno had already recognised the Heraclitean λόγος as a leading physical principle, Hirzel answers that it does not follow that he also transferred it to the region of ethics, and that Cleanthes must be credited with this innovation. The latter part of the fragment has been included in deference to the judgment of Wachsmuth, but it appears extremely doubtful whether we are justified in tracing the epitomised views back to Cleanthes, because his name appears in the context.

διάθεσιν ὁμολογομένην: for διάθεσιν see on Zeno, frag. 117, and for the general sense cf. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5\textsuperscript{b}, p. 60, 7, κοινότερον δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἰναι φασὶ ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον.

ἀτ’ οὐσί: Zeller (p. 238, 3) corrects οὐσίας ψυχῆς πεποιημένης.

ἀφορμάς, cf. frag. 82.

74. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 6\textsuperscript{e}, p. 77, 21, εὐδαιμονία δ’ ἐστὶν εὐροια βίου. κέχρηται δὲ καὶ Κλειάνθης τῷ ὀρῷ τοῦτῳ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασι καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦτων πάντες τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἰναι λέγοντες οὐχ ἐτέραν τοῦ εὐδαιμονος βίου, καίτοι γε λέγοντες τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν σκοπὸν ἐκκείσθαι τέλος δ’ εἰναι τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ὅπερ ταυτὸν εἰναι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν. Sext. Emp. Math. XI. 30, εὐδαιμονία δὲ ἐστὶν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Κλειάνθην, εὐροια βίου.

σκοπὸν. For the distinction between σκοπὸς and τέλος, cf. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 3\textsuperscript{e}, p. 47, 8, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπὸς μὲν τὸ προκείμενον εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν, οἶον ἀστῖς τοξόταις· τέλος δ’ ἡ
75. Clem. Alex. Protrept. vi. 72, p. 21 S., 61 P., Клеа́нвпс δὲ ὁ Ἀσσεύς, ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοάς φιλόσοφος δὲ ὁ θεογονίαν ποιητικήν θεολογίαν δὲ ἀληθινὴν εὐδείκνυται, οὐκ ἀπεκρύψατο τοῦ θεοῦ πέρι ὅτι περὶ εἴχεν φρονῶν.

τάγαθον ἐρωτᾶς μ’ οἴνον ἐστίν; ἀκονε δὴ· τεταγμένοι, δίκαιοι, ὅσιοι, εὐσεβεῖς, κρατοῦν ἐαυτοῦ, χρήσιμοι, καλῶν, δέον, αὐστηρῶν, αὐθέκαστον, αἰεὶ συμφέρον, ἀφοβῶν, ἀλυπῶν, λυσιτελές, ἀνώδυνον, ὀφέλιμον, εὐάρεστον, ἀσφαλές, φίλον, ἐντιμον * * * ὀμολογούμενον, εὐκλεές, ἀτυφῶν, ἐπιμελές, πρᾶον, σφοδρόν, χρονιζόμενον, ἀμεμπτον, αἰεὶ διαμένον.

The same occurs in Strom. v. 14, 110, p. 715 P., 257 S., introduced by the words ἐν τινὶ ποιήματι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ and also in Euseb. P. E. xiii. 13, p. 679.

Clement's mistake in referring these lines to Cleanthes' conception of the deity, when they really refer to the ethical sumnum bonum, is obvious, and has been pointed out by Krische, p. 420 f. Krische thinks that they may have formed a poetical appendix to the prose work, which is either the περὶ τέλους or the περὶ καλῶν.

Seven of these epithets, viz. δίκαιον, χρήσιμον, καλὸν, δέον, συμφέρον, λυσιτελές, ὀφέλιμον are predicated of
ἀγαθὸν in Diog. L. vii. 98, 99, with the addition of αἰρέτον and εὐχρηστον: cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5a, p. 69, 11, πάντα δὲ τάγαθα ὁφέλιμα εἶναι καὶ εὐχρηστα καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ λυσιτελῆ καὶ σπουδαία καὶ πρέποντα καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἶκεία, ib. 51, p. 72, 19, ib. 11h, p. 100, 15 foll. Chrysippus proved similar statements by his favourite chain arguments, Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 13, Cie. Fin. iii. 27, Tusc. v. 45.

3. κρατοῦν ἐαυτοῦ: pointing to the virtue ἐγκράτεια (frag. 76): reliquum est, ut tute tibi imperes, Cie. Tusc. ii. 47.


αὐθέκαστον: in Ar. Eth. iv. 7. 4 the αὐθέκαστος is the mean between the ἀλαξῶν and the εἰρων, and is described as ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ. We may compare then Stob. Ecl. ii. 7, 11m, p. 108, 11, where the wise man is said to be ἀπλοὺς καὶ ἀπλαστος while τὸ εἰρωνεύεσθαι belongs alone to the φαύλος, ib. p. 111, 11, ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν τὸν σοφὸν.

5. ἀφοβον, ἀλυπον, ἀνάδυνον: because the wise man is ἀπαθῆς.

7. Some word has dropped out here. In Clem. Alex. Strom. v. l. c. the words ἀσφαλές φίλον ἐντιμον are omitted and ὀμολογούμενον is placed at the end of l. 6. In Euseb. l. c. we have two complete lines but εὐάρεστον is repeated from l. 6, thus:—ἐντιμον εὐάρεστον ὀμολογούμενον: this is perhaps the original reading, where the error is due to εὐάρεστον having been copied from the previous line in place of the genuine word. The reading in book V. is due to the scribe's eye wandering from the first εὐάρεστον to the second. Mohnine however thinks (p. 51) that Eusebius had the work of Clement
before him while writing, and that the second εὐάρεστον is mere patchwork to mend the metre.


76. Plut. Sto. Rep. v. 4, ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἐν ὑπομνήμασι φυσικοῖς εἰπὼν ὅτι "πληγή πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστί, κἂν ἰκανός ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γεννηταί πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἰσχύς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος," ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν, "ἡ δ' ἰσχύς αὐτῆ καὶ τὸ κράτος ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς φανείσιν ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγενηται, ἐγκράτεια ἐστίν· ὅταν δ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις, ἀνδρεία· περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ δικαιοσύνη· περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις σωφροσύνη." 


πληγή πυρὸς. This is the material air-current which forms the ἄγεμονικὸν of the individual, being an efflux of the divine πνεῦμα. Cleanthes here brings his ethical teaching into close dependence on his physical researches: of the physical aspect of τόνος we have spoken at frag. 24. Zeno's φρόνησις is explained as ἰκανὸς τόνος ψυχῆς, i.e. as ἰσχύς καὶ κράτος. Possibly Cleanthes was influenced by the Cynic use of τόνος: see the passage quoted by Stein, Psych. p. 30 n. 37. Not that Cleanthes intended to deny the fundamental position of Zeno that virtue is wisdom, for we shall find that he expressly declared it to be teachable (frag. 79): and cf. frag. 89. Still, he expanded and developed his master's teaching in two ways, (1) by showing that the doctrine of virtue rests on a psychological basis, and (2) by clearing up an ambiguity in Zeno's statement with regard to the four cardinal virtues.
Zeno held, or appeared to hold, that ἕγκρατεία is found in a double sense, (1) as the essential groundwork of all virtue, and (2) as the first of its four main divisions. This inconsistency is therefore removed by retaining ἕγκρατεία in the wider, but substituting ἐπιστήμη that notion of ἕγκρατεία which was common to Zeno and Cleanthes.

ἐπανίστημιν: so Hirzel, p. 97, 2, for ἐπιφάνειαν, coll. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5\textsuperscript{bg}, p. 61, 11, ἕγκρατείαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀνυπέρβατον τῶν κατὰ τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων ἐπανέντων. We find also definitions of ἕγκρατεία in Diog. L. vii. 93, Sext. Math. ix. 153, which are substantially identical with that cited from Stobaeus: in Stob. it appears as a subdivision of σωφροσύνη, while both in Diog. and Stob. the word ἐμμενετέων is found in connection with καρτέρια, a subdivision of ἄνδρεια. No doubt their account is derived from Chrysippus: it is noteworthy, however, that ὀρθὸς λόγος appears in these definitions: see Hirzel, l. c., Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 262. In giving this prominent position to ἕγκρατεία Cleanthes was following in the steps of Socrates (Xen. Mem. i. 5. 4, ἄρα γε οὐ χρῆ πάντα ἄνδρα ἡγησάμενον τὴν ἕγκρατείαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπίδα), and the Cynics (Diog. L. vi. 15).

ἀξίας: the full definition, probably that of Chrysippus, appears in Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5\textsuperscript{b}, p. 59, 11, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἐκάστῳ, ib. 7\textsuperscript{f}, p. 84, 15.

ἀιρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις: σωφροσύνη is concerned with the regulation of the ὀρμαί (Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5\textsuperscript{bg}, p. 60, 13, ib. 5\textsuperscript{b5}, p. 63, 16), and is therefore directed to the avoidance of πάθη, among which φόβος is defined as ἐκκλίσις ἀπειθής λόγῳ (Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 10\textsuperscript{b}, p. 90, 11).
77. Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 22, 131, p. 499 P., 179 S., διό καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ ὅδον τῶν Σωκράτην φησὶ παρ’ ἐκαστα διδάσκειν ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς δίκαιός τε καὶ εὐδαιμον ἀνήρ καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ διελόντι τὸ δίκαιον ἀπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος καταράσθαι ὡς ἀσεβεῖς τῷ πράγμα δεδρακότη· ἀσεβεῖς γὰρ τῷ ὄντι οἱ τὸ συμφέρον ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ κατὰ νόμον χαριζόντες.

 Cf. Cic. Off. iii. 11, itaque acceipimus Socratem exsecrari solitum eos qui primum haec natura cohaerentia opinione distraxisserunt. cui quidem ita sunt Stoici assensi ut et quidquid honestum esset id utile esse censerent nec utile quicquam quod non honestum. id. Leg. i. 33, recte Socrates exsecrari eum solebat qui primus utilitatem a iure sciemississet: id enim querebatur caput esse exitiorum omnium.

For Socrates, who identified τὸ ὁφέλιμον with τὸ ἀγαθόν, cf. Zeller, Socrates, p. 150 foll. Cleanthes, as we have seen (frag. 75), asserted that the good was also συμφέρον and ὁφέλιμον: for the school in general see Zeller, Stoics, p. 229, 2.

78. Diog. L. vii. 92, πλείονας (εἶναι ἀρεταῖς ἦ τέτταρας) οἵ περὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀντίπατρον.

 Zeller, p. 258, thinks that this simply means that Cleanthes enumerated the various subdivisions of the four cardinal virtues. Hirzel, p. 97, 2, prefers to suppose that it is due to the mistake of placing φρόνησις, which is the source of the several virtues, on the same level as the four main divisions of virtue.

79. Diog. L. vii. 91, διδακτὴν τε εἶναι ἀντίθεν (λέγω δὲ τήν ἀρετήν) καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τέλους φησὶ καὶ Κλεάνθης.

This is, of course, ultimately traceable to Socrates, but
was also enforced by the Cynics: cf. Diog. vi. 10 (Antisthenes) διδακτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρέτην, ib. 105, ἀρέσκει δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρέτην διδακτὴν εἶναι, καθά φησιν 'Αντισθένης ἐν τῷ Ἦρακλεῖ.


On this point Cleanthes is in agreement with the Cynics (Diog. L. vi. 105), whence Wellmann, p. 462, infers that Zeno's teaching must have been in agreement with Cleanthes rather than with Chrysippus. See also the authorities cited by Zeller, p. 295, 3, and add Cic. Tusc. ii. 32, amitti non potest virtus.

μέθην: but Zeno held that the wise man ω' μεθυσθήσεθαί (frag. 159).

μελαγχολίαν: Cic. Tusc. iii. 11, quod (furor) cum maius esse videatur quam insania, tamen eiusmodi est, ut furor (μελαγχολία) in sapientem cadere possit, non possit insania.

βεβαίους καταλῆψεις: although καταλῆψεις is shared by the wise man with the fool (see on Zeno, frag. 16), its especial cultivation and possession belongs to the wise man only: cf. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 184, 185. Cf. also Sext. Math. ii. 6 (quoted on frag. 9). According to Hirzel, p. 68, 3, the meaning is not that Cleanthes denied that the wise man would get drunk and so lose his virtue, but that the strength of his καταλῆψεις is so great, that even melancholy and drunkenness fail to shake him. In support of this he quotes Epict. diss. i. 18. 21—23, τὸς οὐν ὁ ἀήττητος; ὡς οὐκ ἔξιστησιν οὐδὲν τῶν ἀποπροαρέτων. τί οὖν ἂν καῦμα ἡ τούτω; τί ἂν οἰνώμενος ἢ; τί ἂν μελαγχολῶν; τί ἐν ὑπνοῖς; οὕτως μοι ἐστίν ὁ ἀνίκητος.

82. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5¹, p. 65, 8, πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώ-πους ἀφορμᾶς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν, καὶ οἶονεὶ τῶν τῶν ἡμιαμβείων λόγον ἔχειν κατὰ Κλεάνθην· οἶδεν ἄτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους.

ἀφορμᾶς. For this sense of the word cf. frag. 73 ἀφορμᾶς ἀδιαστρόφους “uncorrupted impulses.” Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5², p. 62, 9 ἔχειν γὰρ (τῶν ἀνθρωπον) ἀφορμᾶς παρὰ τῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καθήκοντος εὐρεσίν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὀρμῶν εὐστάθειαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὑπο-μονὰς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις. As a general rule, however, it is contrasted with ὀρμή as “aversion” ("impulse towards," Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 9, p. 87, 5, Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 273, ἐγκράτειαν...ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὀρμαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀφορμαῖς, ib. Math. xi. 210. Cleanthes regarded our capacity for virtue as innate, but whether at the same time he denied an innate intellectual capacity is open to question, cf. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, n. 735.

Cf. M. Aurel. ix. 1, ἀφορμᾶς γὰρ προειλήφει παρὰ τῆς φύσεως, ὅν ἀμελήσας οὐχ οἰός τε ἐστι νῦν διακρίνειν τὰ σευδὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν.
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τὸν: so Zeller, (p. 243, 1), for τὸ.

ἡμιαμβεῖον: so Wachsm. for MSS. ήμιαμβειαίον. Meineke reads μμιαμβεῖον. The meaning is that men possess latent capacities which must be brought into play by their own exertions, if they would attain to perfection, cf. Cic. Tusc. III. 2, sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum, quae si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret.

83. Themist. Or. II. 27 c, ei δὲ αὐτὸ φήσει τις κολα-κελαν εἶναι τῷ Πυθίῳ παραβάλλειν τὸν βασιλέα, Χρύσιπ-πος μὲν ύμῖν καὶ Κλεάνθης οὐ συγχωρήσει καὶ ὅλων ἔθνος φιλοσοφίας ἢ ὁ ἐκ τῆς ποικίλης χορὸς οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ θεοῦ.

This doctrine depends on the divine origin of the human soul. Hence the Stoics could say that good men were friends of the gods, and Chrysippus declared that the happiness of the wise man was as great as that of Zeus, since they only differ in point of time, which is immaterial for happiness. Cf. Procl. in Tim. Plat. II. 106 f, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοϊς καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἰρήκασιν. Cic. Leg. I. 25, iam vero virtus eadem in homine ac deo est neque alio ullo ingenio praeterea.


Λογισμός. τί ποτέ ἐσθ' ὅτι βούλει, θυμεῖ; τοῦτο μοι φράσον.

Θυμός. ἔχειν, λογισμέ, πᾶν ὁ βούλομαι ποιεῖν.

Α. ναὶ βασιλικὸν γε' πλὴν ὅμως εἰπὸν πάλιν.

Θ. ὃν ἄν ἐπιθυμῶ ταῦθ' ὅπως γενήσεται.

tauti tâ âmôiβâia Kleânthous fheisâv einai Posseidônios énârghôs ékeideikvémena tîn perî tòu pathetikou tîs ψυχῆs
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γνώμην αὐτοῦ, εἰ γε δὴ πεποίηκε τὸν Λογισμὸν τῷ Θυμῷ διαλεγόμενον ὡς ἐταίρουν ἐταίρῳ.

2, 3. ἐγὼ λογισμὸν...βασιλικὸν γε MSS. ἔχειν, λογισμέ, Wyttenbach βασιλικὸν ἐστὶ Mullach, βασιλικὸν εὐ γε Scaliger, ναὶ β. γ. Mein. Perhaps we should read ποιεῖν λογισμὸν...ἐγὼ βασιλικὸς.

4. ὁν Meineke, Mullach, ὡς MSS., ὁσ’ Wyttenbach. Mohuike, p. 52, thinks that this fragment comes either from περὶ ὀρμῆς or περὶ λόγου.

Posidonius uses the verses to prove that Cleanthes was in substantial agreement with himself in supposing that the various functions of the ἡγεμονικῶν are radically distinct. Zeller, p. 215, 3, says that this is to confound a rhetorical flourish with a philosophical view, and it may be added that Posidonius must have been hard pressed for an argument to rely on this passage at all. Hirzel, however, pp. 147—160, labours to prove that Posidonius is right, but he mainly relies on frag. 37, θύραθεν εἰσκρινεσθαι τὸν νοῦν, where see note, and is well refuted by Stein, Psych. pp. 163—167.

85. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ix. 1, v. p. 653 K., Ποσειδώνιος...δείκνυσιν ἐν τῇ περὶ παθῶν πραγματείᾳ διοικουμένους ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τριῶν δυνάμεων, ἐπιθυμητικῆς τε καὶ θυμοειδοῦς καὶ λογιστικῆς τῆς δ’ αὐτῆς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἔλεξεν εἰναὶ καὶ τὸν Κλεάνθην.

Though there is no direct proof that Cleanthes adhered to the eightfold division of the soul, yet everything points that way, and Hirzel's opinion (p. 138) that he only recognised three divisions is unfounded: see on frag. 84. The present passage of Galen ought perhaps rather to be added as a testimonium to frag. 84 than cited as a distinct fragment, since the whole argument of Posidonius, so far as we know, was founded on the dialogue be-
tween λογισμὸς and θυμός. For δυνάμεις see Hirzel, ii. p. 486, 1.


This appears to be the only remaining indication of the position of Cleanthes as regards the definition of the πάθη, but it is not without significance. Zeno had probably defined λύπη as ἀλόγος συστολὴ ψυχῆς (see on Zeno frag. 143), but Cleanthes saw his way to a better explanation from the standpoint of τόνος: the soul of the wise man, informed by right reason, is characterised by ἴσχύς, ἰκανὸς τόνος, εὐτονία, but if the emotions overpower the natural reason of a man, there supervenes a resolution of tension, ἀτονία or ἀσθένεια. This view of the emotions was adopted by Chrysippus, cf. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. v. 387 Κ. ἡ ὀρθὴ κρίσις ἐξηγεῖται μετὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν εὐτονίας: see especially the long passage beginning ib. p. 404 Κ. where the view of πάθος as ἀτονία or ἀσθένεια is explained at length by Chrysippus. With regard to λύπη cf. Tusc. ΙΙΙ. 61, omnibus enim modis fulciendi sunt, qui ruunt nec cohaerere possunt, propter magnitudinem aegritudinis. Ex quo ipsam aegritudinem λύπην Chrysippus quasi solutionem totius hominis appellatam putat. ib. Π. 54, animus intentione sua depellit pressum omnem ponderum, remissione autem sic urgetur, ut se nequeat extollere. No doubt Cleanthes, like Plato, derived λύπη from λύω: Plat. Crat. p. 419 c. See also Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 130.

Hirzel's contention (p. 152 f.) that Cleanthes placed the ἕγεμονικῶν in the brain, and that hence we are to explain Plut. plac. iv. 21. 5, is controverted by Stein, Psych. p. 170, from this passage, for we have seen that the πάθη are affections of the ἕγεμονικῶν. Hirzel replies (p. 154) that ὀρμαί and πάθη, though dependent on the ἕγεμονικῶν, are yet distinct from it. The improbability of Hirzel's whole theory lies in the fact that, if it is correct, Cleanthes was in vital opposition to the whole Stoa down to Posidonius on the most important doctrines of psychology. Such an inference ought not to be accepted, unless the evidence conclusively points to it, and no one will affirm that such is the case here.


ἥδονή is, according to Cleanthes, not merely an ἀδιάφωρον but also παρὰ φύσιν, being entirely devoid of ἀξία, cf. Diog. L. vii. 105, and see on Zeno, frag. 192.

κάλλυντρον cannot here mean "a broom," but must be "an ornament": see Suidas s.v. All kinds of personal adornment appeared to the Stoics, as to the Cynics, to be contrary to nature: Zeno wore the τρίβων (Diog. L. vii. 26), recommended the same dress for males and females (frag. 177), and forbade young men to be ἔταιρικῶς κεκοσμημένοι (frag. 174).

αὐτὴν is bracketed by Bekker. Hirzel discusses this passage at length (pp. 89—96). He thinks that the first part (μήτε...βίῳ) contains a climax: ἥδονή has no connection with virtue and therefore is not ἀγαθόν (κατὰ φύσιν); further, it has no ἀξία and is not even προηγμένον. Hence Zeno and Cleanthes did not identify τὰ κατὰ φύσιν with
προηγμένα: for in that case they could not have treated προηγμένα as ἀδιάφορα. Zeller and Wellmann are, therefore, wrong in regarding Cleanthes' attitude towards pleasure as cynical; rather, his position is that pleasure in itself (for this is the force of the second αὐτήν which should be retained) is ἀδιάφορον in the narrower sense. Cf. Stob. Ecl. π. 7. 7", p. 81, 14 οὔτε δὲ προηγμένα οὔτ' ἀποπροηγμένα... ἡδονήν πᾶσαν καὶ πόνον καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο. Next, κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι is a gloss, and when this is struck out we should supply ἀξίαν ἔχειν with καθάπερ δὲ κάλλυντρον. In short, Cleanthes treats pleasure as an ἐπιγέννημα (Diog. L. vii. 86): cf. Seneca Ep. 116, 3, voluptatum natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possimus vivere, gratiora nobis faceret illius accessio. But it does not follow that, because virtue consists in τὸ ὀμολογομένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, therefore everything, which is κατὰ φύσιν, is ἄρετη or μετέχον ἄρετής. Cf. Stob. Ecl. 7. 7", p. 80, 9 διότι κἂν, φασί, λέγωμεν ἀδιάφορα τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς, πρὸς τὸ εὐσχημόνως ζῆν (ἐν ὑπὲρ ἔστι τὸ εὐδαιμόνως) ἀδιάφορα φαμεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐ μὰ Δία πρὸς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν οὔτε πρὸς ὀρμῆν καὶ ἀφορμῆν. Rather, we have seen reason to hold that the class of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν is wider, or, at any rate, certainly not narrower than that of τὰ προηγμένα. Indeed, this is apparent from the present passage:—ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος κατὰ φύσιν μὲν εἶναι ὡς τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχειν, i.e. there are some things which may be κατὰ φύσιν and yet devoid of ἀξία. Again, Sextus obviously treats Cleanthes as more hostile to pleasure than Archedemus, but the view which Hirzel would attribute to Cleanthes is scarcely to be distinguished from that of Archedemus. Certainly, the passage from Seneca ought not to be quoted as an illustration of Cleanthes' meaning: contrast μὴτε κατὰ φύσιν
elvat with natura—admiscuit. The inelegant repetition of μη...είναι has an object, namely, to contrast τὸ καλ-λυτρον with τὰς ἐν μασχάλη τρίχας, whereas, on the other hand, if the second αὐτὴν is retained, it cannot be interpreted differently to the first αὐτὴν, and to press the latter would make nonsense.

89. Stob. Floril. 6. 37, Κλεάνθης ἔληγεν, εἰ τέλος ἐστὶν ἡδονή, πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν φρόνησιν δεδοσθαί.

This is no doubt directed against the Epicureans. Diog. L. x. 128, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἄρχην καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἰναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζήν. Chrysippus also wrote a treatise described as ἀπόδειξις πρὸς τὸ μη εἴναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τέλος (Diog. L. vii. 202). τὴν φρόνησιν furnishes a proof that Cleanthes upheld Zeno’s view of virtue as φρόνησις: see on frag. 76.

dεδοσθαί: so Meineke for δίδοσθαί. Cf. Cic. de Senec. § 40, cumque homini sive natura sive quis deus nihil mente praestabilius dedisset, huic divino muneri ac dono nihil tam esse inimicum quam voluptatem.

90. Cic. Fin. ii. 69, pudebit te illius tabulae quam Cleanthes sane commode verbis depingere solebat. iubebat eos qui audiebant secum ipsos cogitare pictam in tabula Voluptatem, pulcherrimo vestitu et ornatu regali in solio sedentem: præsto esse Virtutes ut ancillulas, quae nihil aliud agerent, nullo suum officium ducerent, nisi ut Voluptati ministrarent et eam tantum ad aurem admo-nerent, si modo id pictura intellegi posset, ut caveret ne quid faceret imprudens quod offenderet animos hominum aut quicquam e quo oriretur aliquis dolor. “nos quidem Virtutes sic natae sumus, ut tibi serviremus; alius negotii nihil habemus.” Cf. Aug. de civit. dei v. 20, solent
philosophi, qui finem boni humani in ipsa virtute consti-
tuunt, ad ingerendum pudorem quibusdam philosophis, qui virtutes quidem probant, sed eas voluptatis corporalis fine metiuntur et illam per se ipsam putant adpetendam, istas propter ipsam, tabulam quandam verbis pingere, ubi voluptas in sella regali quasi delicata quaedam regina considat, cique virtutes famulae subiciuntur, observantes eius nutum ut faciant quod illa imperaverit, quae pruden-
tiae inbeat ut vigilanter inquirat quo modo voluptas regnet et salva sit; iustitiae inbeat ut praestet beneficia quae potest ad comparandas amicitias corporalibus con-
modis necessarias, nulli faciat iniuriam, ne offensis legibus voluptas vivere secura non possit; fortitudini inbeat, ut si dolor corpori acciderit qui non compellat in mortem, teneat dominam suam, id est, voluptatem, fortiter in animi cogitatione ut per pristinarum deliciarum suarum recordationem mitiget praesentis doloris aculeos; tem-
perantiae inbeat, ut tantum capiat alimentorum et si qua delectant ne per immoderationemnoxium alicquid valetu-
dinem turbet et voluptas, quam etiam in corporis sanitate Epicurei maximam ponunt, graviter offendatur. ita vir-
tutes cum tota suae gloria dignitatis tanquam imperiosae cuidam et inhonestae mulierculae servient voluptati; nihil hac pictura dicunt esse ignominiosius et deformius et quod minus ferre bonorum possit aspectus; et verum dicunt.


pulcherrimo vestitu: this illustrates kalxxutprox in frag. 88.
si modo...possent: Madvig points out that these words belong to Cleanthes' statement, and are not a part of Cicero's comment.

Virtutes ut ancillulus: on the controversial character of the work περὶ ἡδονῆς see Krische, pp. 430—432. In the Epicurean system virtue has only a conditional value, as furnishing a means to pleasure. Diog. L. x. 138 διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δέειν αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐ δὲ αὐτὰς: ὁσπερ καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ύγίειαν, καθά φησι Διογένης.


ἀγοὺν δὲ μ', ὁ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺγ' ἡ πεπρωμένη, ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διάπεταγμένος, ὡς ἔψομαι γ' ἀοκνος. ἥν δὲ μὴ θέλω κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἤττον ἔψομαι.

The first line is quoted by Epict. diss. II. 23. 42, and two lines by id. ib. III. 22. 95, IV. 1. 131, and IV. 4. 34. Senec. Epist. 107, 10, et sic adloquamur Iovem cuius gubernaculo moles ista dirigitur, quemadmodum Cleanthes noster versibus disertissimis adloquitur; quos mihi in nostrum sermonem mutare permittitur Ciceronis disertissimis viri exemplo. si placuerint boni consules; si displicuerint, scies me in hoc secutum Ciceronis examplum.

duc, o parens celsique dominator poli, quocumque placuit; nulla parendi mora est. adsum impiger. fac nolle, comitabor gemens, malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono. ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.

See also the commentary of Simplicius on Epict. l. c. p. 329. These celebrated lines constitute the true answer of the Stoa to the objection that the doctrine of πράνοια is incompatible with the assertion of free-
will. Zeller p. 182. The matter is put very plainly in the passage of Hippolyt. Philosoph. 21, 2, Diels p. 571, quoted at length in the note on Zeno frag. 79. The spirit of Stoicism survives in the words of a modern writer:—

"It has ever been held the highest wisdom for a man not merely to submit to Necessity,—Necessity will make him submit,—but to know and believe well that the stern thing which Necessity had ordered was the wisest, the best, the thing wanted there. To cease his frantic pretension of scanning this great God's world in his small fraction of a brain; to know that it had verily, though deep beyond his soundings, a just law, that the soul of it was Good;—that his part in it was to conform to the Law of the Whole, and in devout silence follow that; not questioning it, obeying it as unquestionable." (Carlyle, Hero-Worship, chap. ii.) Marcus Aurelius often dwells on the contrast between τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and τὰ οὖκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Cf. especially x. 28, καὶ ὅτι μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζῷῳ δέδοται, τὸ ἐκουσίως ἐπεσθαυτοῖς γνωριμενοῖς τὸ δὲ ἐπεσθαὶ ψιλόν, πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον. So ib. vi. 41, 42; vii. 54, 55; viii. 7; xii. 32.

92. Seneca Epist. 94, 4, Cleanthes utilem quidem iudicat et hanc partem (philosophiae quae dat cuique personae praecepta, nec in universum componit hominem, sed marito suadet quomodo se gerat adversus uxorem, patri quomodo educat liberos, domino quomodo servos regat), sed imbecillam nisi ab universo fluit, nisi decreta ipsa philosophiae et capita cognovit.

The branch of philosophy here referred to is known as the παραινετικὸς or ὑποθετικὸς τόπος. Aristo regarded it as useless, and it is very possible that his "letters to Cleanthes" (πρὸς Κλεάνθην ἐπιστολῶν δ' Diog. L. vii. 163) dealt with this controversy. Cf. Sext. Math. vii. 12, καὶ Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος οὐ μόνον, ὡς φασί, παρηθεῖτο τὴν τε
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The words in which Philo of Larissa described the πότος υποθετικός illustrate Seneca's statement: Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 2, p. 42, 18, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν μέσων διακειμένων ἀνθρώπων πρόνοιαν ποιητέον, οὐστινας ἐκ τῶν παρανυτικῶν λόγων ὡφελεῖσθαι συμβαίνει, μὴ δυναμένους προσευκαίρειν τοῖς διεξόδικοις πλάτεσιν ἢ διὰ χρόνου στενοχωρίας ἢ διὰ τινας ἀναγκαίας ἀσχολίας, ἐπεισενεκτέον τῶν υποθετικῶν λόγων, δι' οὐ τὰς πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ τὴν ὀρθότητα τῆς ἐκάστου χρήσεως υποθήκας ἐν ἑπτομαῖς ἐξουσίων. The importance attached by Cleanthes to παραινετική illustrates the practical spirit of Stoicism: see also Hirzel, II. p. 104.

93. Cic. Tusc. III. 76, sunt qui unum officium consolantis putent malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet.

Consolatio (παραμυθητική) is a branch of παρανυτική and is concerned with removing the πάθη, cf. Eudorus ap. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 2. p. 44, 15 ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων καλεῖται παραμυθητικός, ὃς καλοῦμενός ἐστὶ πρὸς ἐνίων παθολογικός. Cf. Sen. Epist. 95, 65. As emotion is founded on false opinion (see on Zeno, frag. 138), the duty of him who offers consolation to another is to explain that what appears to the other to be an evil is not really so.

malum illud: the context in Cicero shows that the reference is particularly to death, for which cf. Zeno, frag. 129. The construction is not to be explained by an ellipse of docere or the like, but rather esse is nominalised so that malum...esse = τὸ κακὸν...εἶναι. This is common in Lucr., see Munro on I. 331, 418 and cf. Verr. v. 170, quid dicam
in crucem tollere? Cicero even writes: inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare (Fin. ii. 43). Draeger, § 429.

94. Cic. Tusc. iii. 77, nam Cleanthes quidem sapi- entem consolatur, qui consolatione non eget. nihil enim esse malum, quod turpe non sit, si lugenti persuaseris, non tu illi luctum, sed stultitiam detraxeris; alienum autem tempus docendi. et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando aegritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes ipse fateatur.

Cicero’s criticism here is twofold: (1) that what is called consolation is really only instruction, which is ineffective to assuage grief, because it is inopportune, and as regards the wise man, who is ἀπαθής, is unnecessary; (2) that grief may be caused by baseness, which is an evil. Cf. Tusc. ii. 30.

This cannot be treated as merely containing Cicero’s comment on frag. 93, for we have the additional statement sapientem consolatur, which is surely not an inference from Cleanthes’ definition. The statement is strange and perhaps not to be entirely explained in the fragmentary state of our knowledge, but it is not inconceivable that Cleanthes held that the wise man ought to be reminded of Stoic principles when attacked by μελαγχολία or when in severe pain, in spite of his βεβαιὰς καταλήψεις (see on frag. 80 and cf. Stob. Floril. 7. 21 ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφὸν, μη βασανίζεσθαι δέ. Cic. Fin. v. 94, quasi vero hoc didicisset a Zenone, non dolere, quum doleret! Zeno, frag. 158): cf. generally Sext. Math. xi. 130—140 and esp. 139 ei δ' ἀπλῶς διδάσκει ὅτι τούτι μὲν ὀλυγωφελές ἐστι, πλείονας δ' ἔχει τὰς ὀχλήσεις, σύγκρισιν ἐσται ποιῶν αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς πρὸς ἔτεραν αἰρέσιν καὶ φυγῆν, καὶ όν ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ταραχῆς. ὀπερ ἄτοπον: ὁ γὰρ
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οὐχλοῦμενος οὖ βοûλεται μαθεῖν τί μᾶλλον οὐχλεί καὶ τί ἵπτον, ἀλλ' ἀπαλλαγὴναὶ τῆς οὐχλῆσεως πεπόθηκεν.

95. Stob. Floril. 6. 19.

ὁστις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχετ' αἰσχροῦ πράγματος οὖτος ποιήσει τοῦτ' ἐὰν καίρον λάβῃ.

For the doctrine that virtuous action depends on the intention and not on the deed itself, see Zeller, p. 264 and cf. Zeno frags. 146 and 181.

96. Stob. Floril. 28, 14, Κλεάνθης ἐφη τὸν ὀμνύοντα ἢτοι εὐορκεῖν ἢ ἐπιορκεῖν καθ' ὃν ὀμνυαί χρόνον. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ οὖτως ὀμνύῃ ὡς ἐπιτελέσων τὰ κατὰ τὸν ὄρκον εὐορκεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ πρόθεσιν ἔχων μὴ ἐπιτελεῖν, ἐπιορκεῖν.

See on frag. 95, and cf. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Floril. 28, 15.

97. Seneca de Benef. v. 14. 1, Cleanthes vehementius agit: “licet,” inquit, “beneficium non sit quod accipit, ipse tamen ingratus est: quia non fuit redditurus, etiam si accepisset. sic latro est, etiam antequam manus inquinet: quia ad occidendum iam armatus est, et habet spoliandi atque interficiendi voluntatem. exercetur et aperitur opere nequitia, non incipit. ipsum quod accepit, beneficium non crat, sed vocabatur. sacrilegi dant poenas, quamvis nemo usque ad deos manus porrigit.”

This and the two next following fragments probably come from the book περὶ χάριτος. Introd. p. 52. Eudorus the Academic ap. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 2, p. 44, 20 speaks in Stoic terminology of ο ο ο ν χαρίτων τόπος as arising ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον σχέσιν ὑπάρχειν.

beneficium non sit: because the question is concerning an act of kindness to a bad man, on whom, according to
Stoic principles, it was impossible to confer a favour (Senec. Benef. v. 12. 3), cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11d p. 95, 5, μηδένα δὲ φαύλον μήτε ωφελείσθαι μήτε ωφελεῖν, Plut. Comm. Not. 21.


98. Seneca de Benef. vii. 11. 1, beneficium voluntas nuda non efficit: sed quod beneficium non esset, si optimeae ac plenissimae voluntati fortuna deesset, id aeque beneficium non est, nisi fortunam voluntas antecessit; non enim profuisse te mihi oportet, ut ob hoc tibi oblier, sed ex destinato profuisse. Cleanthes exemplo eiusmodi utitur: "ad quaerendum," inquit, "et arcessendum ex Academia Platonem, duos pueros misi; alter totum porticum perscrutatus est, alia quoque loca in quibus illum inveniri posse sperabat, percuturrit, et domum non minus lassus quam irraus reedit: alter apud proximum circulatorem resedit, et, dum vagus atque erro vernaculis congregatur et ludit, transseuntem Platonem, quem non quaesierat, invenit. illum, inquit, laudabimus puerum qui quantum in se erat quod iussus est fecit: hunc feliciter inertem castigabimus."

Another illustration of the value of the virtuous intention apart from the results attained by it. Cf. Cic. Parad. iii. 20 nec enim peccata rerum eventu, sed vitii hominum metienda sunt.

Academia: see the description of this place in Diog. L. iii. 7: there was doubtless a στοά attached to it, whence totum porticum infra.

circulatorem: a quack, mountebank: cf. Apul. Met. 1. c. 4, Athenis proximo ante Poecilen porticum circulatorem
adspexi equestrem spatham praecutam mucrone infesto devourare. Probably a translation of \( \text{θαυματοποιοῖς} \): with respect to these men see the passages collected by Becker, Charicles. E. T. pp. 185—189, Jebb’s Theophrastus, p. 227, and add Ar. Met. i. 2. 15, Isocr. Or. 15 § 213, where tame lions and trained bears are spoken of.

99. Seneca de Benef. vi. 12. 2, multum, ut ait Cleanthes, a beneficio distat negotiatio, cf. ib. II. 31. 12, a benefit expects no return: non enim sibi aliiquid reddi voluit (qui beneficium dat), aut non fuit beneficium sed negotiatio.

\textit{negotiatio}: probably a translation of \( \chiρηματισμός \), for the Stoic wise man is described as the only true man of business: Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 11\textsuperscript{d}, p. 95, 21, \( \mu \ νον \ δέ \ τὸν \ σπουδαίον \ άνδρα \ χρηματιστικὸν \ εἶναι, \) γυνώσκοντα \( \alpha \ φ' \) \( \ ο\ ν \ χρηματιστεύον \ καὶ \ πότε \ καὶ \ πώς \ καὶ \ μέχρι \ πότε. \)

100. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 3. 17, p. 655 P. 237 S., καὶ ἡ Κλεάνθους δὲ τοῦ Στωικοῦ φιλοσόφου ποιητική ὄδε πῶς τὰ ὁμοία γράφει

\begin{equation}
\mu \ ν \ Πρός \ δόξαν ὅρα, ἐθέλων σοφὸς αἴσθῃς γενέσθαι, \\
μηδε φοβοῦ πολλῶν ἀκρίτων καὶ ἀναιδέαι δόξαν. \\
οὔ γάρ πλήθος ἔχει συνετὴν κρίσιν οὔτε δικαίαν \\
oὔτε καλὴν, ὀλύνοις δὲ παρ' ἀνδράσι τούτῳ κεν εὖροις.
\end{equation}

Clement also quotes an anonymous comic fragment to the same effect:—\( \text{αἰσχρὸν} \ δὲ \ κρίνειν \ τὰ \ καλὰ \ τῷ \ πολλῷ \ ψόφῳ. \) Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 326 says:—“hätte auch er (Kleanthes) den sensus communis, die \( \κοιναὶ \) \( \ęννοιαί \) oder \( \προλήψεις \) gebilligt, wie konnte er dann so wegwerfend und verächtlich über das allgemeine Laienurteil aburteilen?” He concludes therefore that Cleanthes threw over altogether the Stoic concession to
rationalism implied in the doctrine of ὀρθὸς λόγος and προλήψεις, but see Introd. pp. 39, 40. Cf. generally Cic. Tusc. iii. 3, 4.

δόξαν: this is changed to βάξιν by Meineke, who is followed by Wachsmuth, and Cludius is reported as suggesting ἀλογον for ἄκριτου. The reason given for the change by Wachsmuth is that δόξαν “male coniungitur cum ἄκριτον,” presumably because δόξα implies κρίσις, but surely the words may mean “undiscriminating opinion” as explained by the next line. The text is confirmed by M. Aurel. iv. 3, τὸ εὑμετάβολον καὶ ἄκριτου τῶν εὐφημείν δοκούντων. Cf. ib. ii. 17.

οὐ...οὐτε...οὔτε, is justified by Homer, II. vi. 450, ἀλλά οὐ μοι Τρώων τόσσον μέλει ἄλγος ὀπίσσω οὔτ' αὐτῆς Ἐκάβης οὔτε Πριάμου ἄνακτος, κ.π.λ. Cf. Soph. Ant. 952.


ἀνελεύθερος πᾶς ὁστίς εἰς δόξαν βλέπει ως δι' παρ' ἐκείνης τευξόμενος καλοῦ τινος.

In Clem. Alex. Protrept. vi. 72, p. 21 S. 61 P., the same two lines are cited as the conclusion of frag. 75, but they are obviously distinct.

δόξαν: for Zeno’s definition, cf. Zeno, frag. 15. Cleanthes wrote a separate treatise περὶ δόξης, from which we may conjecture that the present and the preceding fragments are derived. Introd. p. 52. The Cynics described εὐγενείας τε καὶ δόξας as προκοσμήματα κακίας (Diog. L. vi. 72). The Stoics regarded them as προηγμένα (Diog. L. vii. 106).

κακῶς ἄκουειν κρείσσου ἢ λέγειν κακῶς.

Κλεάνθους. This is taken from Wachsmuth (Comm. ii. p. 8), whose note is as follows:—"Inter ecclesiasticorum scriptorum sententias hic trimeter laudatur ab Antonio Meliss. i. 53 et a Maximo 10, vid. Gregor. Nazianz. carm. p. 157d."

103. Stob. Floril. 42. 2.

κακουργότερον οὕθεν διαβολῆς ἡστὶ πω·
λάθρα γὰρ ἀπατήσασα τὸν πεπεισμένον
μύσος ἀναπλάττει πρὸς τὸν οὐδὲν αἰτίων.

διαβολῆς: defined, ap. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 118, p. 115, 21, εἶναι δὲ τὴν διαβολὴν διάστασιν φαινομένων φίλων ψευδεῖ λόγῳ, and hence, reasoning on the basis that slander is only connected with apparent and not with true friendship, the Stoics declare that the wise man is ἀδιάβολος both in the active and the passive sense (i.e. μὴτε διαβάλλειν μὴτε διαβάλλεσθαι), but their utterances are not consistent on this point: see Zeller, p. 253 n. 6, who in citing passages to the contrary effect fails to notice this discrepancy.

104. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 111, p. 103, 12, ἵκανῳς δὲ καὶ
Κλεάνθης περὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν λόγον ἠρώτησε τοιούτων: πόλις μὲν <εἰ> ἐστὶν οἰκητήριον κατασκεύασμα, εἰς δὲ καταφεύγοντας ἐστὶ δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστεῖον δὴ πόλις ἐστὶν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις οἰκητήριον· ἀστεῖον ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις.

Possibly this belongs to the πολιτικός: Introd. p. 52. Cleanthes has here adopted the syllogistic form
of argument, which occurs so frequently in Zeno’s fragments: see Introd. p. 33. The Cynics’ line of argument is somewhat similar. Diog. L. vi. 72 ou yarp, phσιν (Diogenes), ἀνευ πόλεως ὀφελός τι εἶναι ἀστείον· ἀστείον δὲ ἡ πόλις· νόμον δὲ ἀνευ, πόλεως οὐδὲν ὀφελός· ἀστείον ἀρα ὁ νόμος. Cicero’s definition is as follows, Rep. i. 39, res publica est res populi, populus autem...coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communique sociatus. Cf. Ar. Pol. i. 2. 1253 a 37.

α, inserted by Heeren, who is followed by Wachsm. Meineke omits it and changes δη before πόλις into δ’ η.

105. Seneca Tranq. An. i. 7, promptus compositus-que sequor Zenonem, Cleanthem, Chrysippum: quorum tamen nemo ad rem publicam accessit, nemo non misit.

See on Zeno, frag. 170.

106. Stob. Floril. 4, 90, Κλεάνθης ἐφη τοὺς ἀπαί-δευτοις μόνη τῇ μορφῇ τῶν θηρίων διαφέρειν.

The same occurs in Stob. Ecl. ii. 31. 64, p. 212, 22, where Wachsmuth cites other authorities. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 326, quotes this frag. in support of his theory that Cleanthes refused to admit any inborn intellectual capacity. Zeno declared τὴν ἐγκύκλιον παϊδείαν ἄχρηστον (frag. 167 and note), with which opinion this passage is not necessarily inconsistent, though it probably implies an advance in teaching. See also on frag. 53.


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tà koivà kai periβó̂nta, à δη παράδοξα kai autóî, met' euvkolias dechómenoi tìn àtopìan.


This may be referred to the érwtikì téxh or peri érovòs, Introd. p. 52. See on Zeno, frags. 172 and 173, and cf. Diog. L. vii. 24 (Zeno apoph. 7) laðìh filosòfow èstìn epìdeξios hì dià tòv ótovn.


110. Stob. Floril. 6, 20.

πóthev pot' úra gnèvetai moìxhòn tènon; ek krpìwntos àndròs èn àfrodísiòs.

moìxhòn: for Stoic views on moìcheia, see Zeno, frag. 178. krpìwntos: for this word cf. Buttmann's Lexilogus, s. v. àkostrîsas, E. T. p. 78.

111. Plut. de Aud. Poet. c. 12, p. 33, òthefon ouv' ai paradìoróswes faiÌòs èχòswin, aìs kai Kleaýnthhès èχró- sato kai 'Antissténev̄ thès, à mev k.t.l.....ó de Kleaýnthhès peri tov plòutou,

fìlous te doûnai soûmà t' eìs nóсосus pèsov dànapanaìsi soûsai,
metagráfow ouvòw:
pòrnavs te doûnai soûmà t' eìs nóсосus pèsov dànapanaìs èpivotòsai.

The lines in question are from Eur. El. 428, 9, where
ξένως is read in place of φίλοις. Stob. Floril. 91, 6 quoting the passage has φίλοις.

The ordinary view of the school regarded πλούτος as a προηγμένου, and we have seen that Zeno concurred in this (frag. 128). It would be hazardous to infer from evidence of this kind that Cleanthes dissented from his master's opinion on this point: a similar question arises with regard to δόξα (frag. 101), but that word is ambiguous.


For the title of the book see Introd. p. 53. The above is Cobet's text; omitting ὡστε δεδιότας, Wachsmuth reads χαλκοῦ for χαλκόν MSS., and also suggests ἐνίοτε for ἐνίοις, but ἐνίοις implies that the payment was not always exacted, while the article shows that, when made, it was made by all. Similarly Soph. O. T. 107 τοὺς αὐτοέντας χειρὶ τιμωρεῖν τινὰς and Ar. Pac. 832.


For κραντήρες cf. Arist. Hist. An. II. 4. φύονται δὲ οἱ τελευταῖοι τοὺς ἀνθρώποις γόμφιοι, οὓς καλούσι κραντήρας, περὶ τὰ εἰκοσιον ἔτη καὶ ἀνδράσι καὶ γυναιξί. It seems fairly safe to infer that Cleanthes the Stoic is meant, and the account given above is probably more correct than that appearing in Etym. M. p. 742, 35 κατὰ τὴν τοῦ φρονείν ὄραν περὶ τὸ εἰκοστὸν ἔτος, and Melet. ap. Cramer Anecd. Ox. III. 82, 26 τοὺς δὲ μυλύτας τῶν ὄδόντων τινὲς σωφρονιστήρας ἐκάλεσαν διὰ τὸ φύεσθαι περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀρχεσθαι φρονείν τοὺς παῖδας ὄραν. Thus, while the growth of the reasoning powers is complete in the fourteenth year (Zeno, frag. 82), the attainment of σωφροσύνη may well have been assigned to the conclusion of the third ἐβδομάς.


2. Diog. L. vii. 170, καὶ ποτε ἄθροισθεν τὸ κέρμα ἐκόμισεν εἰς μέσον τῶν ἱμωρίμων, καὶ φησί, Κλεάνθης μὲν καὶ ἄλλων Κλεάνθην δύναιτ' ἀν τρέφειν, εἰ βούλοιτο. οἱ δ' ἔχοντες οθὲν τραφῆσονται, παρ' ἐτέρων ἐπιζητοῦσι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, καῖπερ ἀνειμένως φιλοσοφοῦντες. οθὲν δὴ καὶ δευτερος Ἡρακλῆς ὁ Κλεάνθης ἐκαλεῖτο.


7. Diog. L. vii. 171, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐαυτῷ ἐπέπληττεν· ὃν ἀκούσας Ὀρίστων, τίνι, ἐφη, ἐπιπλήττεις; καὶ ὁ γελάσας, πρεσβύτη, φησί, πολιάς μὲν ἔχοντι, νοῦν δὲ μή.

8. Diog. L. vii. 173, Σωσιθέου τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐν θεάτρῳ εἰπόντος πρὸς αὐτὸν παρόντα,

οὕς ἢ Κλεάνθους μωρία βοηλατεῖ,

ἐμείνεν ἐπὶ ταυτὸ σχῆματος. ἐφ᾽ ὡς ἀγασθέντες οἱ ἀκροαταί, τὸν μὲν ἐκρότησαν, τὸν δὲ Σωσιθέου εξέβαλον. μεταγινώσκοντα δὲ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ λοιδορίᾳ προσήκατο, εἰπὼν ἄτοπον εἶναι, τὸν μὲν Διόνυσον καὶ τὸν Ἑρακλέα φλαραμμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ τυχούσῃ βλασφημίᾳ δυσχεραίνειν. Cf. Plut. de Adulat. 11.


11. Cic. Tusc. ii. 60, e quibus (philosophis) homo sane levis Heracleotes Dionysius, cum a Zenone fortis esse didicisset, a dolore dedoecus est. nam cum ex renibus laboraret, ipso in eiulatu clamitabant falsa esse illa, quae antea de dolore ipse sensisset. quem cum Cleanthes condiscipulus rogaret quacnam ratio eum de sententia deduxisset, respondit: quia si, cum tantum operae philosophiae dedissem, dolorem tamen ferre non possem, satis esset argymenti malum esse dolorem. plurimos autem annos in philosophia consumpsi nec ferre possum: malum est igitur dolor. tum Cleanthem, cum pede terram percussisset, versum ex Epigonis ferunt dixisse:

Audisne hacc, Amphiarae, sub terram abdite? Zenonem significabat a quo illum degenerare dolebat.

Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος is mentioned also in Zeno apoph. 52, where see note. For the quotation from the Epigoni, cf. Soph. fr. 194, 195. (Dind.)

3. renibus: but according to Diog. L. vii. 37, 166 and Cic. Fin. v. 94 the disease was ophthalmia.

7. si: inserted by Madv. (on Fin. v. 94), who is followed by the later editors.

12. Stob. Floril. 82, 9 = Ecl. ii. 2. 16, Κλεάνθης ἑρωτῶμενος διὰ τί παρὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους οὐ πολλῶν φιλοσοφισάντων ὁμως πλείους διέλαμψαν ἢ νῦν, ὅτι, εἰπε, τότε μὲν ἔργον ἡσκεῖτο, νῦν δὲ λόγος.

13. Diog. L. vii. 172, μειρακίω ποτὲ διαλεγόμενος ἐπύθετο εἰ αἰσθάνεται τοῦ δ' ἐπινεύσαντος, διὰ τί οὖν, εἰπεν, ἐγὼ οὐκ αἰσθάνομαι ὅτι αἰσθάνει;

The quotation is from Eurip. Orest. 140.

15. Stob. Floril. 33, 8, σιωπῶντος τοῦ Κλεάνθους, ἔπει τις ἔφη, τί σιγᾶς; καὶ μὴν ἦδυ τοὺς φίλους ὀμιλεῖν. ἦδυ, ἔφη, ἀλλ’ ὀσφυπτερ ἦδιον τοσοῦτε μᾶλλον αὐτῶν τοὺς φίλους παραχωρητέον.


πόνος is an ἀδιάφορον (Stob. Eel. π. 7. 5a p. 58, 3. Diog. L. vii. 102), but it may perhaps be inferred from this passage that Cleanthes classed it among the προῃμένα. See on Zeno frag. 128. Antisthenes regarded it as ἄγαθον (Diog. L. vi. 2).

18. Stob. Floril. 95, 28, Κλεάνθης, ἐρωτώμενος πῶς ἦν τὶς εἰπὶ πλούσιος, εἴπεν, εἰ τῶν ἑπιθυμιῶν εἰ ἤπειρη.

APOPHTHEGMATA OF CLEANTHES.


22. Diog. L. vii. 176, καὶ τελευτᾶ τόνδε τοῦ τρόπου· διώδησεν αὐτῷ τὸ οὐλόν· ἀπαγορευσάντων δὲ τῶν ἰατρῶν δύο ἡμέρας ἀπέσχετο τροφῆς. καὶ πῶς ἔσχε καλῶς ὡστε τοὺς ἰατροὺς αὐτῶν πάντα τὰ συνήθη συγχωρεῖν. τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι ἀλλ’ εἰπόντα ἥδη αὐτῷ προῳτοπορῆσθαι καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἀποσχόμενον τελευτῆσαι. Lucian, Macrob. 19, Κλεάνθης δὲ ὁ Ζήνωνος μαθητής καὶ διάδοχος ἐννέα καὶ ἐνενήκοντα οὕτως γεγονὼς ἐτη φύμα ἔσχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους καὶ ἀποκαρτέρων ἐπελθόντων αὐτῷ παρ’ ἐταίρων τινῶν γραμμάτων προσενεγκάμενος τροφὴν καὶ πρᾶξας περὶ ὧν ἤξιον οἱ φίλοι, ἀποσχόμενους αὐθίς τροφῆς ἐξέλιπε τὸν βίον. Stob. Floril. 7, 54, Κλεάνθης υπὸ γλώττης ἐλκους αὐτῷ γενομένου τὴν τροφὴν οὐκ ἐδύνατο παραπέμπειν· ὡς δὲ βάσχο εἴπεν καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς αὐτῷ τροφὴν προσήγαγεν, σὺ δὲ με, ἐφη, βούλει ἥδη τὸ πλέον τής ὦδος κατανύσαντα ἀναστρέφειν, εἶτα πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς τὴν αὐτὴν ἐρχέσθαι· καὶ ἐξῆλθεν τοῦ βίου.
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